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ABSTRACT
The codification of the doctrine of imprévision in France and its
codification attempt in Belgium is a significant turning point given
the historical resistance in both countries towards it. Nevertheless,
the fact that the French and Belgian civil codes had remained silent
on the issue for more than 200 years poses problems of interpretation, in particular, with the regard to requirements to be met in order to trigger imprévision as set forth by new Article 1195 of the
French Civil Code and Draft Article 5.77 of Belgian legislative proposal No. 3709/1 of April 3, 2019. In the absence of a well-established line of cases on the doctrine of imprévision, French and Belgian courts might, however, endeavour to interpret the requirements
for imprévision by analysing it in light of the goals shared by the
French and Belgian reform projects, namely modernisation, legal
certainty and contractual justice. The purpose of this research is to
assess the requirements for imprévision in light of the objectives set
by the legislators, in order to recommend a possible interpretation
of those requirements by French and Belgian courts.
Keywords: France, Belgium, imprévision, hardship, art. 1195, draft
article 5.77, modernisation, legal certainty, contractual justice
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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to become more appealing to foreign companies, more
and more often national legislators aim to create a “businessfriendly” legal environment 1 by making significant changes to their
civil or commercial codes. In this respect, comparative law plays a
key role. It is a source of inspiration for legislators, who are pushed
by globalised and interconnected markets to introduce juridical values into their national legal systems to which they do not traditionally belong. 2
Along the same lines, France and Belgium perceived the need to
update their law of obligations, 3 including the introduction of the
long-awaited doctrine of imprévision 4 within their respective civil
∗ Trainee Lawyer, BonelliErede; LL.M. in International Trade and Investment Law, Maastricht University; LL.M. in Law, Università di Napoli Federico
II. The author would like to thank Alexandru-Daniel On for his support and thorough supervision and Professor Olivier Moréteau for his valuable comments.
1. However, a “business-friendly” legal environment is an essential but insufficient condition. See CCI Paris Ile de France, Droit des affaires : enjeux d’attractivité internationale et de souveraineté (2015), https://perma.cc/EDM6U5MH.
2. E. Ciongaru, Influence of globalisation on the law systems, 8 AGORA
INT’L J. JURID. SCI. 24 (2014).
3. The need for modernisation of French contract law was perceived especially after the publication of the Doing Business reports by the World Bank between 2004 and 2006. These documents highlighted the drawbacks of French contract law with regards to its effects on business. France was only ranked fortyfourth for ease of doing business, since French law was considered economically
inefficient, complex, unpredictable, and not being very attractive as opposed to
common law systems. These reports had the effect of “electroshocks” to the
French legal community. The initial reaction from French scholars was highly
critical, in particular for what concerns the methodology employed by the World
Bank in ranking the different legal systems. Nevertheless, these reports were also
constructive, as they sparked a public debate in France about the economic efficiency of law and, as proved by their direct reference within the Report to the
President of the Republic accompanying the reform project, played a role in the
modernisation of the French Civil Code. For the reaction of the French legal community, see ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT DES AMIS DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE
FRANÇAISE, 1 LES DROITS DE TRADITION CIVILISTE EN QUESTION : À PROPOS DES
RAPPORTS DOING BUSINESS DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE (SLC 2006); B. FauvarqueCosson & A. J. Kerhuel, Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions to
the Doing Business World Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of the Law,
57 AM. J. COMP. L. 811 (2009).
4. According to the French doctrinal literature, the theory of imprévision
(often defined as “hardship” in common law jurisdictions) is the theory of
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codes. In France, this desire for reform resulted in Ordinance no.
2016-131 of February 10, 2016, 5 which enshrined the doctrine of
imprévision in the new article 1195 of the Civil Code. In Belgium,
it resulted in legislative proposal no. 3709/1 of 3 April 2019 6 (which
is yet to be approved by the Parliament) to insert Book 5 “Obligations” into the new Civil Code, including draft article 5.77 on imprévision.
On the one hand, the introduction of articles expressly regulating
changed circumstances in the French and—if the reform project is
approved—the Belgian civil codes is to be welcomed, as these two
bodies of laws had remained silent on the issue for more than 200
years. On the other hand, the absence of a well-established line of
cases on this legal issue calls for a hermeneutic effort from French
and Belgian courts, especially in the interpretation of the several
conditions triggering imprévision under article 1195 and draft article
5.77. French and Belgian judges might, however, endeavour to
changed circumstances: it refers to situations where performance of the contract
becomes extremely difficult or much more onerous, without being impossible, as
a result of unforeseeable circumstances subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, which disrupt the balance of the contract. See, on this point, J. GHESTIN ET
AL., TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL : LES EFFETS DU CONTRAT 310-311 (L.G.D.J. 1994);
P. Ancel, Imprévision, 1 RÉP. DE DR. CIV. 1 (2017). In such scenarios, judges are
granted the power to intervene in the contractual sphere in order to provide the
aggrieved party with a contractual remedy to cope with the unforeseeable circumstance. This intervention may take the form of renegotiations imposed upon the
parties, revision of the contract, or termination.
Common law jurisdictions deal with changed circumstances under the doctrine of
“frustration of purpose”: frustration occurs when, due to an unforeseen event, performance of the contract produces a radically different result from what the parties
anticipated when the contract was signed; however, unlike the doctrine of imprévision, this doctrine does not allow for renegotiation and judicial revision of the
contract. It only allows for its termination.
5. Ordonnance no. 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit
des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations, JORF no. 0035,
Feb. 11, 2016. The ordinance came into force on Oct. 1, 2016. As required, it was
ratified by the parliament through Act no. 2018-287, Apr. 20, 2018, JORF no.
0093, Apr. 21, 2018, which entered into force on Oct. 1, 2018 [hereinafter, the
French Revision of 2016].
6. Proposition de loi portant insertion du livre 5 “Les obligations” dans le
nouveau Code civil, no. 3709/001, Chambre, 6e session de la 54e législature (Proposition de loi, no. 3709/001) [hereinafter, the Belgian Draft of 2019],
https://perma.cc/FD9Q-83JZ.
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interpret the requirements for imprévision by analysing it in light of
the goals of the reform projects. Indeed, the French and Belgian reforms are driven by the same goals of modernisation, legal certainty,
and contractual justice. 7
Both countries intended to modernise their civil codes through a
comparative look at foreign law and international and European projects for the harmonisation of the law of contract, particularly the
Principles of European Contract Law, 8 the Draft European Common
Frame of Reference 9 and the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts. 10 With regard to imprévision, the internal resistance to this doctrine caused France and Belgium to be the main
exceptions to a well-established trend in Europe towards the recognition of the duty to renegotiate and the possibility for the courts to
adapt the contract in the event of changed circumstances. 11 The legislators of both countries acknowledged this isolation from the rest
of Europe and presented it as one of the reasons to modernise their
civil codes by welcoming the theory of imprévision. Indeed, in the
Report to the President of the Republic, it is stated that “France is
one of the last countries in Europe not to recognize the theory of
imprévision as a moderating cause of the binding force of the contract.” 12 Similarly, the Belgian Draft of 2019 highlights that this

7. For France, see Rapport au Président de la République relatif à l’ordonnance no. 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du
régime général et de la preuve des obligations, JORF no. 0035, Feb. 11, 2016
[hereinafter Rapport au Président]; for Belgium, see Belgian Draft of 2019, supra
note 6.
8. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (2010) [hereinafter, PECL].
9. DRAFT EUROPEAN COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (Sellier 2009) [hereinafter, DCFR].
10. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts [hereinafter, PICC].
11. R. M. URIBE, THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE
BINDING FORCE OF CONTRACTS 191 (Intersentia 2011).
12. Rapport au Président, supra note 7: “La France est l’un des derniers pays
d’Europe à ne pas reconnaître la théorie de l'imprévision comme cause modératrice de la force obligatoire du contrat.”
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juridical concept is present in all modern legislations and the abovementioned harmonisation projects. 13
Updating the Civil Code was also necessary to provide legal certainty, the main issue being the development of French and Belgian
civil law outside their respective civil codes. As for France, the legislator acknowledged that “the current texts do not allow for an understanding of positive law, as the courts have had to interpret them,
by analogy, a contrario, or even contra legem.” 14 However, “jurisprudence is inherently fluid, and does not provide the legal certainty
which only a written law can offer.” 15 The Belgian Draft of 2019 is
also aimed at “improving legal certainty,” 16 considering that it is no
longer possible to claim that “positive law, as it is applied in practice, is found within the Code.” 17 This is particularly visible in the
above-mentioned draft article 5.77, where the inclusion of a provision on imprévision is justified by the need to establish sécurité juridique with regard to the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation,
which tends to accept it gradually. 18 It is evident that the French and
Belgian legislators feared the confusion created by the numerous
judgements interpreting, and sometimes contradicting, the wording
of their civil codes, and therefore decided to enact clear rules to prevent the creation of law outside of them. 19
13. See Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art.
5.77.
14. Rapport au Président, supra note 7: “les textes actuels ne permettent pas
d’appréhender le droit positif, tant la jurisprudence a dû les interpréter, par analogie, a contrario, voire contra legem.”
15. See id.: “la jurisprudence est par essence fluctuante, et ne permet pas d’assurer la sécurité juridique que seul peut offrir un droit écrit.”
16. See Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Resumé.
17. See id., Introduction: “on ne peut plus prétendre que le droit positif, tel
qu’il est appliqué dans la pratique actuelle, se trouve dans le Code.”
18. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art. 5.77.
19. For France, see S. Rowan, The New French Law of Contract, 66 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 807-808 (2017): “To read the Civil Code therefore did not give a clear
or precise picture of the French law of contract”; for Belgium, see P. Wéry, Mutations et défis du nouveau droit belge des obligations, 60 REVUE DE LA FACULTÉ
DE DROIT DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE LIÈGE 223 (2015), where the author refers to the
Belgian Civil Code in these terms: “La façade de l’édifice n’est toutefois plus
qu’un trompe-l’œil. Les pièces intérieures et le mobilier ont été rénovés en profondeur par la doctrine et la jurisprudence.”
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Regarding contractual justice, this is an overall goal of the reforms on the law of obligations, which can also be identified, among
others, in the provisions on imprévision. 20 The introduction of the
theory of imprévision is intended to promote contractual fairness, 21
by allowing courts to correct serious contractual imbalances that
arise during its execution. The proliferation of long-term contracts
has posed problems in this respect. These contracts are more likely
to be affected by the instability of economic conditions over time. 22
In the absence of code provisions allowing for contract termination
and/or adaptation, commercial parties who did not include specific
clauses regulating the case of supervening circumstances into their
contract bear the risk “to be stuck with 300-year-old contract terms
stipulating prices in a currency that had long ceased to exist.” 23
The purpose of this research is to provide a critical analysis of
the requirements triggering imprévision under the new article 1195
of the French Civil Code and draft article 5.77 of the Belgian Draft
of 2019, in light of the objectives set by the legislators. The following section will introduce the juridical context preceding the French
and Belgian reform of the law of contract, a context of resistance
and sometimes outright rejection of the doctrine of imprévision
(Section II). Then, the article will look into the conditions for
20. For France, see the Rapport au Président, supra note 7, which refers to
the justice contractuelle as an explicit objective of the French Revision of 2016.
The Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, although not specifically, does the same
by stating the goal of modernising “the balance between party autonomy and the
role of the judge as guardian of the interests of the weaker party. . . .” (author’s
translation). The latter goal is pursued, among others, by allowing courts to adapt
the contract in the event of changed circumstances (Draft art. 5.77). Moreover,
Draft art. 5.77 is inspired by French law, where the inclusion of the power of
courts to adapt the contract is justified on grounds of contractual fairness.
21. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7; see also D. Philippe, L’introduction de l’imprévision en droit belge, in HET BURGERLIJK RECHT IN BEWEGING / LE
DROIT CIVIL EN MOUVEMENT : JAARBOEK DAG VAN DE BEDRIJFSJURIST 2018 - ANNUAIRE JOURNÉE DU JURISTE D’ENTREPRISE 2018 (M. Beyens ed., Uitgeverij Larcier 2018).
22. Rowan, supra note 19, at 820.
23. T. Lutzi, Introducing Imprévision into French Contract Law: A Paradigm
Shift in Comparative Perspective, in THE FRENCH CONTRACT LAW REFORM: A
SOURCE OF INSPIRATION? 98 (S. Stijns & S. Jansen eds., Intersentia 2016).
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imprévision, which will be assessed in relation to the above-mentioned goals of modernisation (Section III), legal certainty (Section
IV) and contractual justice (Section V), respectively. This analysis
will be then followed by a conclusion on the recommended interpretation of those requirements by French and Belgian courts.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPRÉVISION FROM THE
CODE NAPOLÉON TO THE REFORM PROJECTS OF THE FRENCH AND
BELGIAN CIVIL CODES
A. The Historical Resistance to Imprévision in France and Belgium
After the publication of the Code Napoléon in 1804, French
courts adopted different approaches towards imprévision. On the
one hand, administrative courts have been more open, as they have
recognised the possibility to grant relief to parties affected by
changed circumstances. 24 On the other hand, the openness of administrative courts has been countered with the rejection of this doctrine
by civil courts. Furthermore, within the latter, the more lenient approach of lower courts has been strongly opposed and overturned by
the Cour de cassation. 25
Administrative courts started to consider changed circumstances
as of the famous judgement rendered by the Conseil d’Etat in the
Gaz de Bordeaux case of 1916. 26 The court considered the price increase affecting a concession contract to be exceptional and therefore granted partial indemnity to the aggrieved party, in order to ensure the continuity of public services. 27 Even though the remedy was
not the adaptation of the contract, this judgement laid the foundation

24. E. HONDIUS & C. GRIGOLEIT, UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROCONTRACT LAW 147 (Cambridge U. Press 2011); Ancel, supra note 4, at
para. 18.
25. HONDIUS & GRIGOLEIT, supra note 24, at 147-48.
26. CE 30 Mar.1916, Cie générale d’éclairage de Bordeaux c/ Ville de Bordeaux, Rec. Lebon 59928.
27. HONDIUS & GRIGOLEIT, supra note 24, at 147.
PEAN
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for the power of administrative judges to remedy unforeseen circumstances. 28
On the civil side, the silence of the Code Napoléon (and of its
preparatory works) on the impact of changed circumstances on the
contract urged civil courts to clarify the question. 29 Despite the attempts of some lower courts to revise contracts whose balance had
been disrupted, 30 the Cour de cassation repeatedly denied this possibility.31 The rejection of the theory of imprévision was explicit in
the Canal de Craponne case of 1876, where the Cour de cassation
stated that “under no circumstances is it for the courts, however fair
their decision may appear to them to be, to take into account the time
and the circumstances in order to substitute new terms for those
which have been freely accepted by the contracting parties.” 32 The
decision was grounded in the principle of the binding force of the
contract enshrined in the then article 1134 of the French Civil Code
(now article 1103 33). This article embodies the principle of pacta
28. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 18. The Conseil d’État confirmed this position in its future jurisprudence, where it also specified the conditions of application: CE 8 Feb. 1918, Sté d’éclairage de Poissy, RD publ. 1918.244, concl. Corneille; CE 27 June 1919, Sté du gaz et de l’électricité de Nice c/ Ville de Nice, S.
1920.3.25, note M. Hauriou; CE 3 Dec. 1920, Fromassol, RD publ. 1921.80,
concl. Corneille; CE 25 Nov. 1921, Cie générale des automobiles postales c/ État,
S. 1923.3.33, note M. Hauriou; CE 25 Nov. 1921; 2 Mar. 1923; Feb. 29, Mar. 28,
Jun. 18 and Aug. 8, 1924 ; Jan. 23, 1925, DP 1925.3.17, note Closset; CE May 8,
1925, Compagnies réunies de gaz et d’électricité c/ Ville de Bordeaux; CE Mar.
27, 1926, Ville de Montfort-l’Amaury, DP 1927.3.17, note Closset; CE Dec. 9,
1932, Cie des tramways de Cherbourg, DP 1933.3.17, note Pelloux; CE 22 June
1934, Cie continentale du gaz, DH 1934.448.
29. Id.
30. Rouen, 9 Feb. 1844, DP 1845. 2. 4; Douai, 3 May 1851, DP 1854. 2. 130;
Grenoble, 18 Aug. 1854, PD 1855. 2. 78; Paris, 26 May 1854, three judgements,
DP 1854. 2. 129; Rouen, 3 June 1854, DP 1854. 2. 131.
31. Cass. Civ., 9 Jan. 1856, PD 1856.1.33, seven judgments; Cass. Civ., 14
May 1872, S. 1873.1.224; Cass. Civ., 24 Mar.1874, S. 1874.1.429. Although these
judgements do not reject in principle the theory of imprévision, they do it implicitly by refusing to revise the contract due to events making performance more
onerous, on the assumption that these events fall short of constituting a situation
of force majeure, and therefore cannot be taken into account.
32. Cass. Civ., Mar. 6, 1876, Canal de Craponne, D. 1876.1.193, available
in English at H. G. BEALE ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONTRACT
LAW 1131 (Hart Publ’g 2010).
33. “Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont
faits.”
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sunt servanda, according to which legally formed agreements have
the force of law between the parties, who must respect them and
abide by whatever has been promised in them. 34 It is believed that
the drafters of the Civil Code, given the historical precedents, could
not have disregarded the issue, and deliberately refrained from allowing any exception to article 1134. 35 The Cour de cassation has
been uncompromising in rejecting imprévision at least until the early
1990s. 36 French scholars, in turn, had not yet analysed the question
of hardship at the time of this judgement, as the term imprévision is
not found in the works of any commentator. 37 This is evidenced by
the fact that the Canal de Craponne case did not arouse attention
among scholars, until the aftermath of World War I. 38
In Belgium, the history of the judicial and doctrinal developments of the theory of imprévision is very similar to the French
one. 39 Unlike France, in Belgium there is no recognition of this theory in administrative cases, as the Conseil d’État is not competent
to deal with public contracts. 40 However, the Cour de cassation has
recognised that some form of the theory of imprévision applies to
public procurement contracts. 41 On the other hand, just like in
34. Rowan, supra note 19, at 813; H. van Houtte, Changed Circumstances
and Pacta Sunt Servanda, in TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 107-109 (E. Gaillard ed., ICC Publ. 1993).
35. J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL. LES BIENS. LES OBLIGATIONS 1075 (PUF
2004).
36. Ancel, supra note 4, at paras. 24-25. Cass. Civ., 15 Nov. 1933, Gaz. Pal.
1934.1.68; Cass. Com., 18 Jan. 1950, D. 1950.227; Cass. Soc., 8 March 1972, no.
71-40.429, D. 1972.340; Cass. Com., 18 Dec. 1979, no. 78-10.763, Bull. civ. IV,
no. 339; Cass. Civ. 3, 14 Oct. 1987, no. 85-18.132, Bull. civ. III, no. 169.
37. Ancel, supra note 4, at paras. 14 and 16. Changed circumstances are analysed, yet without mentioning the term imprévision, only by Larombière. See L.
LAROMBIÈRE, 4 THÉORIE ET PRATIQUE DES OBLIGATIONS, OU COMMENTAIRE DES
TITRES III ET IV, LIVRE III DU CODE CIVIL, ART. 1101 À 1386 (Pedone-Lauriel
1885).
38. Id. at para. 16.
39. HONDIUS & C. GRIGOLEIT, supra note 24, at 156.
40. Id. at 157.
41. P. VAN OMMESLAGHE & H. DE PAGE, 2 TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL BELGE :
LES OBLIGATIONS 824 (Bruylant 2013). However, while in France the doctrine has
been recognised autonomously by administrative courts, in Belgium the decision
of the Cour de cassation was based on the general terms on public works; J.
HERBOTS, CONTRACT LAW IN BELGIUM 185 (Kluwer 1995).
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France, the absence of civil code provisions taking into account
changed circumstances led the Belgian Cour de cassation to reject
the possibility for courts to revise the contract in the event of hardship, based on the principle of the binding force of the contract enshrined in article 1134 42 of the Belgian Civil Code. 43 The majority
of Belgian doctrine has traditionally supported the Cour de cassation in the rejection of the doctrine of imprévision. 44 However, a
movement in favour of its acceptance was formed around the
1980s. 45 Despite the development of this doctrinal trend, the Cour
de cassation has maintained, in principle, its position. 46
B. The Slow Erosion of the Principle of the Binding Force of the
Contract: The Attempts of the Legislator, Scholars, and Courts
While the French and the Belgian courts of cassation insisted on
the binding force of the contract to oppose the judicial revision in
case of unforeseen changed circumstances, some exceptions to this

42. “Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les
ont faites.”
43. Cass., 19 May 1921, Pas. 1921, I, 380; Cass., 30 Oct. 1924, Pas. 1924, I,
565. In these two judgements the Cour de cassation made clear that the revision
of the contract was possible only when envisaged by the law (in that case, Law of
Oct. 11, 1919). The rejection in principle of the theory of imprévision is found in
Cass., 14 Apr. 1994, Pas. 1994, I, 365; Cass., 20 Apr. 2006, Pas., 2006, 884. See
VAN OMMESLAGHE & DE PAGE, supra note 41, at 818; C. Biquet-Mathieu, Propos
sur l’imprévision : l’arrét Scafom international et son contexte belge, européen
et international, in MÉLANGES JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN 212-213 (B. Moore ed.,
Editions Yvon Blais 2012).
44. VAN OMMESLAGHE & DE PAGE, supra note 41, at 823-824; P. DE HARVEN, MOUVEMENTS GÉNÉRAUX DU DROIT CIVIL BELGE CONTEMPORAIN: ÉTUDE
CRITIQUE 231 (Bruylant 1928); C. Renard, La théorie de l’imprévision dans les
contrats, 2 REV. DR. INT. COMP. 17 (1950); Y. Hannequart, La portée du contrat,
in 4 LES NOVELLES, DROIT CIVIL 52 (Larcier 1958); X. Dieux, Réflexions sur la
force obligatoire des contrats et sur la théorie de l’imprévision en droit privé,
REV. CRIT. JUR. BELGE 386 (1983); J. Perilleux, La bonne foi dans l’exécution du
contrat. Rapport belge, in ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT, LA BONNE FOI 237 (Litec 1994); C. Delforge, La modification unilatérale du contrat, in LA VOLONTÉ
UNILATÉRALE DANS LE CONTRAT 139 (P. Van Ommeslaghe & J. F. Germain eds.,
Larcier 2008).
45. VAN OMMESLAGHE & DE PAGE, supra note 41.
46. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 36.
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principle were established first in special legislation, then in scholarly writings, and finally in court decisions.
The French and the Belgian legislators intervened with a series
of temporary measures in order to cope with the economic upheavals
caused primarily by the world wars. Courts could terminate specific
contracts concluded before or during the war, provided that the performance had become too onerous for one of the parties. 47 In the
same context, the legislators of both countries went so far as to grant
courts the power to revise contracts in specific situations. 48 Together
with these temporary measures, permanent legislation was enacted
to allow for the judicial revision of contracts in various sectors,
among others, lease contracts, 49 divorce, 50 copyright, 51 and public
works. 52 These provisions demonstrate the lawmakers’ will to create
exceptions to the principle of the sanctity of contracts, in order to
assist certain categories of contractors whose situation is seriously
unbalanced as a result of major changes in society. 53
47. For France, see Act of Jan. 21, 1918, Loi Faillot, (DP 1918.4.261). Similarly, after World War II, Act no. 49-547 of Apr. 22, 1949, D.1949.241, allowed
for the termination of successive delivery contracts concluded before Sept. 2,
1939, the execution of which would have generated new expenses for the debtor,
due to the war or the new economic circumstances, exceeding by far what could
have been expected at the time of the conclusion of the contract. For Belgium, see
Act of Oct. 11, 1919, Moniteur belge, Oct. 20, 1919.
48. Particularly, in France judges could delay payment terms (Law of June
29, 1935, DP 1935.4.313) or review the capital and interest terms of the purchaser’s debt (Law of July 17, 1937, DP 1938.4.113). For the temporary measures
taken, since the 1960s, in favour of repatriated French nationals, see Ancel, supra
note 4, at para. 28. For Belgium, Act of Oct. 11, 1919, unlike the Loi Faillot,
empowered courts not only to terminate, but also to revise contracts concluded
before WWI.
49. For Belgium, see art. 7 of the Law of Feb. 16, 1991 on residential leases;
art. 6 of the Law of Apr. 30, 1951 on commercial leases; arts. 17 et seq. of the
Law of Nov. 4, 1969 on leases and leased property. For France see decree no. 53960 of Sept. 30, 1953 on commercial leases; art. 17 et seq. Act no. 89-462 of July
6, 1989 on residential leases.
50. For Belgium see art. 1288 Judicial Code; for France see art. 276 Civil
Code.
51. For France see art. 37 of the Act of Mar. 11, 1957 on Copyright (L.1315 Code of Intellectual Property).
52. For Belgium see art. 16 Cahier général des charges des marchés publics
de travaux.
53. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 28; E. HONDIUS & C. GRIGOLEIT, supra note
24, at 146-147.
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The economic upheavals caused by World War I (shortage of
raw materials, increased prices, and the scarcity of male labour) also
had the effect of sparking the doctrinal debate among civilian scholars with regard to the question of imprévision. 54 They started questioning the destiny of those contracts whose performance had been
made more difficult as a result of the events mentioned. In France,
there was an initial trend 55 in favour of the contractual revision by
courts and against the rigidity of the contract, based on different legal grounds. 56 Later, a doctrinal movement, in line with the solutions
offered by the above-mentioned cases, strongly rejected the theory
on grounds of inviolability of the principle pacta sunt servanda. 57
However, as of the late 1980s, there is a re-emergence of post-WWI
ideas in the French civil doctrine. The reappraisal of the theory of
imprévision is due to considerations of solidarity and contractual
justice 58: the key is the third paragraph of (the then) article 1134 of
the French Civil Code, which imposes on the parties a duty to perform agreements in good faith and which would justify the judicial
54. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 17.
55. A. LOUVEAU, THÉORIE DE L’IMPRÉVISION EN DROIT CIVIL ET EN DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (Impr. de F. Simon 1920); L. FYOT, ESSAI D’UNE JUSTIFICATION
NOUVELLE DE LA THÉORIE DE L’IMPRÉVISION À L’ÉGARD DES CONTRATS PORTANT
SUR DES OBJETS AUTRES QU’UNE SOMME D’ARGENT (Impr. veuve Paul Berthier
1921); P. VOIRIN, DE L’IMPRÉVISION DANS LES RAPPORTS DE DROIT PRIVÉ (Ancienne impr. Vagner 1922); A. BRUZIN, ESSAI SUR LA NOTION D’IMPRÉVISION ET
SUR SON RÔLE EN MATIÈRE CONTRACTUELLE (Impr. J. Prély 1922); J. E. GUEULETTE, DES EFFETS JURIDIQUES DE LA GUERRE SUR LES CONTRATS (Jouve 1918);
J. RADOUANT, DU CAS FORTUIT ET DE LA FORCE MAJEURE (Rousseau 1920); S.
Serbesco, Effets de la guerre sur l’exécution des contrats, RTD CIV. 329 (1917);
L. JOSSERAND, DE L’ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITÉ (Dalloz 1927).
56. Fyot assimilates the situation in which a party cannot perform as a result
of unforeseeable circumstances to the position of the non-performing debtor in
good faith under art. 1150 Civ. Code, which can be ordered to compensate the
creditor, only up to the limit of the foreseeable damages; Josserand refers instead
to implicit will of the parties not to bear the negative consequences of changed
circumstances.
57. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 30. This trend begins in the 1930s.
58. C. Jamin, Révision ou intangibilité du contrat ou la double philosophie
de l’article 1134 du Code civil, DR. ET PATR. 46 (1998); See also M. Cédras, Le
solidarisme contractuel en doctrine et devant la Cour de cassation, in RAPPORT
COUR DE CASSATION 2003 (La documentation française 2004), https://perma.cc
/98TZ-95TV.
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revisions of contracts. 59 This solution is further encouraged by the
fact that provisions allowing for the judicial revision of the contract
were part of both the legislation of other European jurisdictions and
the harmonisation projects of contract law at the European level. 60
Like France, and despite its traditional resistance, the Belgian doctrine has taken, in the last decades, a favourable approach to imprévision, based on arguments of good faith, abuse of rights, and equity. 61
Finally, a mitigation of the principle of the sanctity of contracts
is visible in some relatively recent court decisions. While in France
the traditional approach was attenuated through the concepts of
good faith and cause, 62 in Belgium the theory of the abuse of right
has been adopted. Moreover, the courts of both countries have
recognised the theory of imprévision when faced with international

59. Jamin, supra note 58, at 49, 54-57. See also H. Bouthinon-Dumas, Les
contrats relationnels et la théorie de l’imprévision, 15 REV. INT. DR. ÉCON. 361362 (2001).
60. B. Fauvarque-Cosson, Le changement de circonstances, 1 RDC 67
(2004); B. Fauvarque-Cosson, La réforme du droit français des contrats, perspective comparative, 1 RDC 147 (2006); V. Witz, Force obligatoire et durée du contrat, in LES CONCEPTS CONTRACTUELS FRANÇAIS À L’HEURE DES PRINCIPES DU
DROIT EUROPÉEN DES CONTRATS 175 (P. Rémy-Corlay & D. Fenouillet eds., Dalloz 2003). However, among those in favour of the doctrine of changed circumstances, many oppose the judicial revision of the contract and prefer termination as a remedy: see ex multis P. Malaurie, Petite note sur le projet de réforme
du droit des contrats, 1 JCP G 204 (2008); Y. Lequette, Bilan des solidarismes
contractuels, in ÉTUDES DE DROIT PRIVÉ : MÉLANGES OFFERTS À PAUL DIDIER
273 (J. Azéma et al. eds., Economica 2008); E. Savaux, L’introduction de la révision ou de la résiliation pour imprévision - Rapport français, 1 RDC 1057
(2010).
61. VAN OMMESLAGHE & DE PAGE, supra note 41, at 823; D. PHILIPPE,
CHANGEMENT DE CIRCONSTANCES ET BOULEVERSEMENT DE L’ÉCONOMIE CONTRACTUELLE (Bruylant 1986); D. Philippe, Le point sur… l’imprévision, 126
JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 738 (2007); M. Fontaine, Portée et limites du principe
de la convention-loi, in LES OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTUELLES 190 (X. Dieux ed.,
Édition du jeune barreau 1984).
62. However, after the reform of the French Civil Code in 2016, the concept
of cause is no longer mentioned among the essential conditions for the validity of
a contract. As explained in the Rapport au Président, supra note 7, this decision
followed the criticism by both scholars and practitioners, according to which the
cause represented a factor of legal uncertainty due to the difficulty of giving it a
precise definition.
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sales contracts governed by the CISG. 63 The notion of good faith
has been employed by the commercial chamber of the French Cour
de cassation in order to find an obligation for commercial parties to
renegotiate the contract in case of hardship. 64 The refusal to
renegotiate would constitute a breach of the duty to perform the
contract in good faith, which can be sanctioned with a compensation
payment to the other party. 65 Although the remedy granted is not the
typical relief associated to the theory of imprévision, namely the
revision of the contract, 66 these judgements show the efforts of the
Cour de cassation to consider unforeseeable supervening events
disrupting the contractual balance. However praiseworthy this
approach may be, it did not create a general obligation to renegotiate
the contract in those instances. 67 These decisions, according to some
scholars, “can be explained by the particular circumstances of the
two cases and do not testify to a larger change of paradigm.” 68
Moreover, a later judgement denies the possibility of a shift in the
Cour de cassation’s orientation, by refusing to acknowledge the
existence of a duty to renegotiate in case of hardship, as the
aggrieved party accepts the risk of the transaction. 69 In order to
create an exception to the principle of the binding force of the
contract, the French Cour de cassation also resorted to the concept
63. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980.
64. Cass. Com., 3 Nov. 1992, Huard, pourvoi no. 90-18.547; Cass. Com., 24
Nov. 1998, pourvoi no. 96-18.357.
65. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 97; Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 25.
66. On this point, the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux clarified that even if an
obligation to renegotiate the contract in the event of changed circumstances were
to exist, the failure to renegotiate could not lead to imposing on a party the revision of the contract, “this principle of review for unforeseen circumstances being
constantly rejected by the courts since Mar. 6, 1876”; see Bordeaux, 28 Oct. 2015,
RG no. 14/00668, Gaz. Pal. 26 Apr. 2016, no. 16. Against the use of good faith to
overturn the terms of a contract, see Cass. Civ., 9 Dec. 2009, no. 04-19.923, Bull.
civ. III, no. 275; Cass. Com., 10 Jul. 2007, JCP 2007.II.10154.
67. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 25.
68. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 97. Particularly, the fact the both decisions related
to the distribution industry; see C. Pédamon, The Paradoxes of the Theory of Imprévision in the New French Law of Contract: A Judicial Deterrent?, 112 AMICUS
CURIAE 12 (2019).
69. Cass. Civ., 10 Dec. 2003, no. 02-14.990, unreported.
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of cause. It overturned a decision of the court of appeal to impose a
penalty payment on the company Soffimat for not having performed
its obligation, because the court of appeal had failed to investigate
“whether the evolution of economic circumstances … did not have
the effect … of disequilibrating the general economy of the
contract … and of depriving the obligation [of the defendant] of
every counterpart. . . .” 70 In doing so, the court admitted that the
contractual imbalance brought by changed circumstances could
eventually leave the contract without a valid cause. 71 Again, this
ruling did not pave the way for a jurisprudential recognition of the
theory of imprévision. Not only was the judgement not published in
the official bulletin, but the solution proposed was also overturned
by a later decision of the Cour de cassation. 72 Moreover, after the
reform of 2016 the same solution could not be applied anyway
because the concept of cause was removed as an essential element
for the validity of the contract. 73 Turning to Belgium, while, on the
one hand, the Cour de cassation rejected the use of good faith to
overturn the terms of a contract, 74 on the other hand, it employed the
concept of abuse of right in order to interfere with a pre-divorce
agreement, in spite of the pacta sunt servanda principle. The Cour
de cassation considered that the wife had committed abuse of rights
by continuing to demand the performance of the agreement, as it had
become disproportionate to the evolved economic situation of the
parties, and thus released the husband from the payment of
alimony. 75 It is noteworthy that in abolishing the alimony, the Cour
70. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 97; Cass. Com., 29 June 2010, Soffimat, pourvoi
no. 09-67.369, D. 2010, 2481.
71. Lutzi, supra note 23; Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 26.
72. Ancel, supra note 4; Cass. Com., 18 Mar. 2014, no. 12-29.453, D. 2014,
1915, where the Cour de cassation held that the existence of the cause must be
assessed at the moment of contract formation and therefore changing economic
circumstances disrupting the balance of the contract do not make its cause disappear.
73. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 97; Ordonnance no. 2016-131 du 10 février 2016,
art. 1128.
74. Cass., 20 Apr. 2006, Pas., 2006, 884.
75. Cass., 14 Oct. 2010, no. C.09.0608.F/1.
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de cassation contradicted its previous jurisprudence on abuse of
rights, 76 where the remedy had been the reduction of the right, rather
than its suppression. 77 While some 78 believe that the absence of
judicial revision undermines the relevance of this judgement, as it
sets an important distinction between the mechanisms of abuse of
rights and imprévision, others 79 argue that this decision might have
accepted some kind of modification of the contract as a sanction for
the abuse of rights. Lastly, in addition to the developments regarding
internal contracts, the French and Belgian courts of cassation were
openly receptive of imprévision when faced with international sales
contracts governed by the CISG. 80 The CISG does not expressly
regulate hardship, and it is debated whether a party affected by
changed circumstances may find relief under the Convention. 81 It is
even more debated whether the regulation of the remedies to be
granted in case of hardship constitutes an internal gap in the
Convention, which, under article 7.2 CISG, can be filled through the
general principles on which the CISG is based. 82 Nevertheless, the
courts did not hesitate to answer positively to both questions and to
resort to the hardship provisions of the PICC 83 in order to fill the
alleged gap and find, at least, a duty to renegotiate in the event of
changed circumstances.
76. Cass., 11 June 1992, Pas., 1992, I, 898.
77. Biquet-Mathieu, supra note 43, at 216.
78. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 36.
79. Biquet-Mathieu, supra note 43, at 218. In this regard, the author highlights that the Cour de cassation, differently from its previous jurisprudence, does
not mention the prohibition for the judge to amend the content of an agreement.
See also Philippe, supra note 21.
80. For France, see Cass. Com., 17 Feb. 2015, Dupiré Invicta v. Gabo, nos.
12-29550, 13-18956, and 13-20230; for Belgium, see Cass, 19 June 2009, Scafom
International BV v. Lorraine Tubes SAS, no. C.07.0289.N.
81. See, on this point, L. Di Matteo, Contractual Excuse under CISG: Impediment, Hardship and the Excuse Doctrines, 27 PACE INT. LAW REV. (2015).
82. See Dewez et al., The Duty to Renegotiate an International Sales Contract under CISG in Case of Hardship and the Use of the UNIDROIT Principles,
19 EUR. REV. PRIV. LAW 101-154 (2001); S. Slater, Overcome by Hardship: The
Inapplicability of the Unidroit Principles’ Hardship Provisions to CISG, 12 FLA.
J. INT’L L. 231 (1998).
83. Arts. 6.2.2, 6.2.3 PICC.

210

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

C. The Regulation of Imprévision Under the New Article 1195 and
Draft Article 5.77
Eventually, the legislative openness towards imprévision resulted in the French Revision of 2016, 84 introducing the new article
1195 in the French Civil Code, and in the Belgian Draft of 2019,
proposing to insert Book 5 “Obligations” in the Belgian Civil Code
and in particular draft article 5.77. Both of these provisions allow
contractual parties to request the judicial revision of the contract in
case of changed circumstances, should the attempts to renegotiate
the contractual terms fail.
Article 1195 of the French Civil Code85 reads as follows:
If a change of circumstances that was unforeseeable at the
time of the conclusion of the contract renders performance
excessively onerous for a party who had not accepted the risk
of such a change, that party may ask the other contracting
party to renegotiate the contract. The first party must continue to perform his obligations during renegotiation.
In the case of refusal or the failure of renegotiations, the parties may agree to terminate the contract from the date and on
the conditions which they determine, or by a common agreement ask the court to set about its adaptation. In the absence
of an agreement within a reasonable time, the court may, on
the request of a party, revise the contract or put an end to it,
from a date and subject to such conditions as it shall
84. This revision was preceded by the Avant-projet de réforme du droit des
obligations, 2005, (Projet Catala), the Projet de réforme du droit des contrats,
2008, Ministère de la Justice (Avant-projet de la Chancellerie) and by the Projet
Terré, 2013. While the first two envisaged only the power of the aggrieved party
to terminate the contract in the event of hardship, the latter provided for judicial
revision.
85. Art. 1195 C. civ. :
Si un changement de circonstances imprévisible lors de la conclusion du
contrat rend l’exécution excessivement onéreuse pour une partie qui
n’avait pas accepté d’en assumer le risque, celle-ci peut demander une
renégociation du contrat à son cocontractant. Elle continue à exécuter ses
obligations durant la renégociation.
En cas de refus ou d’échec de la renégociation, les parties peuvent convenir de la résolution du contrat, à la date et aux conditions qu’elles déterminent, ou demander d’un commun accord au juge de procéder à son
adaptation. A défaut d’accord dans un délai raisonnable, le juge peut, à
la demande d’une partie, réviser le contrat ou y mettre fin, à la date et
aux conditions qu’il fixe.
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determine. 86
The French provision revolves around three conditions: (1) there
must be a change of circumstances which was unforeseeable at the
moment of the conclusion of the contract; (2) it must render the performance excessively onerous for one party; (3) this party must have
not agreed to bear that risk. 87 As for the effects of imprévision, the
new article 1195 confers upon the aggrieved party the right to request the renegotiation of the agreement. Judicial intervention is an
option of last resort, which can be triggered only if the renegotiations fail or do not take place at all, and if the parties do not reach
an agreement to terminate the contract. Under such circumstances,
parties may either ask the court to adapt the contract by agreement
or individually request the court to terminate or adapt the contract.
On the other hand, the Belgian provision on imprévision, which
is allegedly based on French law, diverges from the latter in some
aspects. Draft article 5.77 88 provides that:
86. J. Cartwright et al., The New Provisions of the Code civil Created by Ordonnance no. 2016-131 of 10 February 2016, translated into English, available
at https://perma.cc/D3GN-26QZ; see also M. SÉJEAN, FRENCH CIVIL CODE, ENGLISH - FRENCH - ARABIC (LexisNexis 2020).
87. C. Pédamon, The New French Contract Law and Its Impact on Commercial Law: Good Faith, Unfair Contract Terms and Hardship, in THE FUTURE OF
THE COMMERCIAL CONTRACT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND LAW REFORM 120 (M. Heidemann & J. Lee eds., Springer 2018).
88. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.77:
Chaque partie doit exécuter ses obligations quand bien même l’exécution
en serait devenue plus onéreuse, soit que le coût de l’exécution ait augmenté, soit que la valeur de la contre-prestation ait diminué.
Toutefois, le débiteur peut demander au créancier de renégocier le contrat en vue de l’adapter ou d’y mettre fin lorsque les conditions suivantes
sont réunies:
1° un changement de circonstances rend excessivement onéreuse l’exécution du contrat de sorte qu’on ne puisse raisonnablement l’exiger;
2° ce changement était imprévisible lors de la conclusion du contrat;
3° ce changement n’est pas imputable au débiteur;
4° le débiteur n’a pas assumé ce risque; et
5° la loi ou le contrat n’exclut pas cette possibilité.
Les parties continuent à exécuter leurs obligations pendant la durée des
renégociations.
En cas de refus ou d’échec des renégociations dans un délai raisonnable,
le juge peut, à la demande de l’une ou l’autre des parties, adapter le contrat afin de le mettre en conformité avec ce que les parties auraient raisonnablement convenu au moment de la conclusion du contrat si elles
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Each party must fulfil his or her obligations even when the
execution has become more onerous, either because the cost
of the execution has increased, or because the value of the
counter-performance has decreased.
However, the debtor may request the creditor to renegotiate
the contract in order to adapt or terminate it when the following conditions are met:
(1) a change of circumstances makes the performance of the
contract excessively onerous so that no one may reasonably
demand it;
(2) the change was unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract;
(3) the change is not attributable to the debtor;
(4) the debtor has not assumed that risk; and
(5) the law or the contract does not exclude this possibility.
The parties continue to perform their obligations during the
renegotiations. In the event of refusal or failure of the renegotiations after a reasonable time, the judge may, at the request of either party, adapt the contract in order to bring it in
line with what the parties would have reasonably agreed at
the time of conclusion of the contract if they had taken into
account the change of circumstances, or terminate the contract in whole or in part from a date that cannot be prior to
the change of circumstances and according to conditions
fixed by the judge. The action is formed and instructed according to the forms of summary proceedings. 89
As for the requirements to be met in order to trigger the Belgian
provision, it is also required, unlike in article 1195, that the change
of circumstances not be attributable to the aggrieved party. The
commentary to draft article 5.77 explains that this requirement must
be read together with draft article 5.299, 90 which defines attributability by linking it to the concept of fault. 91 Moreover, the condition
that “the law or the contract does not exclude this possibility” introduced by draft article 5.77, although not expressly specified in
avaient tenu compte du changement de circonstances, ou mettre fin au
contrat en tout en partie à une date qui ne peut être antérieure au changement de circonstances et selon des modalités fixées par le juge. L’action
est formée et instruite selon les formes du référé.
89. Translated by the author.
90. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art. 5.77.
91. Id. at art. 5.299.
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article 1195, is also a feature of the latter provision. In particular, the
reference to the “law” excluding the possibility to apply draft article
5.77 simply refers to those special legal provisions, such as article
1474/1 of the Belgian Civil Code on equitable judicial review,
which shall prevail over it. 92 By the same token, article 1773 of the
French Civil Code excludes in principle any revision of fixed-price
contracts. 93 As for the possibility that “the contract” excludes the
applicability of draft article 5.77, it refers to the non-mandatory nature of the provision on imprévision, which is also a feature of the
new article 1195. In fact, the comment on article 1195 enshrined in
the Report to the President of the Republic states that parties may
derogate from it.
As to the effects of imprévision, similarly to article 1195, draft
article 5.77 allows the aggrieved party to request renegotiations, and
only as a last resort grants both parties the possibility to ask the judge
either to adapt or terminate the contract.
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF IMPRÉVISION IN LIGHT OF THE GOAL OF
MODERNISATION
The reform projects of the French and Belgian Civil Codes feature a repeated imperative: to modernise. This expression is found
several times both in the Report to the President of the Republic on
the French Revision of 2016 and in the Belgian Draft of 2019. Modernisation is sometimes stated as an independent and overriding
goal, 94 whereas in other passages of those instruments it is described
as the means to achieve other objectives, in particular the protection

92. Id. at art. 5.77.
93. Ancel, supra note 4, at paras. 107-108.
94. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7: “La présente ordonnance est
prise en application de l’article 8 de la loi no. 2015-177 du 16 février 2015 relative
à la modernisation et à la simplification du droit et des procédures dans les domaines de la justice et des affaires intérieures.” See also Belgian Draft of 2019,
supra note 6, Resumé: “Cette proposition vise à moderniser le droit des obligations.”
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of the weaker party. 95 However, this raises the question regarding
the meaning of the modernization of the law of obligations. Both
proposals emphasise the fact that large parts of the Civil Code have
not been modified in more than two centuries and that this triggered
the intervention of courts, which distanced themselves from the
wording of the code in order to adapt it to the changing reality.
Hence, there is the need to codify the solutions developed by the
courts. 96 Consequently, it seems that modernisation, at least in part,
has been perceived by the French and Belgian legislators as keeping
up with the evolution of jurisprudence. This is visible in the incorporation of many jurisprudential rules regarding, for instance,
framework contracts, lapse, unjustified enrichment (articles 1111,
1186, and 1303 of the French Civil Code, respectively), 97 partial

95. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7: “Il est donc apparu nécessaire …
de le moderniser, pour faciliter son accessibilité et sa lisibilité, tout en conservant
l’esprit du code civil, à la fois favorable à un consensualisme propice aux
échanges économiques et protecteur des plus faibles.” See also Belgian Draft of
2019, supra note 6, Resumé: “La proposition a pour objectif . . . de moderniser
l’équilibre entre l’autonomie des parties et le rôle du juge en tant que gardien des
intérêts de la partie faible et de l’intérêt général.”
96. For France, see Rapport au Président, supra note 7:
Force est de constater que les textes actuels ne permettent pas d’appréhender le droit positif, tant la jurisprudence a dû les interpréter, par analogie, a contrario, voire contra legem. La compréhension de nombreuses
dispositions passe ainsi nécessairement par la consultation des décisions
rendues par les tribunaux, voire par l’interprétation qu’en fait la doctrine.
Par ailleurs, la jurisprudence est par essence fluctuante, et ne permet pas
d’assurer la sécurité juridique que seul peut offrir un droit écrit. C’est la
raison pour laquelle l’ordonnance prévoit, pour sa majeure partie, une
codification à droit constant de la jurisprudence, reprenant des solutions
bien ancrées dans le paysage juridique français bien que non écrites.
For Belgium, see Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Introduction Générale:
La jurisprudence a, bien entendu, pu assurer une certaine modernisation
du droit des obligations. . . . L’influence de la jurisprudence est à ce point
considérable que le droit belge des obligations s’apparente de plus en
plus au système de Common law. . . . C’est pour ces mêmes raisons que
le ministre de la Justice décida, conformément à l’Accord de gouvernement du 10 octobre 2014, de créer plusieurs Commissions chargées de
réformer le droit civil.
97. B. MERCADAL, RÉFORME DU DROIT DES CONTRATS : ORDONNANCE DU 10
FÉVRIER 2016 26 (Éditions Francis Lefebvre 2016).
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invalidity, defence of non-performance (draft articles 5.66 and 5.313
of the Belgian draft of 2019, respectively). 98
However, even assuming that the codification of the novelties
brought by the jurisprudence fits a definition of “modernisation,”
the reforms at issue do not simply codify the solutions found in judicial decisions, 99 but go so far as to introduce legal concepts such
as the doctrine of imprévision, which not only had never been codified but had also never been recognised by the jurisprudence of the
Cour de cassation. Therefore, it is fair to wonder whether this innovation actually modernises the Civil Code. Does a revision of the
rules governing the law of contracts necessarily account for a modernisation? Certainly, a new code is not per se a modern code.
Whether the new article 1195 of the French Civil Code and draft
article 5.77 of the Belgian Draft of 2019 are in line with the overall
goal of modernisation, again, depends on how one defines the latter.
The reform projects stress the importance to align the French and
Belgian Civil Codes with the law of foreign countries and with the
European and international projects for the harmonisation of contract law. 100 Therefore, the introduction of rules governing changed
circumstances could be deemed to modernise the Civil Code simply
because it follows the footsteps of other domestic jurisdictions and
transnational legal principles. The French Revision of 2016, on the
other hand, also emphasises the need to strengthen the attractiveness
of its law by adapting it to the developments in the globalised

98. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Introduction Générale.
99. See id.: “Les textes proposés ne sont pas une simple codification de la
jurisprudence. . . .”
100. This is particularly remarked when commenting the introduction of imprévision. For Belgium, see Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire
des articles, art. 5.77, “Le changement de circonstances est pris en compte par
toutes les législations modernes (voy. p. ex. art. 89 CESL; art. 1196 C. civ. fr.; art.
313 BGB; art. 6:258 NBW; art. III.1:110 DCFR; art. 6.2 des PICC. . . .).” For
France, see Rapport au Président, supra note 7:“La France est l’un des derniers
pays d’Europe à ne pas reconnaître la théorie de l’imprévision comme cause modératrice de la force obligatoire du contrat. Cette consécration, inspirée du droit
comparé comme des projets d’harmonisation européens. . . .”
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economy. 101 Hence, although this is a general goal of the reform,
which is not expressly stated in the comment to article 1195, one
may wonder whether the introduction of imprévision modernises the
Civil Code in the sense that it reflects the financial and societal
needs of commercial parties. Ultimately, it is unclear if the new provisions on imprévision are meant to update French and Belgian law
in light of national and transnational legal developments or if they
constitute a concrete response to the commercial needs of businesses. 102 In the following paragraphs, the question of the modernisation of the French and Belgian Civil Codes through the introduction of the doctrine of imprévision will be analysed from both points
of view.
A. Modernisation Through Harmonisation
In the first sense in which modernisation can be understood, the
French Report to the President of the Republic makes a vague reference to “comparative law” and to “European harmonisation projects” as the sources of inspiration of the new solution. 103 Along the
same lines, the commentary to draft article 5.77 in the Belgian Draft
of 2019, after having highlighted that all modern legislations take
into account imprévision, lists by way of example several domestic
jurisdictions (France, Germany, the Netherlands) as well as international and European harmonisation projects (Common European
Sales Law, 104 DCFR, PICC). However, it is stated that the Belgian
provision is based particularly on the CESL and French law. 105 If
modernisation is intended to keep up with the legal developments of
other jurisdictions, it is necessary to compare the French and Belgian solutions with those adopted by the national, international, and
European instruments mentioned in the respective reform projects.
101. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7.
102. Pédamon, supra note 68, at 10.
103. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7; Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 41.
104. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on a Common European Sales Law [hereinafter, CESL].
105. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art. 5.77.
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Overall, the idea of judicial intervention to correct a contractual
imbalance, caused by unforeseeable changed circumstances, by
means of revision or termination of the contract reflects a common
trend both in domestic jurisdictions 106 and in international and European instruments. 107 France was, and Belgium still is, one of the
last countries to refuse to apply the theory of imprévision, together
with a number of other legal systems based on the Code Napoléon
(such as Luxemburg and Quebec) and common law jurisdictions.108
Moreover, when it comes to renegotiation, France and Belgium
proved to be one step ahead of other domestic jurisdictions, such as
Germany, Italy, and The Netherlands (among others), that do not
contain such a requirement. 109 Although they are not imposed upon
the parties (as in the CESL, DCFR, and PECL), the French and Belgian provisions attach great importance to renegotiations, as they are
a necessary condition to then be able to request judicial intervention.
For what specifically concerns the conditions for imprévision, if we
exclude the requirement that the change not be attributable to the
aggrieved party (draft article 5.77), 110 the other conditions shared by
the French and Belgian provisions (excessive onerousness of the
106. See these civil codes: The Netherlands (art. 6:258), Germany (§313),
Greece (art. 388), Egypt (art. 147), Turkey (art. 138), Portugal (art. 437), Argentina (old Civil Code) (art. 1198(2)), Bolivia (art. 581−583), Brazil (art. 478−480),
Paraguay (art. 672), Peru (art. 1440−1444), Colombia (art. 868), El Salvador (art.
994), and Guatemala (art. 688). Art. 1467 of the Italian Civil Code deserves a
particular mention: although the provision only allows the aggrieved party to request judicial termination, the other party may avoid termination by offering an
equitable modification of the contractual terms. However, the Italian Supreme
Court has interpreted this provision as to allow “the judge’s intervention in the
adaptation process by stating that if the offer is inadequate, the judge may determine an equitable revision of the contract,” see M. Kovac & C. Poncibò, Towards
a Theory of Imprévision in the EU?, 14 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 357 (2018).
107. See art. 6:111 PECL; art. 6.2.3 PICC; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 89 CESL;
art. 157 European Contract Code (Code Gandolfi); art. 7:101 Principes contractuels communs de l’Association Capitant (PCC).
108. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 34.
109. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 112; Pédamon, supra note 87, at 122.
110. It is noteworthy that this requirement is absent not only in the CESL and
in the French Civil Code, which are described as a direct source of inspiration of
the Belgian provision, but also in any of the provisions listed in the commentary
to the Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.77.
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performance, unforeseeability of the event, and non-acceptance of
the risk) are in line with those found in many of the above-mentioned instruments. 111 Therefore, in this sense, the introduction of
imprévision can be deemed as an element of modernisation of
French and Belgian law.
B. Modernisation as the Reflection of the Interests of Commercial
Parties
Alternatively, the modernisation of the law can be conceived as
the operation aimed at accommodating new economic and social
needs. The logic behind the modernisation of the French Civil Code,
as stated in the Report to the President of the Republic, was to increase the attractiveness of French law to international business. In
order to do this, the new provisions need to constitute a concrete
response to the commercial needs of international companies. In
light of the strong criticism that has followed the introduction of imprévision, 112 one may wonder whether the new provisions pay heed
to the actual needs of companies and investors. Not only scholars,
but also practitioners warned about the impact of such a reform. The
working group set up by DLA Piper France on the reform of the
Civil Code gathered many practitioners who discussed the proposed
innovations. The doctrine of imprévision, in particular, was criticised for allowing courts to rewrite contracts, as this clashes with
the normal tasks envisioned for a civil law judge and threatens legal

111. This is the structure followed by art. 1467 Italian Civil Code, art. 6:111
PECL; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 89 CESL. Art. 6.2.2 PICC and art. 313 BGB
feature the requirements on foreseeability and risk-taking, however they diverge
when it comes to the impact of changed circumstances on the situation of the parties. Art. 6.2.2 PICC refers to a fundamental alteration of the contractual equilibrium as a result of the event, while art. 313 BGB mentions a performance which
cannot reasonably be expected to be upheld without alteration, rather than a performance rendered excessively onerous.
112. Kovac & Poncibò, supra note 106, at 353; P. Stoffel-Munck, Les clauses
abusives: on attendait Grouchy, 240 DROIT ET PATRIMOINE 56 (2014); Y. M. Laithier, Les règles relatives à l’inexécution des obligations contractuelles, 21 JCP
G SUPPL 52 (2015).
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certainty. 113 Other risks brought by the doctrine of imprévision
would be the “possible exploitation by dishonest contracting parties,
attempting evasion from unfavourable contracts, the subsequent
contamination effect of the termination or revision of contracts, and
the destabilisation of contracting parties’ anticipations.” 114 The fear
of businesses towards the uncertainty brought by the doctrine of imprévision makes the assumption that this innovation answers the
commercial needs of companies less plausible. However, some additional considerations are necessary. The desire of the French legislator to increase the attractiveness of French law was aimed at facilitating its application in international law contracts. 115 Thus, it
seems that the target of the reform is primarily companies operating
cross-border, which are aware of the risk of unforeseen changes of
circumstances in international trade. 116 Especially in long-term contractual relationships, international commercial parties prefer to
safeguard their lasting and productive relationship, in order to preserve their mutual interests. 117 Therefore, the commercial need to
remedy a contractual imbalance (and have the contract revised) is
perceived at the international level. That being said, it is also true
that large companies operating internationally have a preference for
regulating themselves the consequences of unforeseen circumstances by including the so-called hardship clauses within their
113. DLA Piper & Cercle Montesquieu, Groupe de travail sur le projet d’ordonnance et la réforme du Code civil, Travaux depuis février 2015, 204 (2016).
114. A. Pietrancosta, Introduction of the Hardship Doctrine (“théorie de l’imprévision”) into French Contract Law: A Mere Revolution on the Books?, 3
RTDF 1 (2016).
115. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7.
116. E. Zaccaria, The Effects of Changed Circumstances in International Commercial Trade, 9 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 136 (2005):
The risk of hardship is virtually inevitable in the field of international
trade, as the economic and political context is subject to continual flux
and rapid change. A great number of factors may intervene, such as an
alteration in the political situation of a nation, an unexpected price rise
in raw materials or a sudden depreciation of currency. Naturally, the
longer the contract lasts, the greater the risk that circumstances may
change. As international contracts generally last a long time this risk is
ever present.
117. Id.
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agreements, in order to avoid any judicial interference. 118 However,
small and medium-sized enterprises usually lack the know-how to
address in detail hardship situations through sophisticated contractual clauses. Consequently, it is fair to say that new article 1195 is a
response to the interests of the latter enterprises, which in the absence of a default provision on unforeseen circumstances would
bear the financial consequences of the contractual imbalance. 119 At
the same time, as highlighted during the parliamentary debate, 120 the
non-mandatory nature of new article 1195 does not affect the commercial needs of large corporations, which may continue to regulate
imprévision in the contract, therefore ruling out the application of
the provision. At least in theory, the introduction of imprévision
pays heed to the needs of small corporations, without impairing
those of large companies, and therefore, in this limited sense, modernises the Civil Code. However, in practice much will depend on
the bargaining power of small and medium-sized enterprises. Indeed, when they trade with large corporations, the latter may impose
their contractual power to opt-out from the rules on imprévision.
Hence, to cope with possible contractual abuse, the legislators could
have followed the example of article 7:102 of the “Common Contractual Principles” by the Henri Capitant Association, according to
which “[a] clause which would apportion to one of the parties the
essential risks of a change of circumstances is valid only if it does
not entail unreasonable consequences for that party.” 121
118. Pédamon, supra note 68, at 11, 13, 17.
119. Id. at 11.
120. As remarked by the member of the Senate François Pillet, judicial intervention will be limited due to the fact that commercial parties who benefit from
legal advice will systematically exclude the provision from the contract.
121. See PROJET DE CADRE COUMMUN DE RÉFÉRENCE : PRINCIPES CONTRACTUAL COMMUN (SLC 2008); see also B. Fauvarque-Cosson, Does Review on the
Ground of Imprévision Breach the Principle of the Binding Force of Contracts?,
in THE CODE NAPOLÉON REWRITTEN: FRENCH CONTRACT LAW AFTER THE 2016
REFORMS 200 (J. Cartwright & S. Whittaker eds., Hart Publ’g 2017). The author
notes that in France, art. 1171 of the Civil Code on unfair terms applies exclusively to standard-form contracts, only the control on contract terms prescribed
by art. L 442-6 I 2 of the Commercial Code might be able to exclude these optout clauses.
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IV. THE INTRODUCTION OF IMPRÉVISION IN LIGHT OF THE GOAL OF
LEGAL CERTAINTY
The second goal of the French and Belgian reforms of contract
law was to attain more legal certainty (sécurité juridique). This term
can assume different connotations depending on the various legal
systems.
A. The Disputed Meaning of “Legal Certainty”
European countries tend to believe that there is legal certainty
when the law is codified, as opposed to English contract law, where
ensuring legal certainty means giving effect to the contract and to
honest parties’ reasonable expectations. 122
The European approach to legal certainty is visible within the
French Revision of 2016 and the Belgian Draft of 2019: both
stressed that the main threat to legal certainty is the development of
rules by courts, interpreting or even contradicting the wording of
their civil codes. 123 Therefore, codifying the judicial innovations
and enacting clear rules was considered the solution to prevent the
judicial creation of law and to ensure legal certainty.
The commentary to draft article 5.77 in the Belgian draft of 2019
states that the inclusion of imprévision also contributes to legal certainty, as it is in line with the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation
which tends to accept it gradually. However, as it has been shown, 124
the Belgian Cour de cassation has never accepted in principle the
theory of imprévision, but simply mitigated the principle of the binding force of contracts on grounds of abuse of rights. Moreover, the
commentary to draft article 5.77 makes reference to two judgements
rendered by the Cour de cassation, where the law applicable was the
CISG and it was supplemented by the PICC’s provisions on
122. H. G. BEALE ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONTRACT
LAW 8-11 (Hart Publ’g 2019).
123. See supra Introduction, at p.5.
124. See supra Section II(B).
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hardship. 125 While, on the one hand, these judgements show a modern approach by Belgian judges towards imprévision and the transnational instruments on international contracts, on the other hand,
they do not prove an internal openness on the same issue. The same
applies to France, where the Cour de cassation occasionally employed various legal arguments to loosen the principle of pacta sunt
servanda. Therefore, the introduction of imprévision cannot be considered a codification of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, its codification might promote legal certainty, according to the European connotation, as it eliminates the uncertainty of commercial parties, also
in light of the fluctuating and uncertain jurisprudence, related to the
possibility to obtain relief in the event of hardship.
By contrast, following the approach of English contract law, the
French and Belgian provisions might well be a threat to legal certainty, both for the possibility of the judge to adapt the contract and
for the broad and vague drafting of the provisions. According to
English contract law, the interplay between the principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda favours the parties’ decision-making over the judicial one. 126 It is precisely the power of the
courts to interfere with the contractual relationship that mostly worries businesses, since it represents a significant source of uncertainty
as opposed to holding parties to the agreed terms. 127 Moreover, the
common law also links legal certainty to the precise and detailed
regulation of the situations in which a law can be applied. 128 For an
English lawyer, the French and Belgian provisions might pose problems of legal certainty with regard to the conditions necessary to
trigger their application. The broad way in which the legal propositions have been drafted raises concerns in relation to the possible
125. Cass, 19 June 2009, Scafom International BV v Lorraine Tubes SAS, no.
C.07.0289.N.; Cass., 12 Apr. 2013, Pas., 2013, 863.
126. S. Whittaker, Contracts, Contract Law and Contractual Principle, in THE
CODE NAPOLÉON REWRITTEN: FRENCH CONTRACT LAW AFTER THE 2016 REFORMS, supra note 121, at 31.
127. Rowan, supra note 19, at 809.
128. Whittaker, supra note 126, at 32.
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interpretation by French and Belgian courts, in the absence of a wellestablished line of cases on the issue. 129
Since studies have shown that the judicial revision of contracts
does not impact legal certainty, 130 the focus of this section will be
on the possible uncertainties related to the requirements for imprévision under new article 1195 and draft article 5.77.
B. Time of the Change of Circumstances
The first doubt concerns the fact that, unlike provisions which
clarify that the event causing hardship must occur after the conclusion of the contract, 131 the French and Belgian ones are silent on the
issue. Sometimes, an event may occur before the contract is concluded but the parties are not aware of its existence when they sign
the agreement. The absence of this requirement would, prima facie,
lead to the conclusion that article 1195 and draft article 5.77 cover
these situations. Such interpretation would be confirmed by the 2003
ICC-Hardship Clause, which does not feature the above-mentioned
requirement and explains that:
[T]his Clause is not limited to situations where the events
rendering performance excessively onerous occurred after
the time the contract was concluded . . . on the ground that a
party might wish to invoke the Clause in circumstances
where it simply did not know – and could not have known –
of the existence of the event at the time of the conclusion of
the contract. 132
Therefore, the French and Belgian legislators could have perhaps been more precise. In order to rule out the existing doubts, they
could have either stated that the event must occur after the conclusion of the contract, or, following the example of the PICC, specified
129. Lutzi, supra note 23, at 109.
130. M. Mekki, Hardship and Modification (or ‘Revision’) of the Contract, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 7 (A. S. Hartkamp ed., Kluwer 2011).
131. See art. 6:111 PECL; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 89 CESL; art. 313 BGB.
132. See International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Force Majeure Clause
2003/ICC Hardship Clause 2003 11, 17, available at https://perma.cc/UU6G76N4.
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that there is hardship when “the events occur or become known to
the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the contract.” 133
C. Manifestations of Imprévision
The second dilemma concerns the situations which in principle
can amount to imprévision. 134 While draft article 5.77 makes clear
that performance can become excessively onerous due to either an
increase in the cost of performance or a decrease in the value of the
counter-performance, article 1195 merely refers to events rendering
performance excessively onerous for a party. On the surface, it
seems that article 1195 takes into account solely events making performance more costly, excluding the second set of events. It has
been suggested that onerousness should be deemed as a benefit-cost
ratio which negatively affects one party, and therefore should be
viewed in terms of the difference between the value of the performance rendered and the value of the counter-performance. 135 In doing so, article 1195 would also cover situations where, even though
the cost of executing the contract is unaltered for one party, this cost
can no longer be absorbed to the same extent due to the drop in the
value of the compensation received. 136 Moreover, the international
and European instruments from which the French legislator has
drawn inspiration, 137 make clear that both situations fall within their
scope. It is ultimately unclear whether the French legislator intended
to reduce the ambit of new article 1195 or whether it considered the
clarification unnecessary. However, according to the maxim of interpretation ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus (i.e.,
“where the law does not distinguish, nor the interpreter must
133. Art. 6.2.2 PICC.
134. For a discussion on the possibility for art. 1195 to cover situations of loss
of interest in the contract, see Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 77.
135. P. Stoffel-Munck, L’imprévision et la réforme des effets du contrat, RDC
30 (2016).
136. O. DESHAYES ET AL., RÉFORME DU DROIT DES CONTRATS, DU RÉGIME GÉNÉRAL ET DE LA PREUVE DES OBLIGATIONS 396 (LexisNexis 2016).
137. See art. 6:111 PECL; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 89 CESL; art. 6.2.2 PICC.
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distinguish”), the general formulation of a legal text leads to its general application. Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the French
formula, vast as it is, includes the two Belgian hypotheses.
D. Excessive Onerousness of the Performance
Another problem in the interpretation of new article 1195 and
draft article 5.77 concerns the meaning of “excessively” onerous.
The wording adopted shows that not any difficulty in performing the
contract will trigger the application of the provisions on imprévision.
The Belgian provision, emulating international and European harmonisation projects, 138 is more precise than the French one in this
respect, as it prescribes that “[e]ach party must fulfil its obligations
even when the execution has become more onerous.” 139 Even if Article 1195 does not contain such clarification, it is evident from its
wording that it will cover only exceptional situations, as imprévision
is conceived as an exception to the binding force of the contract.140
Nevertheless, neither article 1195 nor draft article 5.77 contain any
indication as to how to determine the excess. Surely, there must be
a significant gap between the benefit received and the cost incurred.
However, the excessive onerousness might be defined in different
ways. One option could be to distinguish mere onerousness from
excessive onerousness in the following manner: a performance
would be merely more onerous when “the costs of performance exceed the contract price but not yet the value of performance to the
promisee” 141; excessively onerous would be when the “costs of performance increase to a level where those costs exceed the initial net
value of performance.” 142 Alternatively, the excessiveness might be
138. Id.
139. Translated by the author.
140. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7, this is clear from the report,
where imprévision is defined as a moderating cause of the binding force of the
contract.
141. M. Kovac, Frustration of Purpose and the French Contract Law Reform:
The Challenge to the International Commercial Attractiveness of English Law?,
25 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 301 (2018).
142. Id. at 300.
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defined by indicating a threshold percentage that must be met. This
concept is not new either to the French and Belgian legislators 143 or
to the French administrative jurisprudence. 144 A threshold for hardship featured also the PICC, from which France and Belgium drew
inspiration: the Official Comment on the 1994 edition of the PICC
stated that “an alteration amounting to 50% or more of the cost or
the value of the performance is likely to amount to a ‘fundamental’
alteration.” 145 However, as of the PICC’s 2004 edition, the 50%
minimum threshold was removed because, as shown in the preparatory works, it was criticized in scholarly writings as being too low
and arbitrary. 146 The absence of any directive or threshold to determine the excessive onerousness leads towards a factual evaluation
by the judge on a case-by-case basis. 147 This raises the question
whether the excessive onerousness will be measured, objectively,
against the counter-performance or, subjectively, against the parties’
conditions. In the first case, courts will assess the balance between
143. For France, see art. L. 411-13, French Rural Code:
Le preneur ou le bailleur qui, lors de la conclusion du bail, a contracté à
un prix supérieur ou inférieur d’au moins un dixième à la valeur locative
de la catégorie du bien particulier donné à bail, peut, au cours de la troisième année de jouissance, et une seule fois pour chaque bail, saisir le
tribunal paritaire qui fixe, pour la période du bail restant à courir à partir
de la demande, le prix normal du fermage selon les modalités ci-dessus.
For Belgium, see art. 6, Law of Apr. 30, 1951 on Commercial Leases:
A l’expiration de chaque triennat, les parties ont le droit de demander au
juge de paix la révision du loyer, à charge d’établir que, par le fait de
circonstances nouvelles, la valeur locative normale de l’immeuble loué
est supérieure ou inférieure d’au moins 15 p.c. au loyer stipulé dans le
bail ou fixé lors de la dernière révision.
144. See Direction des Affaires Économiques et Internationales du Ministère
de l’équipement (France), note du 18 mai 2004 de la DAEI relative à la hausse du
cours de l’acier, 3, available at https://perma.cc/RS8N-23C8. The note stated that
judgements rendered since 1974 accept a disruption of the general economy of
the contract when there is a 10% increase of the initial amount of the contract.
145. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts with Official Commentary, 1994, art. 6.2.2 [hereinafter, PICC Official Commentary].
146. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Working Group
for the Preparation of Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Consolidated Edition of Part I and Part II of the Principles of International Commercial
Contracts: Decided Amendments & Open Questions Memorandum (Rome, Apr.
2013), available at https://perma.cc/K7AS-SA9G.
147. P. Stoffel-Munck, La révision du contrat par l’arbitre à la lumière de
l’article 1195 du Code civil, 1 REV. ARB. 58 (2017).
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the performances or the obligations arising from the contract, while
in the second case courts will consider the impact of the changed
circumstances on the financial situation of the party, even though
there is no disproportion with the counter-performance received. 148
While the French provision is completely silent on the issue, draft
article 5.77 suggests that the aggrieved party’s personal situation
might be taken into account. Indeed, the Belgian provision refers to
a change of circumstances which makes the execution of the contract excessively onerous in a way that “no one may reasonably demand it.” This wording recalls the subjective approach taken by article 313 BGB and article 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. The German provision refers to a change of circumstances so burdensome
that “one of the parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the
contract without alteration,” while the Dutch one speaks of “unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the opposite party, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not expect an
unchanged continuation of the agreement.” As it has been noted, 149
these broader formulations go beyond the mere imbalance between
the performances and could allow courts to take into consideration
whether maintaining the contract would lead to the financial ruin of
the party.
E. Unforeseeability of the Event
Moreover, the French and Belgian provisions raise further concerns regarding the condition of unforeseeability. Both article 1195
and draft article 5.77 require that the change of circumstances was
“unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract.” On the
other hand, many of the above-mentioned harmonisation projects
link the unforeseeability to a standard of reasonableness, by requiring that the event could not have been reasonably foreseeable at the

148. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 76.
149. See id. at para. 78.
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moment the contract was concluded. 150 This departure from the
standard of reasonableness is even more remarkable with respect to
new article 1195. Indeed, the new article 1218 of the French Civil
Code on force majeure defines an unforeseeable event as one which
“could not reasonably be foreseen.” This difference in the drafting
of the provisions poses problems of interpretation both with regard
to the object of foreseeability and the modality of its assessment.151
The first problem concerns what has to be unforeseeable: whether
the nature of the event only or also its extent. If the wording of the
French and Belgian provisions was to be interpreted in the first
sense, it could lead to an assessment of the object of foreseeability
in absolute terms, reducing the scope of application of the rules.152
Indeed, since everything can be foreseeable in abstracto, the rise in
the costs of performance can in principle always be anticipated by
the parties. 153 A different question is whether, in concreto, costs increases of a certain magnitude can reasonably be anticipated at the
moment of conclusion of the contract. A relativization is necessary
because even if an event is in principle foreseeable (e.g., the rise in
the cost of raw materials) its extent can well be reasonably unforeseeable (e.g., an extraordinary and unprecedent rise in those
costs). 154 Otherwise, as it has been noted, 155 parties would have to
bear the consequences of an event which could in principle have
been foreseen, even if the worst-case scenario was considered.
150. See art. 6:111 PECL; art. III.-1:110 DCFR; art. 6.2.2 PICC.
151. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 81.
152. Id.
153. J. Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Under the UNIDROIT Principles, 5 TUL. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 16-17 (1997):
Anyone who has read a bit of history or who has lived for three or more
decades of the twentieth century can foresee, in a general way, the possibility of war, revolution, embargo, plague, terrorism, hyper-inflation
and economic depression, among the other horrors that have afflicted the
human race. If one reads science fiction, one learns of the possibility of
new terrors that have not yet afflicted us, but involve possibilities that
are not pure fantasy.
154. G. CHANTEPIE & M. LATINA, LE NOUVEAU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS,
COMMENTAIRE THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DANS L’ORDRE DU CODE CIVIL 473 (Dalloz 2018).
155. Id. at 474.
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Secondly, this requirement raises the question of how to conduct the
assessment of unforeseeability, whether objectively or subjectively.
In other words, whether the change of circumstances should be objectively unforeseeable for any reasonable person under the same
conditions or whether it is enough that the parties did not consider
the occurrence of the event. 156 A definition of unforeseeability along
with the standard of reasonableness would surely point towards an
objective assessment, 157 but the present formulation might have
courts consider to what extent the parties actually foresaw the occurrence of the changed circumstances. 158 In any case, the absence
of the adverb “reasonably” does not automatically entail a subjective
assessment of unforeseeability, as ample discretion is left to courts
in conducting this test. 159
On a more general note, it is not surprising that the new article
1195, even more than draft article 5.77, does not provide definitions
or a detailed regulation of its conditions of application. The French
legislator usually leaves this task to courts and scholars, as its primary concern is to adopt clear and general legal propositions, devoid
of any technicality, which are comprehensible to ordinary citizens. 160 This is where the contrast between France and common law
jurisdictions in respect to legal certainty becomes more evident:
while a French lawyer would deem such clear and accessible rules
to promote sécurité juridique, an English lawyer would consider
them to be against it because of their uncertain content which gives
courts wide margins of appreciation. 161

156. Id.
157. Stoffel-Munck, supra note 147, at 60-61; Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 81;
CHANTEPIE & LATINA, supra note 154, at 474.
158. Pédamon, supra note 87, at 120.
159. Fauvarque-Cosson, supra note 121, at 197.
160. BEALE ET AL., supra note 122, at 10.
161. Id.
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V. THE INTRODUCTION OF IMPRÉVISION IN LIGHT OF THE GOAL OF
CONTRACTUAL JUSTICE
The above-mentioned objectives of the French and Belgian reforms coexist with the goal of contractual justice, which needs to be
affirmed.
A. The Meaning of Contractual Justice
In France, the idea of contractual justice has been developed by
way of two grand legal theories: autonomy of the will and contractual solidarity. 162 The school of autonomy of the will believes that
since parties freely determine the content of the contract, there can
be no exceptions to its binding force. The doctrine of contractual
solidarity, which was a response to the first, holds that the idea of
autonomy as a general principle is curtailed by a set of exceptions
based on contractual solidarity, among which is the doctrine of imprévision. 163 Through the lenses of solidarity, contractual relationships are not perceived anymore as bargains to make as much profit
as possible, but rather as “a kind of microcosm, a small society
where everyone must work towards a common goal.” 164 Hence, a
duty of cooperation is imposed upon the parties in order to achieve
said common goal. 165 Moreover, unlike the school of autonomy of
the will, which believes that only the contractual parties can judge
the content of the contract, the person responsible for ensuring solidarity against the letter of the contract, in the silence of the legislator, is the judge, who in the event of hardship may step in to correct
the contractual imbalance by terminating or adapting the agreement. 166

162.
163.
164.
1931).
165.
2018).
166.

Cédras, supra note 58.
Id.
R. DEMOGUE, 6 TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS EN GÉNÉRAL 9 (Rousseau
Y. BUFFELAN-LANORE ET AL., DROIT CIVIL : LES OBLIGATIONS 290 (Sirey
Cédras, supra note 58.
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It is believed that considerations of contractual justice might
clash with the goal of legal certainty pursued by the reforms. 167 Legal certainty, at least for common law lawyers, aims not only at the
precise and detailed regulation of the situations in which the law can
be applied, but also at allowing parties to clearly establish their duties and performances. 168 Consequently, the judicial interference
with contractual terms, based on grounds of contractual justice, is
deemed to sacrifice pragmatism and transactional certainty. 169 However, the French and Belgian legislators consider the two goals compatible. In France, this is visible in the new chapter of the Civil Code
entitled “Introductory Provisions,” where freedom of contract (article 1102), binding force of the contract (article 1103) and good faith
(article 1104) are stated as three fundamental principles. As explained by the Report to the President of the Republic, this choice
expresses one of the essential objectives pursued by the French Revision of 2016: to find a balance between contractual justice and autonomy of the will. 170 The Belgian Draft of 2019 also aims at finding
a harmony between these principles, as one paramount objective of
the proposal is to “modernize the balance between the autonomy of
the parties and the role of the judge as guardian of the interests of
the weaker party.” 171
The idea behind contractual justice is to maintain the contractual
equilibrium within the transaction, by allowing the judge to balance
or rebalance the contract. 172 In addition to the provisions on
167. F. CHÉNEDÉ, LE NOUVEAU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS ET DES CONTRATS
CONSOLIDATIONS, INNOVATIONS, PERSPECTIVES 9 (Dalloz 2018).

:

168. Whittaker, supra note 126, at 32.
169. Rowan, supra note 19, at 809. These considerations of contractual justice
to the detriment of legal certainty are traditionally indicated as one of the main
reasons why French law is less attractive to foreign companies and investors as
compared to common law systems.
170. See Rapport au Président, supra note 7.
171. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Resumé.
172. BUFFELAN-LANORE ET AL., supra note 165, at 414; P. Stoffel-Munck, Les
enjeux majeurs de la réforme “Attractivité, Sécurité, Justice”, in RÉFORME DU
DROIT DES CONTRATS ET PRATIQUE DES AFFAIRES 22 (P. Stoffel-Munck ed., Dalloz
2015); Whittaker, supra note 126, at 50.
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imprévision, the Belgian proposal also achieves this result by regulating abuse of circumstances (draft article 5.41), 173 while in France,
after the 2016 reform, contractual justice is pursued, among others,
through the articles on violence in the case of the abuse of a state of
dependence (article 1143) and unfair terms in standard contracts (article 1171). 174
For what specifically concerns the French and Belgian provisions on imprévision, the relation with the goal of contractual justice
can be found in the ratio juris of the former. Namely, that “to insist
on the binding force of contract in such extreme situations, which
may cause several difficulties on the disadvantaged party is judged
as obviously unfair.” 175 Therefore, when a supervening change of
circumstances making performance excessively onerous for one
party occurs, courts step in to correct the serious contractual imbalance that arises during the execution of the contract. However, as
analysed above, the broad wording adopted by the French and Belgian legislators when drafting the requirements for imprévision may
trigger different judicial interpretations. Therefore, these requirements will be analysed in the following sections with a view to finding the interpretation that better suits the goal of contractual justice.

173. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Introduction Générale :
[L]e juge se verra investi de pouvoirs lui permettant de corriger des situations de déséquilibre contractuel (par exemple, lorsque l’économie du
contrat est bouleversée à la suite de circonstances nouvelles imprévisibles – la théorie de l’imprévision – ou lorsque les prestations sont, dès
le départ, affectées d’un déséquilibre manifeste par suite d’un abus par
une partie de la position de faiblesse de l’autre partie – l’abus de circonstances).
174. For an analysis of the provisions of the French Civil Code pursuing contractual justice, see Whittaker, supra note 126, at 50-54.
175. B. BAŞOĞLU, THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL CRISES ON THE BINDING FORCE
OF CONTRACTS - RENEGOTIATION, RESCISSION OR REVISION 9 (Springer 2016).
Although the author is referring to financial crisis, the ratio juris can be extended
to all the events causing hardship.
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B. The Contrast Between a Narrow Interpretation of the Requirements and the Goal of Contractual Justice
To begin with, an interpretation of the requirements for imprévision under the new article 1195 and draft article 5.77 that conforms
to the goal of contractual justice is one which avoids that situations
of contractual imbalance evade the scope of the rules at issue. In
other words, interpretations which excessively narrow down the
scope of the provisions on imprévision, to the detriment of the party
affected by the supervening event, run counter to the realisation of
contractual fairness.
1. Time of the Change of Circumstances: The Relationship
Between the Doctrine of Imprévision and the Doctrine of Mistake
As it has been pointed out above, the first uncertainty concerns
the possibility for the French and Belgian provisions to cover not
only events which occur after the conclusion of the contract, but also
those occurring before the contract is concluded when the parties are
not aware of their existence as they sign the agreement. If the absence of an express requirement in the first sense points towards the
inclusion of the latter situations within article 1195 and draft article
5.77, the same conclusion must be reached on grounds of contractual
fairness. These provisions require a change of circumstances that
was unforeseeable at the time of contract conclusion. This change
does not necessarily need to be factual but can also concern the intellectual considerations of the parties. 176 Therefore, when the parties could not know of the existence of the event causing hardship at
the moment of contract conclusion, and learn about it only later in
time, there is a change of circumstances under article 1195 and draft
article 5.77. Since such changes create a contractual imbalance just
like any other hardship situation occurring after the conclusion of
176. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 391.
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the contract, it would be against contractual justice to exclude them
from the scope of the provisions. However, such solution might
clash with the fact that the unawareness of existing circumstances at
the time of contract conclusion has traditionally been dealt with under the doctrine of “mistake” or “error” (a more civilian term) as a
vice of consent. 177 This doctrine, which is enshrined in article 1130
and following articles of the French Civil Code 178 and article 1110
of the Belgian Civil Code, 179 refers to situations where a party has
given its consent due to misrepresentation of either the obligations
arising out of the contract or of the identity of the other contracting
party. 180 The mistaken party is entitled to obtain the relative nullity
of the contract provided that the misrepresentation was decisive for
its consent. 181 Consequently, when a party signs an agreement just
because that party ignores the real circumstances, the doctrine of
177. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 69. The author argues that art. 1195 should
be interpreted as not covering events already existing at the moment of the conclusion of the contract but ignored by the party, as these situations are covered by
the doctrine of “mistake.”
178. In particular, see Cartwright et al., supra note 86, which provides the following translation of art. 1132: “Mistake of law or of fact, as long as it is not
inexcusable, is a ground of nullity of the contract where it bears on the essential
qualities of the act of performance owed or of the other contracting party.”
179. Art. 1110, Belgian Civil Code:
L’erreur n’est une cause de nullité de la convention que lorsqu’elle
tombe sur la substance même de la chose qui en est l’objet.
Elle n’est point une cause de nullité, lorsqu’elle ne tombe que sur la personne avec laquelle on a intention de contracter, à moins que la considération de cette personne ne soit la cause principale de la convention.
180. F. TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 309 (Dalloz 2018); Y.
BUFFELAN-LANORE ET AL., supra note 165, at 299; C. Goux, L’erreur, le dol et la
lésion qualifiée : analyse et comparaisons, in LA THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DES OBLIGATIONS 24-25 (P. Wery ed., Formation permanente CUP 1998).
181. For France, see J. Cartwright et al., supra note 86, which provides the
following translation of art. 1130: “Mistake, fraud and duress vitiate consent
where they are of such a nature that, without them, one of the parties would not
have contracted or would have contracted on substantially different terms.” For
Belgium, see P. Van Ommeslaghe, Examen de jurisprudence (1974 à 1982) - Les
obligations, 6 R.C.J.B. 33 (1986), where the author explains that this is the interpretation of art. 1110 provided by the Belgian Cour de cassation. See also Belgian
Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.38, which codifies the latter interpretation by
providing that: “L’erreur n’est une cause de nullité que lorsqu’une partie a, de
manière excusable, une représentation erronée d’un élément qui l’a déterminée à
conclure le contrat, alors que l’autre partie connaissait ou devait connaître ce caractère déterminant.”
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mistake appears more appropriate than the doctrine of imprévision,
as it allows the mistaken party to deprive its contractual commitment
of legal effect. However, a better understanding of the relationship
between the doctrine of mistake and that of imprévision requires further considerations. Firstly, there are situations in which the doctrine
of mistake cannot be applied to the unawareness of hardship situations already existing when the contract was concluded, and therefore no conflict with the doctrine of imprévision arises. Indeed, in
order to preserve commercial transactions, not every mistake, even
if decisive, can make the contract null. 182 In particular, a mistake as
to the mere value of performance is irrelevant, unless it bears on the
“essential qualities of the act of performance” 183 (article 1136,
French Civil Code) or on “a decisive characteristic of the subject
matter of the contract” 184 (draft article 5.38, Belgian draft of 2019).
A mistake as to the value is based on the incorrect monetary valuation of the performance, in the sense that the purchase price was either too high or too low compared to the value of the service offered. 185 An example of such mistake can be found in a manufacturing contract where the manufacturer sets the price without knowing
that the cost of raw materials has recently increased. 186 Had the manufacturer known about the increased cost, the final price would have
been commensurate with the economic value of its performance.
182. TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 180, at 310.
183. Cartwright et al., supra note 86, art. 1136.
184. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.38: “N’est pas davantage une
cause de nullité l’erreur qui concerne exclusivement la valeur d’une chose ou
d’une prestation ou le prix, à moins qu’elle résulte d’une erreur concernant une
caractéristique déterminante de l’objet du contrat.”
185. See TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 180, at 324: “Par suite d’une appréciation
économique erronée, le vendeur a vendu trop bon marché ou l’acheteur a acheté
trop cher.” See also B. MERCADAL, supra note 97, at para. 338: “L’erreur sur la
valeur . . . repose sur la mauvaise évaluation monétaire de la prestation de la chose
qui a conduit à lui donner une valeur minorée ou excessive.”
186. This example is adopted by the commentary on art. 89 CESL to argue
that these situations cannot constitute a change of circumstances under the provision. However, such interpretation is in line with the wording of art. 89(3) CESL
which requires the change of circumstances to occur after the conclusion of the
contract, unlike art. 1195 and Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, art. 5.77 which
are silent on the issue.
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However, this mistake bears on circumstances (the increased cost of
raw materials) which are external to the act of performance of the
contract and is therefore irrelevant. 187 Nevertheless, the example
shows a typical hardship situation determined by the increase in the
cost of the manufacturer’s performance. As shown above, situations
where the party could not know about the hardship event at the moment of contract conclusion may well constitute a change of circumstances under article 1195 and draft article 5.77. Therefore, considering that in this scenario the doctrine of mistake cannot operate,
nothing prevents the manufacturer from claiming the application of
the doctrine of imprévision, provided that the other requirements envisaged by article 1195 and draft article 5.77 are met. Secondly, the
doctrine of mistake and that of imprévision may overlap in some
cases. This possibility may arise when a mistake which is legally
relevant pursuant to article 1136 or draft article 5.38, is triggered by
the ignorance of an event which may also constitute hardship, and
consequently falls on the value of performance. This situation occurs, for instance, when a buyer believes to have acquired building
land while it is not legally possible to build on it. In this case, the
mistake as to value of the land assumes relevance as it stems from a
different mistake on the “essential qualities” (article 1136) 188 or “decisive characteristic” (draft article 5.38) 189 of performance, namely
the possibility to build on it. Moreover, the impossibility to build on
the acquired land is not only the source of a mistake but also that of
a hardship situation, as it decreases the value of the counter-performance received by the buyer. Considering that the supervening
knowledge of this impossibility may constitute a change of circumstances under article 1195 and draft article 5.77, the case at issue
may be dealt with under both the doctrine of mistake and that of
imprévision. It is no doubt true that, as pointed out above, the
187. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 69.
188. TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 180, at 321.
189. Belgian Draft of 2019, supra note 6, Commentaire des articles, art. 5.38.
Belgian courts had already taken this position when interpreting art. 1110, see
Cour d’appel de Liège, 11 Dec. 1989, Act. dr., 1991, 210.
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doctrine of mistake is more adequate when dealing with such situations, as the mistaken party presumably prefers to render the contract null. Nevertheless, considering that a mistake produces a relative nullity190 (which can only be invoked by the mistaken party),
the party is probably in the best position to decide which remedy
suits its interests best. Therefore, in the example provided, it is conceivable that if the party decides to keep the land despite the impossibility to build on it, it will claim an adaptation of the price rather
than bringing an action for nullity.
2. Manifestations of Imprévision
The risk of a restrictive interpretation concerns, in the second
place, the events which may constitute hardship under these provisions. As shown in Section IV, while draft article 5.77 refers to
events making performance excessively onerous due to either an increase in the cost of performance or a decrease in the value of the
counter-performance, the new article 1195 merely refers to events
rendering performance excessively onerous for a party. The plain
wording of the French provision might lead courts to consider only
the first set of events, namely those rendering performance more
costly for one party. However, the ratio of new article 1195 is, in
line with the goal of contractual justice, to protect the victim of an
unforeseen circumstance from contractual imbalances. 191 Therefore,
as the decrease in the value of the counter-performance received also
determines a contractual imbalance, ruling out these situations from
the ambit of the French provision would be against the goal of contractual justice, which the new article 1195 purports to achieve.
190. Art. 1131, French Civil Code: “Les vices du consentement sont une cause
de nullité relative du contrat.”
191. Rapport au Président, supra note 7. The section of the report commenting
the introduction of imprévision provides the following: “Cette consécration, inspirée du droit comparé comme des projets d’harmonisation européens, permet de
lutter contre les déséquilibres contractuels majeurs qui surviennent en cours
d’exécution, conformément à l’objectif de justice contractuelle poursuivi par l’ordonnance.”
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3. Unforeseeability of the Event
Furthermore, similar problems may arise if courts adopt a restrictive interpretation of the requirement that the change of circumstances be “unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract,” which features both the French and the Belgian provisions.
For what concerns the object of foreseeability, as shown in the previous section, a narrow interpretation would take into account only
the nature of the change of circumstances, disregarding its extent.
Consequently, even if the event is extraordinary and unprecedented
in its size, it would fall out of the scope of the provisions on imprévision just because it is in principle foreseeable. 192 However, this
would paralyse the application of article 1195 and draft article 5.77,
as the aggrieved party would not be able to benefit from the remedies envisaged in the rules, even if the worst-case scenario occurred
and the contractual equilibrium was destroyed. 193 Therefore, compliance with the goal of contractual justice calls for an extensive judicial interpretation of the requirement at issue, which considers not
only the nature of the event but also its extent. The necessity to assess the unforeseeability of the event on the basis of the specific circumstances of each case, 194 rather than in abstracto, has been
acknowledged by the courts of both civil and common law jurisdictions. As for the common law, in the Alcoa case 195 the parties had
agreed that the contract price would partially escalate in accordance
with changes in the Wholesale Price Index-Industrial Commodities
(WPI). The District Court of Pennsylvania noticed that while “over
192. CHANTEPIE & LATINA, supra note 154, at 474; Ancel, supra note 4, at
para. 81; DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 393.
193. CHANTEPIE & LATINA, supra note 154.
194. See BGE 104 II 314, 317 (1978). In relation to construction works, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal has established that, since every work carried out at fixed
flat or unit rates presents a risk, “the question as to what difficulties a contractor
should take into account in connection with the construction works depends to a
large degree on the particularities of the individual case, in particular the type and
term of the work contract.”
195. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.
Pa. 1980), Civ. A. No. 78-598.
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the previous twenty years, the Wholesale Price Index had tracked,
within a 5% variation, pertinent costs to ALCOA, a 500% variation
of costs to Index [being discussed there] must be deemed to be unforeseeable, within any meaningful sense of the word.” 196 The court
considered that there was a limit to the foreseeability of price increases and that in the case at hand the inflation rate had exceeded
this limit, being “unforeseeable in a commercial sense.” 197 On the
civil law side, 198 the Swiss Federal Tribunal held in the Jolieville
case 199 that when assessing the foreseeability of a change in the legislation the extent of the change plays a fundamental role. Indeed,
while changes of law are generally foreseeable in relation to longterm contracts, 200 “the extent (i.e., the type and essential contents)
of the change of law may not have been specifically foreseeable.” 201
The case dealt with a change in the planning and building laws that
repealed the possibility to build on a land which had been leased for
that purpose. 202 This change frustrated the purpose of the contract
and therefore decreased the value of the performance received,
196. Id. at para. 65.
197. Id. at para. 76. See L. S. Conrad, Bernina Distributors, Inc. v. Bernina
Sewing Machine Co.: New Grounds for Commercial Impracticability Based on
Currency Exchange Rates under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-615, 8
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 125 (2016).
198. There are also arbitral awards based on the hardship provisions of civil
law countries which considered the extent of the change of circumstances when
determining its foreseeability. See ICC Arbitration Case no. 6281 of 26 Aug. 1989
(Steel bars case), available at https://perma.cc/CA75-GYCY, decided on the basis of Yugoslavian law, where the tribunal stated that the increase in world market
prices was “well within the customary margin” and therefore predictable; see also
ICC Arbitration Case no. 2763 of June 25, 1980, Y.B. Com. Arb. 1985, 43, decided on the basis of Libyan law, where the tribunal stated that “while the presence
of undetected submerged explosives at the bottom of a harbour which was subjected to numerous bombardments during the war, constituted a foreseeable circumstance, the importance and the quantity of explosives found went far beyond
what the parties had foreseen.”
199. BGE 127 III 302 (2001).
200. BGE 127 III 300, 305 (2001).
201. C. BRUNNER, 18 FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER GENERAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: EXEMPTION FOR NON-PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 165 (Wolters Kluwer 2008).
202. The supermarket chain (Migros) concluded a 100-year building lease
agreement with an association of landowners for the purposes of building and
operating a shopping mall on their premises.
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causing a typical hardship situation for the seller. 203 The court ruled
that the specific type and extent of the change of law was not foreseeable, since at the moment of contract conclusion nothing indicated such possibility. 204 In France, it appears that the Cour de cassation also leans towards this direction. 205 In the recent Dupire
Invicta Industrie v. Gabo case, 206 the Cour de cassation held that
there is hardship when the cost of raw materials considerably increases beyond what the parties could have foreseen. 207 In this passage, the Cour de cassation implied that there is a limit to the foreseeability of price increases, as not every price increase is per se
foreseeable but only those within this limit. Furthermore, the court
of appeal had previously considered that the aggrieved party assumed the risk that the execution of its performance would become
more expensive. 208 In the absence of an express risk allocation
within the contract, it is indeed presumed that a party assumes the
risk of the events which were foreseeable at the moment of contract
conclusion. 209 However, the Cour de cassation criticised the court
of appeal, as, in deciding that the aggrieved party assumed such risk,
it did not consider if the cost increase of raw materials amounted to
abnormal fluctuations in the relevant market. 210 The Cour de cassation rightly implied that it is not possible to assume the risk of those
events which, by their extent and impact, cannot be foreseen.

203. See PICC Official Commentary, supra note 145, at no. 2.b to art. 6.2.2,
according to which the definition of hardship expressly covers such situations.
204. BGE 127 III 302, 306 (2001).
205. Pédamon, supra note 68, at 14.
206. Cass. Com., 17 Feb. 2015, nos. 12-29.550, 13-18.956, 13-20.230.
207. See id.: “qu’il y a hardship lorsque surviennent des événements qui altèrent fondamentalement l’équilibre des prestations, notamment lorsque le coût des
matières premières se trouve considérablement augmenté, au-delà de ce qu’auraient pu prévoir les parties. . . .”
208. Reims, 4 Sep. 2012, no. 11/02698.
209. BRUNNER, supra note 201, at 157, 441.
210. Pédamon, supra note 68, at 14; Pédamon, supra note 87, at 121.
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C. The Contrast Between a Broad Interpretation of the Requirements and the Goal of Contractual Justice
If, on the one hand, those interpretations of the requirements of
article 1195 and draft article 5.77 which are excessively narrow run
counter to goal of contractual justice pursued by the rules, on the
other hand, the same can be said if these provisions or their requirements are interpreted too broadly as to cover situations which are
caused by the aggrieved party or which are independent of the transaction.
1. Hardship Situations Attributable to the Aggrieved Party
In particular, although the theory of imprévision refers to
changes of circumstances which are caused by factors external to
the contracting party, 211 the new article 1195 neither makes reference to the need for the event to be beyond the party’s control, 212
nor does it prescribe that the event must not be determined by the
party’s conduct. For what specifically concerns the second point,
draft article 5.77, unlike the French provision, requires that the
change of circumstances be not attributable to the debtor. As explained above, this means that it must not be caused by the faulty
behaviour of the aggrieved party. Despite the silence of article 1195,
several authors have suggested that a claim for imprévision under
the French provision must be denied when the event is attributable
to the actions of the debtor. 213 The same view has been upheld by
211. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 70.
212. Art. 1195 also differs from art. 1218 of the French Civil Code, on force
majeure, which prescribes that the event must be beyond the control of the debtor.
As it has been noted, this notion is broader than fault: art. 1218 does not apply if
the situation is within the party’s sphere of control, even if the event was not
caused by the party’s fault. Conversely, it seems that Belgian Draft of 2019, supra
note 6, art. 5.77 would apply even when the event is within the control of the
aggrieved party (e.g., acts of employees), as long as it was not caused by its faulty
behaviour (e.g., employer negligence).
213. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 391; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 180,
at 716; MERCADAL, supra note 97, at para. 615, note that this approach is already
followed by the Conseil d’État when addressing cases of imprévision.
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the Italian Supreme Court, even though article 1467 of the Italian
Civil Code does not contain such requirement. 214 However, French
courts are highly unlikely to protect self-induced hardship, as this
would mean protecting incompetent or careless parties. Indeed, if
article 1195 were to be interpreted as to cover situations of self-induced hardship, the goal of contractual justice pursued by the reform
would hardly be accomplished. The other party would run the risk
to bear further costs resulting from the possible adaptation of the
contract, even when the event making the execution excessively onerous occurred due to a delay in the performance of the contract by
the aggrieved party. 215 In doing so, article 1195 would allow dishonest contracting parties to escape the harmful consequences of their
own faults, unfairly placing the other parties in a disadvantaged position. 216
2. Excessive Onerousness of the Performance Measured
Against the Subjective Conditions of the Aggrieved Party
Moreover, there is the risk that French and Belgian courts might
interpret the excessive onerousness requirement too extensively. It
is true that a case-by-case evaluation is to be preferred to a universal
and mathematical threshold. 217 Indeed, assessing the excessive onerousness against a merely numeric benchmark, without taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the contract, constitutes a
strict application of the principle pacta sunt servanda, which clashes
with the goal of contractual justice. However, it is debated how deep
this evaluation in concreto should be.
In determining when the change of circumstances makes performance of the contract excessively onerous, courts will have to decide whether to interpret this condition objectively, measuring the
214. Corte di Cassazione, section II, 23 Feb. 2001, n. 2661.
215. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 391.
216. Id.
217. D. Girsberger & P. Zapolskis, Fundamental Alteration of the Contractual
Equilibrium under Hardship Exemption, 19 JURISPRUDENCIJA 129 (2012).
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performance of the aggrieved party against the counter-performance, or subjectively, against the aggrieved party’s conditions.218
In particular, it is controversial whether article 1195 and draft article
5.77 allow courts to consider the impact of the change of circumstances on the financial situation of the party, in order to conclude
that the event amounts to hardship. If the latter approach were to be
adopted, French and Belgian courts might find imprévision even
when the supervening event creates no significant disproportion between the parties’ performances, and yet performing the contract
would result in the financial ruin of the party claiming hardship.
As shown in section IV, the wording of draft article 5.77 suggests that courts might take into account the aggrieved party’s personal situation, as it refers to a change of circumstances which
makes the execution of the contract excessively onerous in a way
that “no one may reasonably demand it.” As for article 1195, while
many authors believe that the objective approach should prevail, 219
others hold that French courts might well take into account the personal conditions of the aggrieved party 220 or are ultimately unsure
about the right approach as it is considered a legal policy decision. 221
As seen above, the French and Belgian legislators have made an express legal policy choice with regard to the provisions on imprévision, as they consider them an expression of the overall goal of
contractual justice pursued by the reforms. Consequently, courts
should lean towards the objective approach, disregarding the financial situation of the party. The goal of contractual justice is to avoid
contractual imbalances, namely a disproportion between the obligations stemming from the contract. Conversely, the subjective approach considers the imbalance between the parties rather than their
performances, and it analyses factors which are external to the
218. TERRÉ ET AL., supra note180, at 717.
219. Id.; CHÉNEDÉ, supra note 167, at 118; Stoffel-Munck, supra note 135, at
33; J. S. Borghetti, La force obligatoire des contrats, DR. ET PATR. 68 (2016); P.
MALAURIE ET AL., DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS 764 (L.G.D.J./Lextenso 2016).
220. Ancel, supra note 4, at para. 78; MERCADAL, supra note 97, at para. 613.
221. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 399.
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contract. This has the pathological effect of discriminating between
commercial parties based on their financial situation: on the one
hand, the application of article 1195 and draft article 5.77 would be
prevented to a successful company with high profits, just because it
would be able to absorb the exceptional costs generated by the loss
of the single transaction; on the other hand, a company close to financial ruin would easily meet the threshold for the excessive onerousness even if, for instance, it makes a loss due to an ordinary price
increase. 222 When the excessiveness is examined with regard to the
transaction alone, the remedy of adaptation is meant to correct contractual injustice; when it is examined in relation to the aggrieved
party’s economic situation, adaptation becomes a grace mechanism. 223 Hardship situations must be exceptional, because they constitute a derogation from the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
Therefore, they cannot encompass the state of indebtedness of the
aggrieved party, as anything could amount to hardship for the debtor
with a sensitive financial situation. This conclusion shall not be hindered by the wording of draft article 5.77 which defines contract
execution as excessively onerous when “no one may reasonably demand it.” The reasonableness test must be conducted with regard to
the exceptional increase in the cost of performance or decrease in
the value of the counter-performance, rather than the personal conditions of the party. Furthermore, in most cases the sensitive financial situation of the party is the result of bad business management.
Consequently, the economic condition of the aggrieved party cannot
be taken into account also because, as shown above, the change of
circumstances must not be attributable to the debtor.
Nevertheless, by way of derogation from the proposed objective
interpretation, the economic condition of the aggrieved party may
indirectly assume some relevance in long-term agreements. Parties
enter into long-term agreements with the aim of building up and
222. Stoffel-Munck, supra note 147, at 58-59.
223. DESHAYES ET AL., supra note 136, at 399.
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maintaining “for several years (usually around 20-25) a relationship
that satisfies the reciprocal interests and expectations.” 224 They invest significant resources in planning a commercial relationship on
which they wish to be able to rely for long.225 Consequently, in determining what makes performance of the parties excessively onerous, courts should first look at what risks the parties have assumed
at the moment of contract conclusion, 226 as they might have implicitly ruled out the possibility of financial ruin. Regarding agreements
for a particular long term, such as joint ventures or franchising contracts, parties might express the desire to enter into a mutually beneficial relationship and impliedly expect a certain outcome or profit
rate from the whole operation. Such contracts might be affected by
a change of circumstances, making performance significantly more
onerous, which causes the aggrieved party’s financial ruin even
though the required threshold for hardship is not met. 227 An example
of that situation is a supervening event which is not limited to a short
period of time, causing the aggrieved party to bear an annual loss.
While the single loss is per se sustainable, this prolonged situation
might expose the aggrieved party, whose financial situation was
sound when parties entered into the agreement, to an impeding financial ruin. 228 Moreover, if this loss could have been foreseen, the
length of the hardship situation may not have been specifically foreseeable. Although in long-term contracts bad years may be offset by
good years, 229 the same loss repeated over the years makes this impossible. Indeed, the impending commercial ruin of the aggrieved
party frustrates the purpose of the contract as it prevents the parties
224. P. FERRARIO, THE ADAPTATION OF LONG-TERM GAS SALE AGREEMENTS
BY ARBITRATORS 72 (Wolters Kluwer 2017).

225. Id. at 73.
226. BRUNNER, supra note 201, at 240-241, 432.
227. Id. at 435. The financial impact on the obligor may become disastrous,
especially when the aggrieved party is a relatively small company for which the
affected contract represents a significant part of its revenues.
228. It is conceivable that the repeated loss might hinder the aggrieved party
from accessing financial credit, the lack of which eventually leads to its bankruptcy.
229. BGE 47 II 440, 458 (1921).
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from reversing the consequences of the hardship situation in the future, so as to achieve in the long-term the minimum expected outcome.
VI. CONCLUSION
The codification of imprévision in France and its codification
attempt in Belgium are part of a larger revitalization of the law of
contracts, aimed at attracting foreign investors through the creation
of a business-friendly legal environment which is able to adapt to
the new social and economic challenges. For this outcome to be
achieved, it is paramount that contractual parties know under which
circumstances they can successfully claim adaptation or termination
of their agreements. However, the approach of the French and Belgian legislators to adopt general legal propositions, without definitions or a detailed regulation of the conditions triggering the application of article 1195 and draft article 5.77, leaves itself open to several questions of interpretation and criticism. In particular, the wide
margins of appreciation given to courts might create uncertainty
among contractual parties, confronted with the risk of different judicial interpretations of the same requirements for imprévision.
It is not unusual in continental legal systems for courts to be
given tremendous leeway in interpreting codified provisions. Nevertheless, it appears appropriate, in order not to frustrate the expectations of contractual parties and to give the legal system some sort
of stability, that courts carry out their hermeneutical activity in a
manner consistent with the three main goals of the French and Belgian reforms: that is, to have a law which is modern, certain and fair.
According to the proposed solution, to strike a balance between
said goals, article 1195 and draft article 5.77 should apply: (1) as for
the time of the change of circumstances, also to events occurring
before the conclusion of the contract, when the parties learn about
their existence only after its conclusion; (2) as for the manifestations
of imprévision, also to situations in which performance becomes
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excessively onerous due to a decrease in the value of the counterperformance received; (3) as for the unforeseeability of the event, to
changes of circumstances which are unforeseeable in their extent,
rather than their nature; (4) as for the excessive onerousness of the
performance, to situations where there is an excessive imbalance between the contractual performances and not between the subjective
conditions of the parties (which can be considered only by way of
exception); (5) as for the attributability of the change of circumstances, only to situations where the hardship event has not been
caused by the actions of the aggrieved party. In particular, such interpretation is not against legal certainty (as conceived by European
countries), as the inclusion of these situations is not contrary to the
wording of the norms. Moreover, it conforms with the goal of modernisation, as these solutions have been adopted by modern projects
for the harmonisation of contract law. Finally, these solutions must
be preferred also on grounds of contractual justice, as they allow
courts to better preserve the contractual balance.
The judicial application of the rules at issue will be paramount
in order to end the doctrinal debate surrounding the requirements for
imprévision. Seeing how the French and Belgian reforms emerged
from a context of historical rejection of the doctrine of imprévision,
it will be interesting to analyse how French and, if ever, Belgian
courts will make use for the first time in their history of the power
to revise contracts in the event of unforeseeable circumstances. In
particular, whether the long-standing judicial tradition to protect the
principle of pacta sunt servanda will lead to a restrictive interpretation of such requirements or whether courts, taking into account the
desire of the legislators to pursue contractual justice, will avoid that
situations of contractual imbalance evade the scope of the rules at
issue, however, without excessively broadening the boundaries of
judicial intervention into contractual affairs.
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ABSTRACT
Even though in Spanish law the act establishing the adoption is
judicial in nature, declarations of will have special relevance in the
process, since they are a necessary precondition for the adoption.
This work focuses on the assent of the biological mother, who is affected by and has an interest in the adoption process, even if not a
party to it herself. In this work, the foundation, configuration, and
characteristics of this assent are studied, as well as the form of her
declaration of will, and the ability of the mother to offer it. Special
attention is paid to the minimum time limit for issuing this declaration. This time limit is based on the European Convention on Adoption and constitutes a legal limitation on women’s autonomy. As an
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alternative to this limitation, we come with a proposal de lege
ferenda which ensures a balance between the need for certain precautions and the free exercise of women’s decision-making power.
This proposal is applicable to all European systems and is consistent with the European Convention, which introduces this limitation on women’s autonomy. Finally, a revision of the European Convention is proposed to adapt it to the growing demand for increased
autonomy for all persons.
Keywords: Spain, adoption, autonomy of will, European Convention on Adoption, filiation, legal capacity, personal acts, protection
of minors, Spanish law
I. INTRODUCTION: ADOPTION AND ITS CONSTITUTIVE ACT
Spanish Law 21/1987, of November 11, amended specific articles of the Civil Code (CC) and the Civil Procedure Law in the area
of adoption with the aim of configuring adoption as an instrument
of family integration for minors without a family life and to fight
against child trafficking. 1 In doing so, the configuration of adoption
as a legal transaction between parents and adopters was left behind,
replaced by a system that constituted adoption through a judicial resolution with prior administrative control. This system, with some
changes, has remained in place until today. The most notable modifications in this regard come from Organic Law 1/1996, of January
15, on the Legal Protection of Minors (OLLPM) and Organic Law
26/2015, of July 28, 2015, on the modification of the System for the
Protection of Children and Adolescents. 2
In contrast to the system of conventional constitutive act, this is
a system of constitution through a public authority, 3 specifically, a
1. The legislator understood—as stated in the Preamble to the act—that
there was an almost complete lack of control over the actions preceding adoption,
something which was “necessary if it is to fulfil its true social purpose of protecting minors deprived of a family life.”
2. Other laws that have amended the Civil Code in this area are: Law
13/2005, Law 54/2007, and Law 15/2015.
3. See the distinction between these two systems made by MIGUEL ÁNGEL
PÉREZ ÁLVAREZ, LA NUEVA ADOPCIÓN 201 et seq. (Civitas 1989).
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judicial authority. Adoption is constituted by judicial resolution as
stated in article 176.1 CC. However, this system relies on strong administrative intervention, given that, save for exceptional cases, the
public entity has the exclusive authority to initiate the judicial proceeding by presenting the adoption proposal before the judge. In addition, before the judicial proceeding, the public entity is responsible
for issuing the declaration of the adopters’ suitability and their selection. 4 Likewise, it has the capacity to create a guardianship for
adoption 5 before the submission of the proposal. 6 On the other hand,
the system does not dispense with the declarations of will of those
who are impacted by the adoption and any other subjects involved. 7
As a rule, the iter implemented is as follows: the public entity
declares the suitability of the adopters, proceeds to their selection
and, when appropriate, creates a guardianship for the purpose of
adoption. Subsequently, it presents the adoption proposal to the
judge thus initiating the judicial adoption procedure. The judge will
gather the pertinent declaration of will and, if necessary, will carry
out a hearing. Included in this are all the steps considered necessary
to assess whether the adoption is appropriate, taking into account the
interests of the adoptee and the suitability of the adopter. Finally, if
the judge considers it appropriate, he or she will issue a constitutive
resolution.
II. DECLARATIONS OF WILL
The fact that the constitutive act is—as indicated—of a judicial
nature does not imply that the will of the persons involved is irrelevant. It is still present, but it has ceased to be constitutive and has
instead become a necessary precondition to the constitutive act. The
4. Art. 176.2-176.3 CC.
5. See art. 176 CC: the guardianship for adoption (“guarda con fines de
adopción”) is an institution that allows the minor who needs protection to live
with their future adopters while the judicial procedure for the constitution of the
adoption is processed.
6. Id.
7. Art. 177 CC.
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adoption is constituted by a resolution of the judge that requires, as
a necessary precondition, the issuance of certain declarations of will.
If these requirements are not met, the adoption cannot be constituted
(doing so regardless would affect its validity). However, the opinions contained in these declarations are not binding on the judge,
who is free to decide on the constitution of the adoption. 8
It seems logical that the will of interested parties should not be
excluded. The parent-child relationship that constitutes adoption
cannot be imposed. It is not a relationship originated in nature but
built by law and based on the will of the persons involved. On the
other hand, adoption does not only concern the new parents and the
adoptive child, but there are other subjects involved whose rights
and legitimate interests must be respected. The fact that their declaration of will is a prerequisite for the constitution of the adoption is
fundamental to guarantee this respect. Finally, declarations of will
provide the judge with valuable elements for his or her final decision. 9
There is not a single category of declarations of will. In fact, the
law distinguishes three types, even attributing to them different
names, according to the degree of involvement of the person in the
adoption and the effectiveness given by law: consent, assent, hearing.
In light of article 177 CC, if the person who expresses his or her
will is a party to the adoption, this declaration is qualified as consent.
Thus, according to the first paragraph of the provision, it is up to the
8. See JOSÉ LUIS LACRUZ BERDEJO ET AL., IV EL NUEVO RÉGIMEN DE LA FAMILIA: ACOGIMIENTO Y ADOPCIÓN 86 et seq. (Civitas 1989). The authors referred

to the manifestations of will as necessary, but not binding, procedural presuppositions. This observation was well received by other authors, such as, for example,
PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 204. See also JOSÉ JAVIER HUALDE SÁNCHEZ, COMENTARIOS A LAS REFORMAS DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL 185 (Bercovitz Rodríguez-Cano ed.,
Tecnos 1993); BARTOLOME VARGAS CABRERA, LA PROTECCIÓN DE MENORES EN
EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO 220 (Comares 1994).
9. See PILAR GUTIÉRREZ SANTIAGO, CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA ADOPCIÓN: DECLARACIONES RELEVANTES 96 (Aranzadi 2000). Gutiérrez highlights how the jurisprudence of the Audiencias Provinciales refers to the intervention of the various persons as evaluative elements.
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adopters and adoptees over the age of twelve to give their consent. 10
Consent must necessarily be given, it can never be waived, and it
must be in favor of the adoption.
If the person who expresses his or her will is not a party to the
adoption, it is considered either assent or a mere hearing, depending
on the degree to which the adoption is affected.
Assent must come from the biological parents of the unemancipated adoptee who have not been deprived of their parental authority, are not involved in a legal case regarding deprivation, or who
have not been suspended in accordance with the terms of article
177.2 of the Civil Code. The spouse or partner of the adopter must
also give assent. In certain cases, the law allows for this declaration
of will to be waived; for example, when those who are to provide it
are unable to do so. However, when this declaration of will is mandatory, it must also be in favor of the adoption.
The judge must simply hear from the following persons: (i) the
parents who have not been deprived of their parental authority when
their assent is not required; (ii) when appropriate, the guardian or
the foster family; and (iii) the adoptee under the age of twelve. It is
not necessary that the will expressed by these persons is in favor of
the adoption, although it is necessary that the hearing exists.
III. RATIONALE FOR THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT
In this study, we will examine the assent of the biological
mother, which is necessary—along with that of the father, if paternity is legally determined—to validly constitute the adoption of the
child.
The Civil Code requires this assent in article 177.2. This assent
is based not on the legal relationship of filiation11 but on parental
10. The exception to the rule is the case of a child under 12 years of age, who,
because of his or her special conditions, even though he or she is a party, is simply
heard.
11. Authors agree on this, see PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 180 et seq.; Ignacio
Díaz de Lezcano Sevillano, Consentimiento, asentimiento y ausencia en la nueva
Ley de Adopción, 590 REVISTA CRÍTICA DE DERECHO INMOBILIARIO 28 (1989);
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authority. 12 This distinction is revealed by the exemption from the
requirement when parental authority no longer exists or is affected.
In particular, the need for the parent’s assent is excluded: (a) when
the adoptee is emancipated, 13 since the adoptee is no longer subject
to the parental authority of his or her biological parents; (b) or when
the parents have been deprived of their parental authority, 14 are involved in a pending case for deprivation or have been suspended
from these rights for two years following a declaration of abandonment. 15 In this sense, the doctrine justifies the need for assent by
noting that adoption extinguishes parental authority 16 and, therefore,
cannot take place outside of it. 17
Eduardo Hijas Fernández, Las manifestaciones de voluntad en la constitución de
la adopción, 583 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO 2748 (1993); VARGAS, supra
note 8, at 232.
12. Parental authority (known as “patria potestad”) is regulated by articles
154 et seq. CC. Art. 154 states the following:
Non-emancipated children shall be under the parents’ parental authority.
Parental authority shall be exercised always for the benefit of the children, according to their personality, and respecting their rights and physical and psychological integrity. This authority comprises the following
duties and powers: 1. To look after them, to have them in their company,
feed them, educate them and provide them with a comprehensive upbringing. 2. To represent them and to manage their property.
13. See arts. 314 et seq. CC. Emancipation occurs by attaining the age of majority (18 years old). But a minor who has reached the age of 16 can be emancipated by his or her parents or a judge. The emancipated minor is no longer under
parental authority and may govern his or her person and property as if he or she
were of age, although in order to perform some acts of special importance he or
she needs the authorization of his or her parents. The juridical relationship between parent and child does not disappear with emancipation.
14. Deprivation of parental authority is regulated in art. 170 CC: “The father
or the mother may be deprived in whole or in part of their authority pursuant to a
judgement on grounds of breach of the duties inherent thereto, or rendered in
criminal or matrimonial proceedings.”
15. Art. 172 CC states:
If the public entity entrusted with the protection of minors in the respective territory were to become aware that a minor is in a situation of neglect, it shall have ipso iure the guardianship of such minor. . . . A situation of neglect shall be deemed to exist de facto as a result of the breach
or the impossible or inadequate exercise of the protection duties set forth
by the laws for the custody of minors, when they should be deprived of
the necessary moral or material assistance.
16. Art. 169.3 CC.
17. See, e.g., José Luis Artero Felipe, El elemento volitivo en la adopción, 12
ACCIONES E INVESTIGACIONES SOCIALES 65 (2001); BLANCA GESTO ALONSO, EL
PROCEDIMIENTO DE ADOPCIÓN 67 (Aranzadi 2013).
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I believe, however, that the assent of the parents must transcend
parental authority and be based on the juridical relationship between
parent and child. Adoption does indeed put an end to parental authority, but it only does so because the filiation bond is extinguished.
What is essential is not that parental authority ends, but that filiation
disappears. Parental authority is merely an institution for the protection of minors that the law links to parenthood. The parental relationship has legal content and a significance in the lives of those
who form a part of it that is much more important in intensity and
extension than the mere attribution of this temporary function-duty.
Through the regulation of filiation, the law attributes legal support
to a relationship that is given by nature itself. The legal bond established according to the rules for determining parentage can only be
destroyed if it is demonstrated in a judicial proceeding that the paternity or maternity is not authentic. If they are valid, the bond remains. Notwithstanding the above, by regulating adoption, the legal
system has provided for the creation of a parent-child relationship
not based on biology. Since the constitution of this new bond necessarily entails the disappearance of the original bond, the biological
parents, as parties directly involved, must take part: the relationship
that the law created to recognize their natural bond will cease to exist. That is the basis of their assent to adoption.
That said, if the parents do not comply with their parental duties
and place their child in a situation of need, then the above mentioned
does not prevent that priority be given to the child’s best interests
over that of their parents. This makes it easier for the State to reintegrate the child into another family through adoption, without the
need for the assent of the biological parents, thus depriving them of
the possibility of deciding on the continuity of the parent-child relationship.
What would exclude the juridical relationship between parent
and child as a basis for parental assent to adoption is the possibility
that an emancipated child could be adopted without the assent of the
parents. This adoption would be a unilateral break of the parent-
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child bond without the child having a real need to be protected or
without the parents having failed in their duties; and this fact would
leave them defenseless. Naturally, precautions should be taken to
avoid the prevention of a fair adoption due to a malicious refusal of
the parents.
It should not be forgotten that the relationship between a parent
and a child is the strongest to exist. If the law is not indifferent to
the more—admittedly—banal or collateral interests of other subjects, such as those of the adopter’s spouse or partner, it should not
disregard the interests that derive from this essential bond. These
are, in fact, interests that are taken into account by international conventions: the Convention on the Rights of the Child states in article
9 that “States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated
from his or her parents against their will” and in article 21, it specifies, concerning adoption, that those persons involved, including the
parents, must give their “informed consent.” The European Convention on Adoption 18 also requires the assent of the parents and that
the parents are duly informed: “of the effects of their consent, in
particular whether or not an adoption will result in the termination
of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of
origin.” And the European Court of Human Rights has stated that
adoption without the assent of the mother may be contrary to the
right to family life proclaimed by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 19
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT
The assent of the biological mother, just as—when applicable—
that of the father, is presented as a necessary but non-binding manifestation of the will of the person who is not a party to the adoptive
bond but is affected by it.

18. European Convention on the Adoption of Children, art. 5(1)(a).
19. See Omorefe c. Espagne, No. 69339/16, June 23, 2020.
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Her favorable will is a condition sine qua non for the valid constitution of the adoption. With that manifestation of her will, the
birth mother, not a party to the bond but affected by it, does not assume the content of the juridical relationship of the adoption, with
the rights and duties that compose it, but authorizes the production
of those effects. 20 This authorization, is necessary, but—just as with
consent—not binding for the judge. The judge is not obligated to
grant the adoption, but once the necessary requirements have been
met, he or she can decide freely in the best interests of the child.
The mere existence of the biological mother, and in some cases
of the legally identified biological father, does not make her assent
to the adoption mandatory, but the concurrence of certain circumstances provided by law is necessary. As already mentioned, the
adoptee must not be emancipated, and the biological parent must not
be deprived of his or her parental authority by a final judgement, nor
have legal grounds for such deprivation, nor have his or her parental
authority suspended within the period of two years after the notification of the declaration of abandonment without opposition or with
opposition dismissed. 21
However, the Civil Code admits the possibility that, when assent
is required due to the circumstances indicated, it can be dispensed
with if the mother who is obliged to provide it is unable to do so.
Reasons for this may include, for example, that her capacity to act
has changed, that she has been declared judicially absent, that her
whereabouts are unknown so that it is impossible to summon her, or
that if, having been summoned, she does not appear. 22
20. This function of authorization of legal effects has already been referred
to by VARGAS supra note 8, at 227. See PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 191, he observes
that assent is not a diminished or attenuated consent but is a qualified consentauthorization for the actions of those who are not subject to the relationship that
is to be constituted by judicial decision. See also Miguel Ángel Pérez Álvarez,
Comentario al art. 177 del Código civil, in CÓDIGO CIVIL COMENTADO 937 (2d
ed., Pedro de Pablo Contreras et al. eds., Civitas 2016).
21. Art. 177.2.2 CC.
22. See art. 177.2 CC; see also art. 38.3, Law 15/2015, of July 2, 2015, Law
on Voluntary Jurisdiction Law [hereinafter LVJ].
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The basis and importance of the mother’s assent have already
been pointed out. However, sometimes, situations of impossibility
or neglect of duties may arise in connection with the manifestation
of this will, which may even block the adoption. In such cases where
the judge cannot count on the mother’s assent, if he or she believes
that adoption is the best option and that it stands a good chance of
being a successful one, preventing the judge from establishing the
adoption would cause significant damage to the minor, who would
be deprived of the protection that this measure of family integration
offers him. For this reason, the legislator—balancing these circumstances and the interests of the child and the mother—is inclined to
favor the benefit of the child. Thus, the legislator regulates the possibility that, in these cases, the adoption can be validly constituted
even without the mandatory assent, sacrificing, if necessary, the possible interest of the mother, who is still a third party in the adoption.
In short, it seeks to avoid a situation in which a failure to comply
with a presupposition—intended to guarantee the interests of a third
party—caused either by impossibility or by the abandonment of obligations of the holder of such interests, might prevent an unprotected minor access to a family-integration measure. It should not be
forgotten that adoption is a measure for the protection of minors.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the law provides for the possibility that a mother who has been unable to give her assent through
no fault of her own may, if certain circumstances arise, request the
termination of the adoption under the terms of article 180.2 CC. 23
As to the particular or abstract nature of the mother’s authorization of effects, article 177.2 in fine expressly excludes the possibility
that in adoptions requiring a prior proposal from the public body,
the assent of the parents may be given to specific adopters. The provision, which had been contained in the Law on Civil Procedure of
1881 in art. 1830 (since 1987), has been relocated to the Civil Code
23. See Antonio Vela Sánchez, Irrevocabilidad, nulidad y extinción de la
adopción, 70 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 1230 et seq. (2017) for a work on the
extinction of adoption.
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by Law 26/2015. In order to avoid irregular actions and child trafficking, the law excludes biological parents from decisions related
to the selection of adopters, which is the responsibility of the administration. To admit assent with respect to specific adopters would
imply interference in the selection work of the public entity, which
would then be seen as subject to the control and approval of the parents. Precisely for this reason, the precept refers to cases in which a
previous proposal is required: when there is no proposal from the
public body, which is the exception, the adopters are determined by
the legally foreseen circumstances and—theoretically—they are not
chosen. 24 On the other hand, in such cases, in reality, either the prohibition is illogical (when the adopter is the spouse or partner of the
parent 25) or it is simply not possible or necessary to obtain their assent (when the parents have died and an uncle is going to adopt the
orphan, 26 when the child is emancipated 27 or when a guardian is going to adopt the child already under their care 28). In view of the
above, it can be said that, in general, the effect authorized by the
biological mother, and in some cases the father, is the rupture of

24. Art. 176 CC states that:
[N]o proposal shall be required if the prospective adoptee meets any of
the following circumstances:
1. Being an orphan and a relative of the adopter in the third degree by
consanguinity or affinity.
2. Being a child of the spouse or person partnered with the adopter in an
emotional relationship akin to marriage.
3. Having been in legal foster care for more than a year under a measure
of a pre-adoptive foster care, or having been under the adopter’s guardianship for the same time.
4. Being of legal age or an emancipated minor.
25. See art. 176.2.2 CC.
26. See art. 176.2.1 CC.
27. See art. 176.2.4 CC.
28. See art. 176.2.3 CC: The prohibition would make sense only in the case
of adoption—without proposal—by the pre-adoptive guardian for more than one
year, as there would have been a prior selection by the public entity and there
could be interference.
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their legal parental bonds and the constitution of new ones, 29 with
indifference as to who these bonds are formed with. 30
Finally, the declaration of the mother’s will is of a strictly personal nature, as it will be shown below. This excludes the possibility
of representation. Proof of this is that, as has been mentioned, article
177.2 CC establishes that assent can be dispensed with when the
person who must give it is unable to do so. 31
V. FORM OF THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT
Law 26/2015 has introduced a new paragraph in article 177 CC,
which refers jointly to the form of issuance of consents and assents:
“they shall be freely granted, with the required legal form and in
writing, after information about the consequences thereof has been
provided.” Since it refers to the “required legal form,” it is necessary
to refer to the specific provisions of the law in this regard: in particular to article 177.2 of the Civil Code and, especially, articles 35.2
and 37.1 of Law 15/2015, of July 2, 2015, on Voluntary Jurisdiction
(LVJ)—which replaces the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law
(LCP). 32
29. It should be noted that except in the case of an open adoption, the possibility of the birth parents having knowledge of the specific adopters proposed is,
or should be, limited. Art. 39.2 LVJ establishes that the proceedings will be carried out with appropriate reservation, avoiding in particular that the family of
origin has knowledge of the adoptive one. So it would not be easy for birth parents
to give their assent to the adopters. This possibility was expressly excluded by
lawmakers in order to reinforce their policy of combating these irregular practices.
30. See PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 184: Pérez Álvarez has observed that what
the law prohibits is that the assent of the parents refer to “specific adopters,” that
is to say, the personalized determination of the adopter, but not the circumstances
that must be present in it. He therefore considers that “nothing precludes the possibility for parents to condition their assent to the fact that the adoptive parents
meet certain circumstances (morality, livelihood, or concurrence of certain family
budgets. . . .).” He adds that “if this is admitted, it would appear that what is excluded is subjectively-conditioned assent, but not assent that would have been
objectively conditioned.” In the same sense, María Angeles Parra Lucán, Autonomía de la voluntad y derecho de familia, in 1 AUTONOMÍA DE LA VOLUNTAD EN
EL DERECHO PRIVADO: ESTUDIOS EN CONMEMORACIÓN DEL 150 ANIVERSARIO DE
LA LEY DEL NOTARIADO 421-422 (Wolters Kluwer 2012).
31. See section VI.
32. Before the LVJ, the matter had been regulated, since 1987, by the Civil
Procedure Act of 1881 under arts. 1829.1(c), 1830. The new law has retained the
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In view of these precepts, the issuance of the biological mother’s
assent is not obligatory before the judge, unlike the consent of those
who are part of the adoption. The law establishes two different moments for the provision of assent—before or after the opening of a
file for a specific adoption and three ways of issuing it: in a public
document, before the public entity, or before the judge, which links
the different phases or moments:
(i) Issuance of assent before the file is opened: the law allows
assent to be given before the adoption file is opened, either before
the public body or in a public document, at the choice of the issuer.
This prior assent must be stated in the proposal of the public entity,
so that the court clerk does not summon the mother and that the
judge is aware of the fulfilment of the requirement. 33
The assent thus given has an expiry period of six months from
its issuance. 34 Although the Voluntary Jurisdiction Law does not expressly say so, it seems that the time at which it must be checked
whether the assent has expired is when the adoption proposal is submitted. This was stated in the previous article 1830.2 LCP. This precept also indicated that, once this period had passed, it was necessary for the assent to be renewed before the judge. The new article
37.1 LVJ does not expressly mention the necessary renewal before
the judge either, but it can be deduced, without a doubt, from the
provision for summoning the subjects in question before the judge.
On the other hand, inasmuch as the law does not establish the
irrevocability of the assent thus given, there does not seem to be any
inconvenience in the possibility that, so long as a file is not initiated,
a retraction of assent may be issued in the same form in which it was
given. In such a case, the mother obligated to give her assent must
be summoned under the terms of article 37.1 LVJ in order to issue
it before the judge, if necessary.
essence of the previous regulation, although with some variation in the wording
of the rules entailing certain substantive changes.
33. See arts. 35.2-35.4 LVJ; see also art. 37.2 LVJ.
34. Art. 37.1.2 LVJ.
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(ii) Issuance of the assent once the file has been opened: once
the file has been opened, the mother who, according to article
177.2 CC, must assent and has not yet done so—either in a public
document or before the public entity—or who, having given her assent more than six months ago such that it has expired, will be summoned to do so before the judge. 35
In regard to the possibility that, having given assent before the
judge, it could be revoked before a decision is made, it is not easily
defensible, just as it happens in the case of consent. Just as consent—of adopters and, if applicable, the adopted—is configured by
the law as an essential element in the constitution of the adoption,
so that it is not possible to imagine an adoption without the favorable
will of those who are a party to it, the same is not true of assent,
since—as has already been explained—the law has no problem in
declaring an adoption without it. It must be also added that a great
deal of damage could be caused to the child by desisting at the last
minute—after the time and energy invested in the procedure—by a
person whose will is not considered essential by the law. 36 For all
these reasons, revocation is not easily justifiable. Notwithstanding
the above, the fact that it does not seem defensible that the mother’s
repentance automatically prevents the constitution of the adoption
does not mean that the judge should disregard it: if he or she is aware
of this circumstance, it should be considered in making the final decision. 37 It should not be forgotten that the judge in the adoption
resolution must decide in accordance with the best interests of the
child. 38

35. Art. 37.1 LVJ.
36. In this sense, you have to count on it. According to Organic Law 8/2015,
of July 22, 2015, art. 2.3(c), the irreversible effect of the passage of time on the
development of the child is an element to be taken into account in determining the
interest of the child.
37. See art. 176.1 CC.
38. See art. 176.1 CC and art. 39.1 LVJ.
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VI. BIRTH MOTHER’S CAPACITY TO ASSENT
The Civil Code does not contain any special provisions regarding the capacity to give assent to adoption. This may pose problems
in cases where the biological mother lacks the general capacity to
act because she has not reached the age of majority 39 or because an
order depriving her of capacity to act has been issued. 40
In such cases, someone could argue that that the assent to the
adoption of the child should be given by the mother’s representatives. However, assent is a strictly personal act, which excludes representation. Proof of this is that the law admits that assent is dispensed with when the one who must give it is unable to do so. 41 It
should be remembered that strictly personal acts are those that, due
to their importance or centrality, can only be performed by the person herself. For these acts, the natural capacity to give valid consent
is sufficient, and representation is excluded. Insofar as the mother’s
assent implies the elimination of the legal mother-child relationship
and the consequent modification of her “civil status,” 42 it falls within
the category of a personal act. Because of this, no one can supplant
her in this decision. Therefore, her natural capacity should be sufficient to issue her assent.

39. See art. 322 CC.
40. See art. 199 CC. See also art. 322 CC. In Spanish law “A person who is
of legal age (18 years old) has capacity for all acts of civil life. . . .” But when the
person of legal age does not have the natural capacity to govern himself, he or she
may be deprived of the capacity to act in law by means of a judicial decision. Art.
199 CC. states: “No one may be declared incapable save pursuant to a court judgement due to the causes set forth in the law.” And art. 200 CC states: “Persistent
physical or mental illnesses or deficiencies which prevent a person from governing himself shall be causes for incapacitation.” A legally incapacitated person has
a guardian who takes care of his or her person and property and who can represent
him or her.
41. See art. 177.2 CC.
42. In Spanish law, “civil status” includes personal situations, endowed with
a certain stability and permanence, which influence the person’s capacity to act
or determine the attribution of specific rights or duties, and which the legal system
considers fundamental for the organization of society, thereby granting them the
same formal regime which basically affects the allocation of certain shares and
the peculiarities of their evidence.
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Concerning the natural capacity to perform strictly personal acts,
the law sometimes establishes a general presumption of aptitude for
specific acts when the person reaches a certain age, thus avoiding
the need to examine capacity in each specific case. For example, in
the case of a will—with the exception of a holographic will—there
is a general presumption of natural capacity to create a valid will
after the age of fourteen. 43 In the case of a marriage, the law indirectly presumes that from the age of sixteen onwards the person has
the capacity to consent to the marriage. 44 When recognizing children, it is also indirectly presumed that the person has the full natural
capacity to do so from the age of sixteen onwards, excluding the
need for judicial approval. 45
This does not hold in the specific case of assent to adoption,
where the law does not establish a presumption of natural capacity
from a specific age. This provision does not seem to impede having
the assent of a minor biological mother as a necessary requirement
for the valid constitution of the adoption. 46 This presumption is all
the more true if one takes into account the legislator’s choice to
make mandatory the will of the minor regarding the adoption: it requires the consent of the adoptee older than twelve and allows dual
adoption by a minor spouse (when the other spouse has reached the
age of twenty-five). 47 On this matter, the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) considered an adoption void on the grounds that the
assent given by the minor biological mother corresponded to a fictitious adoption. 48

43. See arts. 663.1, 688 CC.
44. Compare art. 46 CC with arts. 317, 320 CC.
45. Compare art. 121 CC with arts. 46, 317, 320 CC.
46. Pérez is inclined to consider the mother’ assent to be mandatory in cases
of minority status: see PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 188 n.229; And, in the same vein,
see VARGAS, supra note 8, at 233: in relation to parents, Vargas Cabrera observes
that “the condition of father or mother and sufficient discernment will suffice to
give the corresponding declaration of will.”
47. PÉREZ, supra note 3.
48. See Judgement of the Tribunal Supremo of Jan. 18, 2012.
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Since there is no legal presumption of natural capacity to assent
to an adoption based on age, it is necessary to evaluate on a case-bycase basis whether the biological mother has such natural capacity.
Given that the degree of physical maturity necessary for a woman to
be able to procreate requires her to have reached an age at which she
will normally have acquired some capacity for discernment, she will
usually be in a position to assent, except in situations of too-early
motherhood.
If the biological mother is mentally disabled and a declaration of
incapacity exists, the declaration will usually delimit her legal capacity to assent. If nothing is specified in the declaration or there is
no declaration, she will only lack the capacity to validly assent if
that particular circumstance entails a lack of natural capacity to understand the adoption. 49
In the exceptional case that the mother lacks natural capacity,
she will not be able to give valid assent and, given the strictly personal nature of the act, it will also not be possible—as was previously mentioned—for it to be given by proxy. However, this will
not paralyze the adoption, since the situation fits the de facto case of
“impossibility” mentioned in article 177.2 CC, which allows the
judge to waive the assent and continue with the adoption regardless.
In such cases, however, the mother will simply be heard by the
judge. 50
It should be noted that the strictly personal nature of the mother’s
assent to the adoption excludes not only representation but also assistance: she must give it herself and on her own, without the need,
if she is a minor or is legally incapacitated, for her decision to be
49. These sources also allude to the lack of discernment when there is no
judgement: see MANUEL FELIÚ REY, COMENTARIOS DE LA LEY DE ADOPCIÓN 151
(Tecnos 1989); see also VARGAS, supra note 8, at 240; Roncesvalles Barber Cárcamo, La filiación adoptiva, in 5 TRATADO DE DERECHO DE FAMILIA 701 (2d ed.,
Mariano Yzquierdo Tolsada & Matilde Cuena Casa eds., Aranzadi 2017); Carmen
Callejo Rodríguez, El asentimiento a la adopción de los padres del adoptando no
emancipado, 9 LA LEY DERECHO DE FAMILIA: REVISTA JURÍDICA SOBRE FAMILIA
Y MENORES 13 (2016).
50. See art. 177.3.1 CC.
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accompanied by the consent of her representatives, as is the case
with any act of this nature (will, marriage, recognition of children,
etc.). 51 The parents of the minor or incapacitated mother do not even
have to be heard by the judge. Although traditionally the Civil Code
has relied on expressions of will from other relatives or persons related to the parties to the adoption, Law 21/1987 simplified the
lineup in order to speed up and favor the adoption. However, the fact
that the hearing is not mandatory does not mean that the judge cannot carry it out, if he or she deems it appropriate: article 39.1 LVJ
empowers him or her to “order as many procedural acts as he or she
considers appropriate.”
Finally, it should be noted that, in any case (and as a last resort),
the decision as to whether the adoption is appropriate is in the hands
of the judge, 52 which means that assent is not exempt from judicial
control. In this way, the situation of the minor or the incapacitated
mother is not different from that provided for by the law in other
strictly personal acts in which, given their transcendence, judicial
approval is required. This is what happens, for example, in the case

51. It is surprising that, in the judgement of the Tribunal Supremo of Jan. 18,
2012, the Court unexplainably expressed the idea that the assent of the minor
mother would have required the concurrence of her parents. This can only be justified by the fact that the assent of the biological mother is based on her exercise
of parental authority over her child insofar as art. 157 CC provides that the unemancipated minor shall exercise parental authority with the assistance of his or
her parents. In this regard, it should be noted that some authors have understood,
along these lines, that assent is contained in the functions of parental authority:
see Barber, supra note 49, at 706. Without denying that, in most cases, the parents
agree to the adoption for the sake of the child and are therefore carrying out an act
of protection proper to the exercise of this power, it should not be overlooked that
this is not always the case (at least directly): a parent may assent to the adoption
simply because, thinking of himself or herself, he or she does not want a parental
relationship; and, on the other hand, the relationship with the child is more than
parental authority, therefore—as already stated—the basis of assent goes beyond
this power and lies in the parental relationship. This precludes the application of
art. 157 CC to the assent of the biological mother and excludes the need for parental assistance. On the other hand, this entails—as has been developed in the
text—its consideration as a strictly personal act, which can only be carried out by
the person himself, personally and solely, eliminating the intervention of the parents or representatives.
52. See art. 176 CC.
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of recognition of children by those judged mentally incapable or minors. 53
In view of the above, it is desirable to introduce into article
177 CC a specific regulation of the biological mother’s capacity to
assent to the adoption in order to avoid the court having to infer it
by resorting to a systematic interpretation. This is particularly critical because it is not uncommon for the biological mother to be a
minor, especially when the adoption takes place immediately after
birth. Adding this regulation would prevent doubt and provide legal
certainty.
VII. THE SIX-WEEK PERIOD: A LIMITATION ON THE AUTONOMY OF
WOMEN’S WILL
Since the 1987 reform, the Civil Code has contained a limitation
on the biological mother’s ability to give assent, which has recently
been intensified. The European Convention on the Adoption of Children, executed in Strasbourg on April 24, 1967, established in article
5.4 a minimum period of six weeks after birth for the mother to give
her assent to adoption. Some countries have included this period—
or an even longer one—as part of their legislation. 54 Others dispensed with a minimum period. 55 Spain did not ratify the Convention and opted—as Pérez Álvarez notes 56—for an intermediate position between the six-week period set by the Convention and the absence of a time limit, setting instead a minimum period of 30 days
from birth. Initially, the period envisaged in the 1987 Law Draft was
fifteen days, but an amendment passed, extending it to thirty days.57
53. See art. 121 CC.
54. See PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 187, n.226; England and Germany are cited
as examples.
55. Id. at 187. Pérez Álvarez noted that the idea of the time limit was not
without controversy: the limit was criticized because the mother’s relationship
with her child could make adoption difficult.
56. Id.
57. See BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, III legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos
de Ley, Mar. 13, 1987 No. 22-4, 25. See also the report of the conference favorable to its acceptance: BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, III legislatura, Serie A:
Proyectos de Ley, June 2, 1987, No. 22-5, 67; and the approval by the
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The 2008 European Convention on the Adoption of Children,
which replaced the 1967 Convention, establishes in article 5.5 that
“[a] mother’s consent to the adoption of her child shall be valid
when it is given at such time after the birth of the child, not being
less than six weeks, as may be prescribed by law. . . .” It also gives
countries the option of not specifying a particular period, instead allowing the mother to give her assent when the competent authority
determines that she has recovered from the consequences of childbirth. Since Spain has ratified the European Convention on Adoption, the 2015 reform has been used to adapt the Civil Code to the
new international standard, opting, along the lines maintained since
1987, to establish a specific period of time, surely because it is considered to provide more certainty. Thus, Law 26/2015 has modified
article 177.2.2 CC and has extended the period during which the
mother can assent to the adoption, from thirty days to six weeks from
the birth: “The assent of the mother cannot be given until six weeks
have elapsed since the birth.” 58
This means that a woman’s assent is not valid during pregnancy
or even after delivery, so long as six weeks have not passed. This
was made clear by the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) in its
well-known September 21, 1999 decision, which was handed down
Commission with full legislative competence: BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, III legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos de Ley, June 20, 1987, No. 22-6, 90.
58. The number of countries that have ratified the Convention is low. Such
countries usually provide for a longer minimum period, but not only for the
mother but for the two parents: eight weeks in Germany (§ 1747 BGB: “Die Einwilligung kann erst erteilt werden, wenn das Kind acht Wochen alt ist.”) and Finland (Section 15, Act No. 22/2012, adopted on Jan. 20, 2012: “A parent’s consent
to an adoption may not be received until the parent has had the opportunity to
consider the matter thoroughly and eight weeks have elapsed from the birth of the
child.”); two months in Belgium (art. 348.4 Code civil: “La mère et le père ne
peuvent consentir à l’adoption que deux mois après la naissance de l’enfant.”) and
Norway (Section 10, Act of June 16, 2017, No. 48 relating to adoption: “the parents’ consent may not be given until two months after the birth of the child.”);
sixty days in Romania (art. 466 C.Civ.: “Consimţământul la adopţie al părinţilor
fireşti sau, după caz, al tutorelui poate fi dat numai după trecerea unui termen de
60 de zile de la data naşterii copilului.”); three months in Denmark (The Danish
Adoption Act, No. 8: “Consent cannot be accepted before three (3) months after
the birth of the child, unless special circumstances prevail.”).
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under the previous version of the provision. The court considered
null and void, in violation of a mandatory rule, the assent to adoption
given by a woman in her eighth month of pregnancy in a document
explaining that she could not take care of her child because of family, social, emotional and economic circumstances and stating that
she had been informed of her rights and the consequences of her
assent. 59
Given the importance of assent to adoption, the reason for the
rule contained in article 177 CC is to allow the woman to achieve
the emotional stability necessary to evaluate the different options
with perspective and calm and to decide with full freedom and conscience. 60 Similarly, the Council of Europe has explained that the
objective of article 5.5 of the European Convention on Adoption is
“to avoid premature adoptions to which mothers give their consent
as a result of pressure exerted before the birth of the child or before
their physical health and psychological balance have been restored
after the child’s birth.” 61 On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that
the prohibition to give consent during pregnancy also has the
59. On this judgement, see, e.g., among others: María Ballesteros de los Ríos,
Reclamación de filiación materna frustrada por la no práctica de una prueba
biológica esencial y adopción declarada nula por asentimiento prestado con anterioridad al parto, 13 DERECHO PRIVADO Y CONSTITUCIÓN 37 et seq. (1999);
GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 9, at 132 et seq.
60. The amendment of the 1987 draft law, which led to the extension of the
period from 15 to 30 days, was justified on the grounds that the period was too
short and that it was appropriate to extend it so that the mother, who had already
recovered, was “in full freedom and conscience to gauge the seriousness of the
act of assent to the adoption of her child.” See BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados,
III legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos de Ley, Mar. 13, 1987, No. 22-4, 25. The aforementioned Judgement of the Tribunal Supremo of Sept. 21, 1999 explains that
“the reasons for this legal caution are explained by the need to ensure that the
essential faculties of freedom and conscience are fully present in the biological
mother, so that she can carefully and serenely measure the renunciation of the
exercise of her motherhood with the child’s release for adoption.” And, more recently, in the Report on the Preliminary Draft of 2015, the General Council of the
Judiciary expressed its support for the extension of the deadline to six weeks as it
ensures “the greatest possible peace of mind and the freedom of the mother to
grant her assent,” see Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Informe del Consejo
General del Poder Judicial al Anteproyecto de Ley de Protección a la Infancia
84 (Sept. 30, 2014).
61. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the European Convention on
the Adoption of Children (Revised) 6, #202 (Strasbourg, Nov. 27, 2008).
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objective of fighting against child trafficking and even against practices that may favor surrogacy, which is prohibited by Spanish law.
Given the good intentions of the legislator that can be seen in the
inclusion of this caution, this waiting period has been accepted naturally and without further discussion. 62 However, perhaps it is time
for further reflection on this issue, not only at the national level but
also at the European level, in light of the new social and legal realities and trends.
In recent years, there has been an increase in the autonomy of
the will in all areas, especially in the areas of persons and family. 63
This autonomy extends to all persons, including those who have traditionally been protected by depriving them of their capacity to decide because of their special characteristics. 64 A reform of the Spanish Civil Code is planned to remove the judicial incapacity of persons with disabilities 65 in order to adapt the internal order to the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). This Convention changes the paradigm and establishes
that the autonomy of the will of these persons must be promoted and

62. See, e.g., FELIÚ, supra note 49, at 151; VARGAS, supra note 8, at 237;
GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 9, at 131; Artero, supra note 17, at 67; GESTO, supra note
17, at 70 et seq.; Sonia Calaza López, El nuevo proceso de filiación por adopción,
36 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL 240 (2015); Cárcamo, supra note
49, at 715-716; Callejo, supra note 49, at 6-7; Carlos Martínez de Aguirre Aldaz,
La historia interminable: una nueva reforma de la adopción, in EL NUEVO RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DEL MENOR: LA REFORMA LEGISLATIVA DE 2015 342 (Maria Victoria Mayor del Hoyo ed., Aranzadi 2017).
63. On the subject, see Parra, supra note 30, at 97 et seq.
64. On the new trend in favor of the autonomy of persons with disabilities
generated since the 2006 U.N. Convention on the Rights of Personas and Disabilities, see, e.g., MONTSERRAT PEREÑA VICENTE ET AL., LA VOLUNTAD DE LA PERSONA PROTEGIDA: OPORTUNIDADES RIESGOS Y SALVAGUARDAS (Dykinson 2018);
SOFIA DE SALAS MURILLO & MARIA VICTORIA MAYOR DEL HOYO, CLAVES PARA
LA ADAPTACIÓN DEL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO PRIVADO A LA CONVENCIÓN DE
NACIONES UNIDAS EN MATERIA DE DISCAPACIDAD (Tirant lo Blanch 2019).
65. See Anteproyecto de Ley por la que se reforma la legislación civil y procesal para el apoyo a las personas con discapacidad en el ejercicio de su capacidad jurídica (Jan. 2019).
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protected: they must be able to decide for themselves, and they have
the right to make mistakes. 66
This trend that empowers the autonomy of the will clashes with
the paternalism that the law still maintains, in matters of adoption,
with respect to pregnant women or women who have just become
mothers. The Code, finding its justification in the importance of the
decision, deprives women in these circumstances of any possibility
to decide on the matter, on the assumption that they lack the capacity
to do so. This is an irrebuttable presumption, i.e., one which does
not admit evidence to the contrary. This presumption, in addition to
affecting the free development of the woman’s personality, may
place her in a complicated situation, extending the suffering and
psychological burden that may be involved in having a pending decision regarding her child and going through the issuance of assent.
However, this lack of confidence in the decision-making capacity of
the pregnant woman has been abandoned by the legislator in other
areas: the law itself, in Organic Law 2/2010, of March 3, 2010, on
Sexual and Reproductive Health and the Voluntary Interruption of
Pregnancy (in which no limitations of this type are introduced), defends the importance of the autonomy of the woman’s will in matters of filiation. It maintains that the decision about children “constitutes one of the most intimate and personal matters that people
face throughout their lives, which integrates an essential area of individual self-determination” and that “the protection of this area of
personal autonomy has a singular significance for women.” 67
It cannot be ignored that, at times, the emotional tension—characteristic of human beings—that surrounds the birth of a child, as
well as the pressure of certain personal, economic, and social circumstances, can constitute a handicap in decision-making regarding
the relationship of filiation. It is, therefore, understandable that the
66. See U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General
Comment No. 1, Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law (2014),
https://perma.cc/U7TF-QMQ6.
67. See Organic Law 2/2010, of March 3, 2010, on Sexual and Reproductive
Health and the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy, Section I of the Preamble.
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legal system should adopt some caution that takes this reality into
account for the benefit of all parties.
However, the legislator must find a balance between this caution
and the exercise of the decision-making power. It must also take into
account all those involved. It is true that in the tension that surrounds
birth there is an important physical component that (obviously) only
affects women and that can even be complicated by conditions such
as postpartum depression. 68 However, this tension does not have an
exclusively physical origin, but rather has another psychological
component that derives naturally from the arrival of a child into the
world and is present in both parents. Therefore, even if it is not what
is usually done, when filiation is determined with regard to the father, (for example, because of the existence of marriage 69) these
considerations should also be taken into account with regard to him.
In order to ensure this integrative balance, the law could allow
parents to give their assent to adoption at any time during pregnancy
and at any time after birth, but with the possibility of freely revoking
it within a period of time, which could be, for example, during the
two or three months immediately following birth. 70 The determination of the period of revocability should take into account the child’s

68. On the subject, see DANIELA WADIA JARUFE CONTRERAS, TRATAMIENTO
LEGAL DE LAS FILIACIONES NO BIOLÓGICAS EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO ESPAÑOL: ADOPCIÓN VERSUS TÉCNICAS DE REPRODUCCIÓN HUMANA ASISTIDA 241-242

(Dykinson 2013).
69. See art. 116 CC.
70. This possibility is not alien to the legislator, who already raised it in the
drafting of the 1987 Act. Thus, the first Draft Law, of Mar. 10, 1986, proposed
the following wording of art. 176.3 CC: “The irrevocable assent of the mother of
the adoptee shall not be accepted until fifteen days have elapsed since the birth”
(emphasis added). In favor of it, see PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 187, n.228. In some
previous work I already defended the prior provision of a revocable assent: see
Maria Victoria Mayor del Hoyo, Más allá del acogimiento de menores: incapacitados, tercera edad y nasciturus, 734 REVISTA CRÍTICA DE DERECHO INMOBILIARIO 3235-3236 (2012); MARIA VICTORIA MAYOR DEL HOYO, LA ADOPCIÓN EN
EL DERECHO COMÚN ESPAÑOL 243 et seq. (Tirant lo Blanch 2019). In the same
vein, see Parra, supra note 30, at 422. also spoke in favor of a system similar to
this one, setting the deadline for revocation within two months after childbirth:
see JARUFE, supra note 68, at 241 (previously, in the defense of his doctoral dissertation, he already advocated this possibility).
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interest in not prolonging uncertainty in order to avoid the irreversible effect of the passage of time on his or her development. 71
In particular, a system could be set up to provide assent in the
form of a public document that can be registered ex officio by the
notary in a registry created ad hoc. Once the assent has been issued
in these terms, the parents could, at any moment before the deadline
set by law, change their mind in a new notarized document. Once
this period of time has elapsed without exercise of the power of revocation, the assent given would automatically become firm and no
new manifestation of will—not even a confirmation of the previous
one—would be necessary. With that firmness, the manifestation of
will would acquire—by virtue of the law—the juridical condition of
valid assent to adopt, that is assent ad adoptionem, and would open
the door to the possible constitution of the adoption. Moreover, this
assent would not expire. The public body and the judge would only
need to consult the assent kept in the registry.
This is my proposal de lege ferenda: this proposal would allow
respect for the autonomy of the will of women who would not be
deprived of their capacity to decide because they are in a state of
gestation or have recently given birth, favoring the free development
of their personality and facilitating things at a difficult time for them,
in a manner that is coherent with the rest of the order and the new
social reality.
At the same time, it would allow the introduction of a prudent
caution that, given the complexity of the situation, could be of help,
both by offering calm to those making the decision and by facilitating, if necessary, conformation with the perspective of the will. It
could even be said that this option allows for greater perspective,
given that the proposed system would allow the extension of the
term given to consider the decision.

71. See Organic Law 8/2015, of July 22, 2015, art. 2.3 c).
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The proposal would not be detrimental to the child since the
limit to the power of revocation would be determined by the child’s
interest.
The proposal would also enable birth parents to be placed on an
equal footing with respect to each other, by adapting the system once
again to the new social sensibilities.
The proposal would solve the problem, already denounced by
the Special Committee of the Senate that studied the adoption, 72 that
sometimes causes the disappearance of the mother when she leaves
the hospital, before the deadline for her to give her assent to the
adoption has passed.
The system would in no way constitute an adoption of the nasciturus, insofar as the adoption could only be constituted from the
moment the assent became final. And, moreover, the current adoption procedure is designed, as already stated, to firmly prevent any
irregular practice related to child trafficking or other actions prohibited by law. It should be remembered, on the one hand, that it is the
responsibility of the public entity to declare the suitability and selection of the adopters and that, except in the case of assessed cases,
for an adoption file to be opened it must be proposed by the public
entity. And, on the other hand, the adoption is constituted by judicial
resolution with the guarantees that this implies.
Finally, from a teleological point of view, the system would not
conflict with the European Convention on Adoption, given that the
mother’s assent would only be understood to have been given, in the
strict or technical sense, once the previously expressed wish had become firm because the two or three months following the birth, fixed
by law, had elapsed without revocation. Only at that time, and not
before (as it is subject to revocation), would the will be said to acquire the legal status of assent and be valid. In any case, it would be
desirable that in future revisions of the European Convention on
72. See Informe de la Comisión Especial de Estudio de la problemática de la
adopción nacional y otros temas afines, BOCG, Senado, IX legislatura, Series I,
Nov. 17, 2010, No. 545, at 9, 17, 20, 49, 53.
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Adoption, the content of article 5.5 be reconsidered, in order to adapt
it to the new realities and to avoid inappropriate limitations on the
woman’s capacity to decide.
Until this revision of the European Convention on Adoption is
done, the proposal may be extrapolated, with the appropriate adaptations, to the other European legal systems mentioned above that
have ratified the Convention and that, following the provisions of
the Convention, limit the autonomy of the will of women by setting
a minimum time limit for giving assent to adoption.

BILINGUAL ENGLISH-SPANISH LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE,
BOOK I, TITLES IV-X
Mariano Vitetta *
In Volume 13, Number 1, of the Journal of Civil Law Studies,
we published an introduction to the Louisiana Civil Code Spanish
Translation Project 1 together with the first articles (Titles I through
III) translated into Spanish. 2 Now, in addition to the trilingual English-French-Spanish version of Book IV we are also publishing in
this number, 3 we are offering our readers a translation of the rest of
Book I, including Titles IV through X. With this piece, the translation into Spanish of Book I is published in full in this Journal and is
soon to appear on the webpage of the LCCO project. 4 More titles in
Spanish will follow in upcoming issues of the Journal.
This translation into Spanish was done by Mariano Vitetta, under the supervision of Olivier Moréteau. María Natalia Rezzonico
contributed as an assistant translator and reviser. A final review was
done by the Validation Committee made up by Jimena Andino Dorato (Montreal, Canada), Francisco Alterini (Buenos Aires, Argentina), Ignacio Alterini (Buenos Aires, Argentina), Ricardo Chiesa
(Buenos Aires, Argentina), Alejandro Garro (New York, United
States of America), Aniceto Masferrer (Valencia, Spain), Luis
Muñiz Argüelles (San Juan, Puerto Rico), Agustín Parise (Maastricht, The Netherlands), Julio César Rivera (Buenos Aires,
* Research Associate, Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State University; M.A. in English-Spanish Legal Translation and LL.B. (University of Buenos Aires), LL.M. (Louisiana State University).
1. Mariano Vitetta, A Brief Introduction to the Louisiana Civil Code Spanish
Translation Project, 13 J. CIV. L. STUD. 161 (2020).
2. Louisiana Civil Code: Preliminary Title, Book I, Titles I, II, III, 13 J. CIV.
L. STUD. 165 (2020).
3. Olivier Moréteau & Mariano Vitetta, Trilingual Louisiana Civil Code,
Book IV: Conflicts of Laws in English, French, and Spanish, 13 J. CIV. L. STUD.
351 (2020).
4. Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana Civil Code Online, LSU Law,
https://perma.cc/GEQ3-XWFC.
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Argentina), Andrés Sánchez Herrero (Rosario, Argentina), and
Lécia Vicente (Baton Rouge, United States of America). Most members have contributed remarks and have helped improve the quality
of the translation.
As was done in the French translation, when the text of an article
dates back to the 1870 Louisiana Civil Code, the original French has
been followed as the source text, rather than the English. 5 This is the
case, for example, of articles 299, 300, and 338, in which translator’s
notes have been inserted.
The Center of Civil Law Studies looks forward to any comments
on the translation that readers may have. We welcome corrections,
as well as proposals to improve the Spanish text.

5. Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code in French: Translation and
Retranslation, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223 (2016) (“Staying faithful to the original language used in the Code and its sources is a priority in this project, given the fact
that the French version of the Civil Code, whenever traceable, is recognized by
the courts as authoritative, whenever the English may contradict the French”).
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BOOK I. OF PERSONS

LIBRO I. DE LAS PERSONAS

(…)

(…)

TITLE IV. HUSBAND AND
WIFE

TÍTULO IV. DEL MARIDO Y LA
MUJER

CHAPTER 1. MARRIAGE:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES

CAPÍTULO 1. DEL
MATRIMONIO: PRINCIPIOS
GENERALES

[Acts 1987, No. 886, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 886 de 1987,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1988].

Art. 86. Marriage is a legal
relationship between a man and a
woman that is created by civil
contract. The relationship and the
contract are subject to special rules
prescribed by law.

Art. 86. El matrimonio es la
relación jurídica entre un hombre
y una mujer creada mediante
contrato civil. La relación y el
contrato están sujetos a las reglas
especiales establecidas en la ley.

Art. 87. The requirements for
the contract of marriage are:
The absence of legal
impediment.
A marriage ceremony.
The free consent of the parties
to take each other as husband and
wife, expressed at the ceremony.

Art. 87. Son requisitos del
contrato de matrimonio:
La ausencia de impedimento
legal.
La ceremonia de matrimonio.
El libre consentimiento de las
partes para tomarse mutuamente
como marido y mujer, expresado
en la ceremonia.

Art. 88. A married person may
not contract another marriage.

Art. 88. La persona casada no
podrá contraer otro matrimonio.

Art. 89. Persons of the same sex
may not contract marriage with
each other. A purported marriage
between persons of the same sex
contracted in another state shall be
governed by the provisions of Title
II of Book IV of the Civil Code.
[Acts 1999, No. 890, §1.]

Art. 89. Las personas del mismo
sexo no podrán contraer
matrimonio entre sí. El supuesto
matrimonio entre personas del
mismo sexo contraído en otro
estado se regirá por las
disposiciones del Título II del
Libro IV del Código Civil. [Sec. 1,
ley n.o 890 de 1999].
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Art. 90. A. The following
persons may not contract marriage
with each other:
(1) Ascendants and descendants.
(2) Collaterals within the fourth
degree, whether of the whole or of
the half blood.

Art. 90. A. Las siguientes
personas no podrán contraer
matrimonio entre sí:
1) Ascendientes y descendientes.
2) Parientes colaterales dentro
del cuarto grado, consanguíneos
por ambos o por uno de los
progenitores.

B. The impediment exists
whether the persons are related by
consanguinity or by adoption.
Nevertheless, persons related by
adoption, though not by blood, in
the collateral line within the fourth
degree may marry each other if
they obtain judicial authorization
in writing to do so. [Acts 2004,
No. 26, §1.]

B. El impedimento rige tanto
entre personas emparentadas por
consanguinidad como por
adopción. No obstante, las
personas emparentadas por
adopción, pero no por
consanguinidad, en la línea
colateral dentro del cuarto grado
podrán contraer matrimonio entre
sí en caso de obtener autorización
judicial por escrito al efecto. [Sec.
1, ley n.o 26 de 2004].

Art. 91. The parties must
participate in a marriage ceremony
performed by a third person who is
qualified, or reasonably believed
by the parties to be qualified, to
perform the ceremony. The parties
must be physically present at the
ceremony when it is performed.

Art. 91. Las partes deben
participar en una ceremonia de
matrimonio celebrada por un
tercero que esté habilitado o que
las partes crean, con fundamentos
razonables, que lo esté, para tal
acto. Las partes deben estar
presentes físicamente al momento
de la celebración de la ceremonia.

Art. 92. A marriage may not be
contracted by procuration.

Art. 92. No se podrá celebrar el
matrimonio por poder.

Art. 93. Consent is not free
when given under duress or when
given by a person incapable of
discernment.

Art. 93. El consentimiento no es
libre cuando se presta bajo
coerción o cuando quien lo presta
carece de discernimiento.
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CHAPTER 2. NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE

CAPÍTULO 2. DE LA NULIDAD
DEL MATRIMONIO

[Acts 1987, No. 886, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 886 de 1987,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1988].

Art. 94. A marriage is
absolutely null when contracted
without a marriage ceremony, by
procuration, or in violation of an
impediment. A judicial declaration
of nullity is not required, but an
action to recognize the nullity may
be brought by any interested
person.

Art. 94. El matrimonio es nulo
de nulidad absoluta cuando es
contraído sin ceremonia de
matrimonio, por poder o a pesar
de la existencia de un
impedimento. No se requiere
declaración judicial de nulidad,
pero cualquier persona interesada
puede iniciar una acción para el
reconocimiento de la nulidad.

Art. 95. A marriage is relatively
null when the consent of one of the
parties to marry is not freely given.
Such a marriage may be declared
null upon application of the party
whose consent was not free. The
marriage may not be declared null
if that party confirmed the
marriage after recovering his
liberty or regaining his
discernment.

Art. 95. El matrimonio es nulo
de nulidad relativa cuando el
consentimiento de una de las
partes para contraerlo no se presta
de manera libre. Tal matrimonio
podrá ser anulado a petición de la
parte cuyo consentimiento no fue
libre. El matrimonio no se podrá
anular si esa persona confirmó el
matrimonio después de haber
recuperado la capacidad de
prestar su consentimiento
libremente o de haber recobrado el
discernimiento.

Art. 96. An absolutely null
marriage nevertheless produces
civil effects in favor of a party who
contracted it in good faith for as
long as that party remains in good
faith. When the cause of the nullity
is one party's prior undissolved
marriage, the civil effects continue
in favor of the other party,

Art. 96. El matrimonio nulo de
nulidad absoluta produce, no
obstante, efectos civiles a favor de
la parte que lo contrajo de buena
fe en tanto esa parte conserve la
buena fe. Cuando la causa de la
nulidad es el matrimonio anterior
no disuelto de una de las partes,
perduran los efectos civiles a favor
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regardless of whether the latter
remains in good faith, until the
marriage is pronounced null or the
latter party contracts a valid
marriage. When the cause of the
nullity is an impediment of age, the
marriage produces civil effects in
favor of a child of the parties.
When the cause of the nullity is
another reason, a marriage
contracted by a party in good faith
produces civil effects in favor of a
child of the parties. A purported
marriage between parties of the
same sex does not produce any
civil effects. [Amended by Acts
2019, No. 401, § 1.]

de la otra parte,
independientemente de que esta
última conserve o no la buena fe,
hasta que se declare la nulidad del
matrimonio o esa otra parte
celebre un matrimonio válido.
Cuando la causa de la nulidad es
un impedimento debido a la edad,
el matrimonio produce efectos
civiles a favor de los hijos de las
partes. Cuando la causa de la
nulidad es otra,el matrimonio
contraído de buena fe por una
parte produce efectos civiles a
favor de los hijos de las partes. El
supuesto matrimonio entre partes
del mismo sexo no produce ningún
efecto civil. [Modificado por Sec.
1, ley n.o 401 de 2019].

Art. 97. A relatively null
marriage produces civil effects
until it is declared null.

Art. 97. El matrimonio nulo de
nulidad relativa produce efectos
civiles hasta que se declare su
nulidad.

CHAPTER 3. INCIDENTS AND
EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE
[Acts 1987, No. 886, § 1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988.]

CAPÍTULO 3. DE LAS
INCIDENCIAS Y DE LOS
EFECTOS DEL MATRIMONIO
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 886 de 1987,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1988].

Art. 98. Married persons owe
each other fidelity, support, and
assistance.

Art. 98. Las personas casadas
se deben mutuamente fidelidad,
socorro y asistencia.

Art. 99. Spouses mutually
assume the moral and material
direction of the family, exercise
parental authority, and assume the

Art. 99. Ambos cónyuges se
encargan de la conducción moral y
material de la familia, ejercen la
autoridad parental y asumen las
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moral and material obligations
resulting therefrom.

obligaciones morales y materiales
que de ello resulten.

Art. 100. Marriage does not
change the name of either spouse.
However, a married person may
use the surname of either or both
spouses as a surname.

Art. 100. El matrimonio no
altera el nombre de ninguno de los
cónyuges. No obstante, la persona
casada puede usar como apellido
el propio, el del otro cónyuge o
ambos.

CHAPTER 4. TERMINATION
OF MARRIAGE

CAPÍTULO 4. DE LA
DISOLUCIÓN DEL
MATRIMONIO

[Acts 1987, No. 886, § 1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988; Acts 1990, No. 1009, § 1,
eff. Jan. 1, 1991.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 886 de 1987,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1988; sección 1, ley n.o 1009 de
1990, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 1991].

Art. 101. Marriage terminates
upon:
The death of either spouse.
Divorce.
A judicial declaration of its
nullity, when the marriage is
relatively null.
The issuance of a court order
authorizing the spouse of a person
presumed dead to remarry, as
provided by law.

Art. 101. El matrimonio queda
disuelto en los siguientes
supuestos:
La muerte de alguno de los
cónyuges.
El divorcio.
La declaración judicial de
nulidad, cuando el matrimonio sea
nulo de nulidad relativa.
El dictado de una resolución
judicial por la que se autorice al
cónyuge de una persona
presumida fallecida a contraer
nuevo matrimonio, según lo
dispuesto por la ley.

TITLE V. DIVORCE

TÍTULO V. DEL DIVORCIO

CHAPTER 1. THE DIVORCE
ACTION

CAPÍTULO 1. DEL PROCESO DE
DIVORCIO

Art. 102. Except in the case of a
covenant marriage, a divorce shall
be granted upon motion of a

Art. 102. Excepto en caso de
que se hubiera celebrado un
matrimonio con régimen de
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spouse when either spouse has
filed a petition for divorce and
upon proof that the requisite period
of time, in accordance with Article
103.1, has elapsed from the service
of the petition, or from the
execution of written waiver of the
service, and that the spouses have
lived separate and apart
continuously for at least the
requisite period of time, in
accordance with Article 103.1,
prior to the filing of the rule to
show cause.

disolución calificado, se decretará
el divorcio a petición de uno de los
cónyuges cuando cualquiera de
ellos presente la demanda de
divorcio y pruebe que transcurrió
el período exigido por el artículo
103.1 desde la notificación de la
demanda, o desde la renuncia por
escrito a la notificación, y que los
cónyuges han vivido separados sin
interrupción al menos durante el
período exigido, de acuerdo con el
artículo 103.1, antes de la
presentación de la solicitud de
orden de comparecencia.

The motion shall be a rule to
show cause filed after all such
delays have elapsed. [Amended by
Acts 1952, No. 229, § 1; Acts
1958, No. 331; Acts 1990, No.
1009, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1991; Acts
1991, No. 367, § 1; Acts 1993, No.
107, § 1; Acts 1995, No. 386, § 1;
Acts 1997, No. 1380, § 1; Acts
2006, No. 743, § 1, eff. Jan. 1,
2007.]

Dicha petición debe hacerse
después de vencidos tales plazos.
[Agregado por sec. 1, ley n.o 229
de 1952; ley n.o 331 de 1958; sec.
2, ley n.o 1009 de 1990, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1991; sec.
1, ley n.o 367 de 1991; sec. 1, ley
n.o 107 de 1993; sec. 1, ley n.o 386
de 1995; sec. 1, ley n.o 1380 de
1997; sec. 1, ley n.o 743 de 2006,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
2007].

Art. 103. Except in the case of a
covenant marriage, a divorce shall
be granted on the petition of a
spouse upon proof that:

Art. 103. Excepto en caso de
que se hubiera celebrado un
matrimonio con régimen de
disolución calificado, se concederá
el divorcio a petición de un
cónyuge cuando se pruebe alguno
de los siguientes supuestos:
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(1) The spouses have been
living separate and apart
continuously for the requisite
period of time, in accordance with
Article 103.1, or more on the date
the petition is filed.
(2) The other spouse has
committed adultery.
(3) The other spouse has
committed a felony and has been
sentenced to death or
imprisonment at hard labor. [Acts
1990, No. 1009, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1991; Acts 1991, No. 918, §1; Acts
1997, No. 1380, §1; Acts 2006,
No. 743, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2007.]
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1) A la fecha de presentación de
la demanda, los cónyuges vivieron
separados sin interrupción durante
al menos el período exigido en el
artículo 103.1.

2) El otro cónyuge cometió
adulterio.
3) El otro cónyuge cometió un
delito grave y fue condenado a
muerte o prisión con trabajo
forzado. [Sec. 2, ley n.o 1009 de
1990, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 1991; sec. 1, ley n.o 918 de
1991; sec. 1, ley n.o 1380 de 1997;
sec. 1, ley n.o 743 de 2006, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2007].
(4) During the marriage, the
4) Durante el matrimonio, el
other spouse physically or sexually otro cónyuge abusó física o
abused the spouse seeking divorce sexualmente del cónyuge que
or a child of one of the spouses,
solicita el divorcio o de un hijo de
regardless of whether the other
uno de los cónyuges, con
spouse was prosecuted for the act
independencia de que el otro
of abuse. [Amended by Acts 2015, cónyuge haya sido procesado o no
No. 221, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2015.]
por el abuso. [Modificados por
sección 1, ley n.o 221 de 2015,
vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2015].
(5) After a contradictory hearing
5) Después de una audiencia
or consent decree, a protective
contradictoria o una sentencia
order or an injunction was issued
consentida por las partes, se dictó
during the marriage against the
una orden de protección u otra
other spouse to protect the spouse
medida judicial durante el
seeking the divorce or a child of
matrimonio contra el otro cónyuge
one of the spouses from abuse.
para proteger del abuso al
[Amended by Acts 2014, No. 316, cónyuge que solicitó el divorcio o
§ 1, eff. Aug. 1, 2014; amended by a un hijo de alguno de los
Acts 2015, No. 221, § 1, eff. Aug.
cónyuges. [Modificado por sec. 1,
1, 2015; Acts 2018, No. 265, § 1.] ley n.o 316 de 2014, vigente desde
el 1 de agosto de 2014; modificado
por sec. 1, ley n.o 221 de 2015,
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Art. 103.1. The requisite periods
of time, in accordance with
Articles 102 and 103 shall be as
follows:
(1) One hundred eighty days
where there are no minor children
of the marriage.
(2) Three hundred sixty-five
days when there are minor children
of the marriage at the time the rule
to show cause is filed in
accordance with Article 102 or a
petition is filed in accordance with
Article 103. [Acts 2006, No. 743,
Acts. 2010, No. 604 §1, eff. June
25, 2010 (amended by Acts 2014,
No. 316, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2014).]

[Vol. 13

vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2015; sec. 1, ley n.o 265 de 2018].
Art. 103.1. A los efectos de los
artículos 102 y 103, los plazos
exigidos son los siguientes:
1) Ciento ochenta días cuando
no hay hijos menores de edad del
matrimonio.
2) Trescientos sesenta y cinco
días cuando hay hijos menores de
edad del matrimonio al momento
en que se presenta la solicitud de
orden de comparecencia de
acuerdo con el artículo 102 o en
que se presenta una petición
conforme al artículo 103. [Sec. 1,
ley n.o 743 de 2006, Sec. 1, ley n.o
604 de 2010, vigente desde el 25
de junio de 2010 (modificado por
sec. 1, ley n.o 316 de 2014, vigente
desde el 1 de agosto de 2014)].

Art. 104. The cause of action for
divorce is extinguished by the
reconciliation of the parties.
[Amended by Acts 1979, No. 677,
§1; Acts 1980, No. 351, §1; Acts
1990, No. 1009, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1991.]

Art. 104. El fundamento del
proceso de divorcio se extingue
por la reconciliación de las partes.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 677
de 1979; sec. 1, ley n.o 351 de
1980; sec. 2, ley n.o 1009 de 1990,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1991].

Art. 105. In a proceeding for
divorce or thereafter, either spouse
may request a determination of
custody, visitation, or support of a
minor child; support for a spouse;
injunctive relief; use and
occupancy of the family home or
use of community movables or
immovables; or use of personal
property. [Acts 1984, No. 817, §1;

Art. 105. En el proceso de
divorcio o con posterioridad a él,
cualquiera de los cónyuges puede
solicitar que se ordene un régimen
de guarda, visitas o alimentos
respecto de un hijo menor;
alimentos del cónyuge; una
medida judicial de carácter
restrictivo, compulsivo o
impeditivo; el uso y la ocupación
del hogar familiar o el uso de
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Acts 1990, No. 1009, §2, eff. Jan.
1, 1991.]
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bienes muebles o inmuebles de
carácter ganancial; o el uso de
bienes propios. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 817
de 1984; sec. 2, ley n.o 1009 de
1990, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 1991].

Arts. 106-110. [Blank.]

Arts. 106-110. [En blanco].

CHAPTER 2. PROVISIONAL
AND INCIDENTAL
PROCEEDINGS

CAPÍTULO 2. DE LOS
PROCESOS PROVISORIOS E
INCIDENTALES

SECTION 1. SPOUSAL
SUPPORT

SECCIÓN 1. DE LOS
ALIMENTOS ENTRE CÓNYUGES

Art. 111. In a proceeding for
divorce or thereafter, the court may
award interim periodic support to a
party or may award final periodic
support to a party who is in need of
support and who is free from fault
prior to the filing of a proceeding
to terminate the marriage in
accordance with the following
Articles. [Amended by Acts 1928,
No. 130; Acts 1979, No. 72, §1;
Acts 1990, No. 361, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
1991; Acts 1997, No. 1078, §1, eff.
Jan. 1, 1998; Acts 2006, No. 749,
§1, eff. June 30, 2006]

Art. 111. En un proceso de
divorcio o después, el juez podrá
conceder alimentos periódicos
provisorios a favor de una parte o
podrá conceder alimentos
periódicos definitivos a favor de la
parte que los necesite si esa parte
no hubiera sido culpable antes de
la iniciación del proceso para
disolver el matrimonio de acuerdo
con los artículos que siguen.
[Modificado por ley n.o 130 de
1928; sec. 1, ley n.o 72 de 1979;
sec. 1, ley n.o 361 de 1990, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1991; sec.
1, ley n.o 1078 de 1997, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1998; sec.
1, ley n.o 749 de 2006, vigente
desde el 30 de junio de 2006].

Art. 112. A. When a spouse has
not been at fault prior to the filing
of a petition for divorce and is in
need of support, based on the
needs of that party and the ability
of the other party to pay, that

Art. 112. A. Cuando un cónyuge
no haya sido culpable antes de la
presentación de la petición de
divorcio y necesite alimentos,
sobre la base de las necesidades
de esa parte y la capacidad de
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spouse may be awarded final
periodic support in accordance
with Paragraph B of this Article.

pago de la otra, a ese cónyuge se
le podrán conceder alimentos
periódicos definitivos de acuerdo
con el inciso B del presente
artículo.

B. The court shall consider all
relevant factors in determining the
amount and duration of final
support, including:

B. El juez considerará todos los
factores pertinentes para
determinar el monto y la duración
de los alimentos definitivos, lo que
incluye:

(1) The income and means of
the parties, including the liquidity
of such means.
(2) The financial obligations of
the parties, including any interim
allowance or final child support
obligation. [Amended by Acts
2014, No. 616, §1, eff. Aug. 1,
2014]

1) Los ingresos y otros recursos
de las partes, incluida la liquidez
de tales recursos.
2) Las obligaciones financieras
de las partes, incluidas las
obligaciones de asignación
provisoria o de alimentos
definitivos para los hijos.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 616
de 2014, vigente desde el 1 de
agosto de 2014].
3) La capacidad de las partes
de generar ingresos.
4) El efecto de la guarda de los
hijos sobre la capacidad de
generación de ingresos de una de
las partes.
5) El tiempo necesario para que
el peticionante adquiera un nivel
adecuado de educación,
capacitación o empleo.
6) La edad y el estado de salud
de las partes.
7) La duración del matrimonio.

(3) The earning capacity of the
parties.
(4) The effect of custody of
children upon a party’s earning
capacity.
(5) The time necessary for the
claimant to acquire appropriate
education, training, or
employment.
(6) The health and age of the
parties.
(7) The duration of the
marriage.
(8) The tax consequences to
either or both parties.
(9) The existence, effect, and
duration of any act of domestic
abuse committed by the other

8) Las consecuencias
tributarias para alguna de las
partes o ambas.
9) La existencia, el efecto y la
duración de cualquier acto de
violencia doméstica cometido por
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spouse upon the claimant or a child
of one of the spouses, regardless of
whether the other spouse was
prosecuted for the act of domestic
violence.

el otro cónyuge contra el
peticionante o un hijo de alguno de
los cónyuges, con independencia
de si el otro cónyuge fue
procesado por el acto de violencia
doméstica o no.

C. When a spouse is awarded a
judgment of divorce pursuant to
Article 103(2), (3), (4), or (5), or
when the court determines that a
party or a child of one of the
spouses was the victim of domestic
abuse committed by the other party
during the marriage, that spouse is
presumed to be entitled to final
periodic support.

C. Cuando se decrete el
divorcio a favor de un cónyuge
conforme a los incisos 2, 3, 4 o 5
del artículo 103 o cuando el juez
determine que una parte o un hijo
de alguno de los cónyuges fue
víctima de violencia doméstica
ejercida por la otra parte durante
el matrimonio, se presume que ese
cónyuge tiene derecho a alimentos
periódicos definitivos.

D. The sum awarded under this
Article shall not exceed one-third
of the obligor’s net income.
Nevertheless, when support is
awarded after a judgment of
divorce is rendered pursuant to
Article 103(4) or (5), or when the
court determines that a party or a
child of one of the spouses was the
victim of domestic abuse
committed by the other party
during the marriage, the sum
awarded may exceed one-third of
the obligor’s net income and may
be awarded as a lump sum.
[Amended by Acts 1916, No. 247;
Acts 1928, No. 21; Acts 1934, 2nd
Ex. Sess., No. 27; Acts 1964, No.
48; Acts 1979, No. 72, §1; Acts
1982, No. 293, §1; Acts 1986, No.
229, §1; Acts 1997, No. 1078, § 1,
eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Acts 2006, No.
749, § 1, eff. June 30, 2006; Acts

D. El monto otorgado en virtud
del presente artículo no podrá
superar un tercio de los ingresos
netos del deudor. No obstante,
cuando se otorguen alimentos
después de una sentencia de
divorcio conforme a los incisos 4 o
5 del artículo 103 o cuando el juez
determine que una parte o un hijo
de alguno de los cónyuges fue
víctima de violencia doméstica
ejercida por la otra parte durante
el matrimonio, la suma concedida
podrá ser superior al tercio de los
ingresos netos del deudor y
consistir en una suma única.
[Modificado por ley n.o 247 de
1916; ley n.o 21 de 1928; ley n.o 27
de 1934, 2.a Ses. Ex.; ley n.o 48 de
1964; sec. 1, ley n.o 72 de 1979;
sec. 1, ley n.o 293 de 1982; sec. 1,
ley n.o 229 de 1986; sec. 1, ley n.o
1078 de 1997, vigente desde el 1
de enero de 1998; sec. 1, ley n.o
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2014, No. 316, § 1, eff. Aug. 1,
2014; Acts 2018, No. 265, § 1.]

749 de 2006, vigente desde el 30
de junio de 2006; sec. 1, ley n.o
316 de 2014, vigente desde el 1 de
agosto de 2014; sec. 1, ley n.o 265
de 2018].

Art. 113. A. Upon motion of a
party, the court may award a party
interim spousal support based on
the needs of that party, the ability
of the other party to pay, any
interim or final child support
obligation, and the standard of
living of the parties during the
marriage. An award of interim
spousal support allowance shall
terminate one hundred eighty days
from the rendition of a judgment of
divorce, except that the award may
extend beyond one hundred eighty
days but only for good cause
shown.
B. An obligation to pay final
periodic support shall not begin
until an interim spousal support
award has terminated. [Amended
by Acts 2014, No. 316, § 1, eff.
Aug. 1, 2014, corrected by Acts
2014, No. 616, § 1, eff. Aug. 1,
2014; Acts 2018, No. 265, § 1.]

Art. 113. A. A pedido de parte,
el juez puede conceder una
asignación conyugal provisoria
según las necesidades de la parte,
la capacidad de pago de la otra
parte, la existencia de una
obligación de alimentos para los
hijos provisoria o definitiva, y el
nivel de vida de las partes durante
el matrimonio. La asignación de
alimentos provisorios entre
cónyuges cesa a los ciento ochenta
días siguientes al dictado de la
sentencia de divorcio y solo podrá
extenderse más allá de ese plazo si
existe justa causa.
B. La obligación de pagar
alimentos periódicos definitivos no
comenzará a regir sino una vez
finalizada la asignación de
alimentos conyugales provisorios.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 316
de 2014, vigente desde el 1 de
agosto de 2014; corregido por sec.
1, ley n.o 616 de 2014, vigente
desde el 1 de agosto de 2014; sec.
1, ley n.o 265 de 2018].

Art. 114. An award of interim
spousal support or final periodic
support may be modified if the
circumstances of either party
materially change and shall be
terminated if it has become
unnecessary. The subsequent
remarriage of the obligor spouse
shall not constitute a change of

Art. 114. La asignación de
alimentos conyugales provisorios o
periódicos definitivos puede
modificarse si las circunstancias
de alguna de las partes cambian
de manera sustancial y cesa si
deviene innecesaria. El
matrimonio posterior del cónyuge
deudor no se considera un cambio
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circumstance. [Acts 1997, No.
1078, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Acts
2001, No. 1049, § 1; Acts 2018,
No. 265, § 1.]

en las circunstancias. [Sec. 1, ley
n.o 1078 de 1997, vigente desde el
1 de enero de 1998; sec. 1, ley n.o
1049 de 2001; sec. 1, ley n.o 265
de 2018].

Art. 115. The obligation of
interim spousal support or final
periodic support is extinguished
upon the remarriage of the obligee,
the death of either party, or a
judicial determination that the
obligee has cohabited with another
person of either sex in the manner
of married persons. [Acts 1997,
No. 1078, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998.
Amended by Acts 2018, No. 265,
§ 1.]

Art. 115. La obligación de
alimentos conyugales provisorios o
periódicos definitivos entre
cónyuges se extingue por las
nuevas nupcias contraídas por el
acreedor, la muerte de cualquiera
de las partes o la determinación
judicial de que el acreedor
cohabitó con otra persona, del
mismo o del otro sexo, como si
estuvieran casados. [Sec. 1, ley n.o
1078 de 1997, vigente desde el 1
de enero de 1998; modificado por
sec. 1, ley n.o 265 de 2018].

Art. 116. The obligation of final
spousal support may be modified,
waived, or extinguished by
judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction or by authentic act or
act under private signature duly
acknowledged by the obligee.
[Acts 1997, No. 1078, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1998]

Art. 116. La obligación de
alimentos conyugales definitivos
puede ser modificada, dispensada
o extinguida por sentencia de juez
competente, por instrumento
auténtico o instrumento privado
debidamente ratificado por el
acreedor. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 1078 de
1997, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 1998].

Art. 117. The right to claim
after divorce the obligation of
spousal support is subject to a
peremption of three years.
Peremption begins to run from the
latest of the following events:

Art. 117. El derecho de
reclamar alimentos conyugales
después del divorcio caduca a los
tres años. El plazo de caducidad
comienza a computarse a partir
del que ocurra en último término
de los siguientes supuestos:

(1) The day the judgment of
divorce is signed.

1) El día de la firma de la
sentencia de divorcio.
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(2) The day a judgment
terminating a previous judgment of
spousal support is signed, if the
previous judgment was signed in
an action commenced either before
the signing of the judgment of
divorce or within three years
thereafter.
(3) The day of the last payment
made, when the spousal support
obligation is initially performed by
voluntary payment within the
periods described in Paragraph (1)
or (2) and no more than three years
has elapsed between payments.
[Acts 1997, No. 1078, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1998]

2) El día de la firma de la
sentencia por la que se pone fin a
la orden anterior de alimentos
conyugales, si la sentencia
anterior fue firmada en un juicio
iniciado antes de firmada la
sentencia de divorcio o dentro de
los tres años siguientes.
3) El día del último pago,
cuando la obligación de alimentos
conyugales es cumplida
inicialmente por pago voluntario
dentro de los períodos indicados
en los incisos 1 o 2 y no
transcurrieron más de tres años
entre los pagos. [Sec. 1, ley n.o
1078 de 1997, vigente desde el 1
de enero de 1998].

Art. 118. [Repealed by Acts
2018, No. 265, § 2.]

Art. 118. [Derogado por sec. 2,
ley n.o 265 de 2018].

Art. 119. [Blank.]
Art. 120. [Repealed by Acts
1985, No. 271, § 1.]

Art. 119. [En blanco].
Art. 120. [Derogado por sec. 1,
ley n.o 271 de 1985].

SECTION 2. CLAIM FOR
CONTRIBUTIONS TO
EDUCATION OR TRAINING

SECCIÓN 2. DEL RECLAMO DE
APORTES PARA EDUCACIÓN O
CAPACITACIÓN

[Acts 1990, No. 1008, §2, eff. Jan.
1, 1991; Acts 1991, No. 367, §1.]

[Sec. 2, ley n.o 1008 de 1990,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1991; sec. 1, ley n.o 367 de 1991].

Art. 121. In a proceeding for
divorce or thereafter, the court may
award a party a sum for his
financial contributions made
during the marriage to education or
training of his spouse that
increased the spouse’s earning
power, to the extent that the
claimant did not benefit during the

Art. 121. En un proceso de
divorcio o con posterioridad, el
juez puede conceder a favor de
una de las partes un monto por los
aportes económicos que esa parte
haya realizado durante el
matrimonio para la educación o
capacitación de su cónyuge como
consecuencia de lo cual haya
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marriage from the increased
earning power.

aumentado su capacidad de
generar ingresos, en caso de que el
demandante no se haya
beneficiado durante el matrimonio
de esa mayor capacidad de
generación de ingresos.
El monto otorgado puede ser
The sum awarded may be in
adicional a la suma que se haya
addition to a sum for support and
asignado en concepto de alimentos
to property received in the partition
y a los bienes recibidos en la
of community property.
división de los bienes conyugales.
Art. 122. The claim for
contributions made to the
education or training of a spouse is
strictly personal to each party.

Art. 122. El reclamo de aportes
hechos para la educación o
capacitación de un cónyuge es
estrictamente personal respecto de
cada parte.

Art. 123. The sum awarded for
contributions made to the
education or training of a spouse
may be a sum certain payable in
installments.
The award shall not terminate
upon the remarriage or death of
either party.

Art. 123. El monto otorgado en
concepto de aportes hechos para
la educación o capacitación de un
cónyuge puede ser una suma cierta
pagadera en cuotas.
La asignación no cesará en
caso de nuevas nupcias o muerte
de alguna de las partes.

Art. 124. The action for
contributions made to the
education or training of a spouse
prescribes in three years from the
date of the signing of the judgment
of divorce or declaration of nullity
of the marriage.

Art. 124. La acción por los
aportes para la educación o
capacitación de un cónyuge
prescribe a los tres años de la
fecha de la firma de la sentencia
de divorcio o de la declaración de
nulidad del matrimonio.

Arts. 125-130. [Repealed. Acts
1974, No. 89, § 2.]

Arts. 125-130. [Derogados. Sec.
2, ley n.o 89 de 1974].

SECTION 3. CHILD CUSTODY

SECCIÓN 3. DE LA GUARDA DE
LOS HIJOS

Art. 131. In a proceeding for
divorce or thereafter, the court

Art. 131. En un proceso de
divorcio o con posterioridad, el
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shall award custody of a child in
accordance with the best interest of
the child. [Amended by Acts 1888,
No. 124; Acts 1979, No. 718, §1;
Acts 1981, No. 283, §1; Acts 1982,
No. 307, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983; Acts
1983, No. 695, §1; Acts 1984, No.
133, §1; Acts 1984, No. 786, §1;
Acts 1986, No. 950, §1, eff. July
14, 1986; Acts 1989, No. 188, §1;
Acts 1993, No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
1994.]

juez asignará la guarda de los
hijos de acuerdo con el principio
del interés superior del niño.
[Modificado por ley n.o 124 de
1888; sec. 1, ley n.o 718 de 1979;
sec. 1, ley n.o 283 de 1981; sec. 1,
ley n.o 307 de 1982, vigente desde
el 1 de enero de 1983; sec. 1, ley
n.o 695 de 1983; sec. 1, ley n.o 133
de 1984; sec. 1, ley n.o 786 de
1984; sec. 1, ley n.o 950 de 1986,
vigente desde el 14 de julio de
1986; sec. 1, ley n.o 188 de 1989;
sec. 1, ley n.o 261 de 1993, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1994].

Art. 132. If the parents agree
who is to have custody, the court
shall award custody in accordance
with their agreement unless the
provisions of R.S. 9:364 apply or
the best interest of the child
requires a different award. Subject
to the provisions of R.S. 9:364, in
the absence of agreement, or if the
agreement is not in the best interest
of the child, the court shall award
custody to the parents jointly;
however, if custody in one parent
is shown by clear and convincing
evidence to serve the best interest
of the child, the court shall award
custody to that parent. [Acts 1992,
No. 782, §1; Acts 1993, No. 261,
§ 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1994. Amended by
Acts 2018, No. 412, § 1, eff. May
23, 2018.]

Art. 132. Si los padres se ponen
de acuerdo respecto de quién
tendrá la guarda, el juez la
asignará de conformidad con ese
acuerdo, a menos que se apliquen
las disposiciones de R.S. 9:364 6 o
que sea necesario decidir en otro
sentido en pos del interés superior
de los hijos. Con sujeción a las
disposiciones de dicha norma, a
falta de acuerdo o si el acuerdo no
fuera acorde al interés superior de
los menores, el juez asignará la
guarda a los padres de manera
conjunta. Sin embargo, si se
demuestra con pruebas claras y
convincentes que la guarda a favor
de uno de los padres es lo mejor en
pos del interés superior de los
hijos, el juez asignará la guarda a
ese padre. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 782 de
1992; sec. 1, ley n.o 261 de 1993,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1994. Modificada por sec. 1, ley

6. N. de T.: Artículo 364 del Título 9 de la Recopilación de Leyes Actualizadas de Luisiana (Louisiana Revised Statutes).
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n.o 412 de 2018, vigente desde el
23 de mayo de 2018].
Art. 133. If an award of joint
custody or of sole custody to either
parent would result in substantial
harm to the child, the court shall
award custody to another person
with whom the child has been
living in a wholesome and stable
environment, or otherwise to any
other person able to provide an
adequate and stable environment.
[Acts 1986, No. 966, §1; Acts
1989, No. 546, §1; Acts 1993, No.
261, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1994.]

Art. 133. En caso de que la
guarda conjunta o exclusiva
atribuida a uno de los padres
cause un perjuicio sustancial al
menor, el juez concederá la
guarda a otra persona con la que
el menor haya vivido en un
entorno íntegro y estable o a
cualquier otra persona que pueda
ofrecer un entorno adecuado y
estable. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 966 de
1986; sec. 1, ley n.o 546 de 1989;
sec. 1, ley n.o 261 de 1993, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1994].

Art. 134. Except as provided in
Paragraph B of this Article, the
court shall consider all relevant
factors in determining the best
interest of the child, including:

Art. 134. Con excepción de lo
dispuesto en el párrafo B de este
artículo, el juez considerará todos
los factores pertinentes para
determinar cúal es el interés
superior de los niños, entre los que
se incluyen los siguientes:

(1) The potential for the child to
be abused, as defined by
Children’s Code Article 603,
which shall be the primary
consideration.
(2) The love, affection, and
other emotional ties between each
party and the child.
(3) The capacity and disposition
of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance
and to continue the education and
rearing of the child.

1) El riesgo de que se ejerza
maltrato contra el niño, conforme
a la definición del artículo 603 del
Código de la Niñez, que será la
principal consideración.
2) El amor, el cariño y otros
lazos afectivos entre cada una de
las partes y los menores.
3) La capacidad y la
disposición de cada parte para dar
amor, cariño y orientación
espiritual a los menores y
continuar con su educación y
crianza.
4) La capacidad y disposición
de cada parte para proveer a los
menores de alimento, vestimenta,

(4) The capacity and disposition
of each party to provide the child
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with food, clothing, medical care,
and other material needs.
(5) The length of time the child
has lived in a stable, adequate
environment, and the desirability
of maintaining continuity of that
environment.
(6) The permanence, as a family
unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.
(7) The moral fitness of each
party, insofar as it affects the
welfare of the child.
(8) The history of substance
abuse, violence, or criminal
activity of any party.
(9) The mental and physical
health of each party. Evidence that
an abused parent suffers from the
effects of past abuse by the other
parent shall not be grounds for
denying that parent custody.
(10) The home, school, and
community history of the child.
(11) The reasonable preference
of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient age to
express a preference.
(12) The willingness and ability
of each party to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing
relationship between the child and
the other party, except when
objectively substantial evidence of
specific abusive, reckless, or
illegal conduct has caused one
party to have reasonable concerns
for the child’s safety or well-being
while in the care of the other party.

[Vol. 13

atención médica y para satisfacer
otras necesidades materiales.
5) El tiempo durante el que los
menores vivieron en un entorno
estable y adecuado, y si es
deseable mantener la continuidad
de ese entorno.
6) La permanencia, como
unidad familiar, del hogar o los
hogares actuales o propuestos en
vista de la guarda.
7) La idoneidad moral de cada
parte, en tanto afecte el bienestar
de los menores.
8) Los antecedentes de
drogadicción, violencia o
actividad delictiva de alguna de
las partes.
9) La salud mental y física de
cada parte. La prueba de que uno
de los padres sufre los efectos de
haber sido víctima de maltrato por
parte del otro padre no será causal
para negarle la guarda al primero.
10) Los antecedentes de los
menores en relación con el hogar,
la escolaridad y la comunidad.
11) La preferencia razonable de
los menores, si a criterio del juez
los menores tienen edad suficiente
para expresar una preferencia.
12) La disposición y capacidad
de cada parte para facilitar y
promover una relación estrecha y
sostenida entre los menores y la
otra parte, excepto cuando existan
pruebas objetivamente
sustanciales de conductas
abusivas, imprudentes o ilegales
puntuales que generen en una de
las partes preocupación razonable
por la seguridad o el bienestar de
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los menores mientras están al
cuidado de la otra parte.
(13) The distance between the
13) La distancia entre las
respective residences of the parties. respectivas residencias de las
partes.
(14) The responsibility for the
14) La responsabilidad por el
care and rearing of the child
cuidado y la crianza de los
previously exercised by each party. menores ejercida previamente por
cada parte.
B. In cases involving a history
of committing family violence, as
defined in R.S. 9:362, or domestic
abuse, as defined in R.S. 46:2132,
including sexual abuse, as defined
in R.S. 14:403, whether or not a
party has sought relief under any
applicable law, the court shall
determine an award of custody or
visitation in accordance with R.S.
9:341 and 364. The court may only
find a history of committing family
violence if the court finds that one
incident of family violence has
resulted in serious bodily injury or
the court finds more than one
incident of family violence. [Acts
1988, No. 817, §2, eff. July 18,
1988; Acts 1990, No. 361, §1, eff.
Jan. 1, 1991; Acts 1993, No. 261,
§ 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1994. Amended by
Acts 2018, No. 412, § 1, eff. May
23, 2018.]

B. En los casos en que haya
antecedentes de violencia familiar,
conforme a la definición de R.S.
9:362 7 o violencia doméstica,
conforme a la definición de R.S.
46:2132, 8 incluido el abuso sexual,
conforme a la definición de R.S.
14:403, 9 independientemente de
que una parte haya intentado
obtener reparación en virtud de
una ley aplicable, el juez
concederá la guarda o visitas de
acuerdo con R.S. 9:341 y 364. 10 El
juez solo puede determinar que
hubo antecedentes de violencia si
concluye que un incidente de
violencia familiar provocó daños
físicos graves o si concluye que
hubo más de un incidente de
violencia familiar. [Sec. 2, ley n.o
817 de 1988, vigente desde el 18
de julio de 1988; sec. 1, ley n.o 361
de 1990, vigente desde el 1 de
enero de 1991; sec. 1, ley n.o 261
de 1993, vigente desde el 1 de

7. N. de T.: Artículo 362 del Título 9 de la Recopilación de Leyes Actualizadas de Luisiana (Louisiana Revised Statutes).
8. N. de T.: Artículo 2132 del Título 46 de la Recopilación de Leyes Actualizadas de Luisiana (Louisiana Revised Statutes).
9. N. de T.: Artículo 403 del Título 14 de la Recopilación de Leyes Actualizadas de Luisiana (Louisiana Revised Statutes).
10. N. de T.: Artículos 341 y 364 del Título 9 de la Recopilación de Leyes
Actualizadas de Luisiana (Louisiana Revised Statutes).
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enero de 1994; modificado por
sec. 1, ley n.o 412 de 2018, vigente
desde el 23 de mayo de 2018].
Art. 135. A custody hearing
may be closed to the public. [Acts
1990, No. 361, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
1991; Acts 1993, No. 261, § 1, eff.
Jan. 1, 1994.]

Art. 135. La audiencia de
guarda puede ser cerrada al
público. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 361 de
1990, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 1991; sec. 1, ley n.o 261 de
1993, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 1994].

Art. 136. A. Subject to R.S.
9:341 and 364, a parent not granted
custody or joint custody of a child
is entitled to reasonable visitation
rights unless the court finds, after a
hearing, that visitation would not
be in the best interest of the child.

Art. 136. A. Con sujeción a R.S.
9:341 y 364, 11 el padre al que no
se le hubiera asignado la guarda
exclusiva o conjunta de los
menores tendrá derecho a visitas
razonables a menos que el juez
considere, después de una
audiencia, que las visitas no serían
acordes al interés superior de los
menores.

B. In addition to the parents
referred to in Paragraph A of this
Article, the following persons may
be granted visitation if the parents
of the child are not married or
cohabitating with a person in the
manner of married persons or if the
parents of the child have filed a
petition for divorce:

B. Además del padre
mencionado en el párrafo A de
este artículo, las siguientes
personas pueden tener derecho de
visita si los padres de los menores
no están casados ni conviven con
una persona como si estuvieran
casados o si presentaron una
demanda de divorcio:

(1) A grandparent if the court
finds that it is in the best interest of
the child.
(2) Under extraordinary
circumstances, any other relative,
by blood or affinity, or a former
stepparent or stepgrandparent if the

1) Un abuelo si el juez
considera que es acorde al interés
superior de los menores.
2) En circunstancias
extraordinarias, cualquier otro
pariente, por consanguinidad o
afín, o un expadrastro o

11. N. de T.: Artículos 341 y 364 del Título 9 de la Recopilación de Leyes
Actualizadas de Luisiana (Louisiana Revised Statutes).
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court finds that it is in the best
interest of the child. Extraordinary
circumstances shall include a
determination by a court that a
parent is abusing a controlled
dangerous substance.

exabuelastro si el juez considera
que es acorde al interés superior
de los menores. Entre las
circunstancias extraordinarias se
incluye la determinación por un
juez de que un padre sufre
adicción a una sustancia peligrosa
regulada.

C. Before making any
determination under Subparagraph
(B)(1) or (2) of this Article, the
court shall hold a contradictory
hearing as provided by R.S. 9:345
in order to determine whether the
court should appoint an attorney to
represent the child.

C. Antes de decidir en relación
con los supuestos previstos en los
incisos 1 o 2 del párrafo B de este
artículo, el juez celebrará una
audiencia con la presencia de
ambas partes según lo previsto en
R.S. 9:345 12 a fin de determinar si
es necesario designar a un
abogado que represente a los
menores.

D. In determining the best
interest of the child under
Subparagraphs B(1) or 2 of this
Article, the court shall consider
only the following factors:

D. Al determinar el interés
superior de los menores conforme
a los incisos 1 o 2 del párrafo B de
este artículo, el juez solo
considerará los siguientes
factores:

(1) A parent’s fundamental
constitutional right to make
decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their own
children and the traditional
presumption that a fit parent will
act in the best interest of their
children.
(2) The length and quality of the
prior relationship between the
child and the relative.
(3) Whether the child is in need
of guidance, enlightenment, or

1) El derecho constitucional
básico de un padre a tomar
decisiones relativas al cuidado, la
guarda y el control de sus propios
hijos y la presunción tradicional
de que un padre idóneo actuará
acorde al interés superior de sus
hijos.
2) La duración y la calidad de
la relación anterior entre los
menores y el pariente en cuestión.
3) Si los menores necesitan
orientación, consejo o tutelaje y el

12. N. de T.: Artículos 345 del Título 9 de la Recopilación de Leyes Actualizadas de Luisiana (Louisiana Revised Statutes).
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tutelage which can best be
provided by the relative.
(4) The preference of the child
if he is determined to be of
sufficient maturity to express a
preference.
(5) The mental and physical
health of the child and the relative.
[Acts 2012, No. 763, §1, eff. Aug.
1, 2012.]

pariente en cuestión es el más apto
para brindarlo.
4) La preferencia de los
menores si se determina que tienen
madurez suficiente para expresar
una preferencia.
5) La salud mental y física de
los menores y del pariente.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 763 de 2012,
vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2012].

E. If the parents of a child are
married and have not filed for
divorce or they are living in
concubinage, the provisions of
R.S. 9:344 shall apply. [Acts 1993,
No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1994; Acts
1995, No. 57, §1; Acts 2009, No.
379, §2; Acts 2012, No. 763, §1,
eff. Aug. 1, 2012, Acts 2014, No.
586, § 1; Acts 2018, No. 383, § 1;
Acts 2018, No. 412, § 1, eff. May
23, 2018.]

E. Si los padres de los menores
están casados y no presentaron la
demanda de divorcio o si viven en
concubinato, se aplican las
disposiciones de R.S. 9:344. 13
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 261 de 1993,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1991; sec. 1, ley n.o 57 de 1995;
sec. 1, ley n.o 379 de 2009; sec. 1,
ley n.o 763 de 2012, vigente desde
el 1 de agosto de 2012; sec. 1, ley
n.o 586 de 2014; sec. 1, ley n.o 383
de 2018; sec. 1, ley n.o 412 de
2018, vigente desde el 23 de mayo
de 2018].

Art. 136.1. A child has a right to
time with both parents.
Accordingly, when a court-ordered
schedule of visitation, custody, or
time to be spent with a child has
been entered, a parent shall
exercise his rights to the child in
accordance with the schedule
unless good cause is shown.
Neither parent shall interfere with
the visitation, custody or time
rights of the other unless good

Art. 136.1. Los menores tienen
derecho a pasar tiempo con ambos
padres. En consecuencia, cuando
el juez hubiera aprobado un plan
de visitas, guarda o de tiempo
compartido con los menores, los
padres podrán ejercer los
derechos derivados de dicho plan
a menos que se demuestre justa
causa en contrario. Ninguno de los
padres podrá interferir en los
derechos de visita, guarda o de

13. N. de T.: Artículo 344 del Título 9 de la Recopilación de Leyes Actualizadas de Luisiana (Louisiana Revised Statutes).
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cause is shown. [Acts 2008, No.
671, § 1.]

tiempo compartido con el otro a
menos que se demuestre justa
causa. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 671 de
2008].

Art. 137. A. In a proceeding in
which visitation of a child is being
sought by a parent, if the child was
conceived through the commission
of a felony rape, the parent who
committed the felony rape shall be
denied visitation rights and contact
with the child. [Acts 2012, No.
763, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012.]

Art. 137. A. En un proceso en el
que uno de los padres reclame su
derecho de visita, si el menor
hubiera sido concebido por el
delito de violación, se le
denegarán los derechos de visita y
el contacto con el menor al padre
que hubiera cometido la violación.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 763 de 2012,
vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2012].

B. In a proceeding in which
visitation of a child is being sought
by a relative by blood or affinity, if
the court determines, by a
preponderance of the evidence,
that the intentional criminal
conduct of the relative resulted in
the death of the parent of the child,
the relative shall be denied
visitation rights and contact with
the child. [Acts 2001, No. 499, §1,
Acts 2010, No. 873, §1; Acts 2012,
No. 763, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012.]

B. En un proceso en el que un
pariente consanguíneo o afín
solicite derechos de visita de un
menor, si el juez determinara, por
preponderancia de la prueba, que
la conducta delictiva dolosa del
pariente causó la muerte del padre
del menor, se le denegarán a ese
pariente los derechos de visita y el
contacto con el menor. [Sec. 1, ley
n.o 499 de 2001; sec. 1, ley n.o 873
de 2010; sec. 1, ley n.o 763 de
2012, vigente desde el 1 de agosto
de 2012].

Arts. 138-140. [Blank.]

Arts. 138-140. [En blanco].

SECTION 4. CHILD SUPPORT

SECCIÓN 4. DE LOS
ALIMENTOS DE LOS HIJOS

Art. 141. In a proceeding for
divorce or thereafter, the court may
order either or both of the parents
to provide an interim allowance or
final support for a child based on
the needs of the child and the

Art. 141. En un proceso de
divorcio o con posterioridad, el
juez puede ordenar que uno de los
padres o ambos paguen una
asignación provisoria o alimentos
definitivos a favor de los hijos en
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ability of the parents to provide
support.
The court may award an interim
allowance only when a demand for
final support is pending. [Acts
1993, No. 261, §6, eff. Jan. 1,
1994.]
Art. 142. An award of child
support may be modified if the
circumstances of the child or of
either parent materially change and
shall be terminated upon proof that
it has become unnecessary. [Acts
1993, No. 261, §6, eff. Jan. 1,
1994; Acts 2001, No. 1082, §2.]

Arts. 143-148. [Blank.]
Arts. 149-150. [Repealed by
Acts 1990, No. 1009, §9, eff. Jan.
1, 1991.]

[Vol. 13

función de sus necesidades y la
capacidad de los padres de pagar
alimentos.
El juez podrá conceder una
asignación provisoria solo si hay
una solicitud de alimentos
definitivos en trámite. [Sec. 6, ley
n.o 261 de 1993, vigente desde el 1
de enero de 1994].
Art. 142. La orden de pagar
alimentos a favor de los hijos
puede modificarse si las
circunstancias de los hijos o de
alguno de los padres cambian de
manera sustancial y cesa si se
demuestra que devino innecesaria.
[Sec. 6, ley n.o 261 de 1993,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1994; sec. 2, ley n.o 1082 de 2001].
Arts. 143-148. [En blanco].
Arts. 149-150. [Derogados por
sec. 9, ley n.o 1009 de 1990,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1991].

SECTION 5. PROVISIONAL
AND INCIDENTAL
PROCEEDINGS IN ACTIONS
OF NULLITY

SECCIÓN 5. DE LOS PROCESOS
PROVISORIOS E
INCIDENTALES EN LAS
ACCIONES DE NULIDAD

[Acts 1993, No. 108, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1994.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 108 de 1993,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1994].

Art. 151. In a proceeding for
declaration of nullity of a
marriage, a court may award a
party the incidental relief afforded
in a proceeding for divorce.

Art. 151. En un proceso de
declaración de nulidad del
matrimonio, el juez puede
conceder a favor de una de las
partes medidas reparatorias
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otorgadas por vía incidental en el
proceso de divorcio.
Art. 152. After the declaration
of nullity of a marriage, a party
entitled to the civil effects of
marriage may seek the same relief
as may a divorced spouse.

Art. 152. Después de la
declaración de nulidad del
matrimonio, la parte con derecho
a los efectos civiles del matrimonio
puede solicitar las mismas
medidas reparatorias que el
cónyuge divorciado.
Incidental relief granted pending
Las medidas reparatorias
declaration of nullity to a party not otorgadas por vía incidental
entitled to the civil effects of
mientras tramita el proceso de
marriage shall terminate upon the
declaración de nulidad a favor de
declaration of nullity.
una parte que no tenga derecho a
los efectos civiles del matrimonio
cesan con la declaración de
nulidad.
Nevertheless, a party not
No obstante, se le puede otorgar
entitled to the civil effects of
la guarda, alimentos para los hijos
marriage may be awarded custody, o derechos de visita a la parte que
child support, or visitation. The
no tenga derecho a los efectos
award shall not terminate as a
civiles del matrimonio. Tal orden
result of the declaration of nullity. no cesa a consecuencia de la
declaración de nulidad.
Arts. 153-156. [Repealed by
Acts 1990, No. 1009, §9, eff. Jan.
1, 1991.]
Arts. 157-158. [Blank.]
CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF
DIVORCE
Art. 159. A judgment of divorce
terminates a community property
regime retroactively to the date of
filing of the petition in the action
in which the judgment of divorce
is rendered. The retroactive
termination of the community shall

Arts. 153-156. [Derogados por
sec. 9, ley n.o 1009 de 1990,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1991].
Arts. 157-158. [En blanco].
CAPÍTULO 3. DE LOS EFECTOS
DEL DIVORCIO
Art. 159. La sentencia de
divorcio pone fin al régimen de
comunidad de bienes con
retroactividad a la fecha de
presentación de la demanda en el
proceso de divorcio. La extinción
retroactiva del régimen de
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be without prejudice to rights of
third parties validly acquired in the
interim between the filing of the
petition and recordation of the
judgment. [Amended by Acts
1977, No. 483, §2; Acts 1979, No.
711, §1; Acts 1990, No. 1009, §2,
eff. Jan. 1, 1991.]

Art. 160. [Blank.]
Art. 161. [Repealed by Acts
1990, No. 1008, §6, eff. Jan. 1,
1991.]
TITLE VI. OF MASTER AND
SERVANT
Arts. 162-177. [Repealed by
Acts 1990, No. 705, §1.]

[Vol. 13

comunidad de bienes no afecta los
derechos de terceros adquiridos
válidamente en el período
transcurrido entre la presentación
de la demanda y la inscripción de
la sentencia. [Modificado por sec.
2, ley n.o 483 de 1977; sec. 1, ley
n.o 711 de 1979; sec. 2, ley n.o
1009 de 1990, vigente desde el 1
de enero de 1991].
Art. 160. [En blanco].
Art. 161. [Derogado por sec. 6,
ley n.o 1008 de 1990, vigente desde
el 1 de enero de 1991].
TÍTULO VI. DEL SEÑOR Y DE
LOS SIERVOS
Arts. 162-177. [Derogado por
sec. 1, ley n.o 705 de 1990].

TITLE VII. PARENT AND
CHILD

TÍTULO VII. DE LOS PADRES E
HIJOS

CHAPTER 1. FILIATION

CAPÍTULO 1. DE LA FILIACIÓN

[Acts 2009, No. 3, §1, eff. June 9,
2009.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 3 de 2009, vigente
desde el 9 de junio de 2009].

Art. 178. Filiation is the legal
relationship between a child and
his parent.

Art. 178. La filiación es la
relación jurídica entre un hijo y
uno de sus padres.

Art. 179. Filiation is established
by proof of maternity or paternity
or by adoption.

Art. 179. La filiación se
determina mediante prueba de
maternidad o paternidad o por
adopción.

CHAPTER 2. FILIATION BY
PROOF OF MATERNITY OR
PATERNITY

CAPÍTULO 2. DE LA FILIACIÓN
POR PRUEBA DE MATERNIDAD
O PATERNIDAD

2020]

BILINGUAL LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE

305

SECTION 1. PROOF OF
MATERNITY

SECCIÓN 1. DE LA PRUEBA DE
LA MATERNIDAD

Art. 184. Maternity may be
established by a preponderance of
the evidence that the child was
born of a particular woman, except
as otherwise provided by law.
[Amended by Acts 1976, No. 430,
§1; Acts 2005, No. 192, §1, eff.
June 29, 2005; Acts 2009, No. 3,
§3, eff. June 9, 2009.]

Art. 184. La maternidad puede
determinarse por preponderancia
de la prueba de que el hijo nació
de una mujer en particular, salvo
que la ley disponga de otro modo.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 430
de 1976; sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de
2005, vigente desde el 29 de junio
de 2005; sec. 3, ley n.o 3 de 2009,
vigente desde el 9 de junio de
2009].

SECTION 2. PROOF OF
PATERNITY

SECCIÓN 2. DE LA PRUEBA DE
LA PATERNIDAD

SUBSECTION A. THE
PRESUMPTION OF
PATERNITY OF HUSBAND;
DISAVOWAL OF PATERNITY;
CONTESTATION;
ESTABLISHMENT OF
PATERNITY

SUBSECCIÓN A. DE LA
PRESUNCIÓN DE PATERNIDAD
DEL ESPOSO; DEL
DESCONOCIMIENTO DE LA
PATERNIDAD; DE LA
IMPUGNACIÓN; DE LA
DETERMINACIÓN DE LA
PATERNIDAD

Art. 185. The husband of the
mother is presumed to be the father
of a child born during the marriage
or within three hundred days from
the date of the termination of the
marriage. [Amended by Acts 1976,
No. 430, §1; Acts 2005, No. 192,
§1, eff. June 29, 2005; Acts 2009,
No. 3, §3, eff. June 9, 2009.]

Art. 185. El esposo de la madre
se presume padre del hijo nacido
durante el matrimonio o dentro de
los trescientos días posteriores a la
fecha de disolución del
matrimonio. [Modificado por sec.
1, ley n.o 430 de 1976; sec. 1, ley
n.o 192 de 2005, vigente desde el
29 de junio de 2005; sec. 3, ley n.o
3 de 2009, vigente desde el 9 de
junio de 2009].

Art. 186. If a child is born
within three hundred days from the
day of the termination of a

Art. 186. Si nace un hijo dentro
de los trescientos días posteriores
a la disolución del matrimonio y su
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marriage and his mother has
married again before his birth, the
first husband is presumed to be the
father.
If the first husband, or his
successor, obtains a judgment of
disavowal of paternity of the child,
the second husband is presumed to
be the father. The second husband,
or his successor, may disavow
paternity if he institutes a
disavowal action within a
peremptive period of one year
from the day that the judgment of
disavowal obtained by the first
husband is final and definitive.
[Amended by Acts 1976, No. 430,
§1; Acts 2005, No. 192, §1, eff.
June 29, 2005.]

madre se ha vuelto a casar antes
de su nacimiento, se presume que
el padre es el primer esposo.

Art. 187. The husband may
disavow paternity of the child by
clear and convincing evidence that
he is not the father. The testimony
of the husband shall be
corroborated by other evidence.
[Amended by Acts 1976, No. 430,
§1; Acts 1989, No. 790, §1; Acts
2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June 29,
2005.]

Art. 187. El esposo puede
desconocer la paternidad del niño
mediante pruebas claras y
convincentes de que no es el padre.
El testimonio del esposo debe
corroborarse mediante otras
pruebas. [Modificado por sec. 1,
ley n.o 430 de 1976; sec. 1, ley n.o
790 de 1989; sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de
2005, vigente desde el 29 de junio
de 2005].

Art. 188. The husband of the
mother may not disavow a child
born to his wife as a result of an
assisted conception to which he
consented. [Amended by Acts
1976, No. 430, §1; Acts 1989, No.
790, §1; Acts 2005, No. 192, §1,
eff. June 29, 2005.]

Art. 188. El esposo de la madre
no puede desconocer al niño
nacido de su esposa a
consecuencia de una técnica de
reproducción asistida respecto de
la que prestó su consentimiento.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 430
de 1976; sec. 1, ley n.o 790 de
1989; sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de 2005,

Si el primer marido, o su
sucesor, obtiene sentencia
favorable de desconocimiento de
la paternidad del menor, se
presume que el segundo esposo es
el padre. El segundo esposo, o su
sucesor, puede desconocer la
paternidad si inicia una acción de
desconocimiento dentro del plazo
perentorio de un año desde el día
en que quedó firme la sentencia de
desconocimiento obtenida por el
primer marido. [Modificado por
sec. 1, ley n.o 430 de 1976; sec. 1,
ley n.o 192 de 2005, vigente desde
el 29 de junio de 2005].
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vigente desde el 29 de junio de
2005].
Art. 189. The action for
disavowal of paternity is subject to
a liberative prescription of one
year. This prescription commences
to run from the day of the birth of
the child, or the day the husband
knew or should have known that
he may not be the biological father
of the child, whichever occurs
later.

Art. 189. La acción de
desconocimiento de la paternidad
está sujeta a un plazo de
prescripción extintiva de un año.
El plazo de prescripción comienza
a computarse desde el día del
nacimiento del menor o desde el
día en que el marido tuvo o
debería haber tenido conocimiento
de que él podría no ser el padre
biológico del niño, lo que ocurra
en último término.
Nevertheless, if the husband
No obstante, si el marido vivió
lived separate and apart from the
separado de la madre sin
mother continuously during the
interrupción durante los
three hundred days immediately
trescientos días inmediatamente
preceding the birth of the child,
anteriores al nacimiento del niño,
this prescription does not
el plazo de prescripción no
commence to run until the husband comienza a computarse hasta que
is notified in writing that a party in se notifique por escrito al esposo
interest has asserted that the
de que una parte interesada alegó
husband is the father of the child.
que el esposo es el padre del niño.
[Amended by Acts 1976, No. 430, [Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 430
§1; Acts 1999, No. 790, §1; Acts
de 1976; sec. 1, ley n.o 790 de
2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June 29,
1999; sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de 2005,
2005; Acts 2016, No. 309, §1, eff. vigente desde el 29 de junio de
Aug. 1, 2016.]
2005; sec. 1, ley n.o 309 de 2016,
vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2016].
Art. 190. If the prescription has
Art. 190. En caso de que haya
commenced to run and the husband comenzado a computarse el plazo
dies before the prescription has
de prescripción y el esposo muera
accrued, his successor whose
antes de producida la
interest is adversely affected may
prescripción, el sucesor del esposo
institute an action for disavowal of cuyos intereses se vean
paternity. The action of the
perjudicados puede iniciar una
successor is subject to a liberative
acción de desconocimiento de la
prescription of one year. This
paternidad. La acción del sucesor
prescription commences to run
está sujeta a un plazo de
prescripción extintiva de un año.
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from the day of the death of the
husband.
If the prescription has not yet
commenced to run, the action of
the successor is subject to a
liberative prescription of one year.
This prescription commences to
run from the day the successor is
notified in writing that a party in
interest has asserted that the
husband is the father of the child.
[Amended by Acts 1976, No. 430,
§1; Acts 1999, No. 790, §1; Acts
2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June 29,
2005.]
190.1. If blood or tissue
sampling indicates by a ninetynine and nine-tenths percentage
point threshold probability that the
biological father is the father of the
child and he is not the husband or
former husband presumed to be the
father of the child, then the
husband or former husband
presumed to be the father of the
child, the mother, and the
biological father of the child may
execute a three-party
acknowledgment in authentic form
declaring that the husband or
former husband is not the father of
the child and that the biological
father is the father of the child.
When a three-party
acknowledgment is executed, the
husband or former husband is not
presumed to be the father of the
child. The biological father who
has acknowledged the child by

[Vol. 13

Este plazo comienza a contarse
desde el día de la muerte del
esposo.
Si el plazo de prescripción no
hubiera comenzado a transcurrir,
la acción del sucesor estará sujeta
a un plazo de prescripción
extintiva de un año. Este plazo de
prescripción comienza a
transcurrir desde el día en que se
notifica por escrito al sucesor de
que una parte interesada alegó que
el esposo es el padre del niño.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 430
de 1976; sec. 1, ley n.o 790 de
1999; sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de 2005,
vigente desde el 29 de junio de
2005].
190.1. Si las muestras de sangre
o de tejido indican con un grado
de probabilidad del 99,9 % que el
padre biológico es el padre del
niño y este no es el esposo o
exesposo que se presume padre del
niño, el esposo o exesposo que se
presume padre del niño, la madre
y el padre biológico del menor
podrán firmar conjuntamente un
reconocimiento autenticado por el
que se declare que el esposo o
exesposo no es el padre del menor
y que el padre biológico es el
padre del menor. Cuando se firma
un reconocimiento conjunto de
este tipo, el esposo o exesposo no
se presume padre del niño. El
padre biológico que reconoció al
hijo de ese modo se presume su
padre.
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three-party acknowledgment is
presumed to be the father of the
child.
To have effect, this
acknowledgment shall be executed
no later than ten years from the day
of the birth of the child but never
more than one year from the day of
the death of the child. These time
periods are peremptive. [Acts
2018, No. 21, § 2, eff. May 7,
2018.]
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Para tener validez, el
reconocimiento debe firmarse a
más tardar dentro de los diez años
posteriores al nacimiento del niño,
y, en todo caso, dentro del plazo de
un año desde su muerte. Estos
plazos son perentorios. [Sec. 2, ley
n.o 21 de 2018, vigente desde el 7
de mayo de 2018].

Art. 191. The mother of a child
may institute an action to establish
both that her former husband is not
the father of the child and that her
present husband is the father. This
action may be instituted only if the
present husband has acknowledged
the child by authentic act. [Acts
2004, No. 530, §1, eff. June 25,
2004; Acts 2005, No. 192, §1, eff.
June 29, 2005; Acts 2016, No. 309,
§1, eff. Aug. 1, 2016.]

Art. 191. La madre del hijo
puede iniciar una acción para que
se determine que su exesposo no es
el padre y que su actual esposo sí
lo es. Esta acción puede iniciarse
solo si el marido actual reconoció
al hijo por acto auténtico. [Sec. 1,
ley n.o 530 de 2004, vigente desde
el 25 de junio de 2004; sec. 1, ley
n.o 192 de 2005, vigente desde el
29 de junio de 2005; sec. 1, ley n.o
309 de 2016, vigente desde el 1 de
agosto de 2016].

Art. 192. The mother shall
prove by clear and convincing
evidence both that her former
husband is not the father and that
her present husband is the father.
The testimony of the mother shall
be corroborated by other evidence.
[Acts 2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June
29, 2005.]

Art. 192. La madre debe probar
de manera clara y convincente que
su exmarido no es el padre del hijo
y que su actual marido sí lo es. El
testimonio de la madre debe
corroborarse mediante otras
pruebas. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de
2005, vigente desde el 29 de junio
de 2005].

Art. 193. The action by the
mother shall be instituted within a
peremptive period of one hundred
eighty days from the marriage to
her present husband and also
within two years from the day of

Art. 193. La acción de la madre
debe iniciarse dentro de un
período perentorio de ciento
ochenta días desde la fecha de
celebración del matrimonio con su
actual marido y también dentro de
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the birth of the child, except as
may otherwise be provided by law.
[Acts 2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June
29, 2005.]

los dos años posteriores a la fecha
de nacimiento del hijo, a menos
que la ley disponga de otro modo.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de 2005,
vigente desde el 29 de junio de
2005].

Art. 194. A judgment shall not
be rendered decreeing that the
former husband is not the father of
the child unless the judgment also
decrees that the present husband is
the father of the child. [Acts 2005,
No. 192, §1, eff. June 29, 2005.]

Art. 194. No se dictará
sentencia en la que se declare que
el exmarido no es el padre del
menor a menos que la sentencia
también establezca que lo es el
marido actual. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 192
de 2005, vigente desde el 29 de
junio de 2005].

SUBSECTION B.
PRESUMPTION OF
PATERNITY BY SUBSEQUENT
MARRIAGE AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

SUBSECCIÓN B. DE LA
PRESUNCIÓN DE PATERNIDAD
POR MATRIMONIO POSTERIOR
Y DEL RECONOCIMIENTO

Art. 195. A man who marries
the mother of a child not filiated to
another man and who, with the
concurrence of the mother,
acknowledges the child by
authentic act is presumed to be the
father of that child.

Art. 195. Se presume padre de
un menor al hombre que contrae
matrimonio con la madre del
menor que no tiene vínculo filial
con otro hombre y que, con el
asentimiento de la madre, lo
reconoce como hijo mediante acto
auténtico.
El esposo podrá desconocer al
menor en los términos del artículo
187. La revocación del acto
auténtico de reconocimiento no
basta para rebatir la presunción
de paternidad de este artículo.

The husband may disavow
paternity of the child as provided
in Article 187. Revocation of the
authentic act of acknowledgment
alone is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption of paternity created
by this Article.
The action for disavowal is
subject to a peremptive period of
one hundred eighty days. This
peremptive period commences to
run from the day of the marriage or
the acknowledgment, whichever

La acción de desconocimiento
caduca a los ciento ochenta días.
El plazo de caducidad comienza a
transcurrir desde el día del
matrimonio o desde el
reconocimiento, lo que ocurra
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occurs later. [Acts 2005, No. 192,
§1, eff. June 29, 2005; Acts 2009,
No. 3, §3, eff. June 9, 2009; Acts
2016, No. 309, §1, eff. Aug. 1,
2016.]
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después. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de
2005, vigente desde el 29 de junio
de 2005; sec. 3, ley n.o 3 de 2009,
vigente desde el 9 de junio de
2009; sec. 1, ley n.o 309 de 2016,
vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2016].

SUBSECTION C. OTHER
METHODS OF ESTABLISHING
PATERNITY

SUBSECCIÓN C. DE OTROS
MÉTODOS PARA ESTABLECER
LA PATERNIDAD

Art. 196. A man may, by
authentic act, acknowledge a child
not filiated to another man. The
acknowledgment creates a
presumption that the man who
acknowledges the child is the
father. The presumption can be
invoked only on behalf of the
child. Except as otherwise
provided in custody, visitation, and
child support cases, the
acknowledgment does not create a
presumption in favor of the man
who acknowledges the child. [Acts
2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June 29,
2005; Acts 2006, No. 344, §1, eff.
June 13, 2006; Acts 2009, No. 3,
§3, eff. June 9, 2009; Acts 2016,
No. 309, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2016.]

Art. 196. Un hombre puede,
mediante acto auténtico, reconocer
como hijo a un menor sin vínculo
filial con otro hombre. El
reconocimiento crea la presunción
de que el hombre que reconoce al
menor es el padre. La presunción
solo puede ser invocada en nombre
del menor. Excepto cuando se
disponga de otro modo en los
casos de guarda, visitas y
alimentos de los hijos, el
reconocimiento no implica
presunción a favor del hombre que
reconozca al menor. [Sec. 1, ley
n.o 192 de 2005, vigente desde el
29 de junio de 2005; sec. 1, ley n.o
344 de 2006, vigente desde el 13
de junio de 2006; sec. 3, ley n.o 3
de 2009, vigente desde el 9 de
junio de 2009; sec. 1, ley n.o 309
de 2016, vigente desde el 1 de
agosto de 2016].

Art. 197. A child may institute
an action to prove paternity even
though he is presumed to be the
child of another man. If the action
is instituted after the death of the
alleged father, a child shall prove

Art. 197. El menor puede iniciar
una acción para probar la
paternidad aunque se presuma hijo
de otro hombre. Si la acción se
inicia después de la muerte del
padre presunto, el menor debe
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paternity by clear and convincing
evidence.
For purposes of succession only,
this action is subject to a
peremptive period of one year.
This peremptive period
commences to run from the day of
the death of the alleged father.
[Acts 2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June
29, 2005.]
Art. 198. A man may institute
an action to establish his paternity
of a child at any time except as
provided in this Article. The action
is strictly personal.

[Vol. 13

probar la paternidad mediante
pruebas claras y convincentes.
Solo a los efectos de la
sucesión, esta acción está sujeta a
un plazo de caducidad de un año.
Este plazo comienza a contarse
desde el día de la muerte del padre
presunto. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de
2005, vigente desde el 29 de junio
de 2005].
Art. 198. Un hombre puede
iniciar una acción de paternidad
respecto de un menor en cualquier
momento, con las excepciones
contenidas en este artículo. La
acción es estrictamente personal.
If the child is presumed to be
Si se presume que el menor es
the child of another man, the action hijo de otro hombre, la acción
shall be instituted within one year
debe iniciarse dentro del año
from the day of the birth of the
siguiente al nacimiento del menor.
child. Nevertheless, if the mother
No obstante, si la madre de mala
in bad faith deceived the father of
fe hubiera engañado al padre del
the child regarding his paternity,
menor en relación con su
the action shall be instituted within paternidad, la acción debe
one year from the day the father
iniciarse dentro del año posterior
knew or should have known of his al momento en que el padre supo o
paternity, or within ten years from debió haber sabido de su
the day of the birth of the child,
paternidad, o dentro de los diez
whichever first occurs.
años posteriores al nacimiento del
menor, lo que ocurra primero.
In all cases, the action shall be
En todos los casos, la acción
instituted no later than one year
debe iniciarse dentro del año
from the day of the death of the
posterior a la muerte del menor.
child.
The time periods in this Article
Los plazos previstos en este
are peremptive. [Amended by Acts artículo son perentorios.
1944, No. 50; Acts 1948, No. 482, [Modificado por ley n.o 50 de
§1; Acts 1979, No. 607, §1; Acts
1944; sec. 1, ley n.o 482 de 1948;
2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June 29,
sec. 1, ley n.o 607 de 1979; sec. 1,
2005.]
ley n.o 192 de 2005, vigente desde
el 29 de junio de 2005].
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CHAPTER 3. FILIATION BY
ADOPTION

CAPÍTULO 3. DE LA FILIACIÓN
POR ADOPCIÓN

SECTION 1. EFFECT OF
ADOPTION

SECCIÓN 1. DE LOS EFECTOS
DE LA ADOPCIÓN

Art. 199. Upon adoption, the
adopting parent becomes the
parent of the child for all purposes
and the filiation between the child
and his legal parent is terminated,
except as otherwise provided by
law. The adopted child and his
descendants retain the right to
inherit from his former legal parent
and the relatives of that parent.
[Acts 2009, No. 3, §1, eff. June 9,
2009.]

Art. 199. Producida la
adopción, el padre adoptante se
convierte en el padre del menor a
todos los efectos y se extingue la
filiación entre el menor y su padre
originariamente reconocido como
tal por la ley, excepto cuando la
ley dispusiera otra cosa. El hijo
adoptado y sus descendientes
conservan el derecho de heredar al
padre originariamente reconocido
como tal por la ley y a los
parientes de ese padre. [Sec. 1, ley
n.o 3 de 2009, vigente desde el 9 de
junio de 2009].

SECTION 2. ADOPTION OF
MINORS

SECCIÓN 2. DE LA ADOPCIÓN
DE MENORES

Art. 200. The adoption of
minors is also governed by the
provisions of the Children’s Code.
[Acts 2009, No. 3, §1, eff. June 9,
2009.]

Art. 200. La adopción de
menores también está regulada
por las disposiciones del Código
de la Niñez. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 3 de
2009, vigente desde el 9 de junio
de 2009].

Art. 201. [Repealed by Acts
2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June 29,
2005.]

Art. 201. [Derogados por sec. 1,
ley n.o 192 de 2005, vigente desde
el 29 de junio de 2005].

Art. 202. [Repealed by Acts
1979, No. 607, §4.]

Art. 202. [Derogado por sec. 4,
ley n.o 607 de 1979].

Art. 203. [Repealed by Acts
2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June 29,
2005.]

Art. 203. [Derogado por sec. 1,
ley n.o 192 de 2005, vigente desde
el 29 de junio de 2005].
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Art. 204. [Repealed by Acts
1979, No. 607, §4.]

Art. 204. [Derogado por sec. 4,
ley n.o 607 de 1979].

Arts. 205-209. [Repealed by
Acts 2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June
29, 2005.]

Arts. 205-209. [Derogado por
sec. 1, ley n.o 192 de 2005, vigente
desde el 29 de junio de 2005].

Art. 210. [Repealed by Acts
1980, No. 549, §2.]

Art. 210. [Derogado por sec. 2,
ley n.o 549 de 1980].

Art. 211. [Repealed by Acts
2005, No. 192, §1, eff. June 29,
2005.]

Art. 211. [Derogado por sec. 1,
ley n.o 192 de 2005, vigente desde
el 29 de junio de 2005].

SECTION 3. ADOPTION OF
ADULTS

SECCIÓN 3. DE LA ADOPCIÓN
DE ADULTOS

Art. 212. A person who has
attained the age of majority may be
adopted without judicial
authorization only when the
adoptive parent is the spouse or the
surviving spouse of a parent of the
person to be adopted.
In other proposed adult
adoptions, the court, upon the joint
petition of the adoptive parent and
the person to be adopted, may
authorize the adoption of a person
who has attained the age of
majority if the court finds after a
hearing that the adoption is in the
best interest of both parties. [Acts
2008, No. 351, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2009; Acts 2009, No. 3, §3, eff.
June 9, 2009.]

Art. 212. Los mayores de edad
pueden ser adoptados sin
autorización judicial solo si el
padre adoptivo es el cónyuge o el
cónyuge supérstite de uno de los
padres de la persona que será
adoptada.
En las demás propuestas de
adopción de adultos, el juez, a
petición conjunta del padre
adoptante y de la persona que será
adoptada, puede autorizar la
adopción de la persona mayor de
edad si considera, después de
celebrar una audiencia, que la
adopción es acorde al interés
superior de ambas partes. [Sec. 1,
ley n.o 351 de 2008, vigente desde
el 1 de enero de 2009; sec. 3, ley
n.o 3 de 2009, vigente desde el 9 de
junio de 2009].
Art. 213. El padre adoptivo y la
persona que va a ser adoptada
deben prestar su consentimiento

Art. 213. The adoptive parent
and the person to be adopted shall
consent to the adoption in an
authentic act of adoption.
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The spouse of the adoptive
parent and the spouse of the person
to be adopted shall sign the act of
adoption for the purpose of
concurrence in the adoption only.
The act of adoption without this
concurrence is absolutely null. The
concurrence does not establish the
legal relationship of parent and
child.
Neither a party to an adult
adoption nor a concurring spouse
may consent by procuration or
mandate. [Acts 2008, No. 351, §1,
eff. Jan. 1, 2009.]

Art. 214. The adoption is
effective when the act of adult
adoption and any judgment
required to authorize the adoption
are filed for registry, except as
otherwise provided by law.
[Amended by Acts 1948, No. 454,
§1; Acts 1958, No. 514, §1; Acts
1978, No. 458, §1; Acts 1990, No.
147, §1, eff. July 1, 1990; Acts
1995, No. 1180, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
1996; Acts 2008, No. 351, §1, eff.
Jan. 1, 2009.]
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respecto de la adopción mediante
acto auténtico de adopción.
El cónyuge del padre adoptivo y
el cónyuge de la persona que será
adoptada firmarán el acto de la
adopción al solo efecto de prestar
su asentimiento respecto de la
adopción. El acto de la adopción
es nulo de nulidad absoluta sin ese
asentimiento. El asentimiento no
determina la relación jurídica de
padre e hijo.
Ni las partes de la adopción de
un adulto ni el cónyuge que presta
el asentimiento pueden expresar su
asentimiento por poder o mandato.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 351 de 2008,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
2009].
Art. 214. La adopción surte
efectos cuando el acto de la
adopción adulta y la sentencia
requerida para autorizar la
adopción se presentan para su
inscripción, a menos que la ley
disponga de otro modo.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 454
de 1948; sec. 1, ley n.o 514 de
1958; sec. 1, ley n.o 458 de 1978;
sec. 1, ley n.o 147 de 1990, vigente
desde el 1 de julio de 1990; sec. 1,
ley n.o 1180 de 1995, vigente desde
el 1 de enero de 1996; sec. 1, ley
n.o 351 de 2008, vigente desde el 1
de enero de 2009].
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CHAPTER 4. FILIATION OF
CHILDREN BY ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY [RESERVED]

CAPÍTULO 4. DE LA FILIACIÓN
DE LOS HIJOS CONCEBIDOS
POR TÉCNICAS DE
REPRODUCCIÓN ASISTIDA
[RESERVADO]

CHAPTER 5. PARENTAL
AUTHORITY OF MARRIED
PERSONS

CAPÍTULO 5. DE LA
AUTORIDAD PARENTAL DE LAS
PERSONAS CASADAS

Arts. 215-220. [Repealed by
Acts 2015, No. 260, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2016.]

Arts. 215-220. [Derogado por
sec. 1, ley n.o 260 de 2015, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2016].

SECTION 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF PARENTAL
AUTHORITY

SECCIÓN 1. DE LOS
PRINCIPIOS GENERALES DE LA
AUTORIDAD PARENTAL

[Repealed and reenacted by Acts
2015, No. 260, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2016.]

[Derogado y vuelto a aprobar por
sec. 1, ley n.o 260 de 2015, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2016].

Art. 221. The father and mother
who are married to each other have
parental authority over their minor
child during the marriage.

Art. 221. Durante su
matrimonio, el padre y la madre
tienen la autoridad parental sobre
los hijos menores.

Art. 222. Parental authority
includes representation of the child
and the right to designate a tutor
for the child.

Art. 222. La autoridad parental
incluye la representación de los
hijos y el derecho de designar a un
tutor.

Art. 223. Parental authority
includes rights and obligations of
physical care, supervision,
protection, discipline, and
instruction of the child.

Art. 223. La autoridad parental
incluye los derechos y
obligaciones de cuidado físico,
supervisión, protección, disciplina
e instrucción de los hijos.
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SECTION 2. OBLIGATIONS OF
PARENTS

SECCIÓN 2. DE LAS
OBLIGACIONES DE LOS
PADRES

[Repealed and reenacted by Acts
2015, No. 260, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2016.]

[Derogado y vuelto a aprobar por
sec. 1, ley n.o 260 de 2015, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2016].

Art. 224. Parents are obligated
to support, maintain, and educate
their child. The obligation to
educate a child continues after
minority as provided by law.

Art. 224. Los padres están
obligados a apoyar, mantener y
educar a sus hijos. La obligación
de educar a los hijos continúa
después de la minoridad según lo
dispuesto en la ley.

Art. 225. Parents are responsible
for damage occasioned by their
child as provided by law.

Art. 225. Los padres son
responsables por los daños
causados por sus hijos según lo
previsto en la ley.

Art. 226. Parents have a moral
obligation to provide moral, social,
and material direction for their
child.

Art. 226. Los padres asumen la
dirección moral, social y material
de sus hijos.

SECTION 3. OBLIGATIONS OF
CHILDREN

SECCIÓN 3. DE LAS
OBLIGACIONES DE LOS HIJOS

[Repealed and reenacted by Acts
2015, No. 260, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2016.]

[Derogado y vuelto a aprobar por
sec. 1, ley n.o 260 de 2015, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2016].

Art. 227. A child owes
assistance to his parents and may
not quit a family residence without
the consent of both parents, except
as otherwise provided by law.

Art. 227. Los hijos deben
asistencia a sus padres y no
pueden abandonar la residencia
familiar sin el consentimiento de
ambos padres, excepto cuando la
ley lo prevea de otro modo.

Art. 228. A child shall obey his
parents in all matters not contrary
to law or good morals. Parents
have the right and obligation to

Art. 228. Los hijos deben
obedecer a los padres en todos los
asuntos que no sean contrarios a
la ley o a las buenas costumbres.
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correct and discipline the child in a
reasonable manner.

Los padres tienen el derecho y la
obligación de corregir y castigar a
los hijos de manera razonable.

SECTION 4. AUTHORITY
OVER THE PROPERTY OF THE
CHILD

SECCIÓN 4. DE LA AUTORIDAD
SOBRE LOS BIENES DE LOS
HIJOS

[Repealed and reenacted by Acts
2015, No. 260, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2016.]

[Derogado y vuelto a aprobar por
sec. 1, ley n.o 260 de 2015, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2016].

Art. 229. Each parent has the
right and the obligation to
administer the property of the
child. The parent must do so as a
prudent administrator and is
answerable for any damage caused
by his fraud, fault, default, or
neglect. An action for failure to
perform this obligation is subject
to a liberative prescription of five
years that commences to run from
the day the child attains the age of
majority.

Art. 229. Cada padre tiene el
derecho y la obligación de
administrar los bienes de sus hijos.
Debe obrar como administrador
prudente y será responsable por
todo daño causado por su dolo,
culpa, omisión o negligencia. La
acción por omisión del
cumplimiento de esta obligación
está sujeta a un plazo de
prescripción extintiva de cinco
años desde que el hijo alcance la
mayoría de edad.

Art. 230. Either parent may
alienate, encumber, or lease the
property of the child, compromise
a claim of the child, or incur an
obligation of the child for his
education, support, and
maintenance only with prior court
approval, except as otherwise
provided by law.
Nevertheless, a parent may
expend, without court approval,
the fruits of the child’s property for
the shared benefit of the family,
excluding major children not living
in the household, or for the
expenses of the child’s household
or property.

Art. 230. Cualquiera de los
padres puede enajenar, gravar o
arrendar los bienes de los hijos,
transigir un reclamo de los hijos o
contraer una obligación de los
hijos para su educación, sostén y
manutención, con previa
aprobación del juez, salvo que la
ley disponga de otro modo.
No obstante, los padres pueden,
sin necesidad de aprobación del
juez, consumir los frutos de los
bienes del hijo en beneficio común
de la familia, excluidos los hijos
mayores de edad que no vivan en
el hogar familiar, o para los
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Art. 231. Parents are bound to
deliver to the child his property at
termination of parental authority.
Parents shall also give an
account of their administration
when ordered by the court. The
action to compel an accounting is
subject to a liberative prescription
of five years that commences to
run from the day the child attains
the age of majority.
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gastos del hogar o de los bienes
del hijo.
Art. 231. Los padres tienen la
obligación de entregar al hijo sus
bienes cuando cesa la autoridad
parental.
Los padres también deberán
rendir cuentas de su
administración cuando lo ordene
el juez. La acción para exigir la
rendición de cuentas está sujeta a
un plazo de prescripción extintiva
de cinco años, que comienza a
computarse desde que el hijo
alcanza la mayoría de edad.

SECTION 5. PERSON HAVING
PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND
OF ITS DELEGATION AND
SUSPENSION

SECCIÓN 5. DE LA PERSONA
CON AUTORIDAD PARENTAL Y
DE SU DELEGACIÓN Y
SUSPENSIÓN

[Repealed and reenacted by Acts
2015, No. 260, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2016.]

[Derogado y vuelto a aprobar por
sec. 1, ley n.o 260 de 2015, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2016].

Art. 232. Either parent during
the marriage has parental authority
over his child unless otherwise
provided by law.
Under extraordinary
circumstances, such as if one
parent is mentally incompetent,
interdicted, or imprisoned, or is an
absent person, the other parent has
exclusive authority.

Art. 232. Salvo disposición en
contrario, cualquiera de los padres
tiene autoridad parental sobre su
hijo durante el matrimonio.
En circunstancias
extraordinarias, como en el caso
de que un padre fuera incapaz
mental, interdicto o estuviera en
prisión, o fuera persona ausente, el
otro padre tendrá la autoridad de
manera exclusiva.
Art. 233. Los padres pueden
delegar la totalidad o parte de su
autoridad parental a un tercero
según lo dispuesto en la ley.
Los padres delegan una parte
de su autoridad parental a
docentes y otras personas a
quienes encomiendan a sus hijos

Art. 233. Parents may delegate
all or a part of their parental
authority to others as provided by
law.
Parents delegate a part of their
parental authority to teachers and
others to whom they entrust their
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child for his education, insofar as
may be necessary.
Art. 234. Parental authority
continues during marriage, unless
modified by a judgment awarding
custody to one parent, by a joint
custody implementation order, or
by a judgment awarding custody to
a third person.
An ascendant, other than a
parent, who is awarded custody
has parental authority. The
authority of a third person who is
awarded custody, other than an
ascendant, is governed by the rules
of tutorship, unless modified by
court order.
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para su educación, en la medida
de lo necesario.
Art. 234. La autoridad parental
se mantiene durante el
matrimonio, a menos que sea
modificada por una sentencia en la
que se otorgue la guarda a uno de
los padres, por una orden de
guarda compartida o por una
sentencia en la que se otorgue la
guarda a un tercero.
Cuando se otorga la guarda a
un ascendiente que no es uno de
los padres, ese ascendiente tiene la
autoridad parental. La autoridad
parental del tercero al que se le
otorgue la guarda, que no sea
ascendiente, se rige por las reglas
de la tutela, a menos que una
sentencia judicial la modifique.

SECTION 6. TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL AUTHORITY

SECCIÓN 6. DE LA EXTINCIÓN
DE LA AUTORIDAD PARENTAL

[Repealed and reenacted by Acts
2015, No. 260, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2016.]

[Derogado y vuelto a aprobar por
sec. 1, ley n.o 260 de 2015, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2016].

Art. 235. Parental authority
terminates upon the child’s
attaining the age of majority, upon
the child’s emancipation, or upon
termination of the marriage of the
parents of the child.

Art. 235. La autoridad parental
cesa con la mayoría de edad de los
hijos, al momento de la
emancipación o de la disolución
del matrimonio de sus padres.

CHAPTER 6. OBLIGATIONS OF
CHILDREN AND PARENTS
AND OTHER ASCENDANTS

CAPÍTULO 6. DE LAS
OBLIGACIONES DE LOS HIJOS
Y LOS PADRES Y OTROS
ASCENDIENTES

[Repealed and reenacted by Acts
2015, No. 260, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2016.]

[Derogado y vuelto a aprobar por
sec. 1, ley n.o 260 de 2015, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2016].
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Art. 236. A child regardless of
age owes honor and respect to his
father and mother.

Art. 236. Los hijos,
independientemente de su edad,
deben honrar y respetar a su padre
y madre.

Art. 237. Descendants are
bound to provide the basic
necessities of life to their
ascendants who are in need, upon
proof of inability to obtain these
necessities by other means or from
other sources, and ascendants are
likewise bound to provide for their
needy descendants, this obligation
being reciprocal.

Art. 237. Los descendientes
están obligados a satisfacer las
necesidades de subsistencia de sus
ascendientes que estén
necesitados, después de probarse
la incapacidad de satisfacer estas
necesidades por otros medios o a
partir de otras fuentes, y los
ascendientes están igualmente
obligados a ayudar a sus
descendientes necesitados, ya que
esta obligación es recíproca.
Esta obligación es estrictamente
personal y se limita a las
necesidades básicas de
alimentación, vestimenta, vivienda
y atención de la salud.
Esta obligación es debida por
los descendientes y ascendientes
en el orden de su grado de
relación con el acreedor y es
simplemente mancomunada entre
los deudores. Sin embargo, si el
acreedor estuviera casado, la
obligación de asistencia debida
por sus descendientes y
ascendientes será subsidiaria a la
obligación debida por su cónyuge.

This obligation is strictly
personal and is limited to the basic
necessities of food, clothing,
shelter, and health care.
This obligation is owed by
descendants and ascendants in the
order of their degree of
relationship to the obligee and is
joint and divisible among obligors.
Nevertheless, if the obligee is
married, the obligation of support
owed by his descendants and
ascendants is secondary to the
obligation owed by his spouse.
Art. 238. The amount of support
shall be determined in accordance
with the needs of the obligee, as
limited under the preceding
Article, and the means of the
obligor.

Art. 238. El monto en concepto
de asistencia se determinará de
acuerdo con las necesidades del
acreedor, conforme a las
limitaciones del artículo anterior,
y los recursos del deudor.

Art. 239. The amount of support
may be modified if the

Art. 239. El monto
correspondiente a la asistencia
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circumstances of the obligor or the
obligee materially change and shall
be terminated if it has become
unnecessary.

puede modificarse si las
circunstancias del deudor o del
acreedor cambian de manera
sustancial; y deja de deberse si
deviene innecesario.

Arts. 240-245. [Repealed by
Acts 2015, No. 260, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2016.]

Arts. 240-245. [Derogados por
sec. 1, ley n.o 260 de 2015, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 2016].

TITLE VIII. OF MINORS, OF
THEIR TUTORSHIP AND
EMANCIPATION

TÍTULO VIII. DE LOS
MENORES, DE SU TUTELA Y
EMANCIPACIÓN

CHAPTER 1. OF TUTORSHIP

CAPÍTULO 1. DE LA TUTELA

SECTION 1. GENERAL
DISPOSITIONS

SECCIÓN 1. DISPOSICIONES
GENERALES

Art. 246. The minor not
emancipated is placed under the
authority of a tutor after the
dissolution of the marriage of his
father and mother or the separation
from bed and board of either one
of them from the other. [Amended
by Acts 1924, No. 72.]

Art. 246. Los menores no
emancipados quedan bajo la
autoridad de un tutor después de
disuelto el matrimonio entre su
padre y su madre o de su
separación de cuerpos.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 72
de 1924].

Art. 247. There are four sorts of
tutorships:
Tutorship by nature;
Tutorship by will;
Tutorship by the effect of the
law;
Tutorship by the appointment of
the judge.

Art. 247. Hay cuatro tipos de
tutela:
Tutela natural.
Tutela testamentaria.
Tutela legítima.

Art. 248. Tutorship by nature
takes place of right, but the natural
tutor must qualify for the office as
provided by law. In every other
kind of tutorship the tutor must be
confirmed or appointed by the
court, and must qualify for the

Art. 248. La tutela natural se
produce de pleno derecho, pero el
tutor natural debe cumplir con los
requisitos para la función
previstos en la ley. En todos los
demás tipos de tutela, el tutor debe
ser confirmado o designado por el

Tutela dativa.
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office as provided by law.
[Amended by Acts 1960, No. 30,
§1, eff. Jan. 1, 1961.]

juez y debe cumplir con los
requisitos para la función
previstos en la ley. [Modificado
por sec. 1, ley n.o 30 de 1960,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1961].

Art. 249. For every sort of
tutorship, the tutor is accountable.

Art. 249. En todos los tipos de
tutela, el tutor debe rendir cuentas.

SECTION 2. OF TUTORSHIP BY
NATURE

SECCIÓN 2. DE LA TUTELA
NATURAL

Art. 250. Upon the death of
either parent, the tutorship of
minor children belongs of right to
the other. Upon divorce or judicial
separation from bed and board of
parents, the tutorship of each
minor child belongs of right to the
parent under whose care he or she
has been placed or to whose care
he or she has been entrusted;
however, if the parents are
awarded joint custody of a minor
child, then the cotutorship of the
minor child shall belong to both
parents, with equal authority,
privileges, and responsibilities,
unless modified by order of the
court or by an agreement of the
parents, approved by the court
awarding joint custody. In the
event of the death of a parent to
whom joint custody had been
awarded, the tutorship of the minor
children of the deceased belongs of
right to the surviving parent.

Art. 250. Ante el fallecimiento
de uno de los padres, la tutela de
los hijos menores corresponde al
otro padre de pleno derecho. Ante
el divorcio o la separación de
cuerpos judicial de los padres, la
tutela de cada menor corresponde
de pleno derecho al padre a cuyo
cuidado hubiera estado o a quien
se le hubiera encomendado su
cuidado. Sin embargo, si los
padres tuvieran la guarda
compartida de un hijo menor,
ambos ejercerán la tutela
compartida, con igual autoridad,
privilegios y responsabilidades, a
menos que se modifique mediante
orden judicial o convenio entre los
padres, aprobado por el juez que
otorga la guarda compartida. En
caso de muerte de un padre a
quien se le hubiera otorgado la
guarda compartida, la tutela de los
hijos menores del fallecido
corresponderá de pleno derecho al
padre superviviente.
Todos estos casos son supuestos
de tutela natural. [Modificado por
ley n.o 196 de 1924; sec. 1, ley n.o
283 de 1981; sec. 1, ley n.o 307 de

All those cases are called
tutorship by nature. [Amended by
Acts 1924, No. 196; Acts 1981,
No. 283, §1; Acts 1982, No. 307,
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§1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983; Acts 1983,
No. 695, §1.]

1982, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 1983; sec. 1, ley n.o 695 de
1983].

Art. 251. [Repealed by Acts
1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

Art. 251. [Derogado por sec. 2,
ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente desde el
1 de enero de 1961].

Art. 252. If a wife happens to be
pregnant at the time of the death of
her husband, no tutor shall be
appointed to the child till after his
birth; but, if it should be necessary,
the judge may appoint a curator for
the preservation of the rights of the
unborn child, and for the
administration of the estate which
may belong to such child. At the
birth of the posthumous child, such
curator shall be of right the
undertutor.

Art. 252. Si la esposa estuviera
embarazada al momento del
fallecimiento de su esposo, no se
designará tutor del menor hasta
después de su nacimiento. Sin
embargo, si fuera necesario, el
juez puede designar a un curador
para preservar los derechos del
niño por nacer y para la
administración de los bienes que
pudieran corresponderle. Al
nacimiento del hijo póstumo, el
curador será de pleno derecho el
tutor supervisor.

Art. 253. [Repealed by Acts
1974, No. 163, §2.]

Art. 253. [Derogado por sec. 2,
ley n.o 163 de 1974].

Arts. 254-255. [Repealed by
Acts 1960, No. 30, §2.]

Arts. 254-255. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 30 de 1960].

Art. 256. A. The mother is of
right the tutrix of her child born
outside of marriage not
acknowledged by the father, or
acknowledged by him without her
concurrence.

Art. 256. A. La madre es de
pleno derecho la tutora de su hijo
extramatrimonial no reconocido
por el padre o reconocido por el
padre sin el asentimiento de la
madre.

B. After the death of the mother,
if the father had not acknowledged
the child prior to the mother's
death, the court shall give first
consideration to appointment as
tutor either of her parents or
siblings who survive her and

B. Después de fallecida la
madre, si el padre no hubiera
reconocido al menor antes de la
muerte de la madre, el juez
considerará en primer lugar para
la designación como tutor a
alguno de los padres o hermanos
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accept the appointment, and
secondly, the father, always taking
into consideration the best interests
of the child.

de la madre que la sobrevivan y
acepten la designación y, en
segundo lugar, al padre, siempre
teniendo en cuenta el interés
superior del menor.

C. If both parents have
acknowledged their child born
outside of marriage, the judge shall
appoint as tutor the one by whose
care the best interests of the child
will be served. However, if the
parents are awarded joint custody
of such acknowledged child born
outside of marriage, then the
cotutorship of such child shall
belong of right to both parents,
with equal authority, privileges,
and responsibilities, unless
modified by order of the court or
by an agreement of the parents,
approved by the court awarding
joint custody. [Acts 1983, No. 215,
§1, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 2016,
No. 210, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2016.]

C. Si ambos padres hubieran
reconocido al hijo
extramatrimonial, el juez
designará como tutor a aquel cuyo
cuidado mejor sirva al interés
superior del hijo. Sin embargo, si a
los padres se les hubiera otorgado
la guarda compartida de tal hijo
extramatrimonial reconocido, la
tutela compartida sobre tal hijo
corresponderá de pleno derecho a
ambos padres, con igual
autoridad, privilegios y
responsabilidades, a menos que se
modifique mediante orden judicial
o por acuerdo entre los padres
aprobado por el juez que otorgue
la guarda compartida. [Sec. 1, ley
n.o 215 de 1983, vigente desde el 1
de septiembre de 1983; sec. 1, ley
n.o 210 de 2016, vigente desde el 1
de agosto de 2016].

SECTION 3. OF THE
TUTORSHIP BY WILL

SECCIÓN 3. DE LA TUTELA
TESTAMENTARIA

Art. 257. The right of
appointing a tutor, whether a
relation or a stranger, belongs
exclusively to the father or mother
dying last.
The right of appointing a tutor,
whether a relation or a stranger,
also belongs to a parent who has
been named the curator for the
other living spouse, when that
other living spouse has been

Art. 257. El derecho de designar
tutor, ya sea un pariente o un
extraño, corresponde
exclusivamente al padre o a la
madre que muera último.
El derecho de designar tutor, ya
sea un pariente o un extraño,
también corresponde al padre que
haya sido nombrado curador del
otro cónyuge vivo, cuando ese otro
cónyuge vivo haya sido interdicto,

326

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

interdicted, subject only to the
right of the interdicted parent to
claim the tutorship should his
incapacity be removed by a
judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
This is called tutorship by will,
because generally it is given by
testament; but it may likewise be
given by any declaration of the
surviving father or mother, or the
parent who is the curator of the
other spouse, executed before a
notary and two witnesses.
[Amended by Acts 1974, No. 142,
§1.]

con la salvaguarda del derecho del
padre interdicto a reclamar la
tutela en caso de que un juez
competente dicte sentencia por la
que se elimine su incapacidad.

Art. 258. If the parents are
divorced or judicially separated,
only the one to whom the court has
entrusted the care and custody of
the children has a right to appoint a
tutor for them as provided in
Article 257. However, if the
parents have been awarded joint
custody of the children, then the
right to appoint a tutor for them
belongs to the parent dying last,
but either parent may appoint a
tutor of the property of the children
as provided in Article 257. In the
event that both parents appoint a
tutor of the property of the
children, the tutors shall separately
administer that portion of the
children's property which is
attributable to the respective
parent's estate. The court shall
decide which tutor shall administer
that portion of the children's
property which is not attributable

Art. 258. Si los padres están
divorciados o separados
judicialmente, solo aquel al que el
juez haya encomendado el cuidado
y la guarda de los hijos tiene
derecho de designar tutor para los
hijos en los términos del artículo
257. Sin embargo, si a los padres
se les otorgó la guarda compartida
de los hijos, el derecho de designar
tutor para ellos corresponde al
padre que muera último. No
obstante, cualquiera de los padres
puede designar tutor de los bienes
de los hijos conforme al artículo
257. En caso de que ambos padres
designaran tutor de los bienes de
los hijos, cada tutor administrará
de manera separada la parte de
los bienes de los hijos que
corresponda al patrimonio de cada
padre, respectivamente. El juez
decidirá qué tutor administrará la
parte de los bienes de los hijos que
no pueda atribuirse al patrimonio

Esta tutela se denomina
“testamentaria” porque
generalmente se otorga por
testamento, pero puede otorgarse
igualmente por declaración del
padre superviviente o del padre
que sea curador del otro cónyuge,
con firma ante notario y dos
testigos. [Modificado por sec. 1,
ley n.o 142 de 1974].
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to either parent's estate. [Acts
1992, No. 680, §1.]

de alguno de los padres. [Sec. 1,
ley n.o 680 de 1992].

Art. 259. The tutor by will is not
compelled to accept the tutorship
to which he is appointed by the
father or mother.
But if he refuses the tutorship,
he loses in that case all the legacies
and other advantages, which the
person who appointed him may
have made in his favor under a
persuasion that he would accept
this trust.

Art. 259. El tutor testamentario
no está obligado a aceptar la
tutela para la que fue designado
por el padre o la madre.
Sin embargo, si rechaza la
tutela, pierde en ese caso todos los
legados y otras mejoras que la
persona que lo designó pueda
haber hecho a su favor con el
convencimiento de que aceptaría
el encargo.

Art. 260. [Repealed by Acts
1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

Art. 260. [Derogado por sec. 2,
ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente desde el
1 de enero de 1961].

Art. 261. The father or mother
who is entitled to the tutorship of
the child born outside of marriage,
according to the provisions of
Article 256, can choose a tutor for
him, whose appointment, to be
valid, must be approved by the
judge. [Amended by Acts 1979,
No. 607, §1; Acts 2016, No. 210,
§1, eff. Aug. 1, 2016.]

Art. 261. El padre o la madre
que tenga derecho a la tutela del
hijo extramatrimonial, según las
disposiciones del artículo 256,
puede elegir un tutor para el hijo,
cuya designación deberá ser
aprobada por el juez para ser
válida. [Modificado por sec. 1, ley
n.o 607 de 1979; sec. 1, ley n.o 210
de 2016, vigente desde el 1 de
agosto de 2016].

Art. 262. If the parent who died
last has appointed several tutors to
the children, the person first
mentioned shall be alone charged
with the tutorship, and the second
shall not be called to it, except in
case of the death, absence, refusal,
incapacity or displacing of the
first, and in like manner as to the
others in succession.

Art. 262. Si el padre que murió
último hubiera designado a varios
tutores para los hijos, la persona
mencionada en primer término
tendrá a su exclusivo cargo la
tutela y la mencionada en segundo
término no deberá asumirla,
excepto en caso de fallecimiento,
ausencia, negativa, incapacidad o
desplazamiento del primero, y así
sucesivamente.
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SECTION 4. OF THE
TUTORSHIP BY THE EFFECT
OF THE LAW

SECCIÓN 4. DE LA TUTELA
LEGÍTIMA

Art. 263. When a tutor has not
been appointed to the minor by
father or mother dying last, or if
the tutor thus appointed has not
been confirmed or has been
excused, then the judge shall
appoint to the tutorship, from
among the qualified ascendants in
the direct line, collaterals by blood
within the third degree and the
surviving spouse of the minor's
mother or father dying last, the
person whose appointment is in the
best interests of the minor.
[Amended by Acts 1976, No. 429,
§1.]

Art. 263. Cuando el padre que
murió último no designó tutor o si
el tutor designado por el padre que
murió último no fue confirmado o
fue excusado, el juez designará
como tutor, entre los ascendientes
en línea directa que cumplan los
requisitos, los colaterales
consanguíneos dentro del tercer
grado y el cónyuge supérstite del
padre que murió último, a la
persona cuya designación sirva
mejor al interés superior del
menor. [Modificado por sec. 1, ley
n.o 429 de 1976].

Arts. 264-269. [Repealed by
Acts 1976, No. 429, §2.]

Arts. 264-269. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 429 de 1976].

SECTION 5. OF DATIVE
TUTORSHIP

SECCIÓN 5. DE LA TUTELA
DATIVA

Art. 270. When a minor is an
orphan, and has no tutor appointed
by his father or mother, nor any
relations who may claim the
tutorship by effect of law, or when
the tutor appointed in some of the
modes above expressed is liable to
be excluded or disqualified, or is
excused legally, the judge shall
appoint a tutor to the minor.
[Amended by Acts 1960, No. 30,
§1, eff. Jan. 1, 1961.]

Art. 270. Cuando un menor es
huérfano y ni su madre ni su padre
designaron tutor, ni hay parientes
que puedan reclamar la tutela
legítima, o cuando el tutor
designado conforme a alguno de
los métodos anteriores es excluido
o descalificado, o es excusado
legalmente, el juez designará tutor
para el menor. [Modificado por
sec. 1, ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1961].
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Art. 271. [Repealed by Acts
1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

Art. 271. [Derogado por sec. 2,
ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente desde el
1 de enero de 1961].

Arts. 272. [Repealed by Acts
1952, No. 141, §2.]

Art. 272. [Derogado por sec. 2,
ley n.o 141 de 1952].

SECTION 6. OF THE
UNDERTUTOR

SECCIÓN 6. DEL TUTOR
SUPERVISOR

Art. 273. In every tutorship
there shall be an undertutor.
[Amended by Acts 1960, No. 30,
§1, eff. Jan. 1, 1961.]

Art. 273. En toda tutela siempre
habrá un tutor supervisor.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 30
de 1960, vigente desde el 1 de
enero de 1961].

Arts. 274-277. [Repealed by
Acts 1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

Arts. 274-277. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1961].

Art. 278. The undertutor who
fails or neglects to cause to be
inscribed in the manner required
by law, the evidence of the minor's
legal mortgage against his tutor,
shall be liable for all the damages
which the minor may sustain in
consequence of such failure or
neglect; and this claim for damages
shall not be prescribed so long as
the minor's right of action exists
against his tutor.

Art. 278. El tutor supervisor que
omita inscribir o sea negligente al
inscribir la prueba de la hipoteca
legal del menor frente al tutor de
la manera exigida por la ley
responderá por todos los daños
que el menor sufra a consecuencia
de tal omisión o negligencia. El
reclamo por los daños y perjuicios
no prescribe en tanto subsista el
derecho de acción del menor
contra su tutor.

Art. 279. [Repealed. Acts 1960,
No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1, 1961.]

Art. 279. [Derogado. Sección 2,
ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente desde el
1 de enero de 1961].

Art. 280. The duties of the
undertutor are at an end at the
same time with the tutorship.

Art. 280. Las funciones del tutor
supervisor cesan al mismo tiempo
que la tutela.
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SECTION 7. OF FAMILY
MEETINGS

Arts. 281-291. [Repealed. Acts
1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]
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SECCIÓN 7. DE LAS
REUNIONES FAMILIARES
Arts. 281-291. [Derogado. Sec.
2, ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente desde
el 1 de enero de 1961].

SECTION 8. OF THE CAUSES
WHICH DISPENSE OR EXCUSE
FROM THE TUTORSHIP

SECCIÓN 8. DE LAS CAUSAS
POR LAS QUE SE DISPENSA O
EXCUSA DE LA TUTELA

Art. 292. The following persons
are dispensed or excused from the
tutorship by the privilege of their
offices or functions:

Art. 292. Quedan dispensadas o
excusadas de la tutela las
siguientes personas en razón de las
prerrogativas de sus cargos o
funciones:
1. El gobernador y el secretario
de Estado.
2. Los jueces de los diferentes
tribunales de este estado y sus
funcionarios.
3. El alcalde de la ciudad de
Nueva Orleans.
4. El recaudador de la Aduana.

1. The Governor and the
Secretary of State;
2. The judges of the different
courts of this State and the officers
of the same;
3. The Mayor of the city of New
Orleans;
4. The Collector of the
Customs;
5. The officers and soldiers
attached to the regular troops,
whether on land or sea service,
employed and in actual service in
this State, and all the officers who
are intrusted in this State with any
mission from the Government, as
long as they are employed;
6. Preceptors and other persons
keeping public schools, as long as
they remain in the useful and
actual exercise of their profession;
7. Ministers of the gospel.
Art. 293. The persons
mentioned in the preceding article,
who have accepted a tutorship
posterior to their being invested

5. Los oficiales y soldados
asignados a las tropas regulares,
ya sea en servicio de tierra o mar,
que estén empleados y presten
tareas en este estado, y todos los
oficiales que tengan una misión
asignada por el Gobierno en este
estado, en tanto estén empleados.
6. Los directores y otras
personas que mantengan escuelas
públicas, en tanto ejerzan de
manera efectiva y útil su profesión.
7. Los ministros de culto.
Art. 293. Las personas
mencionadas en el artículo
anterior que hayan aceptado la
tutela después de haber asumido el
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with the offices, engaged in the
service, or intrusted with the
mission which dispenses from it,
shall not be admitted to be excused
on that account.

cargo, haber sido contratadas
para el servicio o haber sido
encomendadas con la misión que
los dispensa no pueden ampararse
en ese supuesto para excusarse.

Art. 294. Those, on the contrary,
who shall have been invested with
offices, who shall have engaged in
the service, or shall have been
intrusted with commissions,
posterior to their acceptation and
administration of a tutorship, may,
if they do not choose to continue to
act as tutor, be excused from the
tutorship, and apply for the
appointment of another tutor to
supply their place.

Art. 294. Las personas que, por
el contrario, hayan sido investidas
en sus cargos, contratadas para un
servicio o encomendadas con un
encargo que las dispensa después
de su aceptación y administración
de la tutela pueden, si no optan
por continuar como tutores, ser
excusadas de la tutela y solicitar la
designación de otro tutor para
suplir su lugar.

Art. 295. No person, who is not
a relation of the minor by
consanguinity, or who is only
related to him beyond the fourth
degree, can be compelled to accept
the tutorship.

Art. 295. No puede ser obligado
a aceptar la tutela quien no está
emparentado con el menor por
consanguinidad o quien solo lo
está más allá del cuarto grado.

Art. 296. Every person who has
attained the age of sixty-five years,
may refuse to be a tutor.
The person who shall have been
appointed prior to that age, may be
excused from the tutorship at the
age of seventy years.

Art. 296. Quien haya cumplido
sesenta y cinco años puede
negarse a ser tutor.
La persona designada antes de
esa edad puede ser excusada de la
tutela a los setenta años.

Art. 297. Every person affected
with a serious infirmity, may be
excused from the tutorship, if this
infirmity be of such nature as to
render him incapable of transacting
his own business.

Art. 297. Toda persona afectada
por una discapacidad grave puede
ser excusada de la tutela en caso
de que la discapacidad sea de tal
naturaleza que la vuelva incapaz
de llevar adelante sus propios
asuntos.
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He may even be discharged
from the tutorship, if such
infirmity has befallen him after his
appointment.
Art. 298. The person who is
appointed to two tutorships has a
legal excuse for not accepting a
third.
A parent who has been
appointed to one tutorship shall not
be compelled to accept a second
tutorship, except it be that of his
own children. [Amended by Acts
1974, No. 163, §3.]

[Vol. 13

Incluso puede ser relevada de la
tutela si la discapacidad la afectó
después de su designación.
Art. 298. La persona designada
en dos tutelas puede excusarse
legalmente para no aceptar una
tercera.
El padre designado en una
tutela no puede ser obligado a
aceptar una segunda, excepto que
se trate de la de sus propios hijos.
[Modificado por sec. 3, ley n.o 163
de 1974].

Art. 299. The tutor, who has
excuses to offer against his
appointment, must propose them to
the judge who has appointed him,
within ten days after he has been
acquainted with his appointment,
or after the same shall have been
notified to him, which period shall
be increased one day for every ten
miles distance from his residence
to the place where his appointment
was made, and after this delay he
shall no longer be admitted to offer
any excuse, unless he has
sufficient reason to account for
such delay.

Art. 299. El tutor que tenga
excusas para su designación debe
exponerlas ante el juez que lo haya
designado dentro de los diez días
de enterado de su designación o de
que le fue notificada. Este plazo
aumentará un día por cada diez
millas de distancia entre su
residencia y el lugar en que se
inició la tutela. Después de
transcurridos esos plazos, el tutor
ya no puede alegar excusa alguna,
a menos que tenga motivos
suficientes para explicar la
demora. 14

Art. 300. During the time of the
pendency of the litigation relative
to the validity of his excuses, the
tutor who is appointed shall be
bound provisionally to administer

Art. 300. Mientras tramite el
juicio relativo a la validez de las
excusas, el tutor designado seguirá
obligado a desempeñarse en el
cargo hasta que sea relevado
según corresponda. 15

14. N. de T.: La traducción de este artículo se basa en la versión original francesa de 1870.
15. N. de T.: La traducción de este artículo se basa en la versión original francesa de 1870.
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as such, until he shall have been
regularly discharged.
Art. 301. The causes herein
expressed, or any other, cannot
excuse a parent from the obligation
of accepting the tutorship of his
children. [Amended by Acts 1974,
No. 163, §3.]
SECTION 9. OF THE
INCAPACITY FOR, THE
EXCLUSION FROM, AND
DEPRIVATION OF THE
TUTORSHIP
Arts. 302-306. [Repealed by
Acts 1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]
SECTION 10. OF THE
APPOINTMENT,
RECOGNITION, OR
CONFIRMATION OF TUTORS,
OF THE PERSONS WHOSE
DUTY IT IS TO CAUSE
TUTORS TO BE APPOINTED
AND OF THE LIABILITY OF
SUCH PERSONS

Art. 301. Las causas
enumeradas o cualquier otra
causa no sirven de justificación
para que el padre se excuse de la
obligación de aceptar la tutela de
sus hijos. [Modificado por sec. 3,
ley n.o 163 de 1974].
SECCIÓN 9. DE LA
INCAPACIDAD, DE LA
EXCLUSIÓN Y DE LA
PRIVACIÓN DE LA TUTELA
Arts. 302-306. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1961].
SECCIÓN 10. DE LA
DESIGNACIÓN, EL
RECONOCIMIENTO O LA
CONFIRMACIÓN DE LOS
TUTORES, DE LAS PERSONAS
ENCARGADAS DE QUE SE
NOMBREN LOS TUTORES Y DE
LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE ESAS
PERSONAS

Art. 307. [Repealed by Acts
1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

Art. 307. [Derogado por sec. 2,
ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente desde el
1 de enero de 1961].

Art. 308. In every case where it
is necessary to appoint a tutor to a
minor, all those of his relations
who reside within the parish of the
judge, who is to appoint him, are
bound to apply to such judge, in
order that a tutor be appointed to
the minor at farthest within ten

Art. 308. Cuando sea necesario
designar tutor para un menor,
todos los parientes que vivan en la
parroquia del juez que deba
designarlo deben presentarse ante
el juez, a fin de que se designe el
tutor para el menor a más tardar
dentro de los diez días posteriores
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days after the event which make
[makes] such appointment
necessary.

al hecho que hiciera necesaria la
designación.

Art. 309. Minor relations are not
included in the provisions
contained in the preceding article.
[Amended by Acts 1974, No. 163,
§3.]

Art. 309. Los parientes menores
de edad no están comprendidos en
las disposiciones del artículo
anterior. [Modificado por sec. 3,
ley n.o 163 de 1974].

Art. 310. Relations who have
neglected to cause a tutor to be
appointed, are responsible for the
damages which the minor may
have suffered.
This responsibility is enforced
against relations in the order
according to which they are called
to the inheritance of the minor, so
that they are responsible only in
case of the insolvency of him or
them who precede them in that
order, and this responsibility is not
in solidum between relations who
have a right to the inheritance in
the same degree.

Art. 310. Los parientes que no
se hubieran ocupado de que se
designe tutor deberán responder
por los daños y perjuicios
causados al menor.
Esta responsabilidad recae
sobre los parientes en el orden en
que son llamados a heredar al
menor, de modo tal que son
responsables solo en caso de su
insolvencia o de la de quienes los
preceden en el orden. Esta
responsabilidad no es solidaria
entre los parientes que tienen
derecho a heredar en el mismo
grado.

Art. 311. The action which
results from this responsibility can
not be maintained by the tutor but
within the year of his appointment.
If the tutor neglects to bring his
action within that time, he is
answerable for such neglect to the
minor.

Art. 311. La acción derivada de
esta responsabilidad solo puede
ser ejercida por el tutor dentro del
año de su designación.
Si el tutor omite iniciar la
acción dentro de ese plazo,
responderá frente al menor.

Arts. 312-321. [Repealed by
Acts 1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

Arts. 312-321. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1961].

Art. 322. The recording of the
Art. 322. La inscripción del
certificate of the clerk operates as a certificado del secretario opera
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legal mortgage in favor of the
minor for the amount therein
stated, on all the immovable
property of the natural tutor in the
parish. [Amended by Acts 1960,
No. 30, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1961.]

como hipoteca legal a favor del
menor por el monto indicado sobre
todos los bienes inmuebles del
tutor natural ubicados en la
parroquia. [Modificado por sec. 1,
ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente desde el
1 de enero de 1961].

Arts. 323-332. [Repealed by
Acts 1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

Arts. 323-332. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1961].

Art. 333. Whenever a special
mortgage is given by a tutor to
secure the rights of two or more
minors, any of the minors, on
attaining the age of majority or
being emancipated, may cause the
sale of the mortgaged property to
satisfy the indebtedness of the tutor
to him, after having discussed the
other property of the debtor, in the
following manner:
If the judge is of the opinion
that the mortgaged property is
sufficient to satisfy all of the
demands of the major and minors,
he shall order the sale of so much
of the property as will satisfy the
demand of the major, if susceptible
of division, and the property so
sold shall be free of the mortgage
in favor of the remaining minors.

Art. 333. En caso de que un
tutor constituya una hipoteca
especial para garantizar los
derechos de dos o más menores,
cualquiera de los menores, al
cumplir la mayoría de edad o
emanciparse, podrá vender el bien
hipotecado para saldar la deuda
que el tutor tenga con él, después
de haber excutido los demás bienes
del deudor, del siguiente modo:
Si el juez considera que los
bienes hipotecados son suficientes
para satisfacer la totalidad de las
pretensiones de los mayores y los
menores de edad, ordenará la
venta de la parte necesaria de los
bienes que satisfaga las
pretensiones del mayor en caso de
que sea susceptible de división.
Los bienes vendidos de ese modo
no estarán gravados por la
hipoteca a favor de los menores
restantes.
Si el juez considera que los
bienes hipotecados no bastan para
satisfacer las pretensiones de los
mayores y los menores de edad o
que no son susceptibles de
división, ordenará la venta de la
totalidad de los bienes hipotecados

If the judge is of the opinion
that the mortgaged property is not
sufficient to meet the demands of
the major and minors, or that it is
not susceptible of division, he shall
order the sale of the whole of the
mortgaged property, and the

336

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

release of the mortgage of the
major and minors. The proceeds of
the sale, after defraying the
expenses thereof, shall be divided
equally among the major and
minors, giving each his virile
share. The portion to be paid the
minors shall be paid to their tutor.

When the judge orders the sale
of the property, he shall order the
inscription of the minor’s legal
mortgage in the manner heretofore
provided. This inscription shall be
made in the parish where the tutor
resides within three days of the
order, and in all other parishes
where the tutor has immovable
property within thirty days of the
order. [Amended by Acts 1960,
No. 30, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1961.]

Arts. 334-335. [Repealed by
Acts 1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

[Vol. 13

y la liberación de la hipoteca de
los mayores y los menores de edad.
El producido de la venta, después
de deducidos los gastos
correspondientes, se dividirá
igualmente entre los mayores y los
menores de edad, dando a cada
uno su porción viril. La porción
que corresponda pagar a los
menores de edad deberá pagarse a
su tutor.
Cuando el juez ordene la venta
de los bienes, ordenará la
inscripción de la hipoteca legal del
menor de edad de la manera aquí
prevista. La inscripción se hará en
la parroquia en que resida el tutor
dentro de los tres días de dictada
la orden, y en todas las demás
parroquias en que el tutor tenga
bienes inmuebles dentro de los
treinta días posteriores a la orden.
[Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 30
de 1960, vigente desde el 1 de
enero de 1961].
Arts. 334-335. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1961].

SECTION 11. OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE
TUTOR

SECCIÓN 11. DE LA
ADMINISTRACIÓN DEL TUTOR

[Acts 1966, No. 496, §1.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 496 de 1966].

Art. 336. The prohibition of
alienating the immovables of a
minor, does not extend to the case
in which a judgment is to be
executed against him, or of a
licitation made at the instance of
the coheir, or other coproprietor.

Art. 336. La prohibición de
enajenar los inmuebles de un
menor no se extiende al supuesto
de que se ejecute sentencia contra
él o se haga una licitación a
instancias del coheredero o de otro
copropietario indiviso.
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Art. 337. [Repealed. Acts 2001,
No. 572, §2]

Art. 337. [Derogado. Sec. 2, ley
n.o 572 de 2001].

Art. 338. The sum which
appears to be due by the tutor as
the balance of his accounts, bears
interest, without a judicial demand,
from the day on which the
accounts were closed.
The same rule applies to the
balance due to the tutor.

Art. 338. La suma que aparezca
como exigible al tutor como saldo
de sus cuentas devenga intereses,
sin necesidad de requerimiento,
desde el día de cierre de las
cuentas.
La misma regla se aplica al
saldo debido al tutor. 16

Art. 339. Every agreement
which may take place between the
tutor and the minor arrived at the
age of majority, shall be null and
void, unless the same was entered
into after the rendering of a full
account and delivery of the
vouchers, the whole being made to
appear by the receipt of the person
to whom the account was rendered,
ten days previous to the agreement.

Art. 339. Todo acuerdo que se
celebre entre el tutor y el menor
que haya alcanzado la mayoría
será nulo, a menos que hubiera
sido celebrado después de rendir
cuentas y de entregar todos los
recibos correspondientes; todo
esto debe constar en el recibo de la
persona a quien se le hayan
rendido cuentas, con diez días de
antelación al acuerdo.

Art. 340. The action of the
minor against his tutor, respecting
the acts of the tutorship, is
prescribed by four years, to begin
from the day of his majority.

Art. 340. La acción del menor
contra su tutor en relación con los
actos de la tutela prescribe a los
cuatro años desde que adquirió la
mayoría de edad.

Arts. 341-353. [Blank. Repealed
by Acts 1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan.
1, 1961.]

Arts. 341-353. [En blanco;
derogados por sec. 2, ley n.o 30 de
1960, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 1961].

SECTION 12. OF CONTINUING
OR PERMANENT TUTORSHIP
OF PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES

SECCIÓN 12. DE LA TUTELA
PERMANENTE DE LAS
PERSONAS CON
DISCAPACIDAD INTELECTUAL

16. N. de T.: La traducción de este artículo se basa en la versión original francesa de 1870.
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Art. 354. Persons, including
children, with intellectual
disabilities or mental deficiencies
may be placed under continuing or
permanent tutorship without
formal or complete interdiction in
accordance with the following
rules and the procedures stated in
the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure. [Added by Acts 1966,
No. 496, §2. Amended by Acts
2014, No. 26, §1, eff. Aug. 1,
2014.]

Art. 354. Las personas,
incluidos los menores, con
discapacidad intelectual u otro
tipo de deficiencia mental podrán
ser puestos bajo tutela permanente
sin interdicción formal o plena de
acuerdo con las reglas que se
establecen a continuación y el
procedimiento previsto en el
Código Procesal Civil de Luisiana.
[Agregado por sec. 2, ley n.o 496
de 1966. Modificado por sec. 1, ley
n.o 26 de 2014, vigente desde el 1
de agosto de 2014].

Art. 355. When a person above
the age of fifteen possesses less
than two-thirds of the intellectual
functioning of a person of the same
age with average intellectual
functioning, evidenced by standard
testing procedures administered by
competent persons or other
relevant evidence acceptable to the
court, the parents of such person,
or the person entitled to custody or
tutorship if one or both parents are
dead, incapacitated, or an absent
person, or if the parents are
judicially separated or divorced,
may, with the concurrence of the
coroner of the parish of the
intellectually disabled person’s
domicile, petition the court of that
district to place such person under
a continuing tutorship which shall
not automatically end at any age
but shall continue until revoked by
the court of domicile. The
petitioner shall not bear the
coroner’s costs or fees associated
with securing the coroner’s

Art. 355. Cuando una persona
mayor de quince años posea menos
de dos tercios de la capacidad
intelectual de una persona de la
misma edad con capacidad
promedio, según las evaluaciones
estándares administradas por
personas competentes u otras
pruebas relevantes admitidas por
el juez, los padres de esa persona
o la persona con derecho a la
guarda o la tutela si uno o ambos
padres estuvieran muertos,
incapacitados o fueran ausentes, o
si los padres estuvieran
divorciados o separados
judicialmente, podrán, con el
asentimiento de la autoridad
médica forense de la parroquia del
domicilio de la persona con
discapacidad intelectual, solicitar
al juez de ese distrito que coloque
a esa persona bajo un régimen de
tutela permanente que no finalice
automáticamente a una edad
determinada, sino que continúe
hasta que sea revocada por un juez
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concurrence. [Added by Acts
1966, No. 496, § 2. Amended by
Acts 1974, No. 714, § 1; Acts
1991, No. 107, § 1; Acts 2016, No.
115, § 1, eff. Aug. 1, 2016, Acts
2018, No. 164, § 1.]

competente del domicilio. El
solicitante no será responsable por
los costos u honorarios vinculados
con la obtención del asentimiento
de la autoridad médica forense.
[Agregado por sec. 2, ley n.o 496
de 1966. Modificado por sec. 1, ley
n.o 714 de 1974; sec. 1, ley n.o 107
de 1991; sec. 1, ley n.o 115 de
2016, vigente desde el 1 de agosto
de 2016].

Art. 356. The title of the
proceedings shall be Continuing
Tutorship of (Name of Person),
Person with an Intellectual
Disability.
(1) When the person to be
placed under the continuing
tutorship is above the age of
fifteen, and under the age of
majority, the proceeding shall be
conducted according to the
procedural rules established for
ordinary tutorships;
(2) When the person to be
placed under the continuing
tutorship is above the age of
majority, the proceeding shall be
conducted according to the
procedural rules established for
interdictions;
(3) Upon the petition of both
parents of the mentally deficient
person during their marriage one
parent shall be named as tutor and
the other as under tutor, unless for
good reasons the judge decrees
otherwise. [Added by Acts 1966,
No. 496, §2. Amended by Acts
1974, No. 714, §1. Amended by
Acts 2014, No. 26, §1, eff. Aug. 1,
2014.]

Art. 356. El proceso se titulará
“Tutela permanente de (nombre de
la persona), persona con
discapacidad intelectual”.
1) Cuando la persona que se
colocará bajo el régimen de tutela
permanente es menor de edad pero
mayor de quince años, el proceso
se realizará conforme a las reglas
procesales establecidas para las
tutelas ordinarias.
2) Cuando la persona que se
colocará bajo el régimen de tutela
permanente es mayor de edad, el
proceso se realizará de acuerdo
con las reglas procesales
establecidas para las
interdicciones.
3) A solicitud de ambos padres
de la persona con discapacidad
mental durante su matrimonio, se
podrá nombrar tutor a uno de los
padres y tutor supervisor al otro, a
menos que por razones fundadas el
juez dispusiera de otro modo.
[Agregado por sec. 2, ley n.o 496
de 1966. Modificado por sec. 1, ley
n.o 714 de 1974. Modificado por
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sec. 1, ley n.o 26 de 2014, vigente
desde el 1 de agosto de 2014].
Art. 357. If the prayer for
continuing or permanent tutorship
be granted, the decree shall be
recorded in the conveyance and
mortgage records of the parish of
the minor’s domicile, and of any
future domicile, and in such other
parishes as may be deemed
expedient. The decree shall not be
effective as to persons without
notice thereof outside of the
parishes in which it is recorded.
[Added by Acts 1966, No. 496,
§2.]

Art. 357. Si se concede la tutela
permanente, la sentencia se
inscribirá en los registros de
transmisión e hipotecas de la
parroquia del domicilio del menor,
y de cualquier domicilio futuro,
además de cualquier otra
parroquia en que se considere
oportuno. La sentencia no será
oponible a las personas que no
hayan sido notificadas fuera de las
parroquias en que se haya inscrito.
[Agregado por sec. 2, ley n.o 496
de 1966].

Art. 358. The granting of the
decree shall confer upon the tutor
and under tutor the same authority,
privileges, and responsibilities as
in other tutorships, including the
same authority to give consent for
any medical treatment or
procedure, to give consent for any
educational plan or procedure, and
to obtain medical, educational, or
other records, but the responsibility
of the tutor for the offenses or
quasi-offenses of the person with
an intellectual disability shall be
the same as that of a curator for
those of the interdicted person and
the tutorship shall not terminate
until the decree is set aside by the
court of the domicile, or the court
of last domicile if the domicile of
the person with an intellectual
disability is removed from the
State of Louisiana. [Added by Acts
1966, No. 496, §2. Amended by
Acts 1979, No. 216, §1. Amended

Art. 358. El otorgamiento de la
tutela confiere al tutor y al tutor
supervisor las mismas facultades,
privilegios y responsabilidades que
en otras tutelas, incluida la misma
facultad para prestar
consentimiento respecto de
cualquier tratamiento o
procedimiento médico, respecto de
cualquier plan o procedimiento
educativo y de obtener registros
médicos, educativos o de otro tipo,
pero la responsabilidad del tutor
por los delitos o cuasidelitos de la
persona con discapacidad
intelectual es la misma que la del
curador respecto de la persona
interdicta. La tutela no cesa a
menos que la revoque un juez del
domicilio o el juez del último
domicilio si la persona con
discapacidad intelectual pasara a
estar domiciliada fuera del estado
de Luisiana. [Agregado por sec. 2,
ley n.o 496 de 1966. Modificado
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by Acts 2014, No. 26, §1, eff. Aug.
1, 2014.]

por sec. 1, ley n.o 216 de 1979.
Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 26
de 2014, vigente desde el 1 de
agosto de 2014].

Art. 359. The decree if granted
shall restrict the legal capacity of
the person with an intellectual
disability to that of a minor.
[Added by Acts 1966, No. 496,
§ 2. Amended by Acts 1974, No.
714, § 1. Amended by Acts 2014,
No. 26, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2014, Acts
2018, No. 164, § 1.]

Art. 359. La tutela restringe la
capacidad de la persona con
discapacidad intelectual como si
fuera un menor. [Agregado por
sec. 2, ley n.o 496 de 1966.
Modificado por sec. 1, ley n.o 714
de 1974. Modificado por sec. 1, ley
n.o 26 de 2014, vigente desde el 1
de agosto de 2014, sec. 1, ley
n.o 164 de 2018].

Art. 360. In addition to the
rights of tutorship, the parents shall
retain, during the marriage and for
the minority of the child with an
intellectual disability, all rights of
administration granted to parents
of children without an intellectual
disability during their minority.
[Acts 1966, No. 496, §2. Amended
by Acts 2014, No. 26, §1, eff. Aug.
1, 2014.]

Art. 360. Además de los
derechos de tutela, los padres
conservan, durante el matrimonio
y mientras el hijo con
discapacidad intelectual sea menor
de edad, todos los derechos de
administración otorgados a los
padres de los hijos sin
discapacidad intelectual durante
su minoría de edad. [Sec. 2, ley n.o
496 de 1966. Modificado por sec.
1, ley n.o 26 de 2014, vigente desde
el 1 de agosto de 2014].

Art. 361. The decree restricting
his legal capacity may be contested
in the court of domicile by the
person himself or by anyone
adversely affected by the
decree.For good cause, the court
may modify or terminate the
decree restricting legal capacity.
[Acts 1966, No. 496, § 2.
Amended by Acts 2018, No. 164,
§ 1.]

Art. 361. La decisión por la cual
se restringe la capacidad de
derecho de la persona puede ser
impugnada ante el juez del
domicilio por esa persona o por
cualquiera que se vea perjudicado
por la decisión. El juez puede
modificar o revocar la restricción
de la capacidad de derecho con
justa causa. [Sec. 2, ley n.o 496 de
1966. Modificado por sec. 1, ley
n.o 164 de 2018].
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Art. 362. Persons subject to
mental or physical illness or
disability, whether of a temporary
or permanent nature, of such a
degree as to render them subject to
interdiction, under the provisions
of Title IX hereof, remain subject
to interdiction as provided in
Articles 389 to 399, inclusive, and
such other laws as may relate
thereto. [Acts 1966, No. 496, §2.]

Art. 362. Las personas con una
enfermedad o discapacidad física
o mental, ya sea de carácter
provisorio o permanente, de un
grado tal que las sujete a
interdicción, conforme a las
disposiciones del Título IX del
presente, permanecen sujetas a la
interdicción conforme a lo
dispuesto en los artículos 389 a
399, inclusive, y a las leyes que
pudieran relacionarse. [Sec. 2, ley
n.o 496 de 1966].

Arts. 363-364. [Repealed by
Acts 1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

Arts. 363-364. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1961].

CHAPTER 2. EMANCIPATION

CAPÍTULO 2. DE LA
EMANCIPACIÓN

[Acts 2008, No. 786, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 2009.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 786 de 2008,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
2009].

Art. 365. There are three kinds
of emancipation: judicial
emancipation, emancipation by
marriage, and limited
emancipation by authentic act.

Art. 365. Hay tres tipos de
emancipación: judicial, por
matrimonio y limitada por acto
auténtico.

Art. 366. A court may order for
good cause the full or limited
emancipation of a minor sixteen
years of age or older. Full judicial
emancipation confers all effects of
majority on the person
emancipated, unless otherwise
provided by law. Limited judicial
emancipation confers the effects of
majority specified in the judgment

Art. 366. El juez puede ordenar
por justa causa la emancipación
plena o limitada del menor de
edad de dieciséis años o más. A
menos que la ley indique otra cosa,
la emancipación judicial plena
otorga todos los efectos de la
mayoría de edad a la persona
emancipada. A menos que la ley
indique otra cosa, la emancipación
judicial limitada otorga los efectos
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of limited emancipation, unless
otherwise provided by law.

de la mayoría de edad indicados
en la sentencia.

Art. 367. A minor sixteen or
seventeen years of age is fully
emancipated by marriage.
Termination of the marriage does
not affect emancipation by
marriage. Emancipation by
marriage may not be modified or
terminated.

Art. 367. El menor que tenga
dieciséis o diecisiete años se
emancipa plenamente por
matrimonio. La extinción del
matrimonio no afecta esta
emancipación. Esta emancipación
no se puede modificar ni revocar.

Art. 368. An authentic act of
limited emancipation confers upon
a minor age sixteen or older the
capacity to make the kinds of
juridical acts specified therein,
unless otherwise provided by law.
The act shall be executed by the
minor, and by the parents of the
minor, if parental authority exists,
or by the tutor of the minor, if
parental authority does not exist.
All other effects of minority shall
continue.

Art. 368. A menos que la ley
disponga de otro modo, el acto
auténtico de emancipación
limitada otorga al menor de
dieciséis años o más la capacidad
de realizar los tipos de actos
jurídicos indicados en aquel. El
acto debe ser suscrito por el menor
y por los padres del menor si existe
autoridad parental o, a falta de
ella, por el tutor del menor. Todos
los demás efectos de la minoría de
edad se mantienen vigentes.

Art. 369. Judicial emancipation
is effective when the judgment is
signed. Emancipation by marriage
is effective upon marriage. Limited
emancipation by authentic act is
effective when the act is executed.

Art. 369. La emancipación
judicial surte efectos a partir de la
firma de la sentencia. La
emancipación por matrimonio
surte efectos a partir de su
celebración. La emancipación
limitada por acto auténtico surte
efectos cuando se suscribe el acto.

Art. 370. The court may modify
or terminate its judgment of
emancipation for good cause.
A judgment modifying or
terminating a judgment of
emancipation is effective toward
third persons as to immovable

Art. 370. El juez puede
modificar o revocar la sentencia
de emancipación por justa causa.
La sentencia por la que se
modifica o revoca la sentencia de
emancipación es oponible a
terceros respecto de los bienes
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property when the judgment is
filed for registry in the conveyance
records of the parish in which the
property is situated, and as to
movables when the judgment is
filed for registry in the conveyance
records of the parish or parishes in
which the minor was domiciled at
the time of the judgment.
A judgment modifying or
terminating a judgment of
emancipation does not affect the
validity of an act made by the
emancipated minor prior to the
effective date of modification or
termination.
The termination of judicial
emancipation places the minor
under the same authority to which
he was subject prior to
emancipation, unless otherwise
ordered by the court for good
cause shown.
Art. 371. The parties to an
authentic act of limited
emancipation may modify or
terminate the limited emancipation
by making a subsequent authentic
act. In addition, a court, for good
cause, may modify or terminate
limited emancipation by authentic
act.
An authentic act or judgment
modifying or terminating limited
emancipation by authentic act is
effective toward third persons as to
immovable property when the act
or judgment is filed for registry in
the conveyance records of the

[Vol. 13

inmuebles a partir de su
presentación para su inscripción
en el registro de transferencias de
la parroquia en que se sitúan los
bienes, y respecto de los bienes
muebles, cuando la sentencia se
presente para su inscripción en los
registros de transferencias de la
parroquia o parroquias en que
estaba domiciliado el menor al
momento de la sentencia.
La sentencia por la que se
modifica o revoca una sentencia de
emancipación no afecta la validez
de los actos realizados por el
menor emancipado antes de la
fecha de entrada en vigor de la
modificación o la revocación.
A menos que el juez lo ordene
de otro modo previa demostración
de justa causa, la revocación de la
emancipación judicial vuelve a
colocar al menor bajo la autoridad
a la que estaba sujeto antes de la
emancipación.
Art. 371. Las partes del acto
auténtico de emancipación
limitada pueden modificar o
revocar la emancipación limitada
por acto auténtico posterior.
Además, el juez puede modificarla
o revocarla por justa causa.
El acto auténtico o la sentencia
por los que se modifica o revoca la
emancipación limitada es oponible
a terceros respecto de los bienes
inmuebles cuando el acto o la
sentencia se presenten para su
inscripción en el registro de
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parish in which the property is
situated and as to movables when
the act or judgment is filed for
registry in the conveyance records
in the parish or parishes in which
the minor was domiciled at the
time of the act modifying or
terminating limited emancipation
by authentic act.
An authentic act or judgment
modifying or terminating a prior
act of limited emancipation does
not affect the validity of a juridical
act made by the minor prior to the
effective date of modification or
termination.
Arts. 372-385. [Blank.]
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transferencias de la parroquia en
que se sitúan los bienes, y respecto
de los bienes muebles, cuando el
acto o la sentencia se presente
para su inscripción en los registros
de transferencias de la o las
parroquias en que estaba
domiciliado el menor al momento
del acto por el que se modificó o
revocó la emancipación limitada
por acto auténtico.
El acto auténtico o la sentencia
por la que se modifica o revoca un
acto anterior de emancipación
limitada no afecta la validez de los
actos jurídicos realizados por el
menor antes de la entrada en vigor
de la modificación o la revocación.
Arts. 372-385. [En blanco].

Arts. 386-388. [Repealed by
Acts 1960, No. 30, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1961.]

Arts. 386-388. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 30 de 1960, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1961].

TITLE IX. PERSONS UNABLE
TO CARE FOR THEIR
PERSONS OR PROPERTY

TÍTULO IX. DE LAS PERSONAS
INCAPACES DE CUIDAR DE SÍ
MISMAS O DE SUS BIENES

[Acts 2000, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 25,
§1, eff. July 1, 2001.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 25 de 2000, 1.a Ses.
Ex., vigente desde el 1 de julio de
2001].

CHAPTER 1. GROUNDS FOR
INTERDICTION

CAPÍTULO 1. DE LAS CAUSAS
DE INTERDICCIÓN

Art. 389. A court may order the
full interdiction of a natural person
of the age of majority, or an
emancipated minor, who due to an
infirmity, is unable consistently to
make reasoned decisions regarding
the care of his person and property,

Art. 389. El juez puede ordenar
la interdicción plena de una
persona física mayor de edad o
emancipada que, debido a una
discapacidad, no pueda tomar
decisiones razonadas de manera
sistemática en relación con el
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or to communicate those decisions,
and whose interests cannot be
protected by less restrictive means.

cuidado de su persona y de sus
bienes, o comunicar dichas
decisiones, y cuyos intereses no se
puedan proteger por medios menos
restrictivos.

Art. 390. A court may order the
limited interdiction of a natural
person of the age of majority, or an
emancipated minor, who due to an
infirmity is unable consistently to
make reasoned decisions regarding
the care of his person or property,
or any aspect of either, or to
communicate those decisions, and
whose interests cannot be
protected by less restrictive means.

Art. 390. El juez puede ordenar
la interdicción limitada de una
persona física mayor de edad o
emancipada que, debido a una
discapacidad, no pueda tomar
decisiones razonadas de manera
sistemática en relación con el
cuidado de su persona y de sus
bienes, o de cualquier aspecto de
ellos, o comunicar dichas
decisiones, y cuyos intereses no se
puedan proteger por medios menos
restrictivos.

Art. 391. When a petition for
interdiction is pending, a court
may order a temporary or
preliminary interdiction when there
is a substantial likelihood that
grounds for interdiction exist and
substantial harm to the health,
safety, or property of the person
sought to be interdicted is
imminent.

Art. 391. Si hay una demanda
de interdicción en trámite, el juez
puede ordenar la interdicción
provisoria o preliminar si hubiera
una probabilidad significativa de
que existan fundamentos para la
interdicción y fuera inminente el
daño sustancial a la salud, la
seguridad o los bienes de la
persona que se pretende declarar
interdicta.

CHAPTER 2. GENERAL
DUTIES OF CURATORS AND
UNDERCURATORS

CAPÍTULO 2. DE LOS DEBERES
GENERALES DE LOS
CURADORES Y LOS
CURADORES SUPERVISORES

Art. 392. The court shall appoint
a curator to represent the interdict
in juridical acts and to care for the
person or affairs of the interdict, or
any aspect of either. The duties and
powers of a curator commence

Art. 392. El juez designará
curador para representar al
interdicto en los actos jurídicos y
para cuidar la persona o los
asuntos del interdicto o cualquier
aspecto de ambos. Los deberes y
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upon his qualification. In
discharging his duties, a curator
shall exercise reasonable care,
diligence, and prudence and shall
act in the best interest of the
interdict.
The court shall confer upon a
curator of a limited interdict only
those powers required to protect
the interests of the interdict.
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facultades del curador comienzan
con su designación. En el
cumplimiento de sus funciones, el
curador debe actuar con cuidado
razonable, diligencia y prudencia,
además de actuar según sea más
conveniente para el interdicto.
En caso de interdicción
limitada, el juez otorgará al
curador solo aquellas facultades
necesarias para proteger los
intereses del interdicto.

Art. 393. The court shall appoint
an undercurator to discharge the
duties prescribed for him by law.
The duties and powers of an
undercurator shall commence upon
qualification. In discharging his
duties, an undercurator shall
exercise reasonable care, diligence,
and prudence and shall act in the
best interest of the interdict.

Art. 393. El juez designará a un
curador supervisor que tendrá las
funciones que le asigna la ley. Los
deberes y las facultades del
curador supervisor comienzan con
su designación. En el
cumplimiento de sus funciones, el
curador supervisor debe actuar
con cuidado razonable, diligencia
y prudencia, además de actuar
según sea más conveniente para el
interdicto.

CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF
INTERDICTION

CAPÍTULO 3. DE LOS EFECTOS
DE LA INTERDICCIÓN

Art. 394. Interdiction does not
affect the validity of a juridical act
made by the interdict prior to the
effective date of interdiction.

Art. 394. La interdicción no
afecta la validez de los actos
jurídicos realizados por el
interdicto antes de la entrada en
vigor de la interdicción.

Art. 395. A full interdict lacks
capacity to make a juridical act. A
limited interdict lacks capacity to
make a juridical act pertaining to
the property or aspects of personal
care that the judgment of limited
interdiction places under the
authority of his curator, except as

Art. 395. La interdicción plena
priva a la persona de capacidad
para realizar actos jurídicos. La
interdicción limitada priva a la
persona de capacidad para
realizar los actos jurídicos
relativos a los bienes o a aspectos
del cuidado personal que la
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provided in Article 1482 or in the
judgment of limited interdiction.

sentencia de interdicción limitada
encomiende al curador, con la
excepción de lo previsto en el
artículo 1482 o en la sentencia de
interdicción limitada.

Art. 396. A judgment of
interdiction has effect retroactive
to the date of the filing of the
petition for interdiction.

Art. 396. La sentencia de
interdicción tiene efectos
retroactivos a la fecha de
presentación de la solicitud de
interdicción.

CHAPTER 4. MODIFICATION
AND TERMINATION OF
INTERDICTION

CAPÍTULO 4. DE LA
MODIFICACIÓN Y LA
FINALIZACIÓN DE LA
INTERDICCIÓN

Art. 397. The court may modify
or terminate a judgment of
interdiction for good cause.
Interdiction terminates upon death
of the interdict or by judgment of
the court.
A judgment of preliminary
interdiction granted after an
adversarial hearing terminates
thirty days after being signed,
unless extended by the court for
good cause for a period not
exceeding thirty days. A judgment
of temporary interdiction granted
ex parte terminates ten days after
being signed. On motion of the
defendant or for extraordinary
reasons shown at a contradictory
hearing, the court may extend the
judgment of temporary interdiction
for one additional period not to
exceed ten days.

Art. 397. El juez puede
modificar o revocar la sentencia
de interdicción por justa causa. La
interdicción finaliza con la muerte
del interdicto o por sentencia
judicial.
La sentencia de interdicción
preliminar dictada después de una
audiencia contradictoria pierde
vigencia treinta días después de
haber sido firmada, a menos que el
juez la prorrogue con justa causa
por un período que no exceda los
treinta días. La sentencia de
interdicción provisional dictada
inaudita parte pierde vigencia a
los diez días de su firma. A
solicitud del demandado o por
razones extraordinarias
demostradas en una audiencia
contradictoria, el juez puede
extender la sentencia de
interdicción provisoria por un
período adicional que no exceda
los diez días.
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Art. 398. An order modifying or
terminating a judgment of
interdiction is effective on the date
signed by the court.

Art. 398. La orden por la que se
modifica o revoca la sentencia de
interdicción surte efectos a partir
de la fecha en que la firma el juez.

CHAPTER 5. RESPONSIBILITY
FOR WRONGFUL FILING OF
INTERDICTION PETITION

CAPÍTULO 5. DE LA
RESPONSABILIDAD POR
PRESENTACIÓN INDEBIDA DE
LA PETICIÓN DE
INTERDICCIÓN

Art. 399. A petitioner whose
petition for interdiction is denied is
liable for resulting damages caused
to the defendant if the petitioner
knew or should have known at the
time of filing that any material
factual allegation regarding the
ability of the defendant
consistently to make reasoned
decisions or to communicate those
decisions was false.

Art. 399. El peticionante cuya
petición de interdicción sea
rechazada es responsable por los
daños y perjuicios resultantes
causados al demandado si el
peticionante sabía o debería haber
sabido al momento de la
presentación que era falsa alguna
manifestación de hecho sustancial
en relación con la capacidad del
demandado de tomar decisiones
razonadas o de comunicarlas.

Arts. 400-426. [Blank.]

Arts. 400-426. [En blanco].

TITLE X. OF CORPORATIONS

TÍTULO X. DE LAS
CORPORACIONES

[REPEALED]

[DEROGADO]

Arts. 427-447. [Repealed by
Acts 1942, No. 43, §2, Acts 1987,
No. 126, §1.]

Arts. 427-447. [Derogados por
sec. 2, ley n.o 43 de 1942; sección
1, ley n.o 126 de 1987].
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interns coming directly from France. 2 As progress was made, the
translation was published on the dedicated LSU website 3 and
∗ Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair;
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
† Research Associate, Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State University; M.A. in English-Spanish Legal Translation, LL.B. (University of Buenos
Aires), LL.M. (Louisiana State University).
1. For more information on the Louisiana Civil Code translation into
French, see Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An
Introduction, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 97 (2012); Olivier Moréteau, Le Code civil de
Louisiane en français : traduction et retraduction, 28 INT. J. SEMIOT. L. 155-175
(2014); Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code in French: Translation and
Retranslation, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223 (2016); Alexandru-Daniel On, Revision and
Translation: The Louisiana Experience, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 259 (2016).
2. Most of the translation work was done by the following second-year students of the Master Juriste Trilingue (Université de Nantes): Anne-Marguerite
Barbier du Doré, Laurie Chalaux, Charlotte Henry, Anne Perocheau, Anne-Sophie Roinsard, Laura Castaing, Jean-Pierre Hufen, Oriane Defoix, Giorgia Fabris,
Mélissa Richard, Sarah Charlat, Delphine Droudard, Sara Vono, and Lucie Talet.
The following people also collaborated as translators: Clarisse Baugier, Gaëlle
Forget, Jason Maison-Marcheux, Matthias Martin, Olivier Moréteau, Michel
Séjean, Ivan Tchotourian. The following people collaborated in the revision and
formatting: Gaëlle Forget, Jason Maison-Marcheux, Matthias Martin, Olivier
Moréteau, Alexandru-Daniel On, and Sebastian Telecan. The Validation Committee was made up by Emmanuel Didier (Ottawa, Canada), Jean-Claude Gémar
(Montreal, Canada), David Gruning (New Orleans, United States), Nicholas
Kasirer (Montreal, Canada), Alain Levasseur (Baton Rouge, United States), Matthias Martin (Nancy, France), Michel Séjean (Paris, France).
3. See Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana Civil Code Online, LSU Law,
https://perma.cc/GEQ3-XWFC.
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excerpts were published in this Journal,4 with the English and the
French appearing side by side. When the project was finished, a print
edition of the bilingual English-French Louisiana Civil Code saw
the light in 2017. 5 One could have thought that such publication was
the cherry on the cake, but there was more to come.
A Spanish version has been envisioned since the inception of the
Louisiana Civil Code translation project. In 2020, that vision became a reality, when Professor Moréteau recruited Mariano Vitetta,
a professional legal translator and LL.M. graduate, to embark on the
second chapter of the translation project—rendering the Louisiana
Civil Code into Spanish. The translation work started in June 2020, 6
under the supervision of Professor Moréteau, with the collaboration
of María Natalia Rezzonico, a lawyer and legal translator from Argentina, as an assistant translator and reviser, and the validation of a
committee of experts from different Spanish-speaking countries. 7

4. Louisiana Civil Code — Code civil de Louisiane: Preliminary Title; Book
III, Titles 3, 4 and 5, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. (2012); Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana Civil Code — Code civil de Louisiane Book III, Titles 15 and 16, 6 J. CIV.
L. STUD. (2013); Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana Civil Code — Code civil
de Louisiane - Book III, Titles 7 and 8, 7 J. CIV. L. STUD. (2014); Center of Civil
Law Studies, Louisiana Civil Code — Code civil de Louisiane Book III, Title 6, 8
J. CIV. L. STUD. (2015); Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana Civil Code —
Code civil de Louisiane : Book II — Livre II, 8 J. CIV. L. STUD. (2015); Center of
Civil Law Studies, Louisiana Civil Code — Code civil de Louisiane Book III, Titles 23-24 — Livre III, Titres 23-24, 12 J. CIV. L. STUD. (2019).
5. CODE CIVIL DE LOUISIANE. ÉDITION BILINGUE (Olivier Moréteau ed., Société de législation comparée 2017).
6. For more information on the Louisiana Civil Code translation into Spanish, see Mariano Vitetta, A Brief Introduction to the Louisiana Civil Code Spanish
Translation Project, 13 J. CIV. L. STUD. 161 (2020). The first excerpt in Spanish
can be found in Louisiana Civil Code: Preliminary Title, Book I, Titles I, II, III,
13 J. CIV. L. STUD. 165 (2020).
7. The Validation Committee is made up by Jimena Andino Dorato (Montreal, Canada), Francisco Alterini (Buenos Aires, Argentina), Ignacio Alterini
(Buenos Aires, Argentina), Ricardo Chiesa (Buenos Aires, Argentina), Alejandro
Garro (New York, United States of America), Aniceto Masferrer (Valencia,
Spain), Luis Muñiz Argüelles (San Juan, Puerto Rico), Agustín Parise (Maastricht, The Netherlands), Julio César Rivera (Buenos Aires, Argentina), Andrés
Sánchez Herrero (Rosario, Argentina), and Lécia Vicente (Baton Rouge, United
States of America).

2020]

TRILINGUAL LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE

353

Now, we are presenting to the readers a sample of what is actually the ultimate goal of how the Louisiana Civil Code translation
project will hopefully look like in the future—a trilingual EnglishFrench-Spanish version. When the Spanish translation is completed,
the CCLS foresees the publication of a trilingual version in print of
the entire Civil Code, following the example of the Quebec Civil
Code. 8 This time, the trilingual version we offer includes a revised
French text 9 and the new text in Spanish.
The sample below is Book IV of the Civil Code, which was
added in 1992. 10 The book was authored by a former LSU Law professor and Reporter for the Louisiana State Law Institute, Symeon
C. Symeonides, and unanimously adopted by the House of Representatives and Senate during the 1991 legislative session. 11 This law
represents the first comprehensive attempt at conflicts codification
in the United States of America, along with updating and streamlining Louisiana conflicts jurisprudence. 12

8. JULIO CÉSAR RIVERA, CÓDIGO CIVIL DE QUEBEC. CODE CIVIL DU
QUÉBEC. CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC (Wilson & Lafleur 2008).
9. Our Louisiana translation is based on the one made by J.-P. Rémery,
81 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ (1992).
10. 1991 La. Acts No. 923, § I (effective Jan. 1, 1992).
11. David Conroy, Harvey Couch, James L. Dennis, Cordell H. Haymon,
Harry T. Lemmon, Howard W. L’Enfant, Andrew Rinker, Jr., Ray J. Rabalais,
Katherine S. Spaht, and A. N. Yiannopoulos served as members of the Louisiana
State Law Institute Advisory Committee.
12. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana Conflicts Law: Two “Surprises,”
54 LA. L. REV. 503 (1994).

354

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

BOOK IV.
CONFLICT OF
LAWS

LIVRE IV. DES
CONFLITS DE LOIS

LIBRO IV. DE LOS
CONFLICTOS DE
LEYES

TITLE I. GENERAL
PROVISIONS

TITRE I.
DISPOSITIONS
GÉNÉRALES

TÍTULO I.
DISPOSICIONES
GENERALES

[Acts 1991, No. 923,
§1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.]

[Loi de 1991, no 923,
§1, en vigueur le 1er
janvier 1992]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 923 de
1991, vigente desde
el 1 de enero de
1992].

Art. 3515. Except as
otherwise provided
in this Book, an issue in a case having
contacts with other
states is governed by
the law of the state
whose policies
would be most seriously impaired if its
law were not applied
to that issue. That
state is determined
by evaluating the
strength and pertinence of the relevant
policies of all involved states in the
light of: (1) the relationship of each state
to the parties and the
dispute; and (2) the
policies and needs of
the interstate and international systems,
including the policies of upholding the
justified expectations
of parties and of

Art 3515. Sauf disposition contraire énoncée
au présent Livre, toute
question soulevée par
une situation présentant un lien avec plusieurs États est régie
par la loi de l’État
dont les objectifs de
politique publique se
trouveraient le plus
gravement entravés si
cette loi n’était pas
appliquée à ladite
question. Ledit État est
déterminé en évaluant
la portée et la pertinence des objectifs de
politique publique
poursuivis par les
États impliqués,
compte tenu : (1) des
liens rattachant
chaque État aux parties et au litige, ainsi
que (2) des objectifs et
besoins des systèmes
interétatiques et internationaux, y compris

Art. 3515. A menos
que se indique otra
cosa en el presente
Libro, toda cuestión
jurídica que mantenga contactos con
otros estados se regirá por el derecho
del estado cuyas políticas públicas se verían más seriamente
afectadas si no se
aplicara su derecho
a dicha cuestión. Dicho estado se determina ponderando la
solidez y pertinencia
de las políticas públicas que correspondan de todos los estados involucrados, en
función de lo siguiente: 1) la relación de cada estado
con las partes y la
disputa; y 2) las políticas públicas y necesidades de los sistemas interestatales e
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minimizing the adverse consequences
that might follow
from subjecting a
party to the law of
more than one state.

les principes tendant
au respect des attentes
légitimes des parties et
à minimiser les conséquences néfastes auxquelles pourrait conduire la soumission
d’une partie à la loi de
plus d’un État.

internacionales, incluidas las que apuntan a proteger las expectativas justificadas de las partes y a
reducir las consecuencias adversas
que puedan surgir al
someter a una parte
al derecho de más de
un estado.

Art. 3516. As used
in this Book, the
word “state” denotes, as may be appropriate: the United
States or any state,
territory, or possession thereof; the District of Columbia;
the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico; and
any foreign country
or territorial subdivision thereof that has
its own system of
law.

Art 3516. Tel qu’employé dans le présent
Livre, le terme
« État » signifie, selon
qu’il s’avère approprié : les États-Unis,
ou tout état, territoire,
ou possession en faisant partie ; le District
de Columbia ; l’État
libre associé de Porto
Rico ; de même que
tout pays étranger ou
subdivision territoriale dotée d’un système juridique propre.

Art. 3516. Conforme
al uso dado en este
Libro, la palabra
“estado” tiene el significado que corresponda de los siguientes: los Estados Unidos o uno de sus estados, territorios o
posesiones; el Distrito de Columbia; el
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto
Rico; u otro país o
subdivisión territorial extranjera que
tenga su propio ordenamiento jurídico.

Art. 3517. Except as
otherwise indicated,
when the law of another state is applicable under this Book,
that law shall not include the law of conflict of laws of that
state.

Art 3517. Sauf indication contraire, la désignation de la loi d’un
autre État en vertu du
présent Livre ne vise
pas les règles de conflit de lois en vigueur
dans cet État.

Art. 3517. A menos
que se indique otra
cosa, cuando sea
aplicable el derecho
de otro estado conforme a las disposiciones de este Libro,
ese derecho no incluirá el régimen de
conflicto de leyes de
ese estado.
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Nevertheless, in determining the state
whose law is applicable to an issue under Articles 3515,
3519, 3537, and
3542, the law of conflict of laws of the
involved foreign
states may be taken
into consideration.

Néanmoins, afin de
déterminer l’État dont
la loi régira une question litigieuse en vertu
des articles 3515,
3519, 3537 et 3542,
les règles de conflit de
lois des États étrangers impliqués pourront être prises en
considération.

No obstante, al determinar el estado cuyo
derecho sea aplicable a una cuestión jurídica conforme a los
artículos 3515, 3519,
3537 y 3542, se podrá tener en cuenta
el régimen de conflicto de leyes de los
estados extranjeros
involucrados.

Art. 3518. For the
purposes of this
Book, the domicile
of a person is determined in accordance
with the law of this
state. A juridical person may be treated
as a domiciliary of
either the state of its
formation or the
state of its principal
place of business,
whichever is most
pertinent to the particular issue.

Art 3518. Pour les besoins du présent Livre,
le domicile d’une personne est déterminé
conformément à la loi
de cet État. Une personne morale pourra
être considérée comme
étant domiciliée ou
bien dans l’État où
elle a été constituée,
ou bien dans l’État où
se situe son principal
établissement, selon ce
qui s’avère le mieux
approprié à la question litigieuse.

Art. 3518. A los efectos de este Libro, el
domicilio de una persona se determina de
acuerdo con el derecho de este estado.
Las personas jurídicas pueden considerarse domiciliadas en
el estado que sea más
pertinente para regir
la cuestión jurídica
en particular, ya sea
aquel en que se hayan constituido o
aquel donde se encuentre el asiento
principal de su actividad comercial.
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TITLE II. STATUS

TITRE II. DU
STATUT
PERSONNEL

TÍTULO II. DEL
ESTATUTO
PERSONAL

Art. 3519. The status
of a natural person
and the incidents and
effects of that status
are governed by the
law of the state
whose policies
would be most seriously impaired if its
law were not applied
to the particular issue.

Le statut des personnes physiques et
les conséquences et effets de ce statut sont
régis par la loi de
l’État dont les objectifs de politique publique se trouveraient
le plus gravement entravés si cette loi
n’était pas appliquée à
la question litigieuse.

That state is determined by evaluating
the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the
involved states in the
light of: (1) the relationship of each
state, at any pertinent time, to the dispute, the parties, and
the person whose
status is at issue; (2)
the policies referred
to in Article 3515;
and (3) the policies
of sustaining the validity of obligations
voluntarily undertaken, of protecting
children, minors, and
others in need of
protection, and of
preserving family
values and stability.

Cet État est déterminé
en évaluant la portée
et la pertinence des
objectifs de politique
publique en cause
parmi les États impliqués, compte tenu : (1)
du lien rattachant
chaque État – quelle
que soit la date considérée – au litige, aux
parties, ainsi qu’à la
personne dont le statut
est en cause ; (2) des
principes auxquels il
est fait référence cidessus à l’article
3515 ; et (3) des principes visant à promouvoir la validité des
obligations volontairement assumées, à protéger les enfants, les
mineurs, et toutes
autres personnes

Art. 3519. El estatuto
personal de una persona física, así como
sus asuntos incidentales y efectos, se rigen por el derecho
del estado cuyas políticas públicas se verían más gravemente
afectadas si no se
aplicara su derecho
a la cuestión específica.
Dicho estado se determina ponderando
la solidez y pertinencia de las políticas
públicas que correspondan de los estados involucrados en
función de lo siguiente: 1) la relación de cada uno de
esos estados, en el
momento que corresponda, con la
disputa, las partes y
la persona cuyo estatuto se deba determinar; 2) las políticas
públicas a las que se
refiere el artículo
3515; y 3) las políticas públicas destinadas a respaldar la
validez de las obligaciones asumidas voluntariamente, la
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nécessitant protection,
ainsi qu’à préserver
les valeurs et la stabilité familiales.

protección de los niños, los menores y
demás personas que
necesiten protección,
y la protección de los
valores y la estabilidad de la familia.

Art. 3520. A. A marriage that is valid in
the state where contracted, or in the
state where the parties were first domiciled as husband and
wife, shall be treated
as a valid marriage
unless to do so
would violate a
strong public policy
of the state whose
law is applicable to
the particular issue
under Article 3519.

Art 3520. A. Sera considéré valide un mariage reconnu comme
tel dans l’État où il a
été contracté, ou dans
l’État où les parties
ont établi leur premier
domicile en tant que
mari et femme, à
moins que par là
même ne soit violé un
principe d’ordre public édicté par l’État
dont la loi se trouve
applicable à la question litigieuse en vertu
de l’article 3519.

B. A purported marriage between persons of the same sex
violates a strong
public policy of the
state of Louisiana
and such a marriage
contracted in another
state shall not be recognized in this state
for any purpose, including the assertion
of any right or claim
as a result of the purported marriage.

B. Un prétendu mariage entre deux personnes du même sexe
viole un important
principe d’ordre public de l’État de Louisiane et un tel mariage
contracté dans un
autre État ne saurait
être reconnu dans
l’État de Louisiane à
quelque fin que ce
soit, de même que l’affirmation de tout droit
ou prétention

Art. 3520. A. Se considera válido el matrimonio cuya validez
sea reconocida en el
estado en el que se
contrajo o en el estado donde las partes
establecieron su primer domicilio conyugal, a menos que ello
sea contrario a alguna política pública
fundamental del estado cuyo derecho es
aplicable a la cuestión específica en razón del artículo
3519.
B. El supuesto matrimonio entre personas
del mismo sexo es
contrario a los principios fundamentales
de orden público del
estado de Luisiana y
tal matrimonio contraído en otro estado
no será reconocido
en este estado para
ningún fin, incluida
la invocación de derechos o pretensiones
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découlant de ce prétendu mariage.

derivados del supuesto matrimonio.

Art. 3521. A court of
this state may grant a
divorce or separation
only for grounds
provided by the law
of this state.

Art 3521. Un divorce
ou une séparation de
corps ne pourront être
accordés par un tribunal de cet État qu’en
vertu des fondements
prévus en la matière
par la loi dudit État.

Art. 3521. Los jueces
de este estado solo
pueden decretar un
divorcio o separación por las causales
previstas en el derecho de este estado.

Art. 3522. Unless
otherwise provided
by the law of this
state, the effects and
incidents of marriage
and of divorce with
regard to an issue are
governed by the law
applicable to that issue under Article
3519.

Art 3522. À moins
qu’il n’en soit autrement disposé par la loi
de cet État, les effets
personnels du mariage
ou du divorce au regard d’une question
donnée sont régis par
la loi applicable à ladite question en vertu
de l’article 3519.

Art. 3522. A menos
que el derecho de
este estado indique
otra cosa, los efectos
y las cuestiones incidentales del matrimonio y del divorcio
en relación con una
cuestión específica se
rigen por el derecho
aplicable a tal cuestión conforme al artículo 3519.

TITLE III.
MARITAL
PROPERTY

TITRE III. DU
PATRIMOINE DES
ÉPOUX

TÍTULO III. DE LOS
BIENES
GANANCIALES

Art. 3523. Except as
otherwise provided
in this Title, the
rights and obligations of spouses with
regard to movables,
wherever situated,
acquired by either
spouse during marriage are governed
by the law of the
domicile of the

Art 3523. Sauf disposition contraire énoncée
au présent titre, les
droits et obligations
des époux eu égard
aux biens mobiliers,
quel que soit leur lieu
de situation, acquis
par l’un des époux en
cours du mariage, sont
régis par la loi du domicile de l’époux

Art. 3523. A menos
que este Título lo disponga de otro modo,
los derechos y las
obligaciones de los
cónyuges en relación
con los bienes muebles adquiridos por
cualquiera de ellos
durante el matrimonio, independientemente de dónde estén
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acquiring spouse at
the time of acquisition.

acquéreur à l’époque
de l’acquisition.

ubicados, se rigen
por el derecho del
domicilio del cónyuge adquirente al
momento de la adquisición.

Art. 3524. Except as
otherwise provided
in this Title, the
rights and obligations of spouses with
regard to immovables situated in this
state are governed by
the law of this state.
Whether such immovables are community or separate
property is determined in accordance
with the law of this
state, regardless of
the domicile of the
acquiring spouse at
the time of acquisition.

Art 3524. Sauf disposition contraire énoncée
au présent Titre, les
droits et obligations
des époux eu égard
aux biens immobiliers
situés dans cet État
sont régis par la loi
dudit État. Lesdits
biens seront qualifiés
de biens communs ou
de biens propres conformément à la loi de
cet État nonobstant le
domicile de l’époux
acquéreur à l’époque
de l’acquisition.

Art. 3524. A menos
que este Título lo disponga de otro modo,
los derechos y las
obligaciones de los
cónyuges en relación
con los bienes inmuebles situados en este
estado se rigen por
su derecho. El carácter de gananciales o
propios de los bienes
inmuebles se determina de acuerdo con
el derecho de este estado, independientemente del domicilio
del cónyuge adquirente al momento de
la adquisición.

Art. 3525. Upon the
termination of the
community between
spouses, either of
whom is domiciled
in this state, their
rights and obligations with regard to
immovables situated
in another state acquired during marriage by either
spouse while

Art 3525. À la dissolution de la communauté
entre les époux, lorsque l’un des époux est
domicilié dans cet
État, leurs droits et
obligations eu égard
aux biens immobiliers
situés dans un autre
État, acquis au cours
du mariage par l’un
des époux alors domicilié dans cet État,

Art. 3525. Finalizada
la comunidad de bienes entre los cónyuges, si uno está domiciliado en este estado, se aplica su derecho para determinar los derechos y
las obligaciones de
los cónyuges en relación con los bienes
inmuebles situados
en otro estado que
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domiciled in this
state, which would
be community property if situated in this
state, shall be determined in accordance
with the law of this
state. This provision
may be enforced by
a judgment recognizing the spouse’s
right to a portion of
the immovable or its
value.

lesquels seraient qualifiés de biens communs s’ils étaient situés dans cet État, seront déterminés conformément à la loi dudit État. Cette disposition pourra être mise
en application par jugement établissant le
droit de l’époux à se
voir attribuer, en nature ou en valeur, partie du bien immobilier.

cualquiera de ellos
haya adquirido durante el matrimonio
mientras se encontraba domiciliado en
este estado y que se
considerarían pertenecientes a la comunidad de bienes si estuvieran situados en
este estado. Esta disposición podrá hacerse valer mediante
una sentencia por la
que se reconozca el
derecho del cónyuge
a una parte del bien
inmueble o de su valor.

Art. 3526. Upon termination of the community, or dissolution by death or by
divorce of the marriage of spouses either of whom is
domiciled in this
state, their respective
rights and obligations with regard to
immovables situated
in this state and
movables, wherever
situated, that were
acquired during the
marriage by either
spouse while domiciled in another state
shall be determined
as follows:

Art 3526. À la dissolution de la communauté, ou à la dissolution du mariage consécutive au décès ou
au divorce d’époux
dont l’un se trouve domicilié dans cet État,
les droits et obligations respectifs desdits
époux eu égard aux
biens immobiliers situés dans cet État,
ainsi qu’aux biens mobiliers, quelle que soit
leur situation, lesquels
ont été acquis au
cours du mariage par
l’un des époux alors
domicilié dans un
autre État, seront déterminés comme suit :

Art. 3526. Finalizada
la comunidad de bienes o ante la disolución por muerte o divorcio del matrimonio con uno de los
cónyuges domiciliado en este estado,
sus derechos y obligaciones en relación
con los bienes inmuebles ubicados en este
estado y con los bienes muebles, independientemente de su
ubicación, que cualquiera de los cónyuges haya adquirido
durante el matrimonio mientras se encontraba domiciliado
en otro estado, se
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(1) Property that is
classified as community property under
the law of this state
shall be treated as
community property
under that law; and
(2) Property that is
not classified as
community property
under the law of this
state shall be treated
as the separate property of the acquiring
spouse. However,
the other spouse
shall be entitled, in
value only, to the
same rights with regard to this property
as would be granted
by the law of the
state in which the acquiring spouse was
domiciled at the time
of acquisition.

(1) Les biens qualifiés
de biens communs en
vertu de la loi de cet
État seront considérés
comme tels en vertu de
ladite loi ; de même,

Art. 3527. Upon the
death of a spouse
domiciled outside
this state, that
spouse's immovables
situated in this state
and acquired by that
spouse while domiciled outside this
state, which are not
community property
under the law of this

Art 3527. Lors du décès de l’un des époux
domicilié en dehors de
cet État, les biens immobiliers de cet époux
situés dans cet État et
acquis par lui alors
qu’il se trouvait domicilié en dehors dudit
État, lesquels ne sont
pas qualifiés de biens
communs en vertu de

(2) Les biens non qualifiés de biens communs en vertu de la loi
de cet État seront considérés biens propres
de l’époux acquéreur.
Néanmoins, eu égard
auxdits biens, son conjoint se verra attribuer, en valeur seulement, les droits qui lui
auraient été reconnus
par la loi de l’État
dans lequel l’époux
acquéreur se trouvait
domicilié à la date de
l’acquisition.
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determinarán de la
siguiente manera:
1) Los bienes considerados gananciales
conforme al derecho
de este estado se tratarán como bienes
gananciales conforme a tal derecho.
2) Los bienes que no
se consideren gananciales conforme al
derecho de este estado se tratarán
como bienes propios
del cónyuge adquirente. No obstante, el
otro cónyuge, tendrá
derecho a recibir un
valor equivalente al
resultante de los derechos reconocidos
por el derecho del estado en el que se encontraba domiciliado
el cónyuge adquirente al momento de
su adquisición.
Art. 3527. A la
muerte de uno de los
cónyuges con domicilio fuera de este estado, sus bienes inmuebles adquiridos
mientras estaba domiciliado fuera de
este estado y que no
se consideren gananciales conforme al
derecho de este
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state, are subject to
the same rights, in
value only, in favor
of the surviving
spouse as provided
by the law of the
domicile of the deceased at the time of
death.

la loi du même État,
sont assujettis, en faveur du conjoint survivant et en valeur seulement, aux droits
qu’auraient reconnus
audit conjoint la loi du
domicile du défunt à la
date du décès.

estado, quedan sujetos, solo en cuanto a
su valor, a los derechos que le correspondan al cónyuge
supérstite conforme
al derecho del domicilio del cónyuge fallecido al momento
de su fallecimiento.

TITLE IV.
SUCCESSIONS

TITRE IV. DES
SUCCESSIONS

TÍTULO IV. DE LAS
SUCESIONES

Art. 3528. A testamentary disposition
is valid as to form if
it is in writing and is
made in conformity
with: (1) the law of
this state; or (2) the
law of the state of
making at the time
of making; or (3) the
law of the state in
which the testator
was domiciled at the
time of making or at
the time of death; or
(4) with regard to
immovables, the law
that would be applied by the courts of
the state in which the
immovables are situated.

Art 3528. Un testament est valide en la
forme lorsqu’il est établi par écrit et en conformité avec : (1) la
loi de cet État, ou (2)
la loi de l’État où il a
été rédigé, à la date de
la rédaction, ou (3) la
loi de l’État où le testateur se trouvait domicilié à la date de la
rédaction ou à la date
de son décès, ou (4) eu
égard aux biens immobiliers, la loi qu’appliqueraient les tribunaux où sont situés
lesdits biens.

Art. 3528. Las disposiciones testamentarias son válidas en
cuanto a su forma si
constan por escrito y
se adecuan a lo siguiente: 1) el derecho de este estado, 2)
el derecho del estado
en que se otorgó el
acto, vigente al momento de su otorgamiento, 3) el derecho
del estado en que el
testador estaba domiciliado al momento
de otorgar el acto o
al momento de su fallecimiento, o 4) en
relación con los bienes inmuebles, el derecho que aplicarían
los jueces del estado
en el que se encuentran situados.
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Art. 3529. A person
is capable of making
a testament if, at the
time of making the
testament, he possessed that capacity
under the law of the
state in which he
was domiciled either
at that time or at the
time of death.
If the testator was
capable of making
the testament under
the law of both
states, his will contained in the testament shall be held
free of vices if it
would be so held under the law of at
least one of those
states.
If the testator was
capable of making
the testament under
the law of only one
of the states specified in the first paragraph, his will contained in the testament shall be held
free of vices only if
it would be so held
under the law of that
state.
Art. 3530. The capacity or

[Vol. 13

Art 3529. Une personne a la capacité de
rédiger un testament
lorsqu’à la date de la
rédaction cette capacité lui était reconnue
par la loi de l’État
dans lequel elle se
trouvait domiciliée à
cette date ou à la date
de son décès.
Lorsque le testateur
avait la capacité de
rédiger le testament en
vertu de la loi de ces
deux États, son testament sera réputé
exempt de vices s’il en
est ainsi décidé selon
la loi de l’un au moins
de ces États.

Art. 3529. Se considera capaz de otorgar testamento a
quien, al momento de
hacerlo, poseía la capacidad exigida por
el derecho del estado
en que estaba domiciliado al momento
del otorgamiento o
del fallecimiento.
Si el testador tiene
capacidad de otorgar
el testamento en virtud del derecho de
ambos estados, su
voluntad expresada
en el testamento se
considera libre de vicios si así se la consideraría conforme al
derecho de al menos
uno de esos dos estados.
Lorsque le testateur
Si el testador tiene
avait la capacité de
capacidad de otorgar
rédiger le testament en el testamento en virvertu de la loi d’un
tud del derecho de
seul des États ci-dessolo uno de los estasus évoqués au 1er ali- dos indicados en el
néa, son testament ne
primer párrafo, su
sera réputé exempt de voluntad expresada
vices qu’au cas où il
en el testamento se
en est ainsi décidé se- considera libre de vilon la loi dudit État.
cios solo si así se la
consideraría conforme al derecho de
ese estado.
Art 3530. La capacité
ou les causes

Art. 3530. La capacidad o indignidad de
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unworthiness of an
heir or legatee is determined under the
law of the state in
which the deceased
was domiciled at the
time of his death.
Nevertheless, with
regard to immovables situated in this
state, the legatee
must qualify as a
person under the law
of this state.

d’indignité de l’héritier ou du légataire
sont déterminées conformément à la loi de
l’État où le défunt se
trouvait domicilié à la
date du décès.
Toutefois, eu égard
aux biens immobiliers
situés dans cet État, le
légataire doit être
considéré comme une
personne conformément à la loi dudit
État.

un heredero o legatario se determina conforme al derecho del
estado del domicilio
del causante al momento de su fallecimiento.
No obstante, en relación con los bienes
inmuebles situados
en este estado, el legatario debe ser considerado persona
conforme al derecho
de este estado.

Art. 3531. The
meaning of words
and phrases used in a
testament is determined according to
the law of the state
expressly designated
by the testator for
that purpose, or
clearly contemplated
by him at the time of
making the testament, and, in the absence of such an express or implied selection, according to
the law of the state
in which the testator
was domiciled at the
time of making the
testament.

Art 3531. La signification des termes et expressions dont il est
fait usage dans un testament est déterminée
conformément à la loi
de l’État expressément
désignée à cette fin
par le testateur, ou
clairement envisagée
par ce dernier à la
date de la rédaction
et, en l’absence d’un
tel choix exprès ou tacite, conformément à
la loi de l’État où le
testateur se trouvait
domicilié à la date de
la rédaction.

Art. 3531. El significado de las palabras
y las frases utilizadas
en un testamento se
determina de
acuerdo con el derecho del estado expresamente indicado por
el testador para ese
fin o que claramente
haya sido contemplado por él al otorgar el testamento y, a
falta de tal selección
expresa o tácita, según el derecho del
estado en que el testador estaba domiciliado al otorgar el
testamento.

Art. 3532. Except as
otherwise provided
in this Title, testate
and intestate

Art 3532. Sauf disposition contraire énoncée
au présent Titre, la dévolution successorale

Art. 3532. A menos
que este Título lo disponga de otro modo,
la sucesión de los
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succession to movables is governed by
the law of the state
in which the deceased was domiciled at the time of
death.

des biens mobiliers –
testamentaires et ab
intestat – est régie par
la loi de l’État où le
défunt se trouvait domicilié à la date du
décès.

bienes muebles, ya
sea testada o intestada, se rige por el
derecho del estado
en que el causante
estaba domiciliado al
momento del fallecimiento.

Art. 3533. Except as
otherwise provided
in this Title, testate
and intestate succession to immovables
situated in this state
is governed by the
law of this state.

Art 3533. Sauf disposition contraire énoncée
au présent Titre, la dévolution successorale
– testamentaires et ab
intestat – des biens immobiliers situés dans
un autre État est régie
par la loi dudit État.

The forced heirship
law of this state does
not apply if the deceased was domiciled outside this
state at the time of
death and he left no
forced heirs domiciled in this state at
the time of his death.

Les dispositions de la
loi de cet État afférentes à la réserve héréditaire ne s’appliquent pas lorsque le
défunt était domicilié
en dehors dudit État
lors du décès et s’il ne
laisse aucun héritier
réservataire domicilié
dans cet État à la date
du décès.

Art. 3533. A menos
que este Título lo disponga de otro modo,
la sucesión de los
bienes inmuebles situados en este estado, ya sea testada o
intestada, se rige por
el derecho vigente en
este estado.
No se aplica el régimen de herencia forzosa de este estado si
el causante tenía domicilio fuera del estado al momento del
fallecimiento y no
dejó herederos forzosos que al momento
del fallecimiento tuvieran domicilio en
este estado.

Art. 3534. Except as
otherwise provided
in this Title, testate
and intestate succession to immovables
situated in another
state is governed by
the law that would
be applied by the
courts of that state.

Art 3534. Sauf disposition contraire énoncée
au présent Titre, la dévolution successorale
– testamentaires et ab
intestat – des biens immobiliers situés dans
un autre État est régie
par la loi

Art. 3534. A menos
que este Título lo disponga de otro modo,
la sucesión de los
bienes inmuebles situados en otro estado, ya sea testada o
intestada, se rige por
el derecho que
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qu’appliqueraient les
tribunaux dudit État.
Lorsque le défunt est
décédé domicilié dans
cet État laissant au
moins un héritier réservataire, lequel se
trouvait alors domicilié dans ledit État, la
valeur de ces biens immobiliers doit être
prise en compte pour
calculer la quotité disponible et compléter
la réserve.

aplicarían los jueces
de ese estado.
Si el causante falleció con domicilio en
este estado y al momento de su fallecimiento dejó al menos
un heredero forzoso
que en ese momento
estaba domiciliado
en este estado, el valor de esos bienes inmuebles se incluye en
el cálculo de la porción disponible y en
la satisfacción de la
legítima.

TITLE V. REAL
RIGHTS

TITRE V. DES
DROITS RÉELS

TÍTULO V. DE LOS
DERECHOS
REALES

Art. 3535. Real
rights in immovables
situated in this state
are governed by the
law of this state.

Art 3535. Les droits
réels afférents à un
immeuble situé dans
cet État sont régis par
la loi dudit État.

If the deceased died
domiciled in this
state and left at least
one forced heir who
at the time was domiciled in this state,
the value of those
immovables shall be
included in calculating the disposable
portion and in satisfying the legitime.

Real rights in immovables situated in
another state are
governed by the law
that would be applied by the courts of
that state.
Whether a thing is
an immovable is determined according
to the substantive
law of the state in
which the thing is
situated.

Art. 3535. Los derechos reales sobre
bienes inmuebles situados en este estado
se rigen por el derecho de este estado.
Les droits réels afféLos derechos reales
rents à un immeuble
sobre bienes inmuesitué dans un autre
bles situados en otro
État ont régis par la
estado se rigen por el
loi qu’appliqueraient
derecho que aplicales tribunaux dudit
rían los jueces de ese
État.
estado.
La qualification immo- La condición de inbilière du bien est dé- mueble de un bien se
terminée conformédetermina de conforment au droit interne
midad con el derecho
de l’État où se situe
de fondo del estado
ledit bien.
en que se encuentra
el bien.
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Art. 3536. Real
rights in corporeal
movables are governed by the law of
the state in which the
movable was situated at the time the
right was acquired.
Nevertheless, after
the removal of a
movable to this state,
a real right acquired
while the movable
was situated in another state is subject
to the law of this
state if: (1) the right
is incompatible with
the law of this state;
or (2) the holder of
the right knew or
should have known
of the removal to
this state; or (3) justice and equity so
dictate in order to
protect third parties
who, in good faith,
have dealt with the
thing after its removal to this state.

Art 3536. Les droits
réels mobiliers corporels sont régis par la
loi de l’État dans lequel se trouvait le bien
mobilier à la date de
l’acquisition de ces
droits. Néanmoins,
suite au transfert du
bien mobilier dans cet
État, un droit réel acquis alors que ledit
bien se trouvait dans
un autre État est soumis à la loi de cet État
lorsque: (1) ce droit
réel est incompatible
avec la loi de cet État;
(2) le titulaire dudit
droit savait ou aurait
dû savoir que le transfert dans cet État avait
eu lieu; ou (3) les
principes de justice et
d’équité le requièrent
afin de protéger les
tiers qui, de bonne foi,
se sont engagés dans
des contrats afférents
audit bien postérieurement à son transfert
dans cet État.
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Art. 3536. Los derechos reales sobre
bienes muebles tangibles se rigen por el
derecho del estado
en que se encuentran
al momento de su adquisición. Sin embargo, después de
trasladado un bien
mueble a este estado,
todo derecho real adquirido mientras se
encontraba situado
en otro estado queda
sujeto al derecho de
este estado, si: 1) el
derecho real es incompatible con las
disposiciones del derecho de este estado;
2) el titular del derecho sabía o debería
haber sabido del
traslado a este estado; o 3) así corresponde por consideraciones de justicia y
de equidad para proteger a terceros que
de buena fe hayan tenido conexiones con
el bien después de su
traslado a este estado.
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TITLE VI.
CONVENTIONAL
OBLIGATIONS

TITRE VI. DES
OBLIGATIONS
CONTRACTUELLES

TÍTULO VI. DE LAS
OBLIGACIONES
CONTRACTUALES

Art. 3537. Except as
otherwise provided
in this Title, an issue
of conventional obligations is governed
by the law of the
state whose policies
would be most seriously impaired if its
law were not applied
to that issue.

Art 3537. Sauf disposition contraire énoncée
au présent Titre, toute
question relative aux
obligations contractuelles est régie par la
loi de l’État dont les
objectifs de politique
publique se trouveraient le plus gravement entravés si cette
loi n’était pas appliquée à ladite question.
Cet État est déterminé
en évaluant la portée
et la pertinence des
objectifs de politique
publique des États impliqués, compte tenu:
(1) des liens pertinents
rattachant chaque État
aux parties et au contrat, y compris lieu de
négociation, formation
et exécution du contrat, ainsi que le domicile, la résidence habituelle ou l’établissement des parties ; (2)
de la nature, la catégorie et la finalité du
contrat ; et (3) des
principes auxquels il
est fait ci-dessus référence à l’article 3515,
de même que les politiques tendant à améliorer la sécurité

Art. 3537. A menos
que se indique otra
cosa en este Título,
toda cuestión relativa
a las obligaciones
contractuales se rige
por el derecho del estado cuyas políticas
públicas se verían
más afectadas si su
derecho no se aplicara a la cuestión específica.
Dicho estado se determina ponderando
la solidez y pertinencia de las políticas
públicas que correspondan de los estados involucrados en
función de lo siguiente: 1) los contactos pertinentes de
cada estado con las
partes y la operación, incluido el lugar de negociación,
celebración y cumplimiento del contrato,
la ubicación del objeto del contrato y el
domicilio, la residencia habitual o el
asiento de la actividad comercial de las
partes; 2) la naturaleza, el tipo y el fin
del contrato; y 3) las

That state is determined by evaluating
the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the
involved states in the
light of: (1) the pertinent contacts of each
state to the parties
and the transaction,
including the place
of negotiation, formation, and performance of the contract, the location of
the object of the contract, and the place
of domicile, habitual
residence, or business of the parties;
(2) the nature, type,
and purpose of the
contract; and (3) the
policies referred to
in Article 3515, as
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well as the policies
of facilitating the orderly planning of
transactions, of promoting multistate
commercial intercourse, and of protecting one party
from undue imposition by the other.

juridique, à promouvoir les échanges commerciaux internationaux, ainsi qu’à protéger une partie contre
la contrainte indument
exercée par son cocontractant.

Art. 3538. A contract
is valid as to form if
made in conformity
with: (1) the law of
the state of making;
(2) the law of the
state of performance
to the extent that
performance is to be
rendered in that
state; (3) the law of
the state of common
domicile or place of
business of the parties; or (4) the law
governing the substance of the contract
under Articles 3537
or 3540.

Art 3538. Un contrat
est valide en la forme
lorsqu’il est établi en
conformité avec : (1)
la loi de l’État où il a
été conclu ; (2) la loi
de l’État où en a lieu
l’exécution, dans la
mesure où cette dernière devait s’effectuer
dans ledit État ; (3) la
loi de l’État où est habituellement situé le
domicile ou l’établissement des parties ; ou
(4) la loi régissant le
fond du contrat en
vertu des articles 3537
ou 3540.

Nevertheless, when
for reasons of public
policy the law governing the substance

[Vol. 13

políticas públicas a
las que hace referencia el artículo 3515,
así como aquellas
destinadas a facilitar
la planificación ordenada de las operaciones, promover el
intercambio comercial entre estados y
proteger a una de las
partes de las imposiciones excesivas de
la otra.

Art. 3538. Los contratos son válidos en
cuanto a su forma si
se celebran conforme
a alguno de los siguientes derechos: 1)
el derecho del estado
de celebración, 2) el
derecho del estado
de su cumplimiento,
siempre que deba
cumplirse en ese estado, 3) el derecho
del estado del domicilio o asiento principal de los negocios
en común de las partes, o 4) el derecho
aplicable al fondo
del contrato conforme a los artículos
3537 o 3540.
Néanmoins, lorsque la No obstante, cuando
loi régissant le fond du por razones de orden
contrat en vertu de
público el derecho
l’article 3537 prescrit aplicable al fondo
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of the contract under
Article 3537 requires
a certain form, there
must be compliance
with that form.

impérativement certaines règles de forme,
lesdites règles doivent
avoir été respectées.

del contrato conforme al artículo
3537 exija cierta
forma, deberá cumplirse tal forma.

Art. 3539. A person
is capable of contracting if he possesses that capacity
under the law of either the state in
which he is domiciled at the time of
making the contract
or the state whose
law is applicable to
the contract under
Article 3537.

Art 3539. Une personne a la capacité de
contracter si cette dernière lui est reconnue
par la loi de l’État
dans lequel elle se
trouvait domiciliée à
l’époque de la conclusion du contrat, ou de
l’État dont la loi est
applicable au contrat
en vertu de l’article
3537.

Art. 3539. Las personas tienen capacidad
de contratar si poseen tal capacidad
conforme al derecho
del estado de su domicilio al momento
de celebrar el contrato o al derecho del
estado cuyo derecho
es aplicable al contrato conforme al artículo 3537.

Art. 3540. All other
issues of conventional obligations are
governed by the law
expressly chosen or
clearly relied upon
by the parties, except
to the extent that law
contravenes the public policy of the state
whose law would
otherwise be applicable under Article
3537.

Art 3540. Toute autre
question afférente aux
obligations contractuelles est régie par la
loi expressément choisie par les parties, ou
à laquelle celles-ci ont
clairement entendu se
référer, excepté dans
la mesure où ladite loi
est incompatible avec
les principes d’ordre
public de l’État dont
la loi serait par ailleurs applicable en
vertu de l’article 3537.

Art. 3540. Todas las
demás cuestiones relacionadas con las
obligaciones contractuales se rigen
por el derecho que
las partes expresamente hayan elegido
o claramente hayan
tenido en cuenta, a
menos que tal derecho sea contrario al
orden público del estado cuyo derecho
sería aplicable por
otra razón conforme
al artículo 3537.

Art. 3541. Unless
otherwise provided
by the law of this
state, the law

Art 3541. À moins
qu’il n’en soit autrement disposé par la loi
de cet État, la loi

Art. 3541. A menos
que el derecho de
este estado disponga
otra cosa, el derecho
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applicable to juridical acts other than
contracts and to
quasi-contractual obligations is determined in accordance
with the principles of
this Title.

applicable aux actes
juridiques autres que
les contrats, ainsi
qu’aux obligations
quasi-contractuelles,
est déterminée conformément aux principes
énoncés au présent
titre.

aplicable a los actos
jurídicos que no sean
contratos y a las
obligaciones cuasicontractuales se determina de acuerdo
con los principios de
este Título.

TITLE VII.
DELICTUAL AND
QUASIDELICTUAL
OBLIGATIONS

TITRE VII. DES
OBLIGATIONS
DÉLICTUELLES ET
QUASIDÉLICTUELLES

TÍTULO VII. DE LAS
OBLIGACIONES
RESULTANTES DE
DELITOS Y
CUASIDELITOS
CIVILES

Art. 3542. Except as
otherwise provided
in this Title, an issue
of delictual or quasidelictual obligations
is governed by the
law of the state
whose policies
would be most seriously impaired if its
law were not applied
to that issue. That
state is determined
by evaluating the
strength and pertinence of the relevant
policies of the involved states in the
light of: (1) the pertinent contacts of each
state to the parties
and the events giving
rise to the dispute,
including the place

Art 3542. Sauf disposition contraire énoncée
au présent titre, toute
question afférente aux
obligations délictuelles et quasi-délictuelles est régie par la
loi de l’État dont les
objectifs de politique
législative se trouveraient le plus gravement entravés si cette
loi n’était pas appliquée à ladite question.
Cet État est déterminé
en évaluant la portée
et la pertinence des
objectifs de politique
publique des États impliqués, compte tenu :
(1) des liens pertinents
rattachant chaque État
aux parties et aux événements dont le litige

Art. 3542. A menos
que se indique otra
cosa en este Título,
toda cuestión de responsabilidad extracontractual derivada
de delitos o cuasidelitos se rige por el
derecho del estado
cuyas políticas públicas se verían más
gravemente afectadas si no se aplicara
su derecho a la cuestión específica. Dicho estado se determina ponderando la
solidez y pertinencia
de las políticas públicas que correspondan de los estados involucrados en función de lo siguiente:
1) los contactos
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of conduct and injury, the domicile,
habitual residence,
or place of business
of the parties, and
the state in which the
relationship, if any,
between the parties
was centered; and
(2) the policies referred to in Article
3515, as well as the
policies of deterring
wrongful conduct
and of repairing the
consequences of injurious acts.

a résulté, y compris le
lieu de survenance de
la conduite dommageable et du dommage, le domicile, la
résidence habituelle
ou l’établissement des
parties, et l’État où
d’éventuelles relations
entre les parties se
trouvaient localisées ;
et (2) des principes
auxquels il est fait cidessus référence à
l’article 3515, de
même que des principes de dissuasion
des conduites dommageables et de réparation des dommages.

pertinentes de cada
estado con las partes
y los hechos que den
lugar a la disputa,
incluido el lugar
donde ocurrieron la
conducta y el daño,
el domicilio, la residencia habitual o el
asiento de la actividad comercial de las
partes, y el estado en
que se encontraba el
centro de la relación
entre las partes, en
su caso, y 2) las políticas públicas mencionadas en el artículo 3515, así como
aquellas destinadas a
disuadir conductas
ilícitas y a reparar el
daño causado.

Art. 3543. Issues
pertaining to standards of conduct and
safety are governed
by the law of the
state in which the
conduct that caused
the injury occurred,
if the injury occurred
in that state or in another state whose
law did not provide
for a higher standard
of conduct.
In all other cases,
those issues are governed by the law of
the state in which the

Art 3543. Les questions relatives aux
normes de comportement et de sécurité
sont régies par la loi
de l’État où est survenue la conduite dommageable, lorsque le
dommage a été subi
dans ledit État ou dans
un autre État dont la
loi n’imposait pas des
normes de conduite
plus strictes.
Dans tous les autres
cas, ces questions sont
régies par la loi de
l’État où est survenu

Art. 3543. Las cuestiones relativas a los
estándares de conducta y seguridad se
rigen por el derecho
del estado en que
tuvo lugar la conducta que causó el
daño, si el daño ocurrió en ese estado o
en otro estado cuyo
derecho no exige un
estándar de conducta
superior.
En todos los demás
casos, esas cuestiones se rigen por el
derecho del estado
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injury occurred, provided that the person
whose conduct
caused the injury
should have foreseen
its occurrence in that
state.
The preceding paragraph does not apply
to cases in which the
conduct that caused
the injury occurred
in this state and was
caused by a person
who was domiciled
in, or had another
significant connection with, this state.
These cases are governed by the law of
this state.

le dommage, à condition que la personne
dont la conduite a
causé le dommage ait
été en situation de prévoir la survenance de
celui-ci dans cet État.
Le précédent alinéa
n’est pas applicable
aux cas où la conduite
ayant causé le dommage est survenue
dans cet État, et où
l’auteur était domicilié
dans ledit État ou y
était rattaché de manière significative. Ces
cas sont régis par la
loi de cet État.

en que ocurrió el
daño, siempre que la
persona cuya conducta causó el daño
haya debido prever
su acaecimiento en
ese estado.
El párrafo anterior
no rige en los casos
en que la conducta
que causó el daño
haya ocurrido en este
estado y haya sido
causada por una persona con domicilio
en este estado o con
otros contactos significativos en este estado. Estos casos se
rigen por el derecho
de este estado.

Art. 3544. Issues
pertaining to loss
distribution and financial protection
are governed, as between a person injured by an offense
or quasi-offense and
the person who
caused the injury, by
the law designated in
the following order:

Art 3544. Entre la personne lésée suite à un
délit ou quasi-délit et
l’auteur du dommage,
les questions relatives
aux modalités de répartition des pertes et
de couverture financière sont régies par
la loi déterminée
comme suit :

(1) If, at the time of
the injury, the injured person and the
person who caused

(1) Lorsqu’à l’époque
de la survenance du
dommage la personne
lésée et l’auteur du

Art. 3544. Las cuestiones relativas a la
atribución de responsabilidad por el daño
y a la reparación
económica entre la
persona lesionada
por un delito o cuasidelito civil y la persona que causó el
daño se rigen por el
derecho que corresponda entre los que
siguen, en este orden:
1) Si, al momento del
daño, la persona lesionada y la persona
que causó el daño se
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the injury were domiciled in the same
state, by the law of
that state. Persons
domiciled in states
whose law on the
particular issue is
substantially identical shall be treated
as if domiciled in the
same state.

dommage étaient domiciliés dans le même
État : par la loi dudit
État. Les personnes
domiciliées dans des
États dont la loi est
substantiellement
identique, eu égard à
la question considérée, seront réputées
domiciliées dans le
même État.
(2) If, at the time of
(2) Lorsqu’à l’époque
the injury, the inde la survenance du
jured person and the dommage la personne
person who caused
lésée et l’auteur du
the injury were dom- dommage étaient doiciled in different
miciliés dans difféstates: (a) when both rents États: (a) lorsthe injury and the
que le dommage et la
conduct that caused
conduite l’ayant causé
it occurred in one of sont survenus dans
those states, by the
l’un de ces États: la
law of that state; and loi dudit État; et (b)
(b) when the injury
lorsque le dommage et
and the conduct that la conduite l’ayant
caused it occurred in causé sont survenus
different states, by
dans différents États:
the law of the state
par la loi de l’État
in which the injury
dans lequel le domoccurred, provided
mage est survenu à
that (i) the injured
condition que (i) la
person was domipersonne lésée s’y
ciled in that state, (ii) trouvât domiciliée, (ii)
the person who
l’auteur du dommage
caused the injury
eût dû prévoir que le
should have foreseen dommage surviendrait
its occurrence in that dans ledit État, et (iii)
state, and (iii) the
la loi dudit État aclaw of that state pro- corde à la personne
vided for a higher
lésée une meilleure
standard of financial protection financière
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encontraban domiciliadas en el mismo
estado, por el derecho de ese estado. Si
el derecho de los estados en que estaban
domiciliadas las personas es idéntico en
lo sustancial, se considera que estaban
domiciliadas en el
mismo estado.
2) Si, al momento del
daño, la persona lesionada y la persona
que causó el daño se
encontraban domiciliadas en diferentes
estados: a) si el daño
y la conducta que lo
causó ocurrieron en
uno de esos estados,
por el derecho de ese
estado; y b) si el
daño y la conducta
que lo causó ocurrieron en diferentes estados, por el derecho
del estado en que
ocurrió el daño,
siempre que i) la persona lesionada esté
domiciliada en ese
estado, ii) la persona
que causó el daño
debiera haber previsto que se produciría el daño en ese estado, y iii) el derecho
de ese estado estableciera un estándar
de protección
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protection for the injured person than did
the law of the state
in which the injurious conduct occurred.

que ne le ferait la loi
de l’État dans lequel
la conduite dommageable est survenue.

económica en favor
de la persona lesionada más alto que el
establecido por el derecho del estado en
el que ocurrió la conducta que causó el
daño.

Art. 3545. Delictual
and quasi-delictual
liability for injury
caused by a product,
as well as damages,
whether compensatory, special, or punitive, are governed
by the law of this
state: (1) when the
injury was sustained
in this state by a person domiciled or residing in this state;
or (2) when the
product was manufactured, produced,
or acquired in this
state and caused the
injury either in this
state or in another
state to a person
domiciled in this
state.

Art 3545. La responsabilité délictuelle ou
quasi-délictuelle résultant du dommage
causé par un produit,
de même que les dommages-intérêts, qu’ils
soient à caractère
compensatoire, spécial
ou punitif, sont régis
par la loi de cet État :
(1) lorsque le dommage est subi dans cet
État par une personne
domiciliée ou résidant
dans cet État ; ou (2)
lorsque le produit a
été manufacturé, fabriqué ou acquis dans
cet État et a causé un
dommage dans cet
État, ou a causé un
dommage dans un
autre État à une personne domiciliée dans
cet État.
Le précédent alinéa
n’est pas applicable
lorsque ni le produit à
l’origine du dommage,
ni aucun des produits
similaires provenant

Art. 3545. La responsabilidad por delitos
y cuasidelitos por las
lesiones provocadas
por un producto, así
como la indemnización de carácter
compensatorio, especial o punitivo, se rigen por el derecho de
este estado, si: 1) el
daño fue sufrido en
este estado por una
persona con domicilio o residencia en
este estado, o 2) el
producto fue fabricado, producido o
adquirido en este estado y causó un daño
en este u otro estado
a una persona domiciliada en este estado.

The preceding paragraph does not apply
if neither the product
that caused the injury nor any of the
defendant’s products

El párrafo anterior
no rige si ni el producto que causó el
daño ni ninguno de
los productos del
mismo tipo del
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of the same type
were made available
in this state through
ordinary commercial
channels.
All cases not disposed of by the preceding paragraphs
are governed by the
other Articles of this
Title.
Art. 3546. Punitive
damages may not be
awarded by a court
of this state unless
authorized:

(1) By the law of the
state where the injurious conduct occurred and by either
the law of the state
where the resulting
injury occurred or
the law of the place
where the person
whose conduct
caused the injury
was domiciled; or
(2) By the law of the
state in which the injury occurred and by
the law of the state
where the person
whose conduct
caused the injury
was domiciled.

du défendeur,
n’étaient disponibles
dans cet État par le
biais des chaines de
distribution commerciales usuelles.
Tous les cas ne relevant pas des précédents paragraphes se
trouvent régis par les
autres articles du présent Titre.
Art 3546. Des dommages-intérêts à caractère punitif ne
pourront être octroyés
par un tribunal de cet
État, à moins qu’ils ne
soient autorisés:
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demandado fueron
puestos en circulación en este estado
mediante los canales
comerciales habituales.
Los casos que no están cubiertos por los
párrafos anteriores
se rigen por los demás artículos de este
Título.

Art. 3546. Los jueces
de este estado no
pueden otorgar una
indemnización de carácter punitivo a menos que se encuentren autorizados para
hacerlo:
(1) Par la loi de l’État 1) por el derecho del
dans lequel la conestado donde tuvo luduite dommageable est gar la conducta que
survenue, ainsi que,
causó el daño y por
soit par la loi de l’État el derecho del estado
où le dommage en ré- donde se produjo el
sultant est survenu,
daño causado por disoit par la loi du docha conducta o el demicile de la personne
recho del lugar del
dont la conduite a
domicilio de la percausé le dommage; ou sona cuya conducta
causó el daño; o
(2) Par la loi de l’État 2) por el derecho del
dans lequel le domestado en el que ocumage est survenu et
rrió el daño y por el
par la loi de l’État où derecho del estado
se trouvait domiciliée
en que estaba domila personne dont la
ciliada la persona
conduite a causé le
cuya conducta causó
dommage.
el daño.
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Art. 3547. The law
applicable under Articles 3543-3546
shall not apply if,
from the totality of
the circumstances of
an exceptional case,
it is clearly evident
under the principles
of Article 3542, that
the policies of another state would be
more seriously impaired if its law were
not applied to the
particular issue. In
such event, the law
of the other state
shall apply.

Art 3547. La loi applicable en vertu des articles 3543-3546 ne
s’applique pas si,
compte tenu de l’ensemble des circonstances afférentes à un
cas exceptionnel, il
s’avère évident, en
vertu des principes
énoncés à l’article
3542, que les objectifs
de politique publique
d’un autre État se
trouveraient plus gravement entravés si sa
loi n’était pas appliquée à la question
considérée. Si tel est le
cas, la loi de l’autre
État doit être appliquée.

Art. 3547. El derecho
aplicable en virtud
de los artículos 3543
a 3546 no se aplicará
si, a partir de todas
las circunstancias de
un caso excepcional,
resulta claramente
evidente, conforme a
los principios del artículo 3542, que las
políticas públicas de
otro estado se verían
más gravemente
afectadas de no aplicarse su derecho a la
cuestión específica.
En este caso, se aplicará el derecho del
otro estado.

Art. 3548. For the
purposes of this Title, and provided it is
appropriate under
the principles of Article 3542, a juridical
person that is domiciled outside this
state, but which
transacts business in
this state and incurs
a delictual or quasidelictual obligation
arising from activity
within this state,
shall be treated as a
domiciliary of this
state.

Art 3548. Pour les besoins du présent Titre,
et dans la mesure où
cela s’avère justifié en
vertu des principes
énoncés à l’article
3542, une personne
morale domiciliée en
dehors de cet État,
mais qui s’y livre à
des activités commerciales, et qui, en raison desdites activités
dans cet État, engage
sa responsabilité délictuelle ou quasi-délictuelle, est réputée

Art. 3548. A los efectos de este Título, y
siempre que corresponda de conformidad con los principios del artículo
3542, se considera
domiciliada en este
estado a toda persona jurídica que
esté domiciliada
fuera de este estado
pero que realice actividades comerciales
en este estado y
quede sujeta a una
obligación resultante
de un delito o un
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État.
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cuasidelito civil derivado de su actividad
en este estado.

TITLE VIII

TITRE VIII

TÍTULO VIII

LIBERATIVE
PRESCRIPTION

DE LA
PRESCRIPTION
EXTINCTIVE

DE LA
PRESCRIPCIÓN
LIBERATORIA

Art. 3549. A. When
the substantive law
of this state would
be applicable to the
merits of an action
brought in this state,
the prescription and
peremption law of
this state applies.

Art 3549. A. Au cas où
le droit matériel de cet
État serait retenu pour
régir au fond une action portée devant les
tribunaux dudit État,
les règles de prescription et péremption en
vigueur dans cet État
sont applicables.
B. Au cas où le droit
matériel d’un autre
État serait retenu pour
régir au fond une action portée devant les
tribunaux de cet État,
les règles de prescription et péremption en
vigueur dans cet État
sont applicables, sauf
dans les cas suivants :
(1) Lorsque l’action
est irrecevable selon
la loi de cet État, l’action sera rejetée à
moins qu’elle ne soit
recevable selon la loi
applicable au fond et
que le maintien de
l’action dans cet État
se trouve justifié par
des impératifs de justice réparative.

Art. 3549. A. Se aplican las normas sobre
prescripción y caducidad vigentes en
este estado a toda acción iniciada en este
estado en la cual la
cuestión de fondo se
rija por el derecho de
este estado.
B. También se aplican las normas sobre
prescripción y caducidad vigentes en
este estado a toda acción iniciada en este
estado cuyo derecho
de fondo aplicable
sea el de otro estado,
con las siguientes
salvedades:
1) La acción será
desestimada si es
inadmisible conforme
al derecho de este estado, a menos que no
lo sea conforme al
derecho aplicable a
la cuestión de fondo
y mantener la acción
en este estado esté
plenamente justificado por razones

B. When the substantive law of another state would be
applicable to the
merits of an action
brought in this state,
the prescription and
peremption law of
this state applies, except as specified below:
(1) If the action is
barred under the law
of this state, the action shall be dismissed unless it
would not be barred
in the state whose
law would be applicable to the merits
and maintenance of
the action in this
state is warranted by
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compelling considerations of remedial
justice.
(2) If the action is
not barred under the
law of this state, the
action shall be maintained unless it
would be barred in
the state whose law
is applicable to the
merits and maintenance of the action
in this state is not
warranted by the
policies of this state
and its relationship
to the parties or the
dispute nor by any
compelling considerations of remedial
justice.
C. Notwithstanding
the foregoing provisions, if the substantive law of another
state would be applicable to the merits of
an action brought in
this state and the action is brought by or
on behalf of any person who, at the time
the cause of action
arose, neither resided
in nor was domiciled
in this state, the action shall be barred
if it is barred by a
statute of limitation
or repose or by a law

[Vol. 13

imperativas de justicia reparativa.
(2) Si l’action est recevable selon la loi de
cet État, elle sera
maintenue, à moins
qu’elle soit irrecevable selon la loi applicable au fond et que
le maintien de ladite
action dans cet État ne
soit pas justifié par les
objectifs de politique
publique dudit État, ou
encore par les liens
rattachant cet État aux
parties ou au litige, ou
enfin par des impératifs de justice procédurale.

2) La acción procederá si no es inadmisible conforme al derecho de este estado,
a menos que lo sea
conforme al derecho
aplicable a la cuestión de fondo y mantener la acción en
este estado no esté
justificado por las
políticas públicas de
este estado y su relación con las partes o
con la disputa ni por
consideraciones imperativas de justicia
reparativa.

C. Nonobstant les dispositions précédentes,
si les règles de fond
d’un autre État étaient
en l’espèce applicables à une action intentée dans cet État
par ou au nom de
toute personne qui, au
moment où est survenue la cause de l’action, ne résidait ni
n’était domiciliée dans
cet État, cette action
est prescrite si elle est
irrecevable par une
disposition législative
relative à la prescription, ou par une loi de

C. No obstante las
disposiciones anteriores, si se aplica el
derecho sustantivo de
otro estado a la cuestión de fondo de una
acción iniciada en
este estado y la acción es iniciada por
una persona o en
nombre de una persona que, al momento de producido
el hecho que motivó
la acción, no residía
ni estaba domiciliada
en este estado, la acción se considera
inadmisible si está
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of prescription or
peremption of the
other state, and that
statute or law is, under the laws of the
other state, deemed
to be substantive, rather than procedural,
or deemed to bar or
extinguish the right
that is sought to be
enforced in the action and not merely
the remedy.

prescription ou de péremption de l’autre
État, lorsque cette disposition législative ou
loi est considérée
comme une règle de
fond plutôt qu’une une
règle procédurale, ou
encore comme une
règle interdisant ou
mettant fin au droit
que l’on cherche à
faire exécuter par
cette action plutôt
qu’au recours luimême.

prescrita o caduca en
el otro estado y si,
conforme al derecho
del otro estado, la
norma que establece
la prescripción o caducidad se considera
de fondo y no procesal o se considera extintiva del derecho
reclamado en la acción y no meramente
de la acción.

Arts. 3550-3554.
[Repealed by Acts
1983, No. 173, §1,
eff. Jan. 1, 1984.]

Art 3550 à 3554.
[Abrogés par la loi de
1983, no 173, en vigueur le 1er janvier
1984]

Arts. 3550-3554.
[Derogados por sec.
1, ley n.o 173 de
1983, vigente desde
el 1 de enero de
1984].

Art. 3556. [Repealed
by Acts 1979, No.
709, §2, eff. Jan. 1,
1980.]

Art 3555. [Abrogé par
la loi de 1979, no 709,
§2]

Art. 3555. [Derogado
por sec. 2, ley n.o 709
de 1979].

Art. 3556. [Blank.]

Art 3556. [Blanc]

Art. 3556. [En
blanco].
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I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional division of law into private and public has faded
away in many jurisdictions across the globe, already for several decades. The Republic of Argentina is no exception to that phenomenon, since private and public law cannot be considered watertight
* Maastricht University, School of Governance (The Netherlands); LL.B.,
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(USA); Ph.D., Maastricht University.
† Maastricht University, Faculty of Law (The Netherlands); LL.B., LL.D.,
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(USA); Ph.D., Maastricht University.
Research for this report was undertaken at the law library of Universidad de
Buenos Aires. References to Argentine legislation include amendments and modifications, even when the original numbers of legislation are preserved for citation
purposes. When available, references are provided also to electronic sources,
where readers beyond the borders of Argentina can easily retrieve the official texts
of the referred legislation. All websites were last visited on Dec. 20, 2020.
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compartments. This report addresses the interplay of private and
public law in that South American country. It focusses on developments that deal with the adoption of a national civil and commercial
code (Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, ACCC) on August 1,
2015, 1 while elaborating on two pillars of private law that serve as
examples of the referred interplay, namely the law of family and the
law of property. As this report aims to demonstrate, these developments are interconnected and reflect paradigmatic shifts in the understanding of the law by scholars, courts, and society at large.
The current context welcomes a frequent interplay of private and
public law in Argentina. Constitutional law in this South American
country includes the Argentine Constitution and a selection of
human rights treaties. 2 The Argentine Constitution contains the
value premises under which Argentine society is formed. Human
rights treaties, incorporated in the Argentine Constitution in 1994,3
1. See Law 26994, available at https://perma.cc/Z26Y-TWHE.
On the path towards the adoption of the new Argentine text, see Julieta Marotta & Agustín Parise, On Codes, Marriage, and Access to Justice: Recent Developments in the Law of Argentina, 7 J. CIV. L. STUD. 237 (2014); and Agustín
Parise, The Argentine Civil and Commercial Code (2015): Igniting a Third Generation of Codes for Latin America, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES
PRIVATRECHT 639 (2017).
2. This paragraph borrows part of its exposition, sometimes drawing verbatim, from JULIETA MAROTTA, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF
VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THROUGH LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CITY
OF BUENOS AIRES: A QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDY 44-45 (Boekenplan
Maastricht 2017).
3. See National Constitution of the Republic of Argentina, available at
https://perma.cc/DVK7-UENZ [hereinafter Const. Nacional]; the English translation of art. 75(22) reads as follows:
Congress is empowered:
....
22. To approve or reject treaties concluded with other nations and international organizations, and concordats with the Holy See. Treaties and
concordats have a higher hierarchy than laws. The American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; the International
Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Pact on
Civil and Political Rights and its empowering Protocol; the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide; the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Woman; the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
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recognize and extend rights to the people. 4 They also increase the
international responsibility of the State to, on the one hand,
implement policies to ensure the recognition of fundamental rights
and proper prevention on latent social problems; and, on the other
hand, to examine, adjudicate, and compensate for the violation of
rights. 5 Indeed, policy decisions at an international and
constitutional level may color the subsequent legal provisions that
have to comply with this legal threshold. 6
II. BLURRING DIVIDE
The interplay of private and public law is sensed in many aspects
of the Argentine legal framework. 7 A recent example is present in
the ACCC, and is made palpable in the exposé des motifs by the
drafters of that new code of private law. The nineteenth-century
commercial (1862) and civil (1871) codes had undergone extensive

Degrading Treatments or Punishments; the Convention on the Rights of
the Child; in the full force of their provisions, they have constitutional
hierarchy, do no repeal any section of the First Part of this Constitution
and are to be understood as complementing the rights and guarantees
recognized herein. They shall only be denounced, in such event, by the
National Executive Power after the approval of two-thirds of all the
members of each House. In order to attain constitutional hierarchy, the
other treaties and conventions on human rights shall require the vote of
two-thirds of all the members of each House, after their approval by Congress.
4. The Argentine Constitution incorporates human rights treaties ranking at
the same level than the Constitution itself. In addition, it establishes the procedure
for further approval of international treaties. Human rights treaties that do not rank
at the constitutional level are anyway above federal law. See MARÍA ANGÉLICA
GELLI, CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA: COMENTADA Y CONCORDADA
591-597 (2d ed., La Ley 2004).
5. GENERAL SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ACCESS
TO JUSTICE FOR WOMEN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS § 15, 33 (2007).
See also Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights 1988; and art. 7, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, available at
https://perma.cc/5BVJ-L5G6.
6. MICHAEL J. HILL, THE PUBLIC POLICY PROCESS 160 (6th ed.,
Routledge 2013).
7. This section borrows part of its exposition, sometimes drawing verbatim,
from Parise, supra note 1.
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revision and had been subject to de-codification; while re-codification efforts were launched since the 1980s, aiming to unify civil and
commercial law in a single fabric. 8 Resilience is a characteristic of
codification: codes are indeed able to adapt to different societal
needs at different times and places. 9 Further, codes can be deemed
fundamental corpora that shape law and society, and changes were
introduced to the Argentine legal framework by means of the adoption of the long-awaited ACCC.
The drafters of the ACCC refer in their exposé des motifs to a
number of tenets that are present in the new text. 10 A tenet that is
closely connected to the fading divide of private and public law refers to a code that acknowledges the constitutionalization of private
law. 11 The ACCC offers a community between private law and public law, especially with the Argentine Constitution. 12 For example,
as this report aims to demonstrate, the new code offers articulation
between public and private law in the areas of family and property.
Further, the articulation is sensed between a public law system that
defends human rights and equality and a private law system of contract law that offers adequate consumer protection. 13 This community of systems has long been sought for by a number of Argentine
8. See Marotta & Parise, supra note 1, at 239-250.
9. Agustín Parise & Lars van Vliet, Preface, in RE- DE- CO-DIFICATION?
NEW INSIGHTS ON THE CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW vii, ix (Agustín Parise &
Lars van Vliet eds. 2018).
10. See the complete text of the exposé des motifs in Fundamentos del Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, especially at 4-6, available
at https://perma.cc/2TG8-TK7W [hereinafter, Fundamentos del Anteproyecto].
See also Augusto C. Belluscio, Le Code civil et commercial argentin de 2014
(Aperçu général et droit des personnes et de la famille), 3 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 663 (2015).
11. Julio César Rivera, La constitucionalización del derecho privado en el
proyecto de código civil y comercial, in COMENTARIOS AL PROYECTO DE CÓDIGO
CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN 2012 1, 8 (Julio César Rivera ed. 2012).
12. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 4. See Rivera, supra
note 11, at 8; and Miriam Smayevsky & Marcela A. Penna, Los derechos reales
en el siglo XXI, LA LEY 1, 4 (April 10, 2015).
13. Miguel Carlos Araya, El contenido del derecho comercial a partir del
Código Civil y Comercial, LA LEY 1, 3-4 (Apr. 20, 2015); and Eduardo M. Favier
Dubois, La “autonomía” y los contenidos del Derecho Comercial a partir del
Código unificado, LA LEY 1, 8 (Feb. 2, 2015).
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scholars. 14 The exposé des motifs states along those lines that “it
may be affirmed that a reconstruction of the coherence of the human
rights system with private law exists.” 15 A number of provisions of
the ACCC, therefore, find grounding in the Argentine Constitution
and in supranational law. 16 The ACCC accordingly indicates that
“the situations ruled by this code must be resolved according to the
applicable laws, according to the Argentine Constitution, and to the
human rights treaties subscribed by Argentina.” 17 Furthermore, the
ACCC notes that “the law must be interpreted according to the letter,
the aims, the analogous laws, the dispositions that derive from human rights treaties, the juridical principles and values, in a way that
is coherent with the entire system.” 18 The constitutionalization of
private law and the incorporation of international treaties into the
Argentine Constitution had had an impact in domestic law, 19 and the
ACCC aims to make that scenario explicit in its provisions. The Argentine Constitution is now at the center of the system, and—as
mentioned before—a selection of treaties have become part of the
internal system. 20 The ACCC aims to adapt the civil and commercial
law to the Argentine Constitution and to supranational human
rights. 21 Thus, the new text places all human beings at the center,
protecting all people regardless of their condition, and is able to constitutionalize civil and commercial law according to the human
rights that were included in the 1994 constitutional reform. 22

14. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 4.
15. Id. See Rivera, supra note 11, at 8.
16. Rivera, supra note 11, at 21.
17. Law 26994, art. 1.
18. Id. at art. 2. See Héctor P. Recalde et al., Precisiones sobre el Código
Civil y Comercial y el Derecho Laboral, LA LEY 1, 1 (Nov. 10, 2014).
19. Elena I. Highton, Los jóvenes o adolescentes en el Código Civil y Comercial, LA LEY 1, 1 (Apr. 13, 2015).
20. Id.
21. Julio César Rivera, Aplicación del Código Civil y Comercial a las relaciones preexistentes y a los procesos judiciales en trámite Algunas propuestas,
LA LEY 1, 2 (June 17, 2015).
22. Oscar E. Garay, Protección de la persona y temas de la salud en el Código Civil y Comercial, LA LEY 1, 1 (Nov. 17, 2014).
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Three more tenets may be grouped together and derive from the
constitutionalization of private law. One tenet refers to a code of
equality. Again, the central place in codification is now occupied by
the human being who must be treated equally. 23 Equality does not
distinguish according to sex, religion, place of origin, or wealth: 24 it
has a universal dimension in the ACCC. 25 Two other tenets refer to
a code that is based on a non-discriminatory paradigm, and to a code
of individual rights and of rights with a collective impact (incidencia
colectiva). The non-discriminatory text addresses both types of
rights according to the Argentine Constitution.26 The drafters mention that most codes only regulate individual rights. However, the
ACCC gives significant importance to rights with a collective impact (e.g., the right to a healthy environment, the right to non-discrimination), keeping them in line with the Argentine Constitution. 27 Individual rights and rights with a collective impact are both
explicitly mentioned in the ACCC. 28 The spread of a variety of dangers and their diffuse or collective character justifies the inclusion
of rights with a collective impact. 29
Another tenet focusses on pillars of private law that intermingle
with public law. That tenet relates to a code with a new paradigm of
family law and of property law. 30 On the one hand, in the law of
family, it is possible to sense that family relations experienced the

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 9.
26. It should be noted, however, that some scholars claim that this tenet is not
fully present when dealing with the rights of Native Americans. See Pamela Cacciavillani, ¿Un código para una sociedad multicultural? Algunas reflexiones histórico-jurídicas sobre el proceso de unificación de los códigos civil y comercial
en Argentina, 9 REVISTA ELECTRÓNICA DEL INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES
“AMBROSIO L. GIOJA” 25, 32 (2015).
27. See arts. 41, 43, Const. Nacional.
28. Law 26994, art. 14. See Lidia M. R. Garrido Cordobera, Derechos individuales y de incidencia colectiva en el Código Civil y Comercial, LA LEY 1, 6
(Feb. 10, 2015).
29. Garrido Cordobera, supra note 28, at 6.
30. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 5.
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constitutionalization of private law. 31 Family relations preserve in
Argentina their importance as a social institution and strengthen the
principle of equality and non-discrimination recognized at a constitutional and international level. 32 On the other hand, in the law of
property, the Argentine Civil Code of 1871 had followed the Code
Napoléon conception, and welcomed the liberal paradigm of property. 33 As other nineteenth-century texts, the Argentine code had
embraced the liberal ideal of an absolute, unique, and perpetual real
right of ownership. 34 A broader scope was proposed in the 2015 text
for this pillar of private law, aiming to a reconciliation with constitutional law and human rights. 35 It is possible to note that in Argentina the ACCC welcomes both the unification of civil and commercial laws and the interplay of constitutional principles and their operationalization through private law. 36
III. FAMILY LAW
The ACCC is tightly related to the Argentine Constitution,
where civil law becomes a reflection of a number of constitutional
principles. 37 This relation between a private law code and the constitution was pointed early in the nineteenth century, as expressed
by the ideas of Juan Bautista Alberdi; yet, the relationship lost
31. Carla Modi, El derecho real de habitación del cónyuge/conviviente supérstite, ED-DCCLXXVII-929 1, 1-2 (June 10, 2019).
32. For an analysis on how the principle of equality—as incorporated into the
family law provisions of the ACCC—addresses all sectors of Argentine society,
see Julio César Rivera, La proyectada recodificación del derecho de familia, 4
REVISTA DE DERECHO DE FAMILIA Y DE LAS PERSONAS 3 (2012).
33. Abelardo Levaggi, El proceso de transformación del régimen de la propiedad según la codificación iberoamericana del siglo XIX, in V Actas do XII
Congresso Internacional de AHILA 413, 417 (Eugénio dos Santos ed. 2001).
34. Id. at 416-419; MANUEL I. ADROGUÉ, EL DERECHO DE PROPIEDAD EN LA
ACTUALIDAD: INTRODUCCIÓN A SUS NUEVAS EXPRESIONES 36 (Abeledo-Perrot
1991).
35. 1 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN COMENTADO 26-27 (Julio
César Rivera & Graciela Medina eds., La Ley 2014) [hereinafter, RIVERA & MEDINA, 1 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO].
36. Id.
37. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 59; and RIVERA & MEDINA, 1 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 35, at 26-27.
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strength during the twentieth century. 38 Jurists of the current century
revived the relationship, focusing on the interaction between constitutional principles and the ACCC. They acknowledge that the constitution provides the main principles under which a nation is built
and look at codes as tools to materialize such principles. 39
In family relations the division between private and public law
becomes blurry. After all, families play a fundamental role as a social institution; and the more legislators focus on preserving the
equality of all members of society and on protecting the principle of
non-discrimination, the more private and public law become cooperative and complementary. 40 The Codifying Commission indeed
gave preeminence to a code with express principles that represent a
multicultural society; 41 and, as indicated in the exposé des motifs,
the ACCC represents a “democratization of the family,” 42 recognizing the different types of families that individuals may form. 43 Family relations in the ACCC are hence defined by the current culture
of the Argentine society and not by a natural principle. 44
38. RIVERA & MEDINA, 1 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra
note 35, at 26-27.
39. Id.
40. 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN COMENTADO 567-571 (Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti ed. 2015) [hereinafter, LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO].
41. See Parise, supra note 1, at 654-655; referring to Ricardo L. Lorenzetti,
Proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación 5 (2011), available at
https://perma.cc/4VSB-34SD; and Aída Kemelmajer de Carlucci, Las nuevas
realidades familiares en el Código Civil y Comercial argentino de 2014, LA LEY
1, 2 (Oct. 8, 2014).
42. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 60.
43. Marisa Herrera, Panorama general del derecho de las familias en el Código Civil y Comercial. Reformar para transformar, LA LEY SUPLEMENTO ESPECIAL NUEVO CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL 2014, 39 (Nov. 17, 2014).
For a critical note on how the “democratization of the family” in the ACCC
fails to recognize and protect vulnerable parties in family relations, see Ursula C.
Basset, El abuso en las relaciones de familia, ED-DCCLXIII-778 1 (Mar. 3,
2019).
44. Kemelmajer de Carlucci, supra note 41, at 1.
This current approach also affected the understanding of damages within family relations, see Úrsula C. Basset, Admisibilidad de los daños en las relaciones
de familia: De la inmunidad a la postfamilia, ED-DCCLXXVII-479 1 (June 1,
2018).

2020]

ARGENTINA

391

Drafters of the ACCC aimed to preserve equality amongst all
members of society and to protect the principle of non-discrimination when addressing family relations. The ACCC considers family
as an institution defined by culture, which is in line with article 14
bis of the Argentine Constitution.45 The latter article considers family as an institution independent from the formal act of marriage. 46
Furthermore, the approach to family relations taken by the ACCC
represents the views adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, which recognizes family as an institution that can take different forms. 47 Hence, the approach to family relations democratizes
the concept of family and uses public law to give grounds to its foundational principles. The cooperation and complementarity of private
and public law is therefore palpable in the ACCC.
A. Public Law Principles in Family Relations
The ACCC deals with family relations in Book II. That book
incorporates fundamental principles such as freedom, equality, and
non-discrimination that are relevant to family relations and that can
be traced to public law. These fundamental principles can be found,
for example, in the Argentine Constitution. There, article 19 points

For a critical note on the individualistic approach that the ACCC takes on the
family as a social institution, see Eduardo José Cárdenas, La familia en el Proyecto de Código Civil, LA LEY 1 (Aug. 15, 2012).
45. See art.14 bis, Const. Nacional: it reads in its relevant part, in an English
translation:
The State shall grant the benefits of social security, which shall be of an
integral nature and may not be waived. In particular, the laws shall establish: compulsory social insurance, which shall be in charge of national
or provincial entities with financial and economic autonomy, administered by the interested parties with State participation, with no overlapping of contributions; adjustable retirements and pensions; full family
protection; protection of homestead; family allowances and access to a
worthy housing (emphasis added).
46. GELLI, supra note 4, at 129; and Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra
note 10, at 59-60.
47. Kemelmajer de Carlucci, supra note 41, at 2; and Silvana Ballarin, Las
relaciones de familia: ¿árbol o rizoma?, 96 DERECHO DE FAMILIA: REVISTA INTERDISCIPLINARIA DE DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA 3 (2020).
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to freedom and equality, 48 while article 75(22) welcomes different
international instruments that encapsulate those principles. 49 Examples are found in the incorporation of the American Convention on
Human Rights of 1969 50 and in the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979. 51 At an internal level, Law 26618 of 2010 52 also serves as a precedent for the
ACCC, since it deals with same-sex marriage and the fundamental
principles that surround that paradigmatic change in family law. 53
The fundamental principles are used as a guideline to understand the
spirit of the ACCC, and may assist judges at the time of rendering
justice. 54 Further, they create an international responsibility for signatory countries, since, for example, the Inter-American Court of
48. Art. 19, Const. Nacional reads in an English translation:
The private actions of men which in no way offend public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are only reserved to God and are exempted
from the authority of judges. No inhabitant of the Nation shall be obliged
to perform what the law does not demand nor deprived of what it does
not prohibit.
49. See supra note 3, and accompanying text.
50. Art. 1(1), American Convention on Human Rights reads in its relevant
part:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and
freedoms . . . and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any
other social condition.
American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” available
at https://perma.cc/5XWH-EUS4.
51. Art. 16, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women reads in its relevant part: “1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations. . . .”, available at https://perma.cc/6KZE-M5Z5.
52. LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 40,
at 567-571; and 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN COMENTADO 1-3
(Marisa Herrera et al. eds. 2015) [hereinafter, HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y
COMERCIAL COMENTADO].
53. For a description of how same-sex marriage was incorporated in the
ACCC, see Marotta & Parise, supra note 1, at 250-257. For a reflection on the
developments of how same-sex marriage was incorporated in Argentine legislation, see Ursula C. Basseta, How the Battle to Redefine Marriage affected Family
Law in Argentina, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 529 (2013).
54. LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 40,
at 568.
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Human Rights could hold Argentina accountable for a violation of
the principle of equality. 55
The incorporation of fundamental principles is in line with the
constitutionalization of private law. On the one hand, the principles
of freedom and equality in family relations are present in article 401
of the ACCC. This article reads in an English translation:
This code does not recognize agreements of future marriage.
There shall be no action to demand performance of a promise
of marriage or to claim for damages caused by the end of the
relationship, without prejudice to the application of the rules
of enrichment without cause, or the restitution of donations,
if applicable. 56
This article of the ACCC, accordingly, reinforces the prevalence
of the constitutional principles of freedom by the time of the consummation of marriage. It further ensures that that freedom cannot
be conditioned by prior agreements. 57 On the other hand, the principles of non-discrimination and equality are confirmed in article 402
of the ACCC. That article prescribes that:
No rule can be interpreted or applied in the sense of limiting,
restricting, excluding, or suppressing the equal rights and obligations of the parties to a marriage; and the effects the marriage produces, be it between two people of the same or different sex. 58

55. Id. at 567-571, and its reference to the cases Atala Rifo v. Chile and Fornerón v. Argentina.
56. Law 26994, art. 401 (emphasis added).
57. LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 40,
at 565.
Scholars in Argentina, however, indicate that this article is detrimental for the
constitutional “no-damage” value premises as recognized in art. 19 of the Argentine Constitution, since it does not allow parties to claim for the compensation of
damages. 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN COMENTADO 4-5 (Julio
César Rivera & Graciela Medina eds. 2014) [hereinafter, RIVERA & MEDINA, 2
CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO].
58. Law 26994, art. 402 (emphasis added).
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This article, accordingly, states that no provision of the ACCC
may limit the equality of the rights and obligations of the couple. 59
The principle of non-discrimination, as addressed in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, is embedded in the text of articles 401 and 402 of the
ACCC. 60 All the above mentioned principles serve as examples of
the limitations in the intervention of the State to decide on the private sphere, as long as society is not negatively affected. 61 Ultimately, the ACCC follows an approach to the fundamental principles that derives from public (national and international) law and
private law.
A final note relates to the law of procedure as to family matters,
since the ACCC includes—along similar lines than the Argentine
Civil Code of 1871, yet in a more significant number—provisions
that deal with that part of the law. 62 As expected, substantive reforms in private law necessarily had an impact on procedure. 63 For
example, the new text states the standards it protects, subscribing to
what Ricardo Lorenzetti refers to as the incorporation of a “constitutional procedural law of the family” (derecho procesal constitucional de la familia). 64 The ACCC emphasizes access to justice and
dispute resolution for conflicts among family members. 65 The new
59. LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 40,
at 567-571; and RIVERA & MEDINA, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO,
supra note 57, at 5-6.
60. HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note
52, at 1-5.
61. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 60; and GELLI, supra
note 4, at 183-185.
62. Juan José Guardiola, Necesaria revisión de las normas procesales en
cuestiones de relaciones de poder y prescripción adquisitiva, JURISPRUDENCIA
ARGENTINA 1 (Sept. 30, 2020).
63. Id.
64. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 97. Constitutional procedural law refers to the procedures that aim to secure the enforcement of constitutional principles, see Jorge Horacio Gentile, Derecho Procesal Constitucional
y control de constitucionalidad, 2 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO 111,
116-117 (2011).
65. Graciela Medina, El proceso de familia, in COMENTARIOS AL PROYECTO
DE CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN 2012 437, 440-449 (Julio César
Rivera ed. 2012).
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text therefore addresses procedure within family law aiming at protecting constitutional standards of those involved in family conflicts. 66 The procedure provides further guidance to family judges to
perform their duties and reinforces and ensures the possibility of
parties to exercise their family rights. 67
B. Access to Justice in Family Relations
The term “rights” in Spanish (i.e., derechos) derives from the
Latin directus, which also means “straight.” 68 Legal scholars have
associated “rights” with the image of a “straight” path that connects
a problem with a solution. 69 The positivistic understanding of the
function of rights is far from expressing what actually happens,
though it serves as a reminder that rights are meant to serve as a tool
to simplify access to a remedy (access to justice). This goal is shared
by private and public law, though with a different focus: access to
remedies for private parties, and access to remedies for the public
good. The adoption of article 706 of the ACCC serves as a prime
example of how private and public law interact in Argentina. 70
Access to justice—even beyond Argentina—is currently understood in a holistic and inclusive way. 71 The term considers the drafting and the administration of the law important, together with the
welcoming of other disciplines beyond the law to achieve conflict
66. The ACCC does not define what a “family procedure” is, see id. For a
general analysis of the law of procedure as to family law, see Angelina Ferreyra
de De la Rúa, El procedimiento de familia en el Proyecto, LA LEY 1, 1-9 (June
21, 2012).
67. HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note
52, at 559.
68. MAROTTA, supra note 2, at 376; and EDUARDO ÁNGEL RUSSO, TEORÍA
GENERAL DEL DERECHO 18 (Abeledo-Perrot 2003).
69. Id.
70. Argentina aims to achieve a judicial value of “equality” that materializes
in values of non-discrimination and equal opportunities. The concept of access to
justice, as included in the ACCC, incorporates these values, see Marotta & Parise,
supra note 1, at 258-267. See generally Mario Masciotra, Principios generales en
los procesos de familia, ED-CMXXXIV-181 (Nov. 17, 2020).
71. Roderick A. Macdonald, Access to Civil Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 492, 507-508 (Peter Cane & Herbert M.
Kritzer eds., Oxford U. Press 2010).
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resolution. A clear expansion of the term “access to justice” is observed and boundaries are broadened in view of protecting the ultimate goal of access to justice: conflict resolution and societal order.
The incorporation of human rights treaties in Argentina plays a significant role in broadening the right to access to justice and in addressing equality by introducing principles considering particularities of individuals and especially of vulnerable groups.
The concept of access to justice recognizes the value of law,
courts, and judges when searching for conflict resolution and societal order. It further gives value to international law and constitutional principles, to multidisciplinary assistance, and to the active
participation of all parties involved. This understanding preserves a
legal-empowerment approach to access to justice that positions the
capabilities of individuals at the center, recognizing their capacities
to exercise themselves. Hence, private rights apply to individuals in
an egalitarian way, without distinctions based on constructed identities, such as gender, religion, place of birth, or wealth. 72
Article 706 of the ACCC places access to justice as a central
goal of the law of procedure as to family matters, directly referring
to access to justice for vulnerable groups. 73 That article, being the
main provision for that part of the ACCC, states in its relevant part
that:
Proceedings in family matters should observe the principles of effective judicial protection, procedural immediacy,
good faith and procedural fairness, intervention by the judge
at his/her own initiative when required, oral proceeding, and
limited access [only for parties] to the case file.
The rules governing the procedure must be applied to facilitate access to justice, especially for vulnerable people,
and to achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Judges before whom these cases must be filed should be

72. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 5.
73. Medina, supra note 65, at 440-449; and Masciotra, supra note 70, at 2.
See also Marotta & Parise, supra note 1, at 266-267.
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specialized and have multidisciplinary support. . . . 74
There is merit in undertaking a more detailed analysis of that
seminal provision. 75 Article 706 incorporates the underlying constitutional and international principles of equality and due process.
That incorporation is primarily evident in the adoption of references
to “effective judicial protection” and “procedural immediacy.” First,
the reference to “effective judicial protection,” which is about the
right of a person to be heard by a judge that is independent, impartial, and appointed by law before the act for which he/she is to be
tried. 76 This is in line with article 18 of the Argentine Constitution77
and with articles 8 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948. 78 Further, the reference to “effective judicial protection” represents the contents of articles 8 and 25 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, 79 since the latter articles address the
74. Law 26994, art. 706. Compare this translation with the one provided in
Marotta & Parise, supra note 1, at 266-267. The authors are indebted to Mariano
Vitetta for his suggestions, helping improve in this report the quality of the English translation of article 706.
75. See, e.g. , the brief reference in Belluscio, supra note 10, at 693.
76. Ferreyra de De la Rúa, supra note 66, at 2. For a general note about “effective judicial protection,” see Medina, supra note 65, at 441-442.
77. Art. 18, Const. Nacional reads in its relevant part, in an English translation:
No inhabitant of the Nation may be punished without previous trial based
on a law enacted before the act that gives rise to the process, nor tried by
special committees, nor removed from the judges appointed by law before the act for which he is tried. Nobody may be compelled to testify
against himself, nor be arrested except by virtue of a written warrant issued by a competent authority. The defense by trial of persons and rights
may not be violated. . . .
78. Art. 8, Universal Declaration of Human Rights available at
https://perma.cc/7JGJ-T7DG: “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law.” Art. 10 of this same instrument reads in its
relevant part: “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations. . . .”
See also Ferreyra de De la Rúa, supra note 66, at 2; RIVERA & MEDINA, 2 CÓDIGO
CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 57, at 633; and Masciotra, supra
note 70, at 2-3.
79. Art. 8, American Convention on Human Rights reads in its relevant part:
“1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law. . . .” Art. 25 of this same instrument reads in its relevant part:
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role of judges to ensure a fair trial and the right to judicial protection. 80 Here, once more, the presence of public law is noticed.
The reference to “procedural immediacy” in article 706 is also
important. It can be deemed essential in family proceedings due to
the characteristics of the conflicts in which a delayed involvement
of judges could be detrimental for the possibility to solve conflicts
(or avoid their escalation). 81 “Procedural immediacy” can be found
in a number of international instruments. For example, it is present
in article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 82 in article 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, 83 and in
articles 1, 3, and 13 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities of 2007. 84
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against
acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or
laws of the state concerned or by this Convention. . . .
2. The States Parties undertake: a. to ensure that any person claiming
such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the state; b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and c. to ensure that the competent authorities
shall enforce such remedies when granted.
80. Ferreyra de De la Rúa, supra note 66, at 3; and HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 52, at 559-560.
81. Medina, supra note 65, at 442-443; and Masciotra, supra note 70, at 3-4.
82. See supra note 77, and accompanying text.
83. Art. 9, Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at https://perma
.cc/94WM-98D3, reads in its relevant part:
1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his
or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and
procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the
child. . . .
2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all
interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known.
84. Art. 1, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, available
at https://perma.cc/UW7V-RTXW, reads in its relevant part: “The purpose of the
present Convention is to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities. . . .” Art. 3 of this same instrument reads in its relevant part:
The principles of the present Convention shall be:
1. Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy . . ., and independence of persons;
2. Non-discrimination;
3. Full and effective participation and inclusion in society;
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Article 706 also makes reference to the intervention of the judge
at his/her own motion, which is further addressed in article 709. 85
This incorporation provides family judges with the procedural capacity to move the case forward when the parties fail to do so. Family judges are called on by the ACCC to take an active role in the
proceeding. 86 Hence, family judges are viewed as fundamental social actors in the conflict who are given the possibility to participate
in the proceeding in view of protecting the public interest. 87 After
all, the State must be involved in safeguarding the family as a social
institution since it encompasses one of its main interests. 88 Article
706(b) further refers to the need of family judges to be specialized
in that area of the law and to have multidisciplinary support. 89 The
inclusion of public law elements within the ACCC requires family

4. Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as
part of human diversity and humanity;
5. Equality of opportunity;
6. Accessibility. . . .
Further, art. 13 of this same convention reads in its relevant part: “1. States Parties
shall ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities. . . .” See also
HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 52, at
560-561.
85. See Law 26994, art. 709.
86. Masciotra, supra note 70, at 5-7; and Marianela Calabrese Gilardo, Procesos de familia: principios probatorios en el Código Civil y Comercial, REVISTA
CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL 23, 23-24 (Apr. 12, 2019).
87. HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note
52, at 559; and RIVERA & MEDINA, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO,
supra note 57, at 636.
88. HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note
52, at 559; and RIVERA & MEDINA, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO,
supra note 57, at 636-639.
89. Ferreyra de De la Rúa, supra note 66, at 2; Medina, supra note 65, at 446447.
On the importance of multidisciplinary assistance to family judges, particularly in cases dealing with family violence, see María C. Castillo & Miguel Carol
Lugones, Violencia familiar y la interdisciplina. El abuso sexual intrafamiliar, 87
DERECHO DE FAMILIA: REVISTA INTERDISCIPLINARIA DE DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA 309 (2018).
On how the ACCC highlighted the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to family matters, see Nora Lloveras, El Código Civil y Comercial de la
Nación y la interdisciplina, 87 DERECHO DE FAMILIA: REVISTA INTERDISCIPLINARIA DE DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA 1 (2018).
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judges to be knowledgeable beyond private law, being aware of the
different interpretations by national and international courts. 90
Article 706(a) addresses vulnerable groups, aiming to reduce social inequalities and enhance social cohesion. 91 Scholars have
pointed that the Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice
for Vulnerable People of 2008 92 were the inspiration for that reference to vulnerable groups within the ACCC. They consider that that
international instrument is to be used when aiming to understand the
extension of the definition and classification of those groups. 93 In
addition, that instrument has been referred to extensively by family
law regulations in Argentina. 94
Book II on family relations of the ACCC makes evident the interplay of public and private law. It incorporates principles from
constitutional, international, and procedural law. Likewise, Book II
offers articulation between a public law system that defends freedom, equality, and non-discrimination, and a private law system of
family relations that offers adequate protection to the individuals
that are part of a family. Constitutional, international, and procedural principles are operationalized in that book of the Argentine
new code, influencing the expertise that is needed from the family
judges and the international responsibility undertaken by the State
in protecting those principles.
IV. PROPERTY LAW
The law of property in the ACCC offers positive innovations
when compared with the text of the Argentine Civil Code of 1871.
The new text adapts the law to social realities that had demanded
90. HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note
52, at 563; and RIVERA & MEDINA, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO,
supra note 57, at 640.
91. Masciotra, supra note 70, at 2.
92. Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People,
available at https://perma.cc/6XAH-XNPC.
93. HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note
52, at 561-563.
94. Id.
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change for a number of decades, incorporating jurisprudential and
doctrinal developments. 95 The individualistic paradigm was left behind, being now more in accordance with the tenets of the Argentine
Constitution and special legislation. 96 It is therefore possible to
sense a blurring divide between private and public law. For example,
as indicated in the exposé des motifs, various non-pecuniary things
have emerged since the nineteenth century (e.g., genetics) which require legislative attention. 97 Furthermore, the communitarian rights
of Native Americans are to be acknowledged, especially in Latin
America, where many of those rights were more fully recognized
only with the constitutional reforms of the final part of the twentieth
century. 98 Environmental hazards also trigger the constitutionalization of private law, since they affect property that is considered collective by the Argentine Constitution and by special legislation,
hence not deemed restricted to the private domain. 99
The ACCC introduces fundamental aspects of property in its
Preliminary Title, offering a framework that applies throughout the
text. Property in the new text was expanded to include the environment and the human body. 100 The nineteenth century text—in line
with other contemporary codes—had neglected these elements of
property law. According to the new text, persons can hold individual
rights on property that is part of their patrimony. Material property
is referred to as a thing and the same rules apply to energy and natural forces that can be subject to the service of humankind. Parts of
the human body have no commercial value and can be disposed of
freely if having an affective, therapeutic, scientific, humanitarian, or
95. Eduardo Molina Quiroga, Principales reformas en materia de derechos
reales en el Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, LA LEY SUPLEMENTO ESPECIAL NUEVO CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL 2014 165, [19] (Nov. 17, 2014).
96. María Elena Martínez Espeche, Bienes de dominio público y privado del
Estado en el nuevo Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, ELDIAL DC1F75 4
(Feb. 2, 2016).
97. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 5.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Molina Quiroga, supra note 95, at [2-4].
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social purpose. Finally, Native Americans have the right to possess
and own the lands their community traditionally held and others that
may enable human flourishing, according to the Argentine Constitution. 101
Concepts that are needed to fully understand the extent of property law in Argentina are presented in Book I of the ACCC, dealing
with the general part. Fundamental dichotomies are therefore addressed at turns in that book. For example, property can be movable
or immovable, divisible or not subject to fragmentation, principal or
accessory, consumable or nonconsumable, and fungible or nonfungible. 102 It can be noted that the ACCC suppresses the category of
the so-called “movables or immovables due to their representative
nature.” 103
Relationships with property are addressed in that same book of
the ACCC. First, with relation to people. Here, property can fall
within the public domain (e.g., rivers in their natural beds, streets,
parks, archaeological sites), can belong to the State (e.g., gold
mines, non-navigable lakes), or can be privately owned. Second,
with relation to rights with a collective impact. 104 Elements of an
ecological function of property can be identified in that second relationship in Argentina. Rights with a collective impact secure the enjoyment of individual rights; hence, it is worth positioning the former over the latter. 105
Society at large plays a role in securing the sustainability of the
environment. 106 Owners of property, however, must play a specific
101. Law 26994, arts. 15-18.
102. Id. at arts. 225-232.
103. Molina Quiroga, supra note 95, at [2-4].
104. Law 26994, arts. 235-241. See also José María Mariucci & Natalia Mariel
Peluso, El dominio público en el nuevo Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación:
Su vinculación con los derechos de incidencia colectiva, LA LEY SUPLEMENTO
ADMINISTRATIVO 3 (Sept. 2015).
105. Mariucci & Peluso, supra note 104, at 3.
106. This paragraph and the one that follows borrow parts of their exposition,
sometimes drawing verbatim, from Agustín Parise, Preliminary Reflections on
Paradigms, Ownership, and Ecology, in SUSTAINABILITY AND PRIVATE LAW 17,
17-18 (Bram Akkermans & Gijs van Dijck eds., Eleven Intl. Publ’g 2020).
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role. Sustainability does not fall within the exclusive competence of
public law. For example, in Europe, the Constitution of Slovenia of
1991 welcomes the regulation of restrictions to the right of ownership to ensure the economic, social, and ecological function of property. 107 In the Americas, the Constitution of Colombia states also
since 1991 that property is limited by an ecological function;108
while a Brazilian high court understood in 2012 that there are ecological concerns that prevent owners from destroying natural resources that benefit society. 109 Similar situations may be faced with
hydraulic fracturing in South Africa, with gas drilling in the Netherlands, with mining in China, or with surface mining in the USA.
The ecological function of property refers to ownership as fulfilling an ecological function, with a duty to secure sustainability.110
Limitations to ownership have proliferated since the final decades
of the twentieth century because of environmental controls from the
State. 111 It has been correctly stated, already in 2002 by Myrl L.
Duncan, that “land ownership disconnected from community is a
logical impossibility.”112 Awareness of the role of humans as creatures in an environment enables reconciliation between ownership
107. The text refers to an environmental function, it should be noted. See art.
67 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, in English, available at
https://perma.cc/SM37-N4E2. See also Suzana Kraljić & Vesna Rijavec, Slovenia, in 7 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA LAWS: FAMILY AND SUCCESSION LAW
§ 498 (Wolters Kluwer 2014).
108. See art. 58, Constitution of the Republic of Colombia, in English, available at https://perma.cc/99N8-8EWD. See also Helena Alviar Garcia, Looking beyond the Constitution: The Social and Ecological Function of Property, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LATIN AMERICA 153, 158 (Rosalind Dixon
& Tom Ginsburg eds., Elgar 2017).
109. Nicholas S. Bryner, Public Interests and Private Land: The Ecological
Function of Property in Brazil, 34 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 122 (2016) [hereinafter,
Bryner, Public Interests and Private Land].
On the Brazilian court, see Nicholas S. Bryner, Brazil’s Green Court: Environmental Law in the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (High Court of Brazil), 29
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 470 (2012).
110. See, e.g., Bryner, Public Interests and Private Land, supra note 109.
111. Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity within the Balancing
Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53 (1998).
112. Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-based Resource In Memoriam: Professor Curtis J. Berger, 32 ENVTL. L. 773
(2002).
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and ecology. 113 A main challenge of sustainability relates to reaching a development that is grounded in ecology, social equality, cultural diversity, and democratic participation. 114
The ACCC refers that the exercise of individual rights must be
compatible with rights that have a collective impact, hence not affect
the sustainability or operation of, amongst others, ecosystems of
flora, fauna, biodiversity, and water. The new text includes limitations to individual rights over things in order to protect sustainability. 115 The understanding of property is broader, hence not only focusing on patrimonial aspects, and open to enjoyment of other members of society. 116 It should be noted that the collective value of
property had been addressed by the Argentine Supreme Court already in 2006, in the Mendoza case, 117 in which environmental law
was determined to rank at the constitutional level.
A. Power Relationships
The ACCC refers to power relationships rather than real or possessory relationships. The use of the term “power relationships”—
not free of criticism 118—may be deemed novel, more precise, and

113. Frazier, supra note 111, at 103.
114. Mariano H. Novelli, Bases jurídicas de la educación para el desarrollo
sostenible en el Mercosur, 6 ACADEMIA 183, 187 (2008).
115. Law 26994, arts. 14, 240. See also Aníbal J. Falbo & José Alberto Esain,
El Código Civil y Comercial y el ambiente, REVISTA CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL
19 (Aug. 17, 2015); and Carlos A. Rodríguez, Derecho ambiental y Código Civil
y Comercial, LA LEY ACTUALIDAD 1 (June 2, 2015).
116. María Elena Martínez Espeche, Análisis del Libro Primero, Parte General, Título III del nuevo Código Civil y Comercial: Bienes, ELDIAL DC1F74 1-5
(Mar. 1, 2016).
117. Mendoza, Beatriz Silvia y otros c/ Estado Nacional y otros, Fallos
329:2316 (2006).
118. See, e.g., Jorge Horacio Alterini, Primeras consideraciones sobre los Derechos reales en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE DERECHO 1, [6-8] (Sept. 4, 2012); and Jorge Horacio Alterini et al., Una nueva visión
de las relaciones reales (mal llamadas “relaciones de poder”), LA LEY 1 (Dec.
11, 2017).
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not limited to possession. Further, it may help avoid confusions in
the comparative-law narrative. 119
Possession and detention are the power relationships a subject
may have with a thing, under the ACCC. In addition, those who use
the thing due to a relationship of dependence, service, hospitality, or
hosting are deemed servers of the possession. This additional distinction refers to a lack of autonomy and aims to enable the extrajudicial defense of possession, enabling that those who have the thing
are able to protect themselves from the attacks that imply violence
on the person. 120
Possession occurs when a person exercises a factual power 121
over a thing, acting as the holder of the right, regardless of being
indeed the holder. The drafters of the ACCC, similarly to the drafter
of the 1871 text, enrolled in the ideas of Friedrich K. von Savigny,
according to whom possession requires both corpus and animus.122
Detention occurs when a person exercises a factual power over a
thing, acting as a representative of the possessor. Hence, only corpus
is present in this second power relationship. 123
Possession is presumed when factual power exists, while power
relationships are presumed to be legitimate and to start on the date
of the title, within its limitations. A rebuttable presumption points to
the start of possession on the date indicated in the just title (justo
119. Liliana Abreut de Begher, Impacto de la reforma sobre los derechos
reales en el nuevo Código Civil y Comercial, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1, [69] (Dec. 10, 2014).
120. Law 26994, art. 1911. See Leandro S. Picado & Fabián M. Loiza, La posesión y la tenencia en el Anteproyecto de Código Civil y Comercial, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1, [1] (Oct. 17, 2012).
121. On the factual power, see generally Domingo C. Cura Grassi, Naturaleza
de la posesión en el Código Civil y Comercial, ED-DCCLXXVI-80 1 (June 22,
2016).
122. See generally FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS RECHT DES BESITZES:
EINE CIVILISTISCHE ABHANDLUNG (1803).
See arts. 2351, 2352, 1871 Argentine Civil Code and accompanying notes. See
also Sebastián E. Sabene, Las relaciones de poder y una perspectiva constitucional de la acción de desalojo por intrusión, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1, [1-2]
(Feb. 2, 2018).
123. Law 26994, arts. 1909-1910. See Picado & Loiza, supra note 120, at [3].
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título) or on the date of recordation, if constitutive in nature. Possession and detention rest on the thing determined, and may be exercised by one or multiple persons on the entirety or part of the thing.
Subjects of power relationships act in good faith when facing an excusable and essential error that persuades them on their legitimacy.
Good faith is—as a general rule—a rebuttable presumption, and it
is determined at the time the power relationship starts and remains
unaltered until a new acquisition occurs. Bad-faith possession is illegitimate if: (i) dealing with movables, when acquired by theft, embezzlement, or breach of trust; and (ii) dealing with immovables,
when acquired by force, breach of trust, or in a surreptitious manner.
It should be noted that heirs continue the possession of the deceased. 124
There are further elements that characterize power relationships.
For example, these relationships are affected by a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy, and must be acquired voluntarily by a capable person (except for minors, who must be ten years of age) or by
means of contact with or custody of the thing. Power relationships—
as a general rule—require tradition; hence, the delivery of the thing
from one subject to another who is willing to receive the thing. Further, tradition of movables also includes transfer of, amongst others,
knowledge according to the standard practices when there is no opposition. Things should be free from other power relationships that
might demand exclusion and should be free from opposition. Power
relationships are preserved until they are extinguished and there is a
presumption on their continuity through time. Finally, power relationships are extinguished when the power over the thing is lost
(e.g., when the person abandons the thing expressly and voluntarily). 125
Multiple effects can emerge from power relationships. For example, subjects involved in power relationships must return the
124. Law 26994, arts. 1901, 1903, 1908-1921.
125. Id. at arts.1922-1931.
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things to those who have the right to claim them back. Further, goodfaith possessors keep the fruits received and the natural fruits that
were accrued yet not received. Bad-faith possessors must return the
fruits received and those that due to their fault were not received.
All possessors must return the products that were obtained from the
thing. Another effect is triggered by improvements. Accordingly, no
subjects can claim compensation for improvements of mere maintenance or luxurious in nature. Conversely, they are entitled to claim
any improvements that were necessary unless if resulting from their
bad faith and fault. 126
Each power relationship triggers specific effects, likewise. On
the one hand, possession triggers specific effects. For example, possessors must pay any taxes and burdens on the thing, and perform
the obligation of enclosing, unless provided differently by law. On
the other hand, detention triggers specific effects. For example,
those exerting detention must preserve the thing, yet they can recover the costs from the possessor. 127
B. Innovation in Real Rights
Real rights extend through Book IV of the ACCC. A methodological innovation in the ACCC was the inclusion of a general part
in the opening of that book, hence addressing principles that are
common to all real rights (e.g., acquisition, transfer, and extinction). 128 Accordingly, the new text first addresses the general theory
of these rights, offering a difference when looking at the 1871 text,
being now in line with other modern codes, and avoiding some unnecessary repetitions. 129 Book IV then deals with the general theory
of possession and detention, addressing the acquisition, exercise,
conservation, and extinction, followed by their effects. Further, that
126. Id. at arts. 1932-1938.
127. Id. at arts. 1939-1940.
128. Id. at arts. 1882-1907. See Lily R. Flah & Rosana I. Aguilar, La hipoteca
en el Proyecto de Código, LA LEY 1 (Aug. 2, 2013).
129. Smayevsky & Penna, supra note 12, at 1.
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book of the ACCC deals with all real rights individually; 130 and finally, it addresses possessory actions. Book IV follows, in general,
the proposals included in the 1998 draft of a civil and commercial
code for Argentina, yet it typifies a number of real rights that had
not been included in that earlier work. 131
It is worth noting that the exposé des motifs of the ACCC refers
to a real right for Native American communitarian property. 132 That
real right, however, was ultimately removed from the ACCC. Its inclusion would have been in line with the tenet that calls for a code
with a new paradigm of property law. Furthermore, it would have
offered another example of the constitutionalization of private law,
because starting in 1994 the rights of Native Americans are recognized in the Argentine Constitution.133 Native American lands are
addressed in Argentina in Law 23302 of 1985, 134 it should be noted.
That law deals with Native American policy and must be studied in
conjunction with Law 24071 of 1992 135 that incorporates into the
Argentine framework the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989 of the International Labour Organization. 136 It is worth

130. See also Abreut de Begher, supra note 119, at [1].
131. Id.
132. The definition was included in art. 2028 of the draft by the Codifying
Commission. Liliana Abreut de Begher, La propiedad comunitaria indígena. Comentario del Anteproyecto de Código, LA LEY 1 (June 7, 2012).
133. Art. 75(17), Const. Nacional. See Liliana Abreut de Begher, El derecho
real de propiedad comunitaria indígena, LA LEY 1 (Oct. 11, 2013). See also
Abreut de Begher, supra note 119, at [1]; Irene Pujol de Zizzias, La propiedad
indígena en el Proyecto de reforma del Código Civil y Comercial, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1 (Nov. 11, 2012); and Juan Manuel Salgado, La exclusión de las
normas sobre pueblos indígenas del Proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la
Nación, aprobado por el Senado, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1, [3-5] (July 30,
2014).
134. See Law 23302, available at https://perma.cc/R74M-X4LX. See generally Pablo María Corna & Carlos Alberto Fossaceca, La propiedad indígena comunitaria: un análisis crítico del articulado del Proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial Unificado, 249 EL DERECHO 789 (2012).
135. See Law 24071, available at https://perma.cc/QU4SNZN5.
136. See Álvaro B. Flores, La regulación de las limitaciones al dominio en
razón del interés público en el Proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1, [9] (July 31, 2013).
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noting that those efforts took place within a broader regional context, since several national constitutions had started around that time
to deal with Native American property relations. 137 In addition, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alerted that when
Native American property was not recognized the cultural and spiritual development of the groups was affected. 138 In a similar vein,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the protection
of property as regulated in the American Convention on Human
Rights included the rights of Native American groups within the
framework of communitarian property. 139
Real rights are defined in a neoclassical 140 manner in Book IV
of the ACCC. 141 The 1871 text had not offered a definition of these
rights, it should be noted. Real rights are the juridical powers—of a
legal nature—that are enforced directly over the objects, in an autonomous manner and granting to the holders, amongst others, the
right to follow and the right of preference. The reference to power
alerts of the real rather than personal nature of these rights. Further,
the ius persequendi and the ius preferendi are granted to holders of
real rights. 142 The object of these rights is enforced over the totality
or a material part of the thing, for its entirety or for an undivided
part. The object can likewise consist of a good specifically referred
to by law. Real rights are created and regulated only according to

137. Corna & Fossaceca, supra note 134.
138. Pujol de Zizzias, supra note 133, at 11.
139. Id. See also Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights, Derechos de
los pueblos indígenas y tribales sobre sus tierras ancestrales y recursos naturales:
normas y jurisprudencia del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09); and Salgado, supra note 133, at [1].
140. Picado & Loiza, supra note 120, at [2].
141. See generally Domingo C. Cura Grassi, Definición y caracteres de los
derechos reales en el Código Civil y Comercial, ED-DCCLXXVI-328 1 (Oct. 26,
2016).
142. Law 26994, art. 1886. See also Abreut de Begher, supra note 119, at [2].
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law, and the provisions on real rights are substantially of public order. 143 Argentina subscribes to the numerus clausus principle, 144 and
judges cannot constitute or impose the constitution of a real right,
except when provided by law. 145
Book IV of the ACCC indeed preserves the numerus clausus
principle. The 2015 text welcomes new real rights to the Argentine
codified system: horizontal ownership (propiedad horizontal),146
immovable groups per se (conjuntos inmobiliarios), 147 timesharing, 148 and private cemeteries. 149 These real rights were added to
those that already existed in the civil code before the adoption of the
ACCC: ownership, 150 co-ownership, 151 superficies, 152 usufruct, 153
use, 154 habitation, 155 servitude, 156 hypothec, 157 antichresis,158 and
pledge. 159 The enactment of the ACCC ended the debate that considered usufruct, use, and habitation personal servitudes, for every
time the ACCC clearly considers the three to be autonomous real
rights. 160
The ACCC incorporates a number of provisions that had originally been placed outside of codes because of de-codification, and
143. Abreut de Begher, supra note 119, at [1]. See generally Nelson G. A.
Cossari & Leandro R. N. Cossari, Orden público en los derechos reales, LA LEY
1 (Nov. 13, 2015).
144. Law 26994, arts. 1882-1184, 1887.
145. Id. at art. 1896.
146. Law 26994, arts. 2037-2072.
147. Id. at arts. 2073-2086.
148. Id. at arts. 2087-2102.
149. Id. at arts. 2103-2113.
150. Id. at arts. 1941-1982.
151. Id. at arts. 1983-2036.
152. Id. at arts. 2114-2128.
153. Id. at arts. 2129-2153.
154. Id. at arts. 2154-2157.
155. Id. at arts. 2158-2161.
156. Id. at arts. 2162-2183.
157. Id. at arts. 2205-2211.
158. Id. at arts. 2212-2218. On the current use of this real right in Argentina,
see Domingo C. Cura Grassi, El renacer de la anticresis como derecho real de
garantía a partir del Código Civil y Comercial, ED-DCCLXXVII-40 1 (Dec. 11,
2017).
159. Law 26994, arts. 2219-2237.
160. Claudio M. Kiper, El Proyecto de Código y el derecho real de usufructo,
LA LEY 1, [1] (Apr. 16, 2013).
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that had eventually gained a place within the civil code. For example, the ACCC, as opposed to the original text of 1871, includes the
real right of superficies. This incorporation reflects the need to use
the land in a beneficial way, avoiding vacant plots. This adoption
could be perceived as a limitation to the holders of rights, in benefit
of others, hence showing the percolation of public law. 161 Doctrinal
efforts had welcomed this right already for a number of decades in
Argentina, and this right was included in all revision efforts since
1987. 162 The normative reception would, however, take place by
means of Law 25509 of 2001 163 dealing with superficies of forested
areas, now abrogated by the ACCC. 164
The ACCC—as already mentioned—welcomes new real rights.
Horizontal ownership moved from Law 13512 of 1948 165 into the
ACCC, showing that the de-codification experience of that right extended for six decades. It should be noted that this right was not present in the 1871 code, having been expressly forbidden by the codifier. 166 This right, however, had gained the status of a real right almost undisputedly by its reception in doctrinal writings and jurisprudence, after the enactment of the previously mentioned special
legislation. 167 There was a need to update the legislation that had
existed almost without alterations for more than half a century, and

161. Domingo C. Cura Grassi, Reflexiones acerca del nuevo derecho real de
superficie forestal, 2003-A LA LEY 1268, [2] (2003).
162. Alterini, supra note 118, at [3-4].
163. See Law 25509, available at https://perma.cc/SS5X-CZDA.
Superficies was also affected by Law 25080 of 1999, available at https://perma
.cc/N62H-J89Z.
164. Marina Mariani de Vidal & Adriana N. Abella, Derecho real de superficie en el Código Civil y Comercial, LA LEY 1, [1-3] (Feb. 23, 2016).
165. See Law 13512, available at https://perma.cc/FH2W-FTHF. See generally Juan A. Costantino, La propiedad horizontal en el Proyecto de Código, LA
LEY 1 (Jan. 7, 2013).
166. See art. 2617, 1871 Argentine Civil Code. See also Lilian N. Gurfinkel
de Wendy, La propiedad horizontal en el Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación,
JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1 (Oct. 29, 2014).
167. Jorge C. Resqui Pizarro, Aproximaciones al nuevo Código Civil y Comercial en lo referido a la propiedad horizontal, ELDIAL DC1E06 1, [1] (Dec. 3,
2014).
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the ACCC encapsulates the existing provisions, while also including
copious doctrinal writings and jurisprudential decisions. 168
Other new real rights are included in a specific title associated
with new forms of property. These forms were a consequence of
internal migration in Argentina and challenged the traditional ways
to relate to property. 169 The three new real rights are of special interest when attending the blurring line of private and public law; and
are referred to in the ACCC in an overarching (and ambiguous) manner as “immovable groups.” 170 The three rights—it is worth repeating—are immovable groups per se, timesharing, and private cemeteries.
Immovable groups per se refers to gated communities, industrial
zones, and any other urban development projects regardless of their
designated use for permanent or temporary residence or for commercial exploitation. 171 The already mentioned Law 13512 had
started to bridge the legislative gap, helping to regulate these groups,
and there was a need for specific regulation. 172 Limitations to ownership and an ecological function of property can be identified when
attending the powers and obligations of owners in immovable
groups per se. 173 Rights, accordingly, may be enjoyed within limitations that should aim to protect ecological, architectural, and landscape values. Further, the horizontal ownership regulations of the

168. Id. at [23]; and Abreut de Begher, supra note 119, at [10]. For a comparison of the provisions of Law 13512 and the relevant provisions of the ACCC, see
generally Juan Carlos Hariri, Comparación entre la ley 13.512 y el nuevo Código
Civil y Comercial, 267 EL DERECHO 674 (2016).
169. Miryam A. Farina, Las urbanizaciones privadas en el Proyecto de Reforma del Código Civil y Comercial, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1 (Sept. 1,
2013).
170. María Florencia Franchini, Los derechos reales de garantía en el ámbito
de conjuntos inmobiliarios, tiempo compartido y cementerios privados, REVISTA
CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL 58, [4] (July 6, 2016).
171. Law 26994, arts. 2073-2077.
172. Lilian N. Gurfinkel de Wendy, Barrios cerrados y ejecución de expensas
en el nuevo Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA
1, [2] (Nov. 11, 2015).
173. See supra note 105, and accompanying text.
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group should attend aspects that would be beneficial for the urbanistic community. 174 Likewise, servitudes and other real rights may
be established if allowing for a better enjoyment of the facilities and
spaces in common. 175 Finally, transfer of units can be limited yet not
completely forbidden and sanctions can be imposed on those who
violate the horizontal ownership regulations. 176
Timesharing gained momentum in Argentina in the 1980s. It
currently finds a place in the ACCC, having had its first regulation
in Law 26356 of 2008. 177 Doctrinal debate accompanied that emergence, exploring whether it should be considered an autonomous
real right. 178 Under the ACCC, this real right exists when one or
more movable or immovable goods are subject to periodic or inturns use for, amongst others, dwelling, commerce, tourism, and industry, and to offer the functions that are compatible with its purpose. 179 Actors have different duties in timesharing; 180 and they are
involved in a consumer relationship to be regulated by the specific
provisions of the ACCC and special legislation, needing to comply
likewise with national, provincial, and municipal regulations.181
This aspect points to the constitutionalization of private law, since

174. Law 26994, arts. 2078-2080.
175. Id. at art. 2084.
176. Id. at arts. 2085-2086.
177. See Law 26356, available at https://perma.cc/74WT7BGN. It should be
noted that the special law deals with the regulation of timesharing for tourism
purposes. Therefore, only some chapters of that law have been affected by the
ACCC.
178. See Molina Quiroga, supra note 95, at [12]; Marina Mariani de Vidal &
Adriana N. Abella, Tiempo compartido en el Código Civil y Comercial. Más dudas que certezas, REVISTA CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL 12 (July 6, 2016); and
María Isabel Di Filippo, Tiempo compartido. Derechos de propiedad involucrados (Primer ensayo acerca de su encuadre en el derecho positivo argentino),
1985-D LA LEY 1048 (1985).
179. Law 26994, arts. 2087-2089. See the comprehensive study by Ricardo J.
Saucedo, El régimen jurídico del tiempo compartido en el Código Civil y en el
nuevo Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1
(Dec. 24, 2014).
180. Law 26994, arts. 2094-2099.
181. Id. at arts. 2100-2102.
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the general interest, also in the sphere of public law, is attended in
the new text. 182
Private cemeteries are regulated as a real right in the ACCC.
Cemeteries originally were annexed to the Church and then to the
administration of the State, mainly by regulations of administrative
law. More recently, private cemeteries started to develop, offering
an alternative to the public grounds. 183 This real right encompasses
the immovables of private ownership that are connected to the burial
of human remains. The municipality must approve the operation of
these cemeteries and that approval will prevent the use of the property for other purposes. 184
Innovation in real rights points to a blurring divide between private and public law in Argentina, safeguarding, amongst others, the
right to freedom and non-discrimination of people and highlighting
the role of property for all members of society. The ACCC welcomes changes that had found a place within the legal framework
by means of de-codification and that responded to the needs of the
current Argentine society.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Argentina adopted a much-awaited civil and commercial code
in 2015. A study of that new text assisted in visualizing the interaction of private and public law, showing that it is not adequate to
speak of public and private law as watertight compartments: they
intermingle. The results of the interaction between public and private in Argentina should be of benefit for members of society, when
a plethora of rights can be protected and exercised.
This report first introduced the ACCC. It therefore pointed to the
tenets that the members of the Codifying Commission extracted
182. See Juan Carlos Pratesi, Conjuntos Inmobiliarios, tiempo compartido y
cementerios privados en el Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación 2014, ELDIAL
DC1E21 1, [6] (Mar. 18, 2015). See also the early work by Alfredo Botassi, Cementerios públicos y privados, 1981-C LA LEY 1056, [4-5] (1981).
183. Molina Quiroga, supra note 95, at [10-12].
184. Law 26994, arts. 2103-2104.
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from the new text, welcoming the constitutionalization of private
law. The report then looked at family law, more precisely at family
relations. There readers were directed to the presence of public law
principles within that area of private law, while they were also introduced to the framework that the new text offers in its effort to
secure access to justice for all. After all, families play a fundamental
role as a social institution within a code that is aimed at a multicultural society. Finally, the report focused on property law, which is
unquestionably one of the pillars of private law. There, attention was
devoted to the power relationships that emerge when persons interact with things. In that section the report also alerted about the innovative approach that the Argentine codifiers took in the area of real
rights.
The interconnection between public and private law can assist in
achieving societal goals. Intermingling can be deemed positive in
Argentina, since it is now evident that overarching principles and
values that were traditionally considered as belonging to public law
have been introduced into the main body of private law. The contents of the new text calls for a renewed approach by courts, practitioners, and member of society at large. Actors in Argentina will
have to look at this seminal text of private law also through the prism
of public law.

BOOK REVIEW
LIMITATION AND PRESCRIPTION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY,
edited by Harry Dondorp, David Ibbetson, Eltjo J. H. Schrage
(Duncker & Humblot 2019), ISBN 978-3-428-55626-7, 679 pp.,
€109.90.
To the uninitiated, it would seem that prescription, as a source
of comparative law, is not as rich as other areas of study. After all,
numbers are mere expressions of the universal mathematical language. The selection of a number for any particular “prescription”
is equally arbitrary (and necessary) in civil law, common law, and
mixed jurisdictions.1 It has often been lamented, including by the
subject book’s editors, that “[s]urprisingly little academic attention
has been devoted traditionally to the doctrine of limitation as a general topic,” 2 especially until the late-twentieth century. The editors
rightly acknowledge exceptions to that gap, 3 and recent Continental
law reforms, including in France and in Germany, have engendered
renewed interest since the turn of this past century. 4
1. Douglas Nichols, Contra Non Valentem, 56 LA. L. REV. 337, 347 (1995)
(“Civilians and common-law scholars alike concede that prescription and limitations are as arbitrary as they are necessary”).
2. LIMITATION AND PRESCRIPTION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY 3
(Harry Dondorp, David Ibbetson & Eltjo J. H. Schrage eds., Duncker & Humblot
2019).
3. Id. (citing, e.g., REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, COMPARATIVE FOUNDATIONS
OF A EUROPEAN LAW OF SET-OFF AND PRESCRIPTION (2002)).
4. See, e.g., François-Xavier Licari, Le nouveau droit français de la prescription extinctive à la lumière d’expériences étrangères récentes ou en gestation
(Louisiane, Allemagne, Israël), 61 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ
[RIDC] 739 (2009); Francis Limbach, Droit français et allemand de la prescription: zones de lumière et zones d’ombre, 42 REVUE LAMY DROIT DES AFFAIRES
105 (2009); Dossier Dalloz, Réforme de la prescription (loi no. 2008-561 du 17
juin 2008 portant Réforme de la prescription en matière civile). One regrettable
feature of the work is the absence of Louisiana law, which is ample and a fertile
ground for discussion as a mixed jurisdiction. While the work does analyze other
mixed jurisdictions (especially Scotland), there are unique aspects of prescription
in Louisiana—especially as it relates to grounds for suspension and interruption—
that would have provided useful opportunity for commentary. For example, the
longer than usual gap between Louisiana’s general one-year liberation prescriptive period for most tort claims and the ten-year period for most contract claims
likely gives rise to more opportunities to invoke suspension including through
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For some time, limitation and prescription got short shrift—owing either to inherently flawed efforts to attempt interpretation out
of something that is so “numerical, mathematical, [and] automatic”
or to the fact that at least in most civil law jurisdictions, prescription
“is relegated to the end of the Code, as if to challenge the great commentators to reach it before they run out of breath or die.” 5 Through
the intrepid efforts of editors Harry Dondorp, David Ibbetson, and
Eltjo J. H. Schrage, Limitation and Prescription: A Comparative Legal History is evidence of a groundswell in scholarship focusing on
limitations and prescription from historical and comparative perspectives.
Limitation and Prescription is the thirty-third contribution to the
series Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History. The first band, Englische und kontinentale Rechtsgeschichte: ein Forschungsprojekt (English and Continental Research
History: A Research Project) (Helmut Coing & Knut Wolfgang
Nörr eds., 1985), set the course for the object of the project: to compare various legal topics across jurisdictions and legal systems
through the commission of essays of the current thinking on those
topics. In fidelity to those who have reviewed previous contributions
to the series, which includes one of the editors of this contribution,6
the second and more challenging goal of the project is for the organizers of each band—who are themselves experts in their fields—“to
contra non valentem. But to be fair, this work does not endeavor to provide a
comprehensive treatise on prescription.
5. See J. Denson Smith, Forward, in 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS iii, 459,
461 (La. State L. Inst. trans., West Publ’g 1972) (citing Jean C. Carbonnier, Notes
on Liberative Prescription, 50 RTDCiv. 171–81 (1952)).
6. See David Ibbetson’s book review of ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND
TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998), the nineteenth band of Comparative Studies in Continental
and Anglo-American Legal History, in 4 EDINBURGH L. REV. 244 (2000), wherein
the reviewer notes of the series:
Its recipe for success is well-tried: collect together specialists from different jurisdictions, facilitate debate amongst them in a spirit of critical
co-operation, then publish the papers summarising their detailed researches together with an introduction by the convenor or convenors of
the group—themselves experts in the field—gathering together the common themes which have emerged.
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rise above the terminology and technicality of each system of law
and seek out the points of real similarity and difference,” an endeavor requiring “leadership, scholarship, patience and diplomacy,
not to mention a keen awareness of linguistic and cultural differences.” 7
Under this framework, the editors’ introduction could just as
well be an epilogue, save for one important caveat: for purposes of
terminology, the reader should be cautious not to depart their familiar legal system and wade into the waters of whichever system is
foreign (civil or common) without some orientation in language—
including language that changes over time. A contemporary civilian,
for example, might view “prescription” both as a mode of acquisition of rights (acquisitive prescription) as well as a mode of discharging debts (liberative prescription), just as, for example, German law distinguishes Ersitzung and Verjährung. This is so despite
the fact that early-modern civilian jurists focused primarily on acquisitive prescription in their study of “prescription.” For example,
Giovanni Balvo’s Tractatus de praescriptionibus and Robert-Joseph Pothier’s Traité de la possession et de la prescription primarily
focused on acquisitive prescription; Pothier addressed liberative
prescription separately in his Traité des obligations. 8 But the contemporary civilian may be surprised to learn that the “Statute of
Limitation of Prescription” of 1540, as explained in David Ibbetson’s examination of early modern English law, only concerns real
rights (curtailing periods that had become “absurdly long” and reducing them to fifty or sixty years—eye-popping by today’s standards). 9 The study of English law barring actions as a result of inaction is covered elsewhere, in Professor Ibbetson’s study of “The
Limitations Act of 1624.” 10
7. See Preface in LIMITATION AND PRESCRIPTION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
HISTORY, supra note 2.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 213, 218.
10. Id. at 222.

420

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

The editors observe that by the early-modern era, just as the language of “limitation” had gained a foothold in the common law, so
too did it have its place in procedural law. 11 This placement in the
common law is in contrast with civil law jurisdictions, where liberative prescription is generally considered an area of substantive law.
As such, the editors instruct that there is an important distinction
“between civil obligations, which the law recognizes and enforces,
and natural obligations, rights and duties the law merely recognizes.” 12 This dichotomy presents a noteworthy comparison both
within the civil law and between civil and common law. In the civil
law, the substantive civil obligation is extinguished through the passage of time. The interpretation of whether the natural obligation
remains, however, has changed over time in civil law systems. For
example, in Martin Schermaier’s contribution, Contemporary Use
of Roman Rules: Prescription and Limitation in the Usus Modernus
Pandectarum, 13 the author observes that medieval jurists rejected
the notion that a natural obligation remained beyond the civil obligation, 14 and later scholars such as Raimond Théodore Troplong
would agree. This is in contrast with contemporary French and German interpretations, where a debtor who mistakenly makes a payment beyond the limitation period cannot later recover the payment
because the natural obligation remains. 15 In this civil law construct,
the limitation is still a substantive defense notwithstanding the survival of the natural obligation. At common law, the limitations period is raised as a procedural defense. In both systems, however, the
defense must be pleaded. 16
With this backdrop, the editors rightly caution that the study of
limitations and prescription from a Continental and Anglo11. Id. at 34, 226.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 297.
14. Id. at 307.
15. Id. at 13.
16. There is draft legislation in Louisiana, which is currently under study, that
would allow for Louisiana courts to recognize sua sponte defenses of prescription
in certain limited cases involving consumer debt.
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American framework is rife with concepts that do not fully equate,
such as with civil law acquisitive prescription and common law
“prescription.” 17 Even where there are general equivalents, such as
between civil law liberative prescription and common law limitation, the effects differ. Justinian was responsible for the “double parentage” of praescriptio, combining usucapio as a mode of acquisition of ownership with praescriptio as a defense of limitation, merging both institutions into one. 18 The marriage makes sense in many
respects, as both share a similar balancing of interests of claimants
and defendants, and the tension between social order, legal security,
and equity. 19 On the other hand, as observed in David Deroussin’s
contribution, Le Droit Français des Prescriptions depuis 1804, ou
l’impossible simplicité, 20 there is considerable disagreement regarding the utility of this merger when many scholars consider liberative
and acquisitive prescription as “two species” based on “different
principles.” 21
Considering that “prescription” from either perspective shares
common roots with Roman law and Canon law, and that it developed somewhat independently for at least some period of time in
each of the Anglo-American and Continental law traditions, it is inevitable that attempts to harmonize the terminology will prove maddening. There are seldom any perfect translations in an area of study
replete with rough equivalents and false cognates. In David Ibbetson’s contribution, Limitations and Prescription in Early-Modern
England, he observes that the lack of “common terminology to refer
to the situations where lapse of time barred or created rights suggests
strongly that there was no common conception of the lapse of

17. Id. at 10.
18. Id. at 21.
19. Id. at 36 (citing, e.g., Bigot de Préameneu’s report to the Corps législatif
in preparation of the French Code civil, in 15 PIERRE-ANTOINE FENET, RECUEIL
COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 573–75 (1827; repr. Osnabrück 1968)).
20. Id. at 459.
21. Id. at 480.
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time,” 22 as he bluntly assesses that “[t]here is little to be proud of in
the development of the English law of limitation and prescription.” 23
One can quickly appreciate the “leadership, scholarship, patience,
and diplomacy, not to mention a keen awareness of linguistic and
cultural differences” 24 required of the Comparative Studies project
and especially with respect to limitations and prescription. Equally
engaging in this particular band is the extent to which the “good
faith” (with Canon law roots) is pervasive in the praescriptio, as
would be required of the likes of Bartolus de Saxoferrato, but vigorously disputed by others.
Even within each legal system, there are a multitude of different
grounds for extinguishing rights by the passage of time other than
just by prescription, such as abandonment, péremption, déchéance,
and forclusion, délai préfix. Some systems provide for a “long stop”
period, or a délai-butoir, which is usually distinguished from a peremptive limitation. Further complicating matters, the editors note
that there are at least three different interpretations of determining
the point of accrual of a limitation period. 25 Some of those methods
are intended to provide for objective certainty, but despite those best
intentions, courts have determined strict application of the point of
accrual may violate a plaintiff’s fundamental rights. 26 The calculations relative to the interruption and suspension of prescription, including the application of contra non valentem, are no less controversial either. So then, for the neophyte who views prescription as a
simple application of numbers, one can quickly appreciate that the
academic study of prescription is not as simple as it seems.
French jurist Jean Carbonnier once questioned the paradox between the intense judicial initiative in the field of prescription,
22. Id. at 213.
23. Id.
24. Id. at Preface.
25. Id. at 39.
26. Id. (citing a case where the European Court of Human Rights found that
the Swiss objective limitation of ten years, which runs regardless of the plaintiff’s
knowledge, infringed the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial).
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where the jurisprudence is plentiful, and the seemingly scant volume
of scholarship among commentators who were perhaps “destined to
slip” by trying to interpret something so “numerical, mathematical,
[and] automatic.” 27 To be sure, commentators have quickly filled
this void of scholarship over the past fifty years, with much if not
most of it from a comparative legal perspective (although typically
only within either the civil or common law framework). But the
work of Dondorp, Ibbetson, and Schrage is more daring still, as it
endeavors to explore and synthesize limitation and prescription from
both a Continental and Anglo-American perspective.
Benjamin West Janke
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz P.C.

27. Jean C. Carbonnier, Notes on Liberative Prescription, 50 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 171 (1952), reprinted in 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 468
(La. State L. Inst. trans., West Publ’g 1972).

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIJURALISM, by Jan Jakob Bornheim, Mohr
Siebeck, 2020, ISBN 978-3-16-159168-6, 554 pp., €89.
The author gives a superb account of some of the differences
between the common law and civil law of property as they appear
in “the Canadian experience with bijuralism.” 1 His concern is “not
with how the holder of a property right can use her property.” 2 It is
with how movable property can be used to secure obligations.
The common law and civil law approaches are different. One of
Bornheim’s goals is to show that to “harmonize” them would be a
mistake. He rejects “the law-and-economics suggestion that a Common Law system is inherently ‘better law’” 3 in which the “benefits
of the Common Law systems are intrinsically linked to what defines
Common Law or Civil Law property.” 4 He shows that both the common and the civil law allow debtors to secure the same types of obligations and to provide their creditors with similar security. He does
so by making a painstaking and detailed comparison of the two.
Those who claim that “a Common Law system is inherently
‘better law’” should learn from his example. Their work rarely rests
on a comparison of the economic advantages of the rules that govern
contracts, property or, in Bornheim’s case, credit financing. Their
conclusion often rests on gross comparisons showing the greater
economic success of countries with common law systems. They often base their conclusions on stereotypes: for example, the common
law shows greater concern for private autonomy. The stereotypes
are wrong. Before the 19th century, there was no common law of
contract in the modern sense but particular writs such as covenant
and assumpsit. Common law contract doctrine, as we know it, was
in large part imported in the 19th the century by borrowing and modifying civil law doctrine. Along with this doctrine came the “will
theories” which showed concern for private autonomy but were
1. JAN JAKOB BORNHEIM, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIJURALISM 4 (Mohr Siebeck 2020).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id.
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pioneered by civil law jurists who defined them in terms of autonomous choice. In reaction, many legal systems have allowed courts
to refuse to enforce unfair contracts, but their willingness do so is
not a distinguishing feature of civil law. The doctrine of unconscionability has had greater scope in the United States than in England,
and the German doctrine of Treu und Glauben has played a greater
role than any comparable doctrine in France. Civil law jurisdictions
have required the parties to exercise “good faith” in negotiating a
contract, and yet comparative studies have shown that common law
jurisdictions give relief in the same sorts of cases: when fraud is
committed, promises are broken, or ideas are appropriated. 5 As
these studies show, the only way to determine how legal systems
differ, let alone which is “better,” is as Bornheim does, by analyzing
particular rules and their effects.
As he observes, those who rely on comparisons between the economic success of the common law and civil law systems have a
“simplistic . . . understanding of the Civil Law/ Common Law distinction.” 6 “[F]rom a functionalist perspective [their] simple benchmarking approach . . . insufficiently accounts for functionally
equivalent legal rules.” 7 He describes the approach of Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, who start out “with the assumption that every
legal system faces similar problems.” 8 The goal of their “functionalist approach” is “to examine how different legal systems tackle
these similar problems.” 9 There is a praesumptio similitudinis:
where the problem is the same, the result will often be the same,
despite a difference in how rules are formulated. 10
5. Edward Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217
(1987).
6. Bornheim, supra note 1, at 66.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 64.
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS 33, 37–38 (3d ed.
Mohr 1996)).
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Indeed, Bornheim’s book shows how successful a functionalist
approach can be. Despite great differences in their rules, Bornheim
shows how common law and civil law provide equivalent opportunities for debtors to obtain funds on the security of their assets, for
creditors to determine the priority of their claims against these assets, and for third parties to be protected. Sometimes the differences
are not merely in the rules but in the concepts in which they are formulated. There is no civil law equivalent to the common law distinction between legal and equitable legal title. Yet Bornheim shows
that by recognizing equitable title, the common law arrives at results
like those the civil law achieves by allowing an owner to reclaim his
property through an action of vindication.
Bornheim then disposes of another argument for harmonization.
Even if the civil law were at least as good as the common law in
these respects, could it not be that that harmonization would avoid
the difficulties of governing the same transactions by two different
legal systems, particularly in Canada, where the difference exists
between provinces? Bornheim considers “vertical integration” in
which federal laws such as those governing insolvency must deal
with the differences in the legal systems as to the rights of secured
creditors. He considers the problems that arise when a transaction
spans jurisdictions, for example, when a secured property is moved
from one jurisdiction to another, or the rights a creditor is granted in
one province must be perfected in another. His thorough and convincing study should not only be of interest in bijural states such as
Canada. Any proposal for supranational legislation will confront the
problems of vertical integration. Any proposal for harmonizing national laws will have to consider whether the advantages of doing so
could be attained instead by well-developed doctrines of international private law (or conflict of laws, as common law systems
would say).
Bornheim’s analysis provides solid support, then, for his conclusion that harmonization is not necessary to provide an effective way
of using movable property to secure obligations. If I have a criticism,
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it is that he goes a step further. Quebec, like my state of Louisiana,
was French before it became part of the British Empire by conquest
and mine became part of the United States by purchase. In both
cases, the preservation of French law has been identified with the
preservation of a distinct culture. Indeed, since the enactment of the
Civil Code, Frenchmen themselves have regarded it as a monument
to their culture, much as Englishmen have regarded the common law
as a hallmark of their own. To protect the civil law, according to this
view, is to protect “the cultural identity of Québecers.” 11 Bornheim
quotes the distinguished French-Canadian jurist Paul-André Crépeau: the civil law is “l’un des plus beaux monuments, l’un des
joyaux de notre patrimoine culturel.” 12 According to Bornheim,
what is “euphemistically referred to as ‘harmonization’” means “the
abolishment of one legal system,” 13 “a radical levelling of the legal
culture of either Common Law or Civil Law, or both.” 14
Although he took pains to show that both systems arrive at similar results, his defense of the cultural importance of civil law takes
him in the opposite direction. He claims that despite these similarities, the civil law embodies principles which are different and embody cultural values. He suggests that because of these principles,
“Civil Law property rights are more secure than their Common Law
counterparts.” 15 “[T]he framework for vindication of property is
more straightforward. . . . Unlike Common Law, Civil law has a
clearly defined notion of ownership of movable property. . . . It is
the most complete right in property in relation to everybody.” 16
One of these differences is that “the Common Law has no vindication action.” 17 Moreover, because the common law recognizes

11. Id. at 28, 502.
12. Id. at 28 (citing Paul-André Crépeau, Les lendemains de la réforme du
Code civil, 59 CAN. BAR REV. 625, 637 (1981)).
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 502.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 503.
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“an equitable property right,” 18 “its secured transactions law has not
been fully integrated into its property law.” 19 He immediately notes,
however, that the importance of this distinction “should not be overemphasized.” 20 Indeed, one of his achievements is to show that the
common law recognition of equitable interests and the civil law vindication action achieve largely the same results. Can one imagine,
then, the difference in the way that these results are achieved conceptually is “one of the joys of cultural patrimony” to which Crépeau referred? Bornheim began his book with a quotation: “There
are topics of conversation more popular in public houses than the
finer points of the equitable doctrine of the constructive trust.” 21 I
imagine that there are aspects of their cultural tradition dearer to the
patrons of French bistros than the superiority of the action of vindication.
Among the other differences he mentions are a civil law concern
with the concept of patrimony (patrimoine), the “absolute” concept
of ownership in civil law, and the idea that common law protects
possession rather than ownership.
According to Bornheim, “[t]he notion of patrimony is a differentia specifica between Québec Civil Law and the Common Law.”22
As he notes, “[t]he reception of [the] patrimony concept in French
doctrine took place through the writings of Aubry and Rau, who saw
themselves in the tradition of the German writer Zachariä.” 23 Indeed, the first edition of their treatise was a translation of Zachariä’s
Handbuch des französischen Civilrechts. They improved it each edition, and it became one of the finest treatises of French civil law.
The concept of patrimony was borrowed from Zachariä. He defined
the German term Vermögen (wealth, assets) as comprising the things
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1 (citing Attorney General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1985), [1985] QB
491, 506 (CA Crim), Lord Lane).
22. Id. at 75.
23. Id. at 76–77.
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(Gegenstände) that belong to a person, considered not as individual
things, according to their individual characteristics, but as goods,
according to their monetary value (Geldwerth). Considered in this
way, they constituted a Ganze (whole) or Gesammtheit (ensemble). 24 Aubry and Rau explained that “[t]he ensemble of a person’s
goods constitutes his patrimony (patrimoine).” 25 “[O]ne can also,
substituting . . . cause for effect, define patrimony as the ensemble
of a person’s civil rights.” 26 One has to wonder why such a concept
should be regarded as a differentia specifica between civil and common law. It may be useful to have a definition of what is meant by
a person’s assets, but one could explain French law without it, and
in much the same way. French jurists would have done so had Aubry
and Rau not happened to translate Zachariä’s Handbuch or if Zachariä had not tried to define Vermögen. Common lawyers, had they
chosen to do so, could have used the same definition to explain what
they mean by “assets.”
Another distinguishing feature of the civil law, according to
Bornheim, is “the idea of absolute ownership.” 27 It entered French
law as “a result of the abolition of the seigneurial system and feudal
law.” 28 Before the Civil Code was enacted, French law distinguished two types of ownership: the dominium directum of the lord,
which entitled him to feudal rent, and the dominium utile of the person entitled to occupy and use the land but obligated to pay the rent.
By abolishing this distinction, the French Civil Code has been said
to have ended feudalism. Yet the significance of the distinction was
symbolic. Economically, dual ownership was like a mortgage. One
party had the use of the land. The other was entitled to periodic

24.

KARL SALOMO ZACHARIÄ, HANDBUCH DES FRANZÖSISCHEN CIVIL168 (4th ed., Heidelberg 1837).
25. CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS PAR
C.-S. ZACHARIÄ TRADUIT DE L’ALLEMAND § 168 (2d ed., Lagier 1842).
26. Id.
27. Bornheim, supra note 1, at 82.
28. Id.
RECHTS §
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payments and had his claim to them secured by the land. 29 The right
of the first party to use the land was as “absolute” before the abolition of dual ownership as afterwards. Similarly, William Blackstone, borrowing from civil law, described the right of property as
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe.” 30 Yet the owner of an
English fee simple held what had been a feudal fief. In either system,
then, one could describe an owner’s rights as absolute. Nevertheless,
in either system, to do so, one would have to qualify that statement
by describing the many restrictions that prevent an owner from using
his land in ways that bother his neighbors or from alienating it on
whatever terms he chooses.
Another distinction, according to Bornheim, is that traditionally
the common law protects “possession” rather than ownership. 31 He
acknowledges, however, that the modern common law protects
both. 32 He criticizes an article I wrote with Ugo Mattei in which we
showed that English common law courts first acknowledged that
they protected possession as such in Asher v. Whitlock (1865). 33 We
cited many prior cases in which the courts said that the reason they
protected a person who had possessed land for a long time or been
forcibly expelled was that long possession or forcible expulsion was
evidence of title. 34 According to Bornheim, our mistake was that,
when the courts spoke of title, we “assume[d] that the notion of absolute ownership exists at law, and thus interpret any reference to
‘title’ in the case law as a reference to absolute ownership.” 35 Not at
29. James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459,
501–02 (1994).
30. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2
(Oxford 1765-69).
31. Bornheim, supra note 1, at 125–26.
32. Id. at 146.
33. L.R. 1 Q.B.1.
34. James Gordley & Ugo Mattei, Protecting Possession, 44 AM. J. COMP.
L. 293, 321–25 (1996).
35. Bornheim, supra note 1, at 146–47.
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all. Whatever the courts may have meant by “title,” they said one
must have it to be protected, and that loss of possession mattered,
not in itself, but because it could create a presumption of title.
The reason the French Civil Code is a great achievement is not
that it protects ownership as well as possession, as the common law
now does, or that it symbolically broke with the feudal past by abolishing dual ownership, or that it introduced the concept of patrimoine, which it did not. The greatness of the Civil Code lies in the
clarity with which it expressed principles of law that have a significance which, if it is not universal, extends far beyond the orbit of
French culture. It owes its clarity to the simplicity and elegance of
the French language. It owes its significance to the aspiration of its
drafters to formulate universal principles. 36 For those reasons, it became the model for most of the codes in force throughout the world.
Those who share the same language and aspirations can be proud of
it for those reasons without claiming that it rests on peculiarly
French concepts. It would be a poorer code if it did.
I was educated as a common lawyer, but I have made even more
critical remarks about the idea that the common law embodies distinctively Anglo-American concepts of liberty. In an article I wrote
in the year 2000, I expressed my wish that over the next century, the
common law will lose the remaining traces of its English origins and
come to look more like civil law. 37 Features such as the doctrine of
consideration, the nominate torts, the law of estates and future interests, and the treatment of a leasehold as an interest in property serve
no good purpose. I closed by saying that one can admire the role that
common lawyers played in the struggle for liberty when they opposed Charles I, which later inspired Americans who opposed
George III. That struggle, however, has nothing to do with the English doctrines I mentioned. Moreover, Englishmen today do not need
36. See Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis, Discours préliminaire, Corps législatif,
séance du 23 frimaire an X [14 déc. 1801], in 1 PIERRE-ANTOINE FENET, RECUEIL
COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 471 (1827).
37. James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1815, 1817 (2000).
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protection against a return of the Stuart dynasty any more than
Americans against reincorporation in the British Empire.
James Gordley
Tulane Law School

INTRODUCTION TO ROBERT A. PASCAL’S
MEMORANDUM: THE CODE AS A TEXTBOOK AND A
RULE BOOK
Olivier Moréteau ∗
In 1978, Professor Alain Levasseur asked Professor Robert A.
Pascal, then his colleague on the Louisiana State University (LSU)
law faculty, to express in writing his thoughts regarding the organization of the Louisiana Civil Code and the explanatory material that
appears in it. Pascal produced a short Memorandum that we publish
today as a rediscovered treasure. This Memorandum was written
two years before Pascal’s retirement. It was shared with Dr. Agustín
Parise during his time at LSU, and we are grateful to both Levasseur
and Parise for offering it for publication.
Robert A. Pascal studied law at the Loyola University College
of Law in New Orleans and served during the summer 1938 as a
Research Assistant at LSU. A graduate from Jesuit High School in
New Orleans, he received a liberal education at Loyola. In law
school, the study of the Louisiana civil law became a passion. He
published his first article in 1938, in the first issue of the Louisiana
Law Review, 1 and his Recollections of a Life Studying and Teaching
Law came out 72 years later. 2
He first collaborated with the Louisiana State Law Institute
(LSLI) on its creation in 1938, working on the Compiled Edition of
the Louisiana Civil Codes. He later became a consultant on trust law
revision, an area of jurisprudence where his thoughts are at the forefront. He also taught and produced significant work on conflict of
∗ Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair;
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. Robert A. Pascal, Comment, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA.
L. REV. 182 (1938).
2. ROBERT A. PASCAL: A PRIEST OF RIGHT ORDER 25-95 (Olivier Moréteau
ed., 2018).
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laws, family law, matrimonial regimes, civil and Anglo-American
legal science, and philosophy of law.
In 1940, he was the first person ever to be awarded a Master’s
degree in Civil Law at LSU. He practiced law in New Orleans for
one year, and in 1942, added an LL.M. from the University of Michigan Law School. After serving as a Coast Guard District Legal Officer during World War II, he joined the LSU law faculty. In spring
1951, he taught trust law at the University of Chicago. In 1951–1952
and in 1963–1964, he was a Fulbright lecturer and taught U.S. private law and comparative law at the University of Rome, in Italian.
In 1955, he was made full professor at LSU and never left the Law
School even after his retirement in 1980, keeping an office as a Professor Emeritus. Many remember his tournament with Tulane Professor Rodolfo Batiza, Pascal insisting that the ancestor of the Louisiana Civil Code (the Digest of 1808) was Spanish in substance and
French in form—a “Spanish girl in French dress,” as he later commented. 3
Pascal died in 2018, at the age of 102. He marked generations of
students and colleagues and is remembered as a man of faith and
uncompromising views. Whether or not one embraces his vision of
the law as legal order, of mankind as a community of men under
God, with the ontological obligation to respect and cooperate with
one another, whether or not one endorses his strong preference for
the civil law and its codification, he left an important legacy at LSU,
in Louisiana, and in worldwide jurisprudence and civil law scholarship.
The Memorandum paved the way to Pascal’s Tucker Lecture
given at LSU twenty years later and published in the Louisiana Law
Review. 4 It is a pure sample of both the thinking and writing of Robert A. Pascal. I have published a selection of his articles in a volume

3. Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301
(1998).
4. Id.
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titled Robert Anthony Pascal, A Priest of Right Order. 5 Had I known
of the present Memorandum, I would have invited Pascal to include
it in the volume. 6 He might have objected that, as the Memorandum
goes saying, it was written without revision and editing, using the
French word impromptu. Yet it is pure Pascal in the sense that it is
crisp and to the point, with no word to be removed without a loss of
meaning.
The Memorandum, though very short, speaks volumes of what
the experience of the codification of the civil law in Louisiana is, in
a state otherwise controlled by the common law and dominated by
the United States culture. The section discussing the tripartite organization of the Code, which follows the model of the Institutes by
Gaius and the French Civil Code, is remarkable in the sense that it
gives a 20th or 21st century rationale to a structure that was adopted
by pure convenience. Pascal explains that Part I (Of Persons) and
Part II (Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership) provide the core of imperative law, whereas Book III (Of the Different
Modes of Acquiring the Ownership of Things) is more suppletive in
content, though not devoid of public order limitations. Pascal admits, however, that Book III could be better organized, but makes
limited suggestions to this effect. In his Tucker Lecture, he disapproved of the 1991 addition of a Book IV to the Code (Conflict of
Laws), 7 which this volume of the Journal of Civil Law Studies publishes for the first time in a trilingual version. 8 His structural analysis
of the Code is uncommon in the literature and was further elaborated
on in his Tucker Lecture. 9
5. PASCAL, supra note 2.
6. I had asked him to do the first selection and we discussed the arrangement
of chapters.
7. Pascal, supra note 3, at 303. Pascal taught Conflict of Laws during many
years and was of the opinion that that branch of the law does not belong in the
Civil Code.
8. Olivier Moréteau & Mariano Vitetta, Trilingual Louisiana Civil Code,
Book IV: Conflict of Laws in English, French, and Spanish, 13 J. CIV. L. STUD.
351 (2020).
9. Pascal, supra note 3, at 304-305.
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This first section also expresses a call for prudence regarding
code reform. A reason why Pascal worried about law reform connects to the fact that the legislative system of the State of Louisiana
makes it easy for individual legislators to introduce a bill and have
it discussed and adopted without much discipline and quality control. Though the LSLI prepares the Code revision and other significant legislation, 10 it is an outside agency that does not control the
work of the Legislature. Many a private bill introduced is the outcome of active lobbying and coincides “with clients’ and constituents’ vested interests and other desires” 11 rather than a shared sense
of the public good, which permeated Pascal’s teaching and scholarship. Pascal also complained about the work of the LSLI, where lawyers are overrepresented, which is also conducive of the risk mentioned above. He wished that the Council of the LSLI would be open
to a larger cross-section of society. 12
Part II and III of the Memorandum discuss the presence of explanatory material in the Code, a point of great interest for the contemporary reader. According to Pascal, the view that “rules alone
belong to legislation and that the reason for the rules belong to doctrine” (he refers to Portalis) may be suitable “for a people with a
tradition in which doctrinal opinion has been and is recognized as
the law behind the law.” 13 By contrast, in Louisiana, the judiciary is
very strong due to common law influence and local doctrine is
weaker than in Europe and is a more recent development. Pascal
writes that “the Code must be, more than it ever was before, a textbook as well as a rule book.” 14 The French encyclopedia influence
10. Created by La. Act 166 of 1938; see William E. Crawford, The Louisiana
State Law Institute—History and Progress, 45 LA. L. REV. 1077 (1985); William
E Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana State Law Institute Recognizes 70Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments, 56 LA. B.J. 85 (2008).
11. Memorandum, Section I.
12. Pascal, supra note 3, at 323: “the governing council [of the LSLI] should
be re-composed to include educated nonlawyers: philosophers, theologians, social
workers, economists, educators and ordinary people.”
13. Memorandum, Section II.
14. Id.
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on the drafting of earlier versions of the Louisiana Civil Code was
recently exposed in this Journal, 15 and Pascal advocates for more
explanatory articles, due to the lack of “respect for learning in law” 16
in Louisiana.
The third and final section of the Memorandum that Pascal calls
a lagniappe 17 denounces the current practice of publishing comments together with the text of revised or new Code articles: “frequently they tie the law to previous law or jurisprudence, and provide a million pegs for false argument.” 18 He also regrets the existence of titles in front of every article, which are not part of the law. 19
Comments and article titles are distractors that interrupt the flow of
the reading and make each code article look like an isolated statute,
departing from the logic of a code that should be regarded as a
whole. 20
The Memorandum is pessimistic, as Pascal was not convinced
that the State of Louisiana had sufficient resources to make sound
code reform, in which case he advocates abstention rather than revision. He, however, projects the optimistic vision that “the ambition
in Louisiana should be to have a good workable Civil Code, in content and in form.” 21 This remark alone makes the Memorandum
treasurable.
15. Seth S. Brostoff, The Encyclopedist Code: Ancien Droit Legal Encyclopedias and Their Verbatim Influence on the Louisiana Digest of 1808, 13 J. CIV.
L. STUD. 33 (2020).
16. Memorandum, Section II.
17. DICTIONARY OF LOUISIANA FRENCH, AS SPOKEN IN CAJUN, CREOLE,
AND AMERICAN INDIAN COMMUNITIES, at Lagniappe, meaning 2: “A little something extra received for free.” (Albert Valdman & Kevin J. Rottet ed., 2009).
18. Memorandum, Section III.
19. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1:13 9 (A) Headings to sections, source notes, and
cross references are given for the purpose of convenient reference and do not constitute part of the law. (B) The keyword, one-liner, summary and adjoining information, abstract, digest, and other words and phrases not contained in the section
or sections of the bill following the enacting clause do not constitute part of the
law. (Amended by Acts 2006, No. 826, §1.)
20. The author of this introduction follows Pascal’s recommendations in publishing the Louisiana Civil Code in English, French and soon Spanish without
article titles and revision comments: see Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana
Civil Code Online, LSU Law, https://perma.cc/9VAP-DC4R.
21. Memorandum, Section III.

A MEMORANDUM ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
CIVIL CODE AND EXPLANATORY MATERIAL
February 7, 1978
MEMORANDUM
FROM: Professor Robert A. Pascal
TO: Professor Alain Levasseur
SUBJECTS: I.
II.
III.

Organization of the Civil Code
Explanatory Material in the Civil Code
Comments and Article Titles

The remarks that appear under the first two headings are made
at your request. Those that appear under the third are lagniappe, but
I consider them equally important. Please understand that I am writing without revision or editing, and impromptu. You may, nevertheless, use these remarks, with acknowledgment, as you see fit.
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CIVIL CODE
I recommend retention of the tripartite division of the Civil Code
into books on Persons, Things, and Acquisition [and Loss] of
[Rights and Obligations as to] Things.
The first reason, though not the most weighty, is that the Louisiana bench, bar, and legislature are not so knowledgeable in law as
to be able to accept more than minor changes in the traditional structure. Changes there may be, but they must not appear to be radical
in form. Indeed, I believe them more ready to accept drastic changes
in substance (especially where they coincide with clients’ and constituents’ vested interests or other desires) than they are to accept
changes in appearances or form.
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More important to me is that the tripartite division does correspond to and give evidence of certain facts of our legal science and
of our extra-legal criteria for the civil law portion of our legal order.
Book I is concerned with Persons, the subjects of the law and
the non-patrimonial rights and obligations between them. Book II
treats of the interests persons may have in Things (including credits), the objects of the law; and Book III deals with the manner in
which patrimonial rights and obligations arise and terminate. If the
next Civil Code’s form does not itself evidence this analysis, Louisianians will never notice it, and if doctrinaires attempt to teach it,
they will ignore it. As I will observe in more detail hereafter, the
Louisiana Civil Code must explain itself as much as possible. It must
teach the law’s science and philosophy as well as expound the legal
rules. A functional organization (e.g., in terms of a number of titles
on different subjects) would, I believe, lead to our people desiring
to make each title complete in itself and make improbable the economical statement of the civil law in terms of principles and general
rules applicable to many areas of the law.
Books I and II, I may observe, provide the core of imperative
law; Book III, on the other hand, represents primarily the area of
suppletive law. Stated in another fashion, Books I and II declare matters of public order character; Book III, on the other hand, is concerned largely with the civil law of private order character, the rights
and obligations that can be contracted and those that, though not
contracted (e.g., delictual obligations) can be the object of compromise. There are exceptions to this primary notion of Book III
throughout its length, to be certain, but they are incidental to the
main theme. Thus, though succession is primarily testamentary,
there are public order limitations (e.g., on donations to the prejudice
of forced heirs or in favor of others, such as those to certain illegitimates and concubines, where the effect might be family discord or
the revelation of scandal; on restrictions in marriage contracts for
good domestic peace and order; on certain forms required for certainty as to the intent of the actor; on occupancy and acquisitive
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prescription; on liberative prescription; and on the ranking of credits
in the event of insufficiency of assets). But all these public order
limitations belong in Book III because Book III is concerned with
the acquisition and loss of patrimonial rights.
In similar fashion, Books I and II contain some matters that appear to be in the private order sphere. But here again the appearance
is deceptive, for public order is at the root. Thus persons must consent freely to marriage, but may not vary the personal relationship
of matrimony. (Note that the matrimonial regime, the object of the
marriage contract as to patrimonial affairs is in Book III.) Parents
may name tutors to their children, but are not at liberty to vary the
powers and duties of the tutor. The parental right of enjoyment and
that of administering the minor’s patrimony are only incidentally
patrimonial rights and more directly personal rights growing out of
the natural interdependence of family members that the Code respects. Servitudes can arise on convention, but the essential nature
of a servitude cannot be changed. The Code defines the limits of
status rights and obligations and provides the bounds of rights in
things.
It is true that Book III itself could be refined in its arrangement.
Indeed, perhaps Articles 1760 and 2292, which tell us so eloquently
that there are two sources of [rights and] obligations—conventions,
or more broadly, voluntary juridical acts, and the law—could be
placed at the head of the Book, or better yet, moved to the Preliminary Title so that it might be seen that the sources of right and obligation are three: convention, custom, and law, the first being limited
only and then only as public order demands it, and the last encompassing such laws as those on status relationships, permissible kinds
of interests in things, patrimonial situations demanding adjustments
(e.g., enrichment without cause), unsolicited acts of cooperation (negotiorum gestio), and wrongful acts causing damage or injury.
Certainly it would be well to set out rules applicable to all obligations; sate clearly the general rules on the sources of obligations
that have in common the act of man (convention unilateral will,
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cooperative act, wrongful act); collect together the institutions on
the discharge of obligations; and separate out the rules of (1) transfer
of things, (2) their original acquisition, and (3) their acquisition by
prescription. But I would keep all this in Book III.
II. EXPLANATORY MATERIAL IN THE CIVIL CODE
Even Portalis, I believe, said that rules alone belong in legislation and that the reasons for the rules belong to doctrine. This may
be very well indeed for a people with a tradition in which doctrinal
opinion has been and is recognized as the law behind the law. Anglo-Americans do not have this, have not had it since the Tudors,
and in this century have sought to avoid it—as witnessed by realism
first, then policy science, and the otherwise inarticulated cult of “advocacy” as characterized by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Our Louisiana lawyers and judges are infected with the disease,
as the case of Justice Tate so well demonstrates. If the rules of law
are to be made less avoidable, therefore, the reason for their being
must be in texts enacted as law. The Code must be, more than it ever
was before, a textbook as well as a rule book. Without this characteristic of the Codes of 1825 and 1870, the civil law in Louisiana
would have been more perverted than it is now. My regret is that
these Codes did not go far enough.
Think of the advantage of articles explaining why alimony rules
must be considered rules of public order; why the differentiation of
the rights of legitimates and ordinary illegitimates and incestuous
and adulterous illegitimates must be made so as to maintain peace
in families, avoid destructive partitions of family homes and enterprises, and avoid scandal; why the patrimonial affairs of a family
should be under one management; why no person should be allowed
to interdict another through limitations on a transfer to him; why
prescription must not be waived in advance; or why the will of one
who has alienated a thing should not have the power to control its
use and disposition.
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It should be recognized that those of us who know better must
protect the people against even so-called law professors who know
no more than what judges tell them, or, for one reason or another,
seek to communicate no more to their students. If the raison d’être
of the law is in the legislation, it will not be avoided so easily. Louisiana’s situation is not that of a civilian jurisdiction with a respect
for learning in law and this must not be forgotten.
III. COMMENTS AND ARTICLE TITLES
In my judgment, there must be no publication whatsoever of
what the drafters of articles or the legislators themselves conceived
the meaning of the articles to be. Comments theoretically are not
law, but they are in fact embellishments that swell the bulk of the
verbiage that must be consulted for drafters’ or legislators’ intent,
frequently they tie the law to previous law or jurisprudence, and provide a million pegs for false argument. If something must be said to
explain a law, the law is not stated clearly. If Louisiana does not
have a people competent enough to write legislation, then a Code
revision project must not be entertained.
Comments, besides, break the practical continuity of a Code.
The reader no longer reads the articles as convenient segments of a
larger exposition of the plan of order for the subject at hand, but
rather as isolated statutes. The same observation applies to article
titles, though to a lesser degree. In my judgement, within any chapter or similar division of the Code, nothing should interfere with the
reading of the chapter as a whole, and nothing should so direct the
reader’s attention to one or a few particularly relevant provisions.
The Code must be written so that the reader will be forced to read
all the articles on the topic to make certain he has read all he should.
May you see the light. The ambition in Louisiana should be to
have a good workable Civil Code, in content and in form. We must
not innovate simply to show that we can, or to imitate others whose
juristic backgrounds and habits are different from ours. We must
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seek an instrument with content and form that will improve our civil
order and facilitate its appreciation and its application.

MOMMA’S BABY, DADDY’S MAYBE: HOW LEGER V.
LEGER RESTRICTS THE RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE FATHERS
SEEKING TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY IN LOUISIANA
Jessica Brewer ∗
I. Background .............................................................................. 447
II. Decision of the Court ............................................................. 451
III. Commentary .......................................................................... 452
A. The Role of DNA Testing in Modern Actions for
Disestablishment and Establishment of Paternity .............. 453
B. Policy Motivations for the Peremptive Period on Avowal
Actions ............................................................................... 455
Keywords: Louisiana, paternity, putative father, disestablishment of
paternity, avowal action, peremptive period, presumptive father,
parenting rights, equal protection rights.
I. BACKGROUND
Currently, Louisiana law imposes a peremptive period of one
year on putative fathers seeking to file paternity actions where their
biological child is presumed to be the child of another. 1 However,
the law allows a mother to assert an action contesting a former husband’s paternity and prove her current husband is the father of her
∗ J.D. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. This case note was prepared under the tutelage of Professor Clare
Ryan.
1. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2020) states the current rule governing a
father’s action to establish paternity and the restricted one-year peremptive period.
Article 3458 explains that “[p]eremption is a period of time fixed by the law for
the existence of a right. Unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon
the expiration of the peremptive period.” Typically, putative father refers to the
alleged biological child of a father of a child born out of wedlock. See Father,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). However, in this case note, the term “putative father” refers to a father seeking to establish paternity of a child who is
legally presumed to be the child of another man. A paternity action, commonly
referred to as a paternity suit, is a court proceeding to determine whether a person
is the father of a child. Paternity suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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child within a two-year window. 2 Is that fair? Or is the one-year difference a violation of the putative father’s equal protection rights as
articulated in the federal and state constitutions? Although the putative, and biological, father of a young child argued that the existing
law constituted a violation of his equal protection rights as afforded
in the U.S. Constitution as well as the Louisiana Constitution, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. 3
In August 2012, Danielle Gotreaux Leger gave birth to a child
while married to Michael J. Leger, II. 4 Pursuant to Louisiana Civil
Code article 185, which states the “husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a child born during the marriage,” the child
was presumed to be the legal offspring of Mr. Leger. However, unbeknownst to Mr. Leger, the child was actually the offspring of his
wife’s paramour—John Fontenot. 5 Though it is not entirely clear
from the record when Mr. Leger became aware of his wife’s infidelity, the couple remained legally married for another four years after
the child’s birth. Mr. Leger did not initiate divorce proceedings until
May of 2016. 6
When Mr. Leger commenced divorce proceedings, Mr. Fontenot
seized the chance to intervene and assert his paternity rights as the
biological father of the minor child born during Leger’s marriage. 7
Mr. Fontenot alleged that DNA testing “established he was the biological father of the minor child” and explained he was “unable to

2. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2020).
3. Michael J. Leger, II v. Danielle Gotreaux Leger, 17-270 (La. App. 3 Cir.
12/6/17); 258 So. 3d 624.
4. Id. at 625.
5. Id. at 625.
6. Leger, 258 So. 3d at 625.
7. Id. Mr. Fontenot intervened in the couple’s divorce proceedings as allowed by LA CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1091(3) (2020), which allows a third
person with an interest in a pending legal action to “enforce a right related to or
connected with the object of the pending action against one or more of the parties”
by “opposing both the plaintiff and the defendant.” He intervened during the divorce proceedings in order to assert his legal parentage of the minor child born
during the Leger’s marriage.
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timely file the avowal action pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 198.” 8 Louisiana Civil Code article 198 states as follows:
A man may institute an action to establish his paternity of a
child at any time except as provided in this Article. The action is strictly personal.
If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the
action shall be instituted within one year from the day of the
birth of the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith
deceived the father of the child regarding his paternity, the
action shall be instituted within one year from the day the
father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within
ten years from the day of the birth of the child, whichever
first occurs.
In all cases, the action shall be instituted no later than one
year from the day of the death of the child.
The time periods in this article are peremptive (emphasis
added).
While intervening, the putative father acknowledged that his attempt to formally assert paternity was past the mandated peremptive
period. 9 However, Mr. Fontenot argued that the bad-faith exception
applied to his circumstances. 10 The paramour explained that he delayed in asserting his parental rights due to “concerns for the safety
of both Ms. Leger and the child” if the child’s true paternity was
revealed during the marriage. 11 He even produced proof of attempts
to covertly seek joint custody by presenting a petition for joint custody and child support filed in a separate trial court proceeding in
February of 2014. 12 Still, the trial court declined to grant Mr. Fontenot an extension on the peremptive period on the basis of bad
faith. 13
In response to the trial court’s denial of his attempts to assert
paternity, Mr. Fontenot filed a “Petition to Declare Louisiana Civil
Code article 198 Unconstitutional” under the same docket as the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Leger, 258 So. 3d at 626.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.
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Leger’s divorce proceedings. 14 In that action, Mr. Fontenot “named
Mr. and Ms. Leger, as well as the State of Louisiana, through the
Attorney General, as defendants.” 15 In Mr. Fontenot’s petition, he
referenced the “fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children” and alleged
the one-year peremptive period within Louisiana Civil Code article
198 was “unconstitutionally short and an undue interference with
[his] constitutionally protected rights as a parent of the minor child”
as recognized in Troxel v. Granville. 16
Mr. Fontenot’s petition also highlighted Louisiana Civil Code
article 193 which “allows a mother to institute an action to disavow
a presumed father and establish paternity of the biological father as
long as she institutes the action within two years of the date of the
birth of the child” where the presumed father was the mother’s former husband and the biological father is her current husband. 17 In
his action, Mr. Fontenot lamented that the disparity in the amount of
time afforded to a mother compared to the time afforded a putative
father to bring a disavowal action “violated his rights of equal protection both of Louisiana Constitutional article 1, §3, and U.S. Constitutional Amendment XIV, §1.” 18 He contended there was no reasonable justification for “granting an extra year for the mother of a
child to bring an action to establish the paternity of the biological
father than for the biological father himself.” 19 Consequently,
Mr. Fontenot asked the court to declare Louisiana Civil Code article
198 unconstitutional, and that he be allowed to establish his paternity as well as assert legal custody of the minor child. 20 After this
14. Id. at 626.
15. Id.
16. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49
(2000). See also Leger, 258 So. 3d at 626 (citing id. and Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)).
17. Id. at 627. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2020) must be read in light of
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 192 (2020).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 627.
20. Id.
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matter was formally submitted to the trial court, the court denied Mr.
Fontenot’s claim and declared Louisiana Civil Code article 198 constitutional.21 Mr. Fontenot appealed that holding to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal. 22
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
On appeal, the Third Circuit delivered two pertinent holdings in
this case. First, the court stated that Louisiana Civil Code article 198
“did not violate [the] equal protection clause of [the] state or federal
constitution, even though a mother’s action to contest a former husband’s paternity of her child . . . could be filed within two years of
the child’s birth.” 23 The court reasoned that the difference in time
afforded had a reasonable basis, and explained “a mother contesting
both a former husband’s paternity and attempting to establish her
current husband’s paternity” in accordance with Louisiana Civil
Code article 193 “faced different circumstances and consequences
than a putative father attempting to establish his paternity.” 24 Second, the court also held that “it is possible for parties to be treated
differently without violation of equal protection rights; equal protection of all claimants in all circumstances is not required, as the
law merely requires equal application in similar circumstances.” 25
For that reason, the court held Louisiana Civil Code article 198 does
not violate the equal protection clause of the state or federal constitution. 26
The Third Circuit’s denial of Mr. Fontenot’s rights conforms to
well-established case law regarding the limited rights of putative fathers. In the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., the United States Supreme Court “declined to recognize a biological father’s interest in
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 624.
24. Id.
25. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe”: Disestablishment of Paternity, 48 AKRON L. REV. 263 (2015).
26. Leger, 258 So. 3d at 624.
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maintaining a relationship with his daughter, born as a result of an
adulterous affair with the mother who was then married to another
man.” 27 Mr. Fontenot was in an identical predicament in Leger v.
Leger. In Michael H., the Supreme Court refused to “recognize the
biological father’s Fourth Amendment due process or liberty interest in the maintaining a relationship with his child.” 28
Likewise, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal found no merit in
Mr. Fontenot’s argument that the short peremptive period in Louisiana Civil Code article 198 violated his due process rights. 29 Because
Mr. Fontenot’s due process rights were not violated, the lower
court’s refusal to allow him to establish paternity and denial of custodial rights was constitutional.
III. COMMENTARY
The commentary will explain Mr. Fontenot’s restricted rights to
assert parentage as a putative father under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 in accordance with federal regulations mandating state procedures for establishment and disestablishment of paternity. The
one-year peremptive period in the aforementioned article reflects
federal practices as well. 30 Whether or not the law governing disestablishment of paternity should change in light of modern DNA testing is a related and contested issue shrouded in debate. The policy
motivations for the short temporal limitation on an avowal action
under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 will also be discussed.
As mandated in section 666(a)(5), Title 42, United States Code,
states must create “procedures to establish, rescind, or challenge paternity.” 31 Accordingly, Louisiana Civil Code article 198 provides a
mechanism for the establishment of paternity as required by federal
law. 32 Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Browne-Barbour, supra note 25, at 276.
Id. at 276-277.
Leger, 258 So. 3d at 629.
42 U.S.C.§ 666(a)(5) (2006).
Browne-Barbour, supra note 25, at 291.
Id.
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“incorporates a one-year limitation of action period for claims based
upon fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or
newly discovered evidence.” 33 Similarly, Louisiana Civil Code article 198 also imposes a one-year limitation on putative fathers bringing an action to disestablish paternity, mirroring the federal regulation.
A. The Role of DNA Testing in Modern Actions for Disestablishment and Establishment of Paternity
Mr. Fontenot’s use of DNA testing to prove his paternity is indicative of a growing concern regarding the role of genetic testing
in cases where paternity is disputed. Generally, “commentators
agree that disestablishment [or establishment of paternity] requires
the balancing of the interests of the affected parties.” 34 Surely, modern DNA testing provides a level of certainty regarding paternity not
previously afforded to presumed fathers such as Mr. Leger and putative fathers such as Mr. Fontenot. However, the role which DNA
testing should play in determining the outcome of legal battles remains uncertain. 35 Because disestablishment of paternity by a nonbiological father “legally severs the parent-child relationship” until
the child is eighteen, at which time the child can choose to have a
relationship with a putative father of their own volition, the role
DNA testing should play in determining who is entitled to custody
and visitation rights remains contested. 36
There are two competing arguments regarding the role DNA
testing should play in establishing or disestablishing parental rights.
Some commentators argue “biological proof of non-paternity should
cause the balancing process to favor the non-biological father’s interests [in disestablishing paternity] over others, including the best

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 292.
Id. at 288-289.
Id.
Id. at 264.
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interests of the child.” 37 Advocates of this rule are primarily concerned with the issue of fairness, and argue DNA testing is valid
grounds for disestablishing paternity obligations.38 It seems unjust
to make a man financially responsible for a child with whom he is
not biologically related. There is also a concern that the presumptive
father is legally bound to the parent-child relationship “based upon
fraud, a material mistake of fact, or other misrepresentation.” 39 This
line of reasoning focuses upon the rights of the established father
and are the primary motivations for granting paternity disestablishment. 40
Instead of mandating legal obligations based solely on biological connections, some argue “courts should place more weight on
maintaining stability in an established parent-child relationship, despite the potential for a loving and supportive relationship with the
biological father.” 41 Here, proponents contend a “child’s right to
have a relationship with his or her paternal family should be comparable to the child’s right to have a relationship with his or her maternal family.” 42 Therefore, a court should focus on the existing ties
between a child and the father seeking to establish or disestablish
paternity as opposed to allowing DNA results to be dispositive of
legal obligations and visitation rights. 43
Moreover, scholars argue mandating a parent-child relationship
is contrary to the best interests of the child. 44 These legal theorists
argue that creating legal rules which establish rights for biological
fathers will be harmful to the child both emotionally and financially. 45 In other words, a “disestablishment of paternity order not
only severs permanently a child’s legally recognized relations with
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Browne-Barbour, at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 288.
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a man previously deemed to be [his or] her father, but also terminates financial support obligations associated with that parent-child
relationship.” 46 These commentators are concerned with the complicated and potentially disastrous nature of reallocating parental
rights after a familial bond, regardless of biological ties, is established. This line of reasoning seeks to preserve an intact family unit
regardless of biological links and appears to be the ideology behind
the Third Circuit’s decision in Leger.
In its analysis, the Leger court emphasized that “the minor child
lived in an ‘intact family structure’ with Mr. Leger as the presumptive father.” 47 The Third Circuit did not consider Mr. Fontenot’s evidence of a biological tie to the young child a persuasive factor when
assessing his claim. In fact, the court only mentioned the DNA evidence proving Mr. Leger was the biological father once in its decision. 48
B. Policy Motivations for the Peremptive Period on Avowal Actions
In Leger, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s reasoning suggests
the peremptive period articulated in Louisiana Civil Code article
198 is necessary to preserve public policy interests in maintaining
intact families. The court explained Mr. Fontenot’s failure to timely
file an avowal action was contrary to the “policy statement contained in Louisiana Civil Code article 198, comment (e),” providing
that the limitation period protects a child “from the upheaval of such
litigation and its consequences in circumstances where the child
may actually live in an existing intact family with his mother and
presumed father or may have become attached over many years to
the man presumed to be his father.” 49 The court also chastised Mr.
Fontenot for failing to properly establish that the “minor child did
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 288.
Leger, 258 So. 3d at 628.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 628.
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not or could not have become attached to Mr. Leger between the
August 2012 birth and the filing of the avowal action in June 2014,”
indicating that a successful avowal action would effectively prove
that there is no attachment between the minor child and presumptive
father. 50 The court’s rationale in denying Mr. Fontenot’s claim
demonstrates the hefty burden required to rebut the presumptive paternity of a husband in accordance with Louisiana Civil Code article
185.
In conclusion, though the one-year peremptive period in Louisiana Civil Code article 198 restricting a putative father’s right to
bring a paternity action appears (at least facially) a violation of his
equal protection rights when compared to the rights of mothers under Louisiana Civil Code article 192, it is not. As the Third Circuit
noted, a putative father under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 is not
similarly situated to a mother seeking to contest a former husband’s
paternity and prove her current husband is the father of her child
pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code articles 192 and 193. 51 To state the
matter plainly, Mrs. Leger’s maternity rights regarding the young
child were never challenged, which contrasts greatly with Mr. Fontenot’s struggle to assert paternity rights. Mr. Fontenot, in contrast
to a mother contesting paternity under Louisiana Civil Code articles
192 and 193, was not married to the child’s biological parent and
seeking to rebut the legal presumption of parentage of a former
spouse. In order for Louisiana Civil Code article 198 to be found
unconstitutional, a civil code article extending a longer peremptive
period for putative mothers would need to exist. 52
In accordance with state and federal law, the Third Circuit’s reasoning was sound in the case at issue. In light of modern familial
structures and the policy motivations protecting intact family units,
50. Id. at 629.
51. Id. at 628.
52. Black’s Law dictionary does not include the term “putative mother,”
which indeed sounds purely hypothetical. However, in this context, the phrase
refers to a mother seeking to assert parental rights where her child is presumed to
be the child of another woman.
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the Third Circuit’s decision to avoid allocating parental rights based
solely on DNA evidence was wise and well poised. Leger v. Leger,
in a manner analogous to Michael H. v. Herald G., restricts a putative father’s rights and illustrates the “remaining power of the parental presumption” of parentage within marriage as well as the
“stigma of sexual conduct outside the marital relationship.” 53 This
case serves as a clear warning to those with married lovers; file an
avowal action within the one-year peremptive period stipulated in
Louisiana Civil Code article 198 or forfeit custodial rights to any
offspring of that relationship.

53. Browne-Barbour, supra note 25, at 277.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While not every civil case goes before a jury, Louisiana recognizes the right to a trial by jury under specified circumstances, which
is way more restrictive than any of the other states, where trial by
jury is commonplace. 1 This is not surprising given the historical
roots of Louisiana in the civil law tradition, but jury trials set Louisiana apart from other civil law jurisdictions, where juries are not
used in civil trials and typically limited to felony criminal trials
only. 2 In jury trials, the jury then becomes the body that will decide
* J.D./D.C.L. candidate (May 2022) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University. The author would like to thank Prof. William Corbett for his
guidance throughout the writing of this case note.
1. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1731(A) (2020). Louisiana had the
highest jury threshold in the nation—no jury trial in cases that do not exceed
$50,000. The state legislature passed Act No. 37 of the First Extraordinary Session
of 2020, which lowers the amount to a case that “does not exceed $10,000.” This
change takes effect Jan. 1, 2021 but is not retroactive.
2. Neither France nor Germany, for example, use juries in civil trials; instead, they opt to use panels of judges for more efficient proceedings. See Daniel
Soulez Larivière, Overview of the Problems of French Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 737, 737 (1997); see also Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure—Reflections on the Comparisons of Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 409 (1960).
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the fate of the parties on all issues of fact at the close of trial. 3 Outside of the factual determinations made by the jury, judges resolve
questions of law. 4 One of the issues typically decided by a jury if it
finds a defendant liable is the amount of damages to be awarded to
a plaintiff. However, what happens when a judge disagrees with the
jury verdict? Boothe discusses the power of the court to rectify what
the court sees as a mistaken verdict by the jury. 5 This note questions
whether trial and appellate courts overstep their bounds by interfering with verdicts, and whether there is a better remedy than a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) for an improper jury
verdict.
II. BACKGROUND
The issues in Boothe stem from a car accident in 2008. 6 After
dropping her daughter off at school, Sherry Boothe was driving on
Greenwell Springs Road. 7 On her drive, she crossed over the Comite
River Bridge and lost control of her car and crashed it. 8 Police responded to the accident and the officer, Lt. Ruiz, found ice on the
bridge. 9 The bridge then had to be sanded to remove the ice. 10 Following the accident, Boothe sued the Department of Transportation
and Development (“DOTD”) for her and her children’s injuries. 11
For Boothe to succeed, the elements she needed to prove were
that: (1) the DOTD had custody of the bridge that caused her injuries, (2) the bridge was defective because its icy condition created
3. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1736 (2020). “The trial of all issues
for which a jury trial has been requested shall be by jury.” Determinations of law
are made by the judge.
4. Question of law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “An issue
to be decided by the judge, concerning the application or interpretation of law.”
5. Boothe v. Dep’t of Transportation & Dev. & Par. of E. Baton Rouge, 181746 (La. 6/26/19), 285 So. 3d 451.
6. Id. at 453.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 454.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.

2020]

BOOTHE V. DOTD

461

an unreasonable risk of harm, (3) the DOTD had actual or constructive notice of the icy condition and did not take any corrective
measures within a reasonable time, and (4) the icy condition was a
cause-in-fact of Boothe’s injuries. 12 After listening to the testimony
of Ms. Boothe, Lt. Ruiz, and DOTD employees, the jury found that
the DOTD was not at fault for Ms. Boothe’s injuries. 13
Following the verdict, Boothe filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and an alternate motion for a new trial. 14
The Court granted the motion for JNOV and found in favor of
Boothe, awarding her $919,191.20. 15 In its decision, the District
Court focused on the testimony of Lt. Ruiz and DOTD’s own employees, while mostly ignoring Boothe’s testimony. 16 One DOTD
employee admitted that while he normally has both sides of a bridge
sanded when it is icy, they only sanded one side of the bridge in
question. 17 Combining that with Lt. Ruiz’s testimony that the bridge
was icy and the other DOTD employees’ testimony that icy bridges
are hazardous to motorists, the district court was convinced that the
plaintiff satisfied all elements of her claim and found for her. 18
The DOTD then appealed to the First Circuit, where the JNOV
was affirmed, but damages were altered. 19 The First Circuit did not
find that the almost $1-million award was an abuse of discretion, but
it applied a statutory damages cap to reduce the award. 20 The First
Circuit instead characterized the award as “relatively high” and left

12. Id. at 456 (citing Comeaux v. Comeaux, 98-2378 (La. 7/7/99), 748 So.2d
1123, 1127).
13. Id. at 453-54.
14. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1811 (2020).
15. Boothe, 285 So. 3d at 454. The new trial was conditionally granted as
well.
16. Id. at 457.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 455.
20. Id. La. R.S. 13:5106 capped general damages at $500,000, so the court
reduced the $600,000 general damage award accordingly.
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the special damages in place. 21 Following this ruling, the DOTD appealed and the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Court first addressed the DOTD’s assertion that granting
and affirming the JNOV was improper. 22 The DOTD’s assignment
of error was that the evidence presented did not show that the condition of the road presented an unreasonable risk to Boothe when
she wrecked. 23 In order to find that a JNOV is proper, the Court had
to find that “evidence points so strongly in favor of the moving party
that reasonable persons could not reach different conclusions, not
merely when there is a preponderance of evidence for the mover.” 24
The Supreme Court decided that the evidence did indeed meet this
high standard and pointed towards the unrefuted testimony that the
lower courts relied on. 25 After affirming the JNOV, the Court moved
on to the assessment of damages.
Finding that there was an abuse of discretion by the district court
in its $600,000 general award damage, the Supreme Court vacated
it. 26 In deciding this, the Court acknowledged that Boothe’s injuries
were serious, but her doctor did not place any limits on her activities. 27 The Court awarded a lesser amount of $300,000 in general
damages. 28 The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part,
and there were two dissents. 29

21. Id.
22. Id. at 456.
23. Id. at 458.
24. See Joseph v. Broussard Rice Mill, Inc., 00-0628 (La. 10/30/00); 772 So.
2d 94, at 99.
25. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
26. Boothe, 285 So. 3d at 458.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 459 (citing Collins v. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co., 36-528 (La. App. 2
Cir. 12/11/02); 833 So.2d 1166 as basis for their decision. There the Plaintiff was
awarded $150,000).
29. Boothe, 285 So. 3d at 459.
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Justice Hughes’s dissent was based on the reduction of Boothe’s
damage award. 30 He considered the majority’s reduction as superficial and thought the amount was “picked out of thin air.” 31 Justice
Hughes would have affirmed the decision from the appeals court. 32
In his dissent, Justice Crichton writes that he believes that the
trial court substituted its judgment for the jury’s. 33 Justice Crichton
saw the trial court evaluated witness credibility inappropriately and
did not resolve factual questions in favor of the DOTD. 34 Crichton
would have reinstated the jury’s verdict. 35
IV. COMMENTARY
While none of the three courts that heard Boothe disagreed with
granting the JNOV, the Louisiana Supreme Court had one justice
that thought that the JNOV should not have been granted. There may
have been a less intrusive remedy that the Court could have given
the plaintiff after deciding that the jury verdict was incorrect. The
Boothe decision risks that JNOVs that do not meet the high standard
may be granted more often.
A. Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto
Awarding a JNOV to a party means taking away the verdict that
a panel of jurors decided, so anytime this motion is granted it should
bear some scrutiny. The Code of Civil Procedure itself does not provide a detailed standard for granting one. 36 The JNOV standard from
Joseph is that “evidence points so strongly in favor of the moving
party that reasonable persons could not reach different conclusions,
not merely when there is a preponderance of evidence for the
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. In fact, there is no standard articulated in the Code that guides the judge.
See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1811 (2020).
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mover.” 37 Justice Crichton argues in his dissent in Boothe that the
Court substituted its own judgment for the jury’s, raising further
questions on whether reasonable persons could actually disagree. 38
If both a jury and a justice disagree on whether a verdict can
withstand a JNOV motion, it is possible that the JNOV should not
have been granted. If Justice Crichton is correct, then there is a rational worry that the role of the jury to decide a case can be interfered with by a judge that thinks the jury’s determination of the facts
is incorrect. 39 While it seems that the Boothe case could have been
decided either way, caution should be taken when deciding that the
jury was incorrect. Different minds have indeed found that there
could be two different conclusions. The Court may have come to the
wrong conclusion in Boothe.
The evidence here seemed to point somewhat towards liability
for the DOTD, but having the power taken away from the jury when
it is not absolutely clear that Boothe should have won defies the demanding JNOV standard. There is an alternative option for the Court
that still leaves the decision to the jury.
B. Granting a New Trial
The Louisiana Supreme Court could have chosen to grant a new
trial instead of a JNOV. 40 If a party loses at trial, that party does not
have to choose between moving for a JNOV or a new trial. 41 Since
both the new trial and the JNOV were granted by the district court,
the Supreme Court could have determined that the higher standard
for granting a JNOV was not met but sent the case back to be heard
by another jury. 42 The new trial standard “clearly contrary to the law
37. See Joseph, 772 So. 2d 94 at 99.
38. See Boothe, 258 So. 3d at 459.
39. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1736 (2020).
40. See id. at art. 1972(1): “A new trial shall be granted, upon contradictory
motion of any party, in the following cases: when the verdict or judgment appears
clearly contrary to the law and the evidence.”
41. See id. at art. 1811(A)(2).
42. Id. at art. 1811(C). If the court grants a JNOV, then the court is required
to conditionally grant the motion for a new trial. Thus, if the court’s ruling for a
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and evidence” is lower than the Joseph standard for JNOV. 43 Justice
Crichton’s dissent argued that the trial judge assessed the witnesses’
credibility and drew her own inferences. 44 When a trial court grants
a new trial, the judge is allowed to both assess credibility and draw
her own inferences. 45 If Justice Crichton was correct, then the Louisiana Supreme Court should have reversed the lower court on the
JNOV, but left the provisional new trial in place.
Granting a new trial over a JNOV still lets a jury decide the outcome of the case rather than the judge fully invading the province of
the jury. The jury is not there by accident, or automatically. A party
to the suit must specifically ask for a jury trial in a pleading and pay
a bond to the court for it. 46 Further, a party is only eligible for a jury
if the party’s cause of action is above a certain dollar amount. 47 If
there is a JNOV granted, a case in which a party that has a right to
jury trial and has done all that is required to preserve that right has
it taken away from the jury and goes back the hands of the judge. If
the party who prayed for the jury and paid the bond is the losing
party in the JNOV, this seems problematic.
Granting a new trial, though, would avoid that problem by taking
the case from the hands of one jury and placing it into the hands of
another. So, the trier of fact is still a jury of their peers, rather than
one judge. This is a much less radical remedy than a JNOV. In a
case where the record does not clearly support a JNOV, the new trial
is a much better intervention by the judge.

JNOV is overturned on appeal, the appellate court can remand the case for a new
trial.
43. See id. at art.1972(1).
44. See Boothe, 258 So. 3d at 459.
45. See Martin v. Heritage Manor South, 00-1023 (La. 4/31/01); 784 So. 2d
627, 637.
46. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1733(A) (2020).
47. See id. at art. 1732(A)(1).
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C. Code of Civil Procedure Article 1732 Amendment
One final consideration is whether there will be more JNOVs
granted because the jury threshold has been lowered. 48 Assuming
that there will be more jury trials under the amended Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 1732(A)(1), there will likely be at least
some uptick of motions for new trial and JNOV. If this is correct,
then courts may be more likely to grant JNOVs, even if they do not
unquestionably meet the Joseph standard. Because jury trials are
more time-consuming and expensive than bench trials, an influx of
trials that must be tried twice in front of a jury may strain the resources of courts. If this is the case, then judges may decide that they
can solve the problem by granting JNOVs on lesser evidence than
in the past and save the courts time and money and strain on the
resource of citizens serving on juries. It bears watching to see if this
comes to fruition in coming days.

48. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1732(A)(1) (2021). The jury threshold
is being lowered to $10,000 from $50,000, effective Jan. 1, 2021.

